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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Did the district court commit prejudicial error by excluding the 
former sworn testimony of Henry Jack Moore at trial? 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's 
ruling at pages 34-35 of Addendum 8, R. 2206, and page 2 of Addendum 14, R. 2213. 
The fact-findings underlying a decision to admit evidence are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, and the court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Widdison. 2000 UT App. 185, % 45,4 P.3d 100,101 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
B. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Aland's 
Motion to Reopen Discovery to take the deposition of Henry Jack Moore prior to trial? 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's 
ruling at pages 31-33 of Addendum 12, R. 2207, and pages 35-36 of Addendum 8, 
R.2206. 
A trial court's rulings regarding discovery are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62,1j 37, 29 P.3d 638, 648 (Utah 2001). 
C. Did the district court abuse its discretion by limiting the testimony of 
Ms. Aland's expert witnesses; specifically, by limiting the testimony of Joseph Fandey to 
matters which American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and/or American Water Heater 
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Co. had actual knowledge, and by prohibiting Chris Long from testifying as to the origin 
of the fire? 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced by the court's ruling 
at pages 29-33 of Addendum 8, R. 2206, and pages 13-14 of Addendum 21, R. 2208. 
A trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Pack v. W.A. Case, 2001 Utah App. 
232,1f 16, 30 P.3d 436, 440 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
D. Did the district court commit prejudicial error by requiring Ms. 
Alarid to elect a single theory of recovery to submit to the jury? 
This issue was raised below, as evidenced by Ms. Alarid's Complaint, 
Addendum 2, R. 1-13, and her requested Jury Instructions, Addendum 35, R. 2043-46. 
A trial court's refusal to give jury instructions is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. Star v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2, f 27, 40 P.3d 611, 620 (Utah 
2002). 
E. Did the district court commit prejudicial error by refusing to submit 
to the jury the issue of punitive damages? 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced by the district 
court's ruling at pages 17-18 of Addendum 25, R. 2211. 
2 i 
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A trial court's refusal to give requested jury instructions is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. Star v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, % 27, 40 P.3d 611, 620 (Utah 
2002). 
F. Did the district court commit prejudicial error by refusing to give a 
Summers v. Tice instruction to the jury on the issue of causation and by permitting 
defendants to separate as two separate defendants on the eve of trial? 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced by the district 
court's ruling at pages 16-17 of Addendum 27, R. 2210; Addendum 32, R. 2026, and Ms. 
Aland's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. Addendum 36, 
R. 2078-91. 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. State v. Kruger. 2000 UT 
App. 60,111, 6 P.3d 1116,1118 (Utah 2000). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statues, and rules are determinative 
of issues in this appeal: 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 reads: 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
3 
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knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R.Evid. 702. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 703 reads: 
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts. 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or 
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
Utah R.Evid. 703. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 (2)(C) and (D) reads: 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is . . . (C) a statement by a person 
authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the 
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, 
Utah R. Evid. 801(2X0 and (D). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(24) reads: 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness: 
4 
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(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered 
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will 
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. 
However, a statement may not be admitted under this 
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and 
the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
Utah R.Evid. 803(24). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5) and (b)(1) reads: 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" 
includes situations in which the declarant: 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the 
declarant's statement has been unable to procure the 
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
5 
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(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at 
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a 
deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the 
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a 
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive 
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination. 
Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5) and (b)(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Anna Marie Alarid against American 
Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water Heater Co. (referred to hereinafter 
collectively as "American")1 for damages she sustained when vapors from a flammable 
carpet adhesive were ignited by one of two side-by-side, gas-fired water heaters 
manufactured by American. (A copy of the Fire Investigator's Report of July 8, 1996 is 
attached hereto as Addendum 1.) 
On May 29, 1998, Ms. Alarid filed a Complaint against American, alleging 
negligence and strict liability based on defective design, and seeking punitive damages. 
(A copy of the Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum 2, R. 1-13.) 
1
 American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water Heater Co. 
are sister corporations owned by the same parent corporation, Southcorp, and represented 
jointly until the eve of trial. Addendum 31, R. 1766-69; Addendum 33, R. 136-37, 
183-84; Addendum 36, R. 2078-91. 
6 
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Following her failed efforts to depose Henry Jack Moore, a former senior 
vice president and safety engineer for American, Ms. Alarid sought to introduce Mr. 
Moore's former testimony from a similar case which had gone to trial in March 1999. (A 
copy of Ms. Aland's Notice of Deposition for Moore, as well as copies of correspondence 
between Ms. Alarid and American discussing Moore's proposed deposition, and trial 
transcript in Ellis v. American, are attached hereto as Addendum 3, R. 1468-71; 
Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 30.) American responded by filing a 
Motion in Limine on April 6, 2001, which the district court granted. (A copy of 
American's Mem. in Support of its Mot. in Limine, Ms. Aland's Opp'n to the Mot. in 
Limine and American's Reply, as well as the judge's order, are attached hereto as 
Addendum 5, R. 1333-40; Addendum 6, R. 1425-32, 1434, 1436; Addendum 7, R. 1459-
65; Addendum 9, R. at 1981-83.) 
On September 17, 2001, six weeks prior to trial, the district court ruled that 
Mr. Moore's former testimony was inadmissible. Ms. Alarid then made an oral motion 
requesting the opportunity to depose Mr. Moore. The district court denied this request 
because the motion was not properly before the court. (A copy of the trial transcript from 
September 17, 2001 is attached hereto as Addendum 8, R. 2206; Addendum 9, 
R. 1981-83.) 
On September 26, 2001, Ms. Alarid then moved to reopen discovery in 
order to take the deposition of Mr. Moore. (A copy of Ms. Aland's Mot. to Reopen 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Discovery, as well as American's Opp'n, is attached hereto as Addendum 10, R. 1816-20, 
1822, 1827, 1830-38, 1873-74; Addendum 11,R. 1877-88.) After hearing oral argument 
on the motion on October 12, 2001, the district court denied the motion because it was 
two weeks prior to trial. (A copy of the trial transcript from October 12, 2001 is attached 
hereto as Addendum 12, R. 2207.) 
The district court had requested Ms. Alarid provide cases regarding the 
admission of former testimony, and Ms. Alarid then supplied the court with a letter on 
October 19, 2001 discussing several relevant cases. (A copy of the letter referencing 
these cases is attached hereto as Addendum 13, R. 1979-80.) On October 24, 2001, the 
district court again heard oral argument regarding the use of Moore's former testimony. 
Without considering the applicability of Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), the district 
court concluded that this former testimony was inadmissible. (A copy of the trial 
transcript from October 24, 2001 is attached hereto as Addendum 14, R. 2213.) 
Ms. Alarid also sought to introduce expert testimony from Joseph Fandey, 
who worked for the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") and was a senior 
engineer and then branch manager over the safety of gas-fired water heaters. American 
filed another Motion in Limine to exclude this testimony, as well as a Motion in Limine 
to exclude certain exhibits which were central to this testimony. (A copy of American's 
Motions in Limine, as well as copies of Ms. Aland's Opp'n and American's Reply to 
each Motion, are attached hereto as Addendum 15, R. 1063-70; Addendum 16, 
8 
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R. 1344-48, 1350, 1352-56; Addendum 17, R. 1453-57; Addendum 18, R. 1294-1304; 
Addendum 19, R. 1376-80; Addendum 20, R. 1499-1501.) The district court excluded 
many significant exhibits relied upon by Mr. Fandey, and ruled that Mr. Fandey's 
testimony must be limited to the design and safety of American's product and to 
American's actual knowledge. Addendum 8 at 29-33, R. 2206. 
Ms. Alarid also sought to introduce at trial the expert testimony of Jeff 
Long, a trained fire investigator. The district court precluded Mr. Long from providing 
any opinions as to the cause of the fire because he had not been listed as a witness by Ms. 
Alarid, although his fire incident report had been provided to American prior to trial. (A 
copy of relevant pages of the trial transcript of October 31, 2001, is attached hereto as 
Addendum 21, R. 2208.) 
American also filed a Motion in Limine regarding Ms. Aland's request for 
punitive damages. (A copy of American's Mem. in Support of Mot. in Limine, and Ms. 
Aland's Opp'n, and American's Reply, is attached hereto as Addendum 22, R. 1157-65; 
Addendum 23, R. 1362-71; Addendum 24, R. 1446-51.) After American rested its case at 
trial, the district court ruled that Ms. Alarid could not submit the issue of punitive 
damages to the jury. (A copy of the trial transcript from November 7, 2001 is attached 
hereto as Addendum 25 at 17-18, R. 2211.) 
The district court ruled on the eve of trial that American could separate as 
two independent parties. (A copy of the Court's Minute Entry, dated October 29, 2001, is 
9 
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attached hereto as Addendum 32, R. 2026.) As a result, Ms. Alarid requested a Summers 
v. Tice instruction because the evidence demonstrated that the fire could have been 
caused by either of the two side-by-side water heaters manufactured by American. 
(Copies of the trial transcript from November 5 and 6, 2001 are attached hereto as 
Addendum 26, R. 2209; Addendum 27, R. 2210.) The district court denied this request. 
(Addendum 27 at 18-19, R. 2210.) 
Finally, the district court required Ms. Alarid to elect one theory of recovery 
to submit to the jury. See Addendum 2, R. 1-13; Addendum 35, R. 2043-46. 
On November 7,2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of American, 
finding that the water heaters were not defective. (A copy of the Judgment is attached 
hereto as Addendum 28.) Judgment was entered on November 27,2001, and on 
December 26, 2001, Ms. Alarid filed her Notice of Appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
Rudy Gomez was the manager and maintenance person for two four-plex 
apartment units located in Salt Lake City, Utah. On July 8, 1996, he was installing new 
outdoor carpet on one of the four-plex units, using a flammable carpet adhesive. While 
he was working on the second floor of a partially-covered outdoor stairwell, near a closet 
housing two side-by-side water heaters, the vapors from the carpet adhesive ignited. 
Mr. Gomez's daughter, Anna Marie Alarid, who was helping Mr. Gomez, was seriously 
burned in the resulting fire. 
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Ms. Alarid sued the manufacturers of the water heaters, American 
Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water Heater Co. ("American"), alleging 
negligence and strict liability based on defective design, and seeking punitive damages. 
Addendum 2, R. 1-13. 
In preparing her case, Ms. Alarid requested that American admit the 
genuineness of prior depositions which had been given by Henry Jack Moore, Ron 
Carbone, and James Berkely in an earlier case entitled Ellis v. American et al. In 
particular, Ms. Alarid intended to use Mr. Moore's former testimony to establish that 
American was aware of the dangers of flammable vapor fires caused by its floor-mounted 
gas-fired water heaters. American agreed to produce the depositions of Mr. Moore, Mr. 
Carbone, and Mr. Berkely, and Ms. Alarid was able to procure a transcript of Mr. 
Moore's trial testimony from the court reporter. (A copy of Mr. Moore's Deposition, as 
well as a copy of relevant portions of the trial transcript of his former trial testimony, is 
attached hereto as Addendum 29, R. 1358-59, 1438-43; Addendum 30.) 
Moore worked as Vice President of Engineering, responsible for safety 
design of American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Company 
until 1996. Addendum 30 at 4-6. Has testified on behalf of American, in cases where 
flammable vapors were ignited by water heaters. Addendum 30 at 6, 8. At trial and 
depositions, Moore was represented by American's lawyers. Addendum 30 at 11. His 
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testimony was at the heart of Ms. Aland's case. Specifically, he testified to the 
following. 
For the past 40 years, air for combustion of the water heaters are two inches 
off the ground because it is the most economical. Addendum 30 at 15-16. Moore knew 
from CPSC reports, Z21 subcommittees, that people were burned in fires. Addendum 30 
at 18. The standards for design were written by the committee Moore was on with other 
water heater manufacturers. Addendum 30 at 19. Moore knew other engineers criticized 
Defendants' product for taking air off the floor and other designs were available. 
Addendum 30 at 20. Moore has known since the 1970's that people were injured by their 
product. Addendum 30 at 22. American considered it to be a hazard of the product. 
Addendum 30 at 22. Moore was familiar with CALSPAN (1975), and Moore knew from 
1975 CALSPAN report that the number one hazard of water heaters was accidental 
ignition of flammable vapors. Addendum 30 at 23, 24. Moore read Gas Appliance 
Manufacturers Association ("GAMA") reports before 1990. Addendum 30 at 26. 
In 1976, American recognized the danger of ignition of flammable vapors 
by gas-fired water heaters. Addendum 30 at 27. The hierarchy of engineering requires 
to design out the hazard, then guard against the hazard and lastly, warn of the hazard. 
Addendum 30 at 28-29. In the 1970's, American knew elevation would reduce these 
accidents. Addendum 30 at 33-37. Elevating the water heater would guard against the 
hazard. Addendum 30 at 36. Moore was familiar with the National Fuel Gas handbook 
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of 1988, where it said elevating 18 inches will prevent fires. Addendum 30 at 38-39. 
American made 18-inch stands in the 1970's, which cost between $10-$12. Addendum 
30 at 40-41. Elevation was recommended where flammable vapors are used. Addendum 
30 at 42. Instead of guarding with elevation, American chose to warn with .35 labels. 
Addendum 30 at 43-44. 
American is in a better position than the consumer to know of the hazards. 
Addendum 30 at 44. American knew of National Fire Protection Association ("NFPA") 
(1980-1984). Addendum 30 at 44-45. American accepted as true that 300 bum victims 
each year from water heater ignition of flammable vapors occurred. Addendum 30 at 48. 
American made a conscious decision not to include this safety device with water heaters. 
Addendum 30 at 57. One reason not to include the safety device was cost. Addendum 30 
at 58. American knew when it made a conscious decision not to include the stand that 
persons would continue to be burned. Addendum 30 at 60. The water heater committee 
which Defendants served on along with other manufacturers could block any design 
changes to the water heaters. Addendum 30 at 64-66. American's water heaters are 
unsafe for the reasonably anticipated handling and use. Addendum 30 at 69. American 
examined Moore extensively for 69 pages. Other than the cheapest way, there is no 
reason to take air for combustion from the floor. Addendum 30 at 157. 
Because the above testimony was central to her case, on February 14,2000, 
Ms. Alarid served American with a Notice of Deposition for Moore, to be scheduled on 
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March 9, 2000. Addendum 3, R. 1468-71. Three days later, on February 17, 2000, 
American responded, 
[Pjlease be advised that, as you know Mr. Moore is a former 
employee. Accordingly, I do not have any ability to require 
his attendance at deposition. I am in the process of attempting 
to discern from Mr. Moore whether or not he will voluntarily 
present himself for deposition at a date and time mutually 
agreed. As soon as I have discerned Mr. Moore's position in 
that regard, I will so advise you. 
Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77. Later that same year, on October 9, 2000, Ms. Alarid 
again informed American of her desire to depose Mr. Moore. In the alternative, Ms. 
Alarid asked American to stipulate the use of Mr. Moore's former deposition and trial 
testimony in the EUis case. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77. 
This time, American responded by filing nine Motions in Limine, seeking 
to exclude the former testimony of Mr. Moore, Mr. Carbone, and Mr. Berkely. 
Addendum 5, R. 1333-40. On April 9, 2001, Ms. Alarid filed her opposition to 
American's motions, arguing that this testimony was crucial to Ms. Aland's claims and 
that no prejudice would result to American as a result of its use. Addendum 6, R. 1425, 
et. seq. 
Ms. Alarid then made several other attempts to take Mr. Moore's 
deposition. Although her initial request on September 17, 2001 to take Mr. Moore's 
deposition six weeks prior to trial was denied by the district court because the motion was 
not properly before the court, Addendum 8 at 35, R. 2206, Ms. Alarid tried again on 
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October 12,2001, two weeks prior to trial, this time having filed a Motion to Reopen 
Discovery. Addendum 12 at 31-33, R. 2207. 
In the meantime, Ms. Alarid learned that Mr. Moore would be giving a 
deposition in another case against American, Fuimer v. Craftsmaster Water Heater Co., 
on October 11, 2001, and that he would be in his/American's attorney's office on 
October 10 for preparation. Ms. Alarid requested that American allow her the 
opportunity to take Mr. Moore's deposition near this same time, but American refiised. 
Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77. Mr. Moore had always voluntarily appeared for 
depositions when requested by American, was on American's payroll for giving 
testimony, and was represented by American's counsel. Addendum 12 at 12, R. 2207; 
Addendum 10, Ex. D at 1-3, 38-43, R. 1830-38, and Ex. F, R. 1873-76. 
Ruling on the Admission of Mr, Moore's Former Testimony 
When the district court first heard oral arguments on September 17, 2001, 
on the issue of the admissibility of Mr. Moore's former deposition and trial testimony, it 
ruled that the former testimony was inadmissible. Addendum 8 at 38-39, R. 2206; 
Addendum 9, R. 1981. 
On October 12, 2001, the district court revisited this issue. Ms. Alarid 
specifically argued that the former testimony should be admissible under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 804. Addendum 12 at 2-3, R. 2207. Instead, the district court simply stated 
that "I don't know anything about the Ellis case" and that "every trial is a different 
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event," and ruled that the former testimony was inadmissible. Addendum 12 at 10, 
R. 2207. After the court requested Ms. Alarid submit cases regarding the admission of 
former testimony, see Addendum 12 at 9, R. 2207, and Ms. Alarid sent a letter discussing 
several relevant cases, see Addendum 13, R. 1979-80, the district court again heard oral 
arguments on this issue on October 24, 2001. 
This time, although the district court concluded that Mr. Moore met the 
definition of "unavailable," Addendum 14 at 2, R. 2213, the court nevertheless expressed 
concern whether the testimony given in the former trial would have been the same under 
these circumstances, and concluded that the former testimony was inadmissible. 
Ruling on Motion to Reopen Discovery 
When the district court ruled that Mr. Moore's former testimony would be 
inadmissible, Ms. Alarid moved to reopen discovery in order to take Mr. Moore's 
deposition. On October 12, 2001, the district court heard oral argument on Ms. Alarid's 
motion. Ms. Alarid established that American did in fact control Mr. Moore's voluntary 
attendance at depositions, and that American actually prepared Mr. Moore, paid him to 
attend depositions, and provided him with an attorney in other cases filed against 
American. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 12 at 3-5, R. 2207; 
Addendum 29 at 26, R. 1358; Addendum 10, R. 1816-20, 1822, 1827, 1830-38, 1873-74. 
The district court denied Ms. Alarid's motion, however, finding that 
although there might not be any prejudice to American if Mr. Moore's deposition were 
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taken, it was simply too close to trial. Addendum 12 at 32-33, R. 2207. The district court 
concluded by stating, "[I]f I've made errors, they're clearly prejudicial to you. I mean, I 
would concede that in a heartbeat.... I mean, it seems to me that if I've made an error 
it's clearly prejudicial so you know, no, I'm not - 1 mean, you wouldn't offend me at all 
if you appeal to whoever there is to appeal to." Addendum 12 at 39, R. 2207. 
Ruling on the Exclusion And/or Limitations 
on Expert Testimony by Joseph Fandev 
American filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude the expert testimony 
of Joseph Fandey. See Addendum 15, R. 1063-70. The district court ruled that Mr. 
Fandey's testimony must be limited to the design and safety of American's water heaters. 
Although he worked for the CPSC and had been a senior engineer and then branch 
manager over the safety of gas-fired water heaters, Mr. Fandey was not allowed to testify 
regarding the history of the water heater industry as a whole, nor was he allowed to 
discuss governmental meetings which American attended. Mr. Fandey was also 
prohibited from referring to Mr. Moore's former trial testimony. Addendum 8 at 30-32, 
38, R. 2206. 
When he testified on October 31, 2001, Mr. Fandey testified that 
American's representative, Mr. Moore, had been present at a sub-committee meeting on 
standards for gas-fired water heaters when a presentation had been made regarding the 
dangers of water heaters with low pilots, the number of incidents that had occurred thus 
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far, and possible solutions to the problem. Addendum 21 at 100-01, R. 2208. The district 
court ruled that evidence of this presentation, as well as several other key exhibits, were 
hearsay and thus inadmissible. Addendum 21 at 114-15, 118-19, 124, 156-58, 164-66, 
R.2208. 
Ruling on the Exclusion And/or Limitations 
on Expert Testimony by Jeff Long 
American also protested the expert testimony of the fire investigator, Jeff 
Long. Although Mr. Long had prepared the fire incident report related to Ms. Alarid's 
accident, his name did not appear on the report, and Ms. Alarid was not aware that he had 
prepared the report until she subpoenaed the listed author of the report who informed her 
of Mr. Long's involvement. Addendum 21 at 6-7, R. 2208. Although American had been 
provided with a copy of the fire incident report and attached narrative log prior to trial, 
the district court ruled that because Mr. Long had not been included on the witness list, he 
could not testify about his opinions regarding the origin of the fire. Addendum 21 at 
12-14, 37-38, 41-42, 44-45, R. 2208. 
Ruling That the Issue of Punitive Damages 
Could Not Be Submitted to the Jury 
On November 7, 2001, the district court ruled that the issue of punitive 
damages could not be submitted to the jury. In reaching this conclusion, the district court 
cited Behrens and found that there was not a high degree of probability that water heaters 
would result in substantial harm to someone, and that American's conduct was not 
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unreasonable or an extreme departure from ordinary care because American complied 
with the relevant statutes. Addendum 25 at 13-14, 17-18, R. 2211. 
Ruling That a Summers v. Tice Instruction on Causation 
Could Not Be Submitted to the Jury 
In the trial proceedings on November 5 and 6, 2001, Ms. Alarid argued that 
because American was not treated as two separate defendants until the first day of trial, 
and because the two companies were involved in the production of identical products, 
located side-by-side, with essentially the same design, the same components, the same 
materials, and the same defect, either of which could have ignited the flammable vapors, 
the jury should be given a Summers v. Tice instruction on causation. Addendum 27 at 9-
11, R. 2210. The district court concluded, however, that "Summers v. Tice doesn't 
belong in this case at all," Addendum 27 at 16, R. 2210, and refused to give the 
instruction to the jury. 
Ruling Requiring Ms. Alarid to Select 
Only One Theory of Liability to Submit to the Jury 
Following both sides resting, but before the matter was submitted to the 
jury, the Court required Ms. Alarid to choose one theory of liability to submit to the jury 
over her objections. She had pled negligence and strict liability in her Complaint and had 
proposed instructions on both theories. She ultimately chose strict liability and was 
forced to abandon her negligence cause of action. Addendum 2, R. 1-13; Addendum 35, 
R. 2043-46. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court committed prejudicial error in several ways in this case -
by ruling that the former testimony of Henry Jack Moore was inadmissible, by denying 
Ms. Aland's Motion to Reopen Discovery in order to take the deposition of Mr. Moore, 
by limiting and/or excluding expert testimony of Fandey and Long, and by refusing to 
allow Ms. Alarid to submit punitive damages and her theories of negligence and strict 
liability to the jury. 
First, the district court committed prejudicial error by ruling that the former 
testimony of Mr. Moore was inadmissible. Mr. Moore was unavailable at the time of 
trial. The testimony of Mr. Moore at the prior Ellis trial was the heart of Ms. Aland's 
case, and all of the requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 804 regarding the 
admissibility of former testimony were satisfied. American conducted a thorough 
examination of Mr. Moore at the former trial, and the Ellis case was similar to Ms. 
Aland's case involving tragic burns to a victim when flammable vapors were ignited by 
American's gas-fired water heater like the present case. Moreover, American had notice 
of Ms. Aland's intended use of Mr. Moore's former testimony, and Ms. Alarid provided 
American a copy of the Ellis trial transcript long before trial. The district court, however, 
did not examine the similarity between the two cases, American's opportunity and motive 
to examine the witness, or the content of the testimony. By failing to properly consider 
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whether Rule 804 regarding former testimony applied, the district court committed 
prejudicial error. 
Second, the district court abused its discretion by denying Ms. Aland's 
Motion to Reopen Discovery in order to take the deposition of Mr. Moore. Ms. Alarid 
requested the opportunity to take Mr. Moore's deposition six weeks prior to trial. Since 
the request was not properly before the Court, the request was denied. Ms. Alarid was 
able to put the request before the Court on October 12, 2001, 19 days before trial, and the 
Court denied the request as being made too close to the trial. 
Third, the district court abused its discretion by excluding and/or limiting 
certain expert testimony of Joseph Fandey and Jeff Long. Although he worked for the 
CPSC and had been a senior engineer and branch manager over the safety of gas-fired 
water heaters, Mr. Fandey was not permitted to testify about the history of the water 
heater industry. Specifically, he was not permitted to testify regarding the fact that water 
heaters (all made similarly from manufacturer to manufacturer) were known to cause fires 
because the pilot light was not elevated to a height of 18 inches, even though an 18-inch 
stand was available and American knew long ago of the danger but sought to warn 
against the danger rather than reduce the danger. Moreover, Mr. Fandey relied upon 
exhibits which were excluded in violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 703. 
Similarly, although he had written the fire incident report for Ms. Aland's 
injury, fire investigator Jeff Long was not permitted to testify regarding the cause of the 
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fire since he had never been identified as a witness. The fire incident report and narrative 
(not bearing the name of Jeff Long as preparer), however, had been provided long before 
trial to American and no deposition of any fire investigator had ever been taken. 
American did not show that any prejudice would result if Jeff long would have been 
permitted to testify about the cause of the fire. The district court committed abuse of 
discretion by improperly limiting the testimony of these experts. 
Finally, the district court committed prejudicial error by refusing to allow 
Ms. Alarid to submit certain issues to the jury. Specifically, the district court improperly 
required Ms. Alarid to elect one theory of recovery to submit to the jury, refused to 
submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury, and refused to give a Summers v. Tice 
causation instruction to the jury. Ms. Alarid should have been allowed to submit both her 
negligence and strict liability claims to the jury because there was ample evidence to 
support both theories. The issue of punitive damages also should have been submitted to 
the jury because of the large numbers of people injured annually by water heater fires and 
the mere fact that American's water heaters complied with the Federal Standards is not a 
bar to punitive damages. Where American knowingly and willfully continued to sell 
hazardous water heaters to the public in willful and reckless disregard for safety of the 
public, punitive damages are proper. A Summers v. Tice instruction on causation should 
also have been submitted to the jury because the evidence pointed to either of the two 
water heaters as the cause of the fire, and because American was not treated as two 
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separate defendants until the first day of trial. The district court committed prejudicial 
error by permitting American to separate and by not submitting these crucial issues to the 
jury. 
For all of these reasons, the decisions of the district court should be 
reversed, the jury verdict should be vacated, and the case should be remanded for a new 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING THAT MOORE'S FORMER 
TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE CONSTITUTES 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR UNDER THE CORRECTNESS STANDARD 
Certain kinds of hearsay are considered to have special guarantees of 
trustworthiness and are recognized exceptions to the hearsay exclusion. One of the most 
important of these exceptions to the hearsay rule is the former testimony rule as outlined 
in Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Under this rule, the testimony of a now unavailable witness given at another 
hearing or in a deposition taken in accordance with law is admissible in a subsequent trial 
as long as there is a sufficient similarity of parties and issues so that the opportunity to 
develop testimony or cross-examine at the prior hearing was meaningful. Utah R. Evid. 
804(a)(5); (b)(1). Here, all of the requirements of Rule 804 are satisfied. 
First, Mr. Moore was unavailable. A declarant is unavailable if: (1) he is 
exempted from testifying by court ruling on the ground of privilege; (2) he persists, 
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despite a court order, in refusing to testify concerning the statement; (3) he testifies to 
lack of memory of the subject matter of the statement; (4) he is unable to be present or 
testify because of death or physical or mental illness; or (5) he is absent (beyond the reach 
of the trial court's subpoena) and the statement's proponent has been unable to procure 
his attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means. 
Here, Mr. Moore was unavailable for trial. Addendum 8 at 25, R. 2206. 
American agreed with the district court that declarant Moore lives outside the State and 
was therefore unavailable at the time of trial. Addendum 8 at 25, 33, R. 2206; 
Addendum 14 at 2, R. 2213. "We hold that absence of the deponent at the time the 
deposition is offered is sufficient to allow the deposition into evidence, and the party 
offering the deposition need not proffer an excuse for the failure of the deponent to 
appear." Brown v. Prvor. 954 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Wyo. 1998). 
Second, the parties are identical. This requirement does not mean that 
parties on both sides of the controversies must be identical; it only requires that the party 
against whom the testimony is offered must have been a party, or in privity with a party, 
in the former action. This requirement is intended merely to ensure that the party against 
whom the testimony is offered had an adequate opportunity and motive to cross-examine 
the witness. 
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Here, Mr. Moore was the former Vice President of Safety Engineering for 
American when he gave deposition and trial testimony in the Ellis case against these 
defendants. Addendum 30 at 4-5. 
Third, the subject matter is the same. Obviously, "the cause of action" in 
both proceedings need not be identical; it is enough if the "subject matter" of the 
testimony is the same. In other words, the party against whom the testimony is offered 
must have had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the declarant's testimony at 
the prior hearing. Again, the sole purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the party 
against whom the transcript is offered had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the 
unavailable witness on the relevant issue. 
Here, although the Rule implicitly requires the court to compare the former 
and present case to determine whether they are substantially similar giving American an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony. This was never undertaken by 
the court. See Addendum 12 at 10, R. 2207 (stating that the Court did not "know 
anything about the Ellis case" and that "every trial is a different event"). The Ellis case 
was substantially similar to our case. Both cases involved nearly identical water heaters 
manufactured by American, where flammable vapors were ignited by pilot lights located 
near the floor causing bum injures. Ms. Alarid advised the court that Ellis was 
substantially similar to the present case and that American did have a similar motive and 
opportunity to develop Moore's prior testimony. See Addendum 8 at 27, R. 2206. 
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Furthermore, Mr. Moore was actually extensively examined at trial by 
American. See Addendum 30 at 75-144. In fact, American performed a thorough cross-
examination of Moore during the Ellis trial. See Addendum 30 at 75-144. Moore had 
also been prepared by American for five to six hours prior to testifying at trial. 
Addendum 29, R. 1358-59, 1438-43. 
Fourth, the party against whom the former testimony is offered had the 
opportunity to develop the testimony at the prior proceeding by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination of the declarant. Here, as discussed above, American not only had the 
motivation and opportunity but did in fact develop Mr. Moore's testimony in the prior 
proceeding. 
Finally, the former testimony was given under oath or sworn affirmation, 
and the Moore deposition and trial transcripts were taken in compliance with law. 
All of the requirements of Rule 804 are clearly satisfied here, and the 
district court erred when it ruled that Mr. Moore's former testimony was inadmissible. 
Ms. Alarid sought to introduce the former generic, non case specific, testimony of Moore 
to demonstrate what American knew about the dangers of its water heaters, and cited 
Foster v. Koeler for the proposition that former testimony of Defendant's expert taken in 
another lawsuit is admissible in a subsequent trial. Foster v. Koeler, 779 P.2d 272, 276 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989). The Foster court concluded that the deposition fits within the 
exception to the hearsay rule since the declarant was unavailable, the deposition had been 
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taken in compliance with the law, and the prior proceeding had been similar in nature. Id. 
at 276. 
The court in Foster went on to explain that even though Plaintiff was not a 
"predecessor in interest" at the time of the prior deposition, and the time frame of the 
incidents were different, and defendant admitted that counsel in the prior action had no 
similar motive to fully develop the testimony, the plaintiff did have a similar opportunity 
to develop the testimony. IdL at 276-77. The court found that "[n]othing in the record 
suggests that his (deponents) conclusion would have been different if counsel had been 
examining him vigorously." Id at 277. 
There is nothing in the record here to suggest that what Mr. Moore said he 
knew at the time of the Ellis trial would have been any different at our trial. Furthermore, 
American had the ability to bring Mr. Moore to our trial to testify. Addendum 10 at 
Ex. D at 1-3, 38-43, R. 1830-38 and Ex. F, R. 1873-76. Because Mr. Moore was 
unavailable at the time of trial, the trial judge was required by Utah Rule of Evidence 804 
to determine whether the Ellis case was similar to our case such that American had a 
similar motive and opportunity to examine Mr. Moore. The court's failure to make such 
an examination is error. 
The issue of whether American was similarly motivated to examine Mr. 
Moore is moot since Mr. Moore was in fact vigorously examined by American at the time 
he testified. The substance of Moore's trial testimony in Ellis was so generic as to the 
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knowledge American had that it was unlikely to be different at our trial. Arguably 
Moore's recollection of knowledge he gained while employed as Vice President of safety 
engineering by American was fresher at the time of the Ellis trial than it would have been 
in our case. Addendum 12 at 7, R. 2207. 
The Moore trial testimony falls squarely within the purposes of Rule 804 
and his trial transcript should have been admitted as evidence in our trial. The district 
court found that Moore's testimony was highly relevant and probative and if the court 
erred it certainly was prejudicial error. The ruling of the district court should be reversed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF MS- ALARID'S MOTION 
TO REOPEN DISCOVERY TO TAKE MOORE'S DEPOSITION 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
In Andrew v. Bradshaw the court ordered a telephonic deposition two 
weeks before trial where counsel had claimed not to receive a witness and exhibit list. 
Andrews v. Bradshaw, 895 P.2d 973, 974 (Alaska 1995). The deposition was ultimately 
not taken due to the failure of the attorneys to cooperate. Id at 976. "By precluding 
Andrews from testifying, the trial court imposed severe sanctions for the unexcused 
inaction of plaintiff s counsel." Id. at 977. "In the process, however, the court allowed 
Bradshaw to reap a windfall benefit from his own counsel's equally unjustified-and 
evidently-tactical inaction." Id at 977. The discovery process is meant to promote the 
search for truth, not to reward gamesmanship." Id 
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Here, American was aware of the former testimony of their employee Mr. 
Moore given at the trial of Ellis to which they were party defendants. Ms. Alarid put 
American on notice of her intentions to use the former testimony of Moore and ultimately 
listed Moore on her witness list and the deposition and trial transcript of Moore and the 
depositions of Carbone and Berkely on her Exhibit list. (A copy of Ms. Alarid's Exhibit 
List is attached hereto as Addendum 34, R. 2006-25.) The trial court did not conclusively 
find that there would be any prejudice to American if Moore's deposition were taken after 
the discovery cut-off but prior to trial. Addendum 8 at 10-12, R. 2206. Nonetheless, the 
court would not permit Ms. Alarid to take the deposition of Moore because the discovery 
cut-off had passed. Addendum 12 at 31-33, R. 2207. Ms. Aland's request to take 
Moore's deposition was made immediately following the court's ruling that his former 
testimony was inadmissible. Addendum 8 at 28, R. 2206, 2212; Addendum 12 at 16-17, 
35-37, R. 2207. 
In the present case, Ms. Alarid had Noticed the deposition of Moore on 
February 14, 2000. Addendum 3, R. 1468-71. American instructed Ms. Alarid not to 
contact Moore directly. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77. American advised that they 
would try to get Moore to appear for deposition voluntarily. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 
1476-77. Ms. Alarid learned, following the September 17, 2001 hearing, that American 
provided Mr. Moore's attorneys on cases where American were named parties, 
Addendum 10 at Ex. D at 38, R. 1833, and Ex. F, R. 1873-76, and that Moore was on 
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American's payroll for giving deposition testimony, Addendum 10 at Ex. D at 41-42, 
R. 1836-37; and that Moore always made himself available for depositions when 
requested to do so by American, Addendum 29 at 26, R. 1358. Ms. Alarid also learned 
after the September 17, 2001 hearing that Moore would be present at American's office 
on October 10, 2001 to prepare five to six hours for his deposition in another matter on 
October 11, 2001. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 29 at 24, R. 1358. 
Ms. Alarid attempted to schedule the Moore deposition immediately before or following 
that deposition. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 1476-77; Addendum 10 at Ex. D, R. 1830-38, 
andEx.F,R. 1873-76. 
American represented to the district court that Moore would have 
voluntarily appeared for deposition if given sufficient notice. Addendum 4, R. 1473-74, 
1476-77. American should not be rewarded for its gamesmanship. American's attorney 
sent a letter to the opposing counsel in Nolan regarding a deposition of Mr. Moore. 
Addendum 10 at Ex. F, R. 1873-74. American stated that they had the "authority to 
voluntarily produce him [Mr. Moore] for deposition in this case without the necessity of 
service of a deposition subpoena," and then cautioned that service of process 4Cwould be 
harrasive [sic]." Addendum 10 at Ex. F, R. 1873-74. They were given over one and one-
half years of notice to present Moore for deposition. American always had the ability to 
control Moore and obtain his cooperation to appear at deposition. Addendum 10 at 
Ex. D, R. 1830-38 and Ex. F, R. 1873-74; Addendum 29 at 26 R. 1358. Furthermore, 
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Moore, who was on the payroll of American was an employee, and was therefore required 
to appear at deposition. Addendum 10 at Ex. D at 41-42, R. 1836-37. This would make 
Moore's testimony that of a party-opponent under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(2)(C) and 
(D). Addendum 10 at Ex. D, R. 1830-38, and Ex. F, R. 1873-76; Addendum 12 at 4-5, 
R.2207. 
On October 31, 2001, the district court ruled that Mr. Moore's statements 
while employed by American were statements by a party-opponent and were therefore 
admissible. Addendum 21 at 129-30, R. 2208. 
In the present case, American made no showing of prejudice were Moore's 
deposition to have been taken. Addendum 12 at 32, R. 2207. The testimony of Moore 
was highly relevant, probative and material to the issues of product defect and 
American's knowledge of same. Addendum 12 at 31-32, 39, R. 2207. Without this 
evidence the jury did not find that a defect in the product existed. Addendum 28. The 
taking of Moore's deposition when requested six weeks before trial on the heels of the 
court's ruling excluding his former testimony and again two weeks before trial to simply 
read his former testimony into a new deposition was certainly reasonable, and would have 
caused no prejudice to American, who knew of the contents of the testimony long before 
the discovery cut-off. In view of the critical nature of the testimony, the decision of the 
district court should be reversed. 
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IH. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING AND/OR LIMITING THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES JOSEPH FANDEY AND JEFF LONG 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
EXCLUDING CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT EXHIBITS RELIED 
UPON BY EXPERT WITNESS JOSEPH FANDEY AND BY 
LIMITING HIS TESTIMONY 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 703 states, 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or 
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 703. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 702 further states, "If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Utah 
Rules of Evidence 702. 
It has often been held that "[ojnce the expert is qualified by the court, the 
witness may base his opinion on reports, writings or observations not in evidence which 
were made or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in that particular field. The opposing party may challenge the suitability or 
reliability of such materials on cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight 
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to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 
682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984) (citing State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982)). 
An expert's opinion may be based upon hearsay statements contained in a 
report where the source of the information is "trustworthy, reliable, and of necessity." 
Lvnn v. Helitec Corp., 698 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). "Trustworthiness 
comes from external indicia of reliability, such as a routine and customary business 
record or preparation of a report by a disinterested, expert third party." Id The Lynn 
court pointed out that the "[f]acts or data, not admitted or inadmissible, on which experts 
may rely may be revealed to the trier of fact not as substantive evidence but to show the 
basis of the expert's opinion." Id In the present case, Joseph Fandey and Jeff Long were 
qualified as experts. The Court would not permit Mr. Fandey to testify about the data he 
relied upon in forming his opinions. Addendum 8 at 29-32, R. 2206; Addendum 9, 
R. 1981-83; Addendum 21 at 13, R. 2208. 
Mr. Fandey had personal knowledge of American's labeling participation, 
attendance at meetings and participation at GAMA and knowledge of GAMA minutes of 
meetings and ANSI committee meetings including those where American were present. 
Addendum 21 at 62, R. 2208. Expert Fandey reviewed memorandum of Moore and the 
McFarland-A.D. Little study, and he knew Moore in context with his work with CPSC 
and personally observed Moore at committee meetings on behalf of American. 
Addendum 21 at 65, 67, R. 2208. Mr. Fandey worked at CPSC as Senior Engineer and 
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then Branch Chief over the safety of gas water heaters. Addendum 21 at 84-87, R. 2208. 
Mr. Fandey and Moore were present at the water heater sub-committee meeting on 
November 13 where Ed Downing made a presentation and provided Moore with a report. 
Addendum 21 at 100, 101, 104, 118, R. 2208. The Court ruled that the report was 
inadmissible hearsay, and that the NFPA study was inadmissible hearsay. Addendum 21 
at 104, 114, 115, 118, R. 2208. Documents provided by Downing (reports, photos) were 
ruled inadmissible hearsay based on Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6) despite Ms. Aland's 
argument that they were not used to prove the truth of the matter but just to show 
American's notice. Addendum 21 at 119, R. 2208. A video demonstration demonstrating 
a feasible fix to the problem was ruled inadmissible hearsay, Addendum 21 at 124, R. 
2208, as was the CALSPAN Report finding that it would be used to show the truth of the 
matter asserted and was not a government publication. Addendum 21 at 156, 158, 159, R. 
2208. The Gas Heating System Report of 1982 was ruled inadmissible. Addendum 21 at 
164-66, R. 2208. An offer of proof made regarding all the evidence ruled inadmissible. 
Addendum 21 at 189, R. 2208. 
Other documents were reviewed by Ms. Aland's experts Joseph Fandey and 
John Hoffman whom relied upon these documents in forming the basis for their opinions 
in this case. Addendum 19, R. 1376 and Utah R. Evid. 703. These reports were reliable, 
trustworthy, prepared by a third party disinterested in this lawsuit and of the type 
routinely relied upon by experts in the field and as such Ms. Aland's experts should have 
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been permitted to testify about this data at trial. Ms. Alarid was substantially prejudiced 
by the exclusion of this evidence at trial. The outcome of the case would have likely been 
in favor of the Ms. Alarid if the jury would have heard a discussion of this evidence by 
the experts. 
Furthermore, this evidence falls under the exceptions to the hearsay 
Rule 803, public records and business exception. It also falls under Rule 803(24), in that 
it is generally trustworthy. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY LIMITING THE TESTIMONY OF FIRE INVESTIGATOR 
JEFF LONG 
The fire incident report was provided to American and was listed in Ms. 
Alarid's Exhibit List long before trial, see Addendum 34, R. 2006-25; Addendum 21 at 6, 
7, 9, 10, R. 2208, and referred to in depositions taken years before trial and listed in 
Expert Hoffman's report November 16, 1999. American also saw the narrative report 
attached thereto. Addendum 21 at 9-10, R. 2208. American never took the depositions of 
any persons listed as those preparing the Fire Incident Report. Long's name did not 
appear on the report and Ms. Alarid did not learn that Jeff Long prepared the report until 
the subpoena was served on the individual whose name did appear on the report. 
Addendum 21 at 7-10, R. 2208. 
The trial judge ruled that Long, although a fire origin expert, could not 
testify about his conclusions of the cause and origin of the fire and therefore excised out 
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all the conclusions stated in the report. Addendum 21 at 12-14, 21-22, R. 2208. Nor was 
Long permitted to testify about the significance of the photos, nor about his conclusions 
about which water heater had the most damage nor as to the greatest area of fire damage 
on the landing. Addendum 21 at 37-38, 41-42, 44-45, R. 2208. 
The judge's ruling was based upon the fact that Ms. Alarid did not name 
Jeff Long as a witness. American did not make a specific showing of how they would 
have been prejudiced if Jeff Long was permitted to testify in accordance with the contents 
of the report which American had long before trial, although the Court concluded that 
prejudice would exist because they weren't able to question him before trial, Addendum 
21 at 13, R. 2208, even though no deposition was ever taken of the fire investigators 
named on the report. The Washington Court of Appeals held in a product liability case 
where a witness was not disclosed in accordance with a pretrial order that "[i]t is only 
where willful noncompliance substantially prejudices the opponent's ability to prepare for 
trial that the exclusion of evidence is within the trial court's discretion." Foster v. 
Fibreboard Corp. (In re Estate of Foster). 779 P.2d 272, 274 (Wash. 1989) (citing 
Hampson v. Ramer. 737 P.2d 298 (Wash. 1987)). 
The judge's ruling substantially prejudiced Ms. Aland's likelihood of 
prevailing at trial. 
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT REQUIRED MS. ALARID TO ELECT A SINGLE 
THEORY OF RECOVERY TO PRESENT TO THE JURY 
Ms. Alarid alleged multiple causes of action against American in her 
complaint. Addendum 2, R. 1-13. The district court, at the close of Ms. Alarid's and 
American's case, required Ms. Alarid to elect a single theory of liability to submit to the 
jury over Plaintiff?Appellant's objection. Addendum 2, R. 1-13; Addendum 35, 
R. 2043-46. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that "where more than one cause of action is 
submitted to the jury, if one of the causes of action is error free, is supported by 
substantial evidence and provides an appropriate basis for the general verdict, we will 
affirm that verdict." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984) 
(citing Leigh Furniture & Carpet v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Utah 1982)). "The Utah 
Supreme Court had previously ruled that the doctrine of election of remedies 
"presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedie." Roval Resources Inc. v. Gibralter 
Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). The "[pjurpose is not to prevent 
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong." Id, (citing 
25 Am Jur. 2d, Election of Remedies, section 2). 
In this case, Ms. Alarid should have been permitted to present negligence 
and strict liability theories to the jury since both were supported by the evidence. 
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
NOT PERMITTING MS. ALARID'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM 
TO BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY 
The United States Supreme Court held that mere compliance with statutory 
regulations does not bar a finding of recklessness nor an award of punitive damages. 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 104 S. Ct. 615, 626 (U.S. 1985). "Industry standards are 
merely a minimal standard that may be considered but is not conclusive." Zacher v. The 
Budd Co.. 396 N.W.2d 122 (S.D. 1986); see also Restatement of Torts 2d § 288(c); 
Salmon v. Parke Davis and Co.. 520 F.2d 1359, 1366 (4th Cir. 1975); Raymond v. Riegel 
Textile Corp.. 484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973). Compliance with federal safety 
standards does not preclude an award of punitive damages as a matter of law. Dorsey v. 
Honda. 655 F.2d 650, 658 (5th Cir. 1981). When there are dangers of which the 
manufacturer is aware, meeting federal standards will not bar a finding of liability. 
Grundbere v. Upiohn Co.. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 199 n. 
"Compliance with industry standards does not constitute an absolute 
defense in a product liability action." Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.. 544 F.2d 442, 447 
(10* Cir. 1976). Punitive damages are appropriate for conduct which is willful and 
malicious or that manifests a knowing and reckless disregard toward the rights of others. 
Lake Phileas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.. 845 P.2d 951,959 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). "Manufacturers have a powerful hold over the means for discovering and 
correcting product hazards." Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.. 297 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn. 
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1980). "Through the processes of design, testing, inspection and collection of data on 
product safety performance in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive access to 
much of the information necessary for the effective control of dangers facing product 
consumers." Id. at 732, 733. Compliance with a federal standard does not preclude an 
award of punitive damages. Id at 734, 735. 
In our case, the evidence showed that gas-fired water heaters were injuring 
at least 300 people per year, year after year. Addendum 25 at 13-14, R. 2211. The 
50 million water heaters in use is a constant number. Over the years thousands of people 
have been injured by water heaters. (CALSPAN reports would also have shown many 
fires and property damage over and above actual injuries.) It was certain that people will 
be injured each year by gas-fired water heaters designed like American's product. The 
fact that American's water heaters met minimum federal standards is not a defense to 
punitive damages, where American knew of the dangers of their product and continued to 
market their product willfully with a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard of 
the safety of those coming in contact with their product. The court committed error by 
refusing to allow Ms. Alarid to submit the matter of punitive damages to the jury. 
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VI. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
NOT GIVING A SUMMERS v. TICE INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY 
ON THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
Where the evidence established that either of the two water heaters 
manufactured by American (jointly) could have caused the fire herein a Summers v. Tice 
instruction should have been given to the jury. Addendum 26 at 7, R. 2209; Addendum 
27 at 12, R. 2210. The two remaining defendants in the case at the time of trial were the 
two companies, and the fire was evidenced to be caused by either of the two water heaters 
manufactured by these companies. 
Up until the eve of trial they were represented jointly as one Defendant. 
Addendum 31, R. 1766-69; Addendum 32, R. 2026; Addendum 36, R. 2078-91. (A copy 
of the Order Pro Hac Vice is attached hereto as Addendum 33, R. 136-37, 183-84.) Ms. 
Alarid was ambushed by the Court's separating the two Defendants at trial, thus 
necessitating the Summers instruction request. 
In this situation as in Summers, where two or more persons are possibly the 
sole cause of a harm, the defendant has the burden of proving that the other person was 
the sole cause of the harm. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). In this case 
where the issue of actual cause is limited to the two water heaters, the application of 
Summers is appropriate. Additionally, where American is in reality one and the same 
company, it is unjust to allow American to escape liability by hiding behind that veil and 
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maintaining that Ms. Alarid can not say which of the two water heaters was the cause of 
the fire. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's refusal to admit the former trial testimony of Henry Jack 
Moore was prejudicial as noted by the court. The testimony demonstrated the dangers of 
the water heaters known by American and of the means of reducing or eliminating the 
dangers. 
Moore was actually extensively examined by American in Ellis. His 
testimony met all requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 804 for former testimony. 
American should not be rewarded gamesmanship in obstructing the taking of Moore's 
deposition. American controlled Moore-technically Moore was still an employee of 
American who paid him $150 an hour from portal to portal to testify at depositions at the 
time he testified in Fulmer and Ellis. As such, his former testimony is a party admission 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(2)(C) and (D). The Court should have at least allowed 
Ms. Alarid to take the deposition of Moore weeks before the trial (Moore was at 
American's counsel's office on October 11, 2001) and allowed Ms. Alarid to read the trial 
transcript of Moore into a deposition in the Alarid matter. 
The Court erred by limiting of testimony and exhibits relied upon by the 
experts in forming the basis of their opinions severely prejudiced Ms. Alarid. 
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Plaintiff was entitled to present negligence and strict liability theories to the 
jury. 
Punitive damages were appropriate where American knew of the dangers of 
its water heater and continued to sell. Meeting the Federal Standards is not a bar to 
punitive damages. Where a person a day for the past 20 years is severely burned in gas-
fired water heater fires, there is a substantial likelihood of continued harm to the public. 
Where American ambushed Alarid on the eve of trial by separating into two 
separate defendants, this error necessitated a Summers instruction-where cause of the fire 
is limited to the two water heaters and at issue. 
Relief sought is reversal of the trial courts orders and judgment by the jury 
and remand for a new trial with instructions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20TH day of June, 2002. 
MITCHEL ZAGER ~ / J A 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appelant 
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I hereby certify that on this 20th day of June, 2002,1 caused to be mailed, 
through the U.S. mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellate Brief to the 
following: 
John R. Lund 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
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Attorneys for Appellee American Water Heater Co. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT 
Investigations Division 
Investigation Report Narrative 
Details: 
On July 8, 1996 at approximately 1158 hours I responded to a fire at 936 South Lincoln Street m 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Upon our arrival we met with one of the on scene fire captains who 
informed us that two individuals had been injured by the fire and had been transported via 
ambulance to the University of Utah Medical Center. 
Investigator Long assigned me to respond to the University Medical Center and attempt to 
interview each of the injured parties regarding what had happened at the fire. I arrived at the 
hospital at approximately 1220 hours an went to the emergency room. The emergency room staff 
was working on two of the fire victims Ms. Anna Maria Alared, 03-17-66, and her father Mr. 
Rudolph Gomez, 10-14-44. 
As I was waiting for the medical personnel to finish so that I could interview Gomez and Alared I 
saw Captain Devin Villa of the Salt Lake City Fire Department enter the emergency room 
escorted by two ambulance personnel. Tasked Villa if he had been at the fire on Lincoln Street 
and he told me that he had. I then asked Villa if he could tell me what he saw when he arrived. 
Villa told mc that he and his crew were in the area returning from another assignment when they 
heard the call go out of a structure fire at 936 South Lincoln Street. He and his crew responded 
from "just around the corner''. When they arrived they"saw smoke and flames coming from and 
alcove at the entry way to the apartments. They "also saw two victims of the fire King on the 
ground. One female and one male victim. After seeing that these victims were being taken care of 
they began rescue and suppression operations. At one point during these activities, Villas slipped 
and fell in the stairwell grabbing the stairway rail. This caused the burn to his hand. 
At approximately 1230 hours I met with Ms. Avelina Gomez, 03-04-45, the wife of Rudolph 
Gomez. She told me that she had been at the apartments and was in her apartment when she 
heard her husband yelling. She ran over to see her husband pulling her daughter Anna Maria 
down the stairs as she was on fire. Gomez told mc she could see that her daughters face, arms 
and feet were on fire. Gomez ran over to her daughter and husband who were then on the ground 
and attempted to put out the fire on her daughter with her own hands. Ms. Gomez was treated 
and released from the University Medical Center for burns to her hands. 
At approximately 1250 hours I met with Mr. Rudolph Gomez who was being treated by 
emergency room starf at the University Medical Center Gomez told me the following. He is the 
manager of the apartment complex. He, his daughter and the owner of the apartments were 
installing outdoor carpet on che stairwells and landings of the apartments using adhesive. 
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Investigation Report Narrative. 
His daughter was standing at the top of the stairwell in the-landing area while he was laying the 
carpet about three quarters of the way up the
 vstairwell. He heard a sound and iooked up to sec fire 
coming from under the door to the left at the top of the. stairwell. The next thing he knew there 
was fire coming out from under the door onto the landing area. He could not believe how fast it 
spread. He yelled to his daughter Anna Maria to run down the stairs. She did not move and told < 
him that she was afraid. He ran up to her a grabbed ber. By this time she had caught fire. He 
grabbed her and pulled her toward him causing them both to fall down the stairs. They landed at 
the bottom of the stairs on the ground. He could see that his daughter was on fire so he attempted 
to put the fire out with his hands. Gomez told me that he was aware that the adhesive was 
flammable but he was sure that no one was-smoking. He-to Id me that the doors at the top of the 
stairwell enter into small rooms where tha water heater and heaters are located. He told me that 
he did not know the name of the adhesive, but he did know that it was carpet adhesive. 
At approximately 1330 hours 1 returned to the scene and met with the owner of the apartments 
Mr. Kent Nelson, who told me the following. He had bought the materials for he and Mr. Gomez 
to carpet some of the stair wells and landings. Nelson told me that he had purchased a carpet 
adhesive by the name of Henry's Outdoor Carpet Adhesive. Nelson told me that he was away 
from the area being working at the time the'fire first started, but he ran over after hearing some of 
the commotion in time to see Gomez and Alared failing onto the ground. He thought he could see 
them on fire. 
End of report. 
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone (801)964-6100 
% . 
•'/> 
Sji: 
i -
it 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
• - < > / • • 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFAC-
TURING, INC., a California 
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER HEATER 
CO., a Nevada Corporation, INSTALLATION 
PRODUCTS DIVISION OF ARMSTRONG 
WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania 
Corporation, and EAGLE HARDWARE & 
GARDEN, INC., a Washington Corpor-
ation, and DOES I through 25, 
Inclusive, 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No P§&&339-
Judge ^ x T \ > a 
Defendants. 
— o o O o o — 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, by and through her attorney Mitchel 
Zager, and complains and alleges against defendants as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. For all causes of action hereinafter stated, plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the 
Court under section 78-3-4, Utah Code Annotated 1997. 
2. Venue is proper pursuant to section 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
3. The amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeds $25,000. 
1 
J 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTIES 
4. At all times pertinent herein Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, was, and is now a resident 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. Defendant American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation (hereinafter referred to 
as "American Appliance"), is a California Corporation, and at all times herein was, in the 
business of manufacturing water heaters to be sold to the public throughout the Continental 
United States, and was doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. Defendant American Water Heater Co. (hereinafter referred to as "American") is, and 
at all material times hereto was, a Nevada Corporation, in the business of manufacturing water 
heaters to be sold to the public throughout the Continental United States, and was doing business 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. The Installation Products Division of Armstrong, World Industries, Inc., (hereinafter 
referred to as "Armstrong") is, and at all material times hereto was a corporation in the business 
of manufacturing carpet adhesives to be sold to the public throughout the Continental United 
States, and was doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
8. Defendant Eagle Hardware & Garden, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Eagle") is, 
and at all material times hereto was, a Washington Corporation, in the business of selling, 
among other items, carpet adhesives to be sold to the public throughout the Continental United 
States, and was authorized to do business and doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
9. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as 
DOES I through 25, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. 
Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. 
2 
( 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff is informed and believe and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named * ,^ > 
r N . . . ' • - -> 
defendants are responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and causetjthe 
V... ' _ 
damages to plaintiff as hereinafter alleged. Plaintiff will ask leave of Court to amend this -^J
 c 
Complaint by setting forth same. 
10. Defendants DOES I through 25, inclusive, at all times relevant herein were the 
agents, servants and employees, each of the other and in doing the things hereinafter alleged 
were acting within the course and scope of such agency and employment and with the permission 
and consent of each other. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Strict Products Liability - Defective Design - Punitive Damages) 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS AMERICAN APPLIANCE AND AMERICAN 
11. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
through 10 above as though fully set forth herein. 
12. Defendants are, and at all times relevant herein were, engaged in the business of 
designing, testing, formulating, manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing and/or distributing 
hot water heaters, among other products, for use by members of the general public. 
13. As part of it's business, defendants, American Appliance and American, designed, 
tested, manufactured, assembled and sold, leased, and/or distributed the water heater, a 40 
gallon American Appliance, Serial number 9102311484 on or before July 8, 1996 in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and installed at 940 South Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
14. As part of it's business, defendants, American and American Appliance, designed, 
tested, manufactured, assembled and sold, leased, and/or distributed the 40 gallon U. S. 
3 
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Craftsmaster water heater Serial Number 944930189A on or before July 8, 1996 in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and installed at 940 Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
15. All times relevant herein, said defendants, American Appliance and American and 
each of them, knew and intended that the products would be purchased by members of the 
general public and used by them and others without inspection for defects therein. No changes 
nor modifications had been made to the Defendant's water heaters. 
16. Defendants, American and American Appliance, designed, manufactured, tested, 
sold, leased and distributed their products in such a way that they were defective and not fit for 
use by the general public including, but not limited to their failure to raise the pilot lighter a safe 
distance from the floor. As such, the defective products were inherently dangerous to the 
Plaintiff and other users and/or consumers and defective when they left the defendants' 
manufacturing plants. 
17. On or about July 8, 1996, at approximately 11:27 a.m., plaintiff, Anna Marie 
Alarid, was applying adhesive cement while laying carpet in a reasonably foreseeable manner 
at 940 Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah. The pilot lights on both the side by side 
American Appliance and American water heaters were on. Within moments after applying the 
adhesive cement the product's active vapors ignited from the defendants' waterheaters' pilot 
lights causing an explosion and flash fire, burning the body of plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid. 
18. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing described defects, plaintiff, Anna 
Marie Alarid, sustained serious and permanent injuries to her health, strength and activity, 
severe shock to her nervous system, severe burns to large portions of her head, face and entire 
body, all of which has caused, and continues to cause plaintiff to suffer extreme physical and 
4 
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mental pain and suffering in an amount to be proven at trial. 
19. As a further, direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters and incident, 
plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, was required to, and did, employ and continue to employ 
physicians, surgeons and others for medical examination, treatment and care of said injuries, and 
did incur medical and incidental expenses in an amount according to proof. 
20. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters and incident, 
plaintiff will incur future medical and incidental expenses for the care and treatment of said 
injuries in an amount to be proven at trial. 
21. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters and incident 
plaintiff has lost past wages in an amount according to proof. 
22. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective water heaters plaintiff has 
lost her future earning capacity in an amount according to proof. 
23. Prior to distribution of defendants' American Appliance and American water heaters, 
defendants failed to utilize the state-of-technology that was available at the time of manufacture 
for a pilot lighter raised to a safe distance above the floor. Defendants American Appliance and 
American, chose to use less expensive, dangerous water heaters susceptible to causing fires when 
heavy fumes from carpet adhesives travelled to their pilot lights. 
24. Notwithstanding this knowledge, said defendants, in wilful, reckless and conscious 
disregard of the safety of such persons, and plaintiff herein, wilfully, wantonly, knowingly and 
recklessly, designed, tested, formulated, manufactured, sold and distributed these defective and 
inherently dangerous water heaters with pilots unsafely close to the floor, causing plaintiffs 
injuries as heretofore described. As a result of said defendant's wilful conduct, plaintiff is 
5 
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therefore, entitled to an award of exemplary or punitive damages in an amount calculated to 
deter and punish said defendants, as well as prejudgment interest as prescribed by Utah law upon 
any and all damages suffered by plaintiff as stated herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Strict Product Liability - Punitive Damages) 
AGAINST DEFENDANT ARMSTRONG 
25. Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 10 above as though fully set forth herein. 
26. Defendant Armstrong is, and at all times herein mentioned was, engaged in the 
business of designing, testing, formulating, manufacturing, selling and /or distributing carpet 
adhesive including a product used by Plaintiff known as Henry 263 carpet adhesive, with the 
name W. W. Henry Co. on the 3 1/2 gallon container (hereinafter referred to as the "carpet 
adhesive") for use by members of the general public prior to July 8, 1996, to Defendant Eagle. 
27. At all times material herein, Defendant Armstrong knew and intended that the 
product would be purchased by members of the general public and used by them and others 
without inspection for defects therein. 
28. Defendant Armstrong designed, manufactured, tested, formulated, sold and 
distributed the carpet adhesive in such a way that it was defective and not fit for use by the 
general public. Defendant used a defective formula by designing a carpet adhesive that was 
extremely flammable when safer non-extremely flammable formulas were available. As such, 
the Defendant's carpet adhesive was inherently dangerous to the consumer and defective as tested 
and formulated when it left the Defendant manufacturer. 
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29. Defendant's language on the carpet adhesive container was inadequate and defective 
and failed to adequately warn users, like Plaintiff, of the extremely flammable nature of the 
carpet adhesive, and of a specific safe distance to keep away from flames. 
30. The defendant's carpet adhesive had not been changed nor modified at the time of 
the subject incident. 
31. On or about July 8, 1996, Plaintiff, an inexperienced user, was applying the carpet 
adhesive outdoors in a reasonably foreseeable manner and using the carpet adhesive for it's 
intended purpose of securing carpet. 
32. Within moments of Plaintiffs use of the carpet adhesive the fumes from the carpet 
adhesive ignited with the pilot lights of Defendants' water heaters causing a fire which burned 
a portion of the premise and Plaintiff. 
33. Plaintiff did not know that the carpet adhesive was defective. 
34. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing described defects, plaintiff, Anna 
Marie Alarid, sustained serious and permanent injuries to her health, strength, activity, severe 
shock to her nervous system, severe burns to large portions of her head, face and entire body, 
all of which has caused, and continues to cause plaintiff to suffer extreme physical and mental 
pain and suffering in an amount to be proven at trial. 
35. As a further, direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive and 
incident, plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, was required to and did employ and continue to employ 
physicians, surgeons and others for medical examination, treatment and care of said injuries, and 
did incur medical and incidental expenses in an amount according to proof. 
36. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive and incident 
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plaintiff will incur future medical and incidental expenses for the care and treatment of said 
injuries in an amount to be proven at trial, 
37. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive and incident 
plaintiff has lost past wages in an amount according to proof. 
38. As a further direct and proximate result of the defective carpet adhesive plaintiff has 
lost her future earning capacity in an amount according to proof. 
39. At all times material hereto, defendant Armstrong knew that the carpet adhesive 
contained extremely flammable and highly dangerous ingredients. 
40. Prior to distribution defendant failed to ensure that it's product was not distributed 
to the unassuming general public, like plaintiff, who was unaware of the highly dangerous 
propensities of this carpet adhesive. 
41. Notwithstanding defendant's knowledge, defendant, in wilful and conscious disregard 
for the safety of such persons and plaintiff herein, wilfully, wantonly and recklessly designed, 
tested, formulated, manufactured and distributed this defective and inherently dangerous product 
causing plaintiff s injuries as heretofore described. 
42. As a direct result of defendant's wilful conduct, plaintiff is therefore entitled to an 
award of exemplary or punitive damages in an amount calculated to punish and deter said 
defendant. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Strict Product Liability - Punitive Damages) 
AGAINST DEFENDANT EAGLE 
43. Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in 
8 
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paragraphs 1 through 10 and 25 through 38, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein. 
44. On or before July 8, 1996, Defendant Eagle at it's location 203 West 9000 South, 
Sandy, Utah, was in the business of selling products including Defendant Armstrong's Henry 
263, 3 1/2 gallon carpet adhesive to the general public. 
45. Kent Nelson, a non-professional (not a licensed contractor) lay person, and member 
of the general public unfamiliar with the extremely flammable and highly dangerous carpet 
adhesive, purchased same on or before July 8, 1996 at Defendant Eagle's Sandy location. 
46. Defendant Eagle knew prior to distributing the carpet adhesive to the general public 
that the carpet adhesive was extremely flammable and highly dangerous and was defective as 
such. Despite this knowledge, defendant Eagle sold the carpet adhesive to Kent Nelson, a 
member of the general public. 
47. The Plaintiff ultimately used the carpet adhesive, unaware of its extremely 
flammable and highly dangerous propensities. 
48. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiffs use of the carpet adhesive she suffered 
injuries and loses as described heretofore. 
49. Defendant Eagle, in wilful and conscious disregard for the safety of the general 
public and Plaintiff, wilfully, wantonly, and recklessly sold the product to inexperienced 
persons, and as a direct result, Plaintiff, an inexperienced user, was badly burned and injured 
as described heretofore. 
50. As a direct result of Defendant Eagle's wilful conduct, Plaintiff is therefore entitled 
to an award of exemplary or punitive damages in an amount calculated to deter and punish 
defendant. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS AMERICAN APPLIANCE AND AMERICAN 
51. Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 23 above as though fully set forth herein. 
52. Defendants American Appliance and American and DOES 1 through 15 did so 
negligently design, test, manufacture, formulate, inspect, label, instruct, warn and/or produce 
regarding each of Defendant's water heaters thereby proximately causing Plaintiffs injuries and 
damages as more fully hereinabove set forth. That the negligence of Defendants, and each of 
them, includes a duty to potential users, like Plaintiff, to use due care in the manufacture of the 
water heaters so that the design is safe, testing sufficient to ensure that the water heaters are 
safe, warnings and instructions to it's distributors to warn customers of dangers, place proper 
warnings which would attract the customers' attention to hazards of fire when within a specific 
distance of adhesive contacts which are extremely flammable, and manufacture water heaters 
with pilots a safe distance above the floor. 
53. Defendants knew or should have foreseen that persons might use flammable carpet 
adhesive which would be ignited by its water heater pilot lights. Defendants breached their duty 
to Plaintiff described above and failed to manufacture water heaters with pilots safely above the 
floor, failed to provide a safe design, failed to test the water heaters to insure its' safety, failing 
to instruct it's distributorships to warn consumers of it's dangers and failing to properly affix 
adequate warnings in conspicuous places on the water heaters. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of defendants', and each of their 
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negligence,Plaintiff was injured and damaged as hereinabove described. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
AGAINST DEFENDANT ARMSTRONG 
55. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
through 10 and 25 through 38 above, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein. 
56. Defendants Armstrong, as a manufacturer, and DOES 16 through 20, and seller of 
adhesive cement owed a duty of due care to the general public, of which Plaintiff was at all 
times material herein a member to adequately design, test, manufacture, inspect, label, instruct 
and warn regarding the 3 1/2 gallon container of Henry 263 carpet adhesive. 
57. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff when they negligently designed the 
chemical formulation of the carpet adhesive, negligently failed to test to ensure that the product 
had a sufficiently high flash point to be reasonably safe for inexperienced users, negligently 
failed to instruct it's distributors not to sell or provide this carpet adhesive to inexperienced users 
(non-licensed contractors) negligently failed to instruct its' distributors to warn customers not 
to use the product within a specific distance of water heater pilot lights, and negligently failed 
to properly design adequate warnings which would attract the consumers attention to the 
extremely flammable nature of the carpet adhesive, provide a specific safe distance from the 
water heater pilots before using and failed to describe the extremely dangerous nature of the 
carpet adhesive. Defendant knew or should have known that persons might use the carpet 
adhesive cement near water heaters and that flash fires could result from adhesive cement fumes 
causing injury to the user and those nearby. 
11 
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58. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' breach of duty, Plaintiff was injured 
and damaged as heretofore set forth above. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
AGAINST DEFENDANT EAGLE AND DOES 21 THROUGH 25) 
59. Plaintiff hereby incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 10 and 43 through 48 as though fully set forth herein. 
60. Defendants Eagle and DOES 21 through 25 owed a duty to Plaintiff as a member 
of the general public to use due care in the sale of Henry 263, 3 1/2 gallon, carpet adhesive. 
61. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff when they negligently sold the carpet 
adhesive to an inexperienced user and when they failed to warn the customer of the extremely 
flammable nature of the carpet adhesive and of it's ultra hazardous propensities to ignite when 
it's fiimes reach a fire source, such as a water heater pilot flame. 
62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of duty, an inexperienced 
and uninformed purchaser passed the carpet adhesive on to plaintiff without warning and Plaintiff 
was severely injured and damaged as heretofore described above. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Implied Warranty) 
AGAINST DEFENDANT ARMSTRONG AND DOES 16 THROUGH 20 
63. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges all of the allegations of her Second and Fifth 
Causes of Action as though fully set forth herein. 
64. In connection with it's distribution and sale of said Henry 263 3 1/2 gallon carpet 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
adhesive, defendant did impliedly warrant that said product was fit and proper for the uses and 
purposes for which it was intended, was of merchantable quality and was safe for use by anyone 
including inexperienced users. 
65. That said representations and warranties were, in fact, false and untrue in that said 
carpet adhesive was not safe for use, especially by inexperienced users, was extremely 
flammable, and ultra dangerous. 
66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of implied warranty Plaintiff 
was injured and suffered damages as more fully hereinabove set forth. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, prays as follows: 
AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND EACH OF THEM: 
1. For general damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. For special damages for medical and incidental expenses, past and future, in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
3. For loss of earnings, past and future, in an amount to be proven at trial; 
4. For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount calculated to punish defendants 
and deter them from engaging in similar misconduct; 
5. For costs of suit herein incurred; 
6. For prejudgment interest on plaintiffs damages at the legal rate; and 
7. For such other and further relief as this Court deems proper. 
DATED this 2 7 day of May, ]998. 
fitchel Zager /) / 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Anna Marie Alarid 
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
3587 West 4700 South 
salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone (801) 964-6100 
GIRARDI/KEESE 
Thomas V. Girardi, Cal. BN 36603 
James G. 0'Callahan, Cal. BN 126975 
1126 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 977-0211 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, ANNA MARIE ALARID 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OO0OO 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFAC-
TURING, INC., a California 
Corporation, et al, and 
DOES I through 25, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, 
INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. KENT NELSON, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ooOoo 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that counsel for Plaintiff, Anna 
Marie Alar id, will take the deposition of Defendants' designated 
expert witnesses listed below at 9:00 a.m. on the date and place 
specified opposite their names, who must be present at the time and 
place indicated. Said depositions will continue from day to day 
l 
EXPERT WITNESSES 
Civil NO. 980905332 
Judge ANNE M. STIRBA 
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until completed, Sundays and holidays excepted: 
DEPONENT DATE PIACE 
^Charles Jacobsen 
^/Marcelo M. 
Hirschler 
/ Henry Jack Moore 
J John Blundell 
JJean L. McDowell 
J Gary Deegear, M-D 
J Charles E. Morin,^ 
P.E * 
/ Donald E. Wandlinc 
2/00 jjfe03 Hamilton Springs Road, Bethesda, 
Maryland 
"573/00 ) GBH International, 2 Friar's Lane, 
Mill Valley, California 
7573 West 82nd Street, Plaza Del Ifey, 
California 
/10/00 ^Global Investigations,Inc., 4892 S. 
' Commerce Drive, Murray, "-Utah. 
MpDowell-Owens Engineering, Inc., 1075 
"KingwoodDr. , Suite 100,Kinwood,Texas 
3/14/00 diodynamic Research Corp., 9901 IH-10 
--'West, Suite 1000, San Antonio, Texas 
3/15/00 ^Engineering Systems, Inc., 3851 
Exchange Avenue, Aurora, Illinois 
lf/16/00 handling Engineering, 923 North S&xrd 
' Street, Ames, Iowa 
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that request is hereby made 
that said party deponents produce at the aforementioned depositions 
the following documents and other things in the custody of said 
party deponents and said party's attorneys, employees, agents and 
investigators. 
l. Any and all reports authored by deponent in 
reference to this matter. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that since deponents are designated 
expert trial witnesses, each witness is request to bring his/her 
deposition any and all files, notebooks or other records concerning 
any activity of the witness in connection with preparation for and 
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testimony during the trial of this matter• This includes, but is 
not limited to, any and all letters to or from defendant's counsel, 
any and all materials supplied to the witness for examination, 
consideration and review, any and all calculations, drawings, 
diagrams, equations, or memoranda created by or used by the witness 
in the course of any analysis he/she may have performed; any and 
all textbooks, handbooks/ treatises, scientific articles or any 
other references relied upon by the witness in reaching any opinion 
held in this matter; any and all -photographs, slides, movies, 
videotapes, or other graphic material viewed by the witness in 
connection with his/her work on this case; any and all reports, 
memoranda/ letters or other documentary materials created by the 
witness (rough drafts as well as final drafts) in connection with 
his analysis of this case. 
All such expert witnesses are required to bring with 
them and produce all reports, writings and all discoverable reports 
and writings concerning each expert's proposed testimony and 
preparation to testify. Non-compliance will be considered grounds 
for exclusion of the witness and all of his/her testimony at the 
time of trial. 
DATED this /( day of February, 2000. 
[TCHEL ZAGER 
Attorney for P 
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that on this /l day 
of February, 2000, s/he served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of (Defendant's) Expert Witness Depositions, on 
each of the Defendants herein, by placing said copies in separate 
envelopes, then placing said envelopes in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, and addressed to each of the respective 
Defendants' counsel as follows: 
A / A -
DATED this ff day of February, 2000. 
Royal I Hansen, Esq. ^ Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq. 
MOVLE & DRAPER, P.C. RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
City Centre I, Suite 900 Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
175 East Fourth South 50 Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Suite 1100 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Jerrald D. Conder, Esq, 
P. o. BOX 1181 
Draper, Utah 84020 
84111 
Daniel McConkie, Esq. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael S. Sutton, Esq. 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, CA 92691 
John R. Lund, Esq, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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SUTTON & MURPHY 
Attorneys at Law 
Michael S. Sutton 26056 Accra Legal Assistants: 
Thomas M. Murphy Mission Viejo, CA 92691-2765 Laura M Johnson 
Joseph A. Hcndrix Telephone: (949) 206-0550 Jennifer S. Fox 
Patrick J. Wchage Facsimile: (949) 206-0560 Lance Odcrmat 
E-Mail: sution-murphyiSjpacbcll.net 
Internet: wwwJawycrc.com/sutton&murphy 
February 17,2000 
Mitchcl Zager, Esq. VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL 
3587 W. 4700 South & US. MAIL 801-964-6111 
Salt Lake City, UT 84)18 
RE: ALARIDVS AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC 
Dear Mr, Zager: 
This correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your facsimile transmittal on February 14, 
2000, wherein you asked me to "arrange to have Mr. Moore available for deposition at a place of 
his convenience.'1 Further, this correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 
February 14,2000, along with your "Notice of Experts' Depositions," received in our office on 
February 15,2000. Despite the fact that Mr. Moore was not designated as an expert herein, you 
have purported to notice his expert deposition to proceed March 9,2000, in Plaza (sic) Del Rev, 
California, 
Preliminarily, please be advised that, as you know, Mr. Moore is a former employee. 
Accordingly, 1 do not have any ability to require his attendance at deposition. 1 am in the process 
of attempting to discern from Mr. Moore whether or not he will voluntarily present himself for 
deposition at a date, time and place mutually agreed. As soon as I have discerned Mr. Moore's 
position in that regard, I will so advise you. 
With respect to your Notice as it relates to the truly designated defense experts, I note that you 
have arbitrarily scheduled those depositions on dates where depositions have previously been 
scheduled to proceed. It does not appear necessary to "double track" depositions in this case. 
Therefore, I see no reason why it was necessary to double set depositions. Nonetheless, I have 
now written to each of our designated experts to discern their availability for deposition in the 
upcoming weeks. By virtue of the fact that the defense experts are in large part providing 
rebuttal testimony to the theories, opinions and conclusions proffered by the plaintiffs experts, it 
would seem only appropriate that the plaintiffs designated experts be deposed first, followed by 
our experts. 
As you know, given the stipulated continuance of the trial date such that this matter will now 
proceed in August. 2000,1 have previously indicated a willingness to stipulate to continue the 
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proceed in August, 2000,1 have previously indicated a willingness to stipulate to continue the 
discovery cut-off as it relates to expert depositions for sixty (60) days. Mr. Hansen has advised 
that he would be agreeable to such a continuance as well. You were going to coordinate with 
Mr. Conder in this regard and I have heard nothing further from you. Perhaps this is a subject 
that can be discussed by all counsel who attend Dr. Morns' deposition in Salt Lake City 
tomorrow. 
I am quite confident that Judge Stirba would prefer and/or insist that the attorneys work out these 
scheduling matters without necessity of Court intervention. I am optimistic that wc can resolve 
these deposition scheduling issues without the necessity of any Motions to Compel or Motions 
for Protective Orders. However, my confidence in this regard will require your cooperative 
efforts. 
I look forward to bearing from you at your convenience. 
W Michae/s. Sutton ) / 
of SUTtoN^tfMURPHY 
( MSS:kjc 
cc: John R. Lund, Esq/SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU (via fax) 
Royal I. Hansen, Esq./MOYLE & DRAPER (via fax) 
Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq./RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON (via fax) 
Daniel S. McConkie, EsqVKlRTON & McCONKIE (via fax) 
John K. Mangum, Esq./NIELSEN & SENIOR (via fax) 
Jeixald D. Conder, Esq. (via fax) 
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SUTTON & MURPHY 
Attorneys at Law 
Michael S. Sutton 26056 Accro LcgaJ Assistants; 
Thomas M. Murphy Mission Viejo, CA 92691-2768 Laura M. Johnson 
Joseph A. Hendrix Telephone: (949) 206-0550 Jennifer K. Murray 
Patrick J. Wchagc Facsimile: (949) 206-0560 Brian KL Waters 
E-Mail; sution-murphy@pacbdl.net 
Internet: www.lawycrs.com/sution&murphy 
October 12,2000 
James G. O'Callahan, Esq. 
GIRARDI & KEESE 
1126 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017-1904 
RE: ALARID VS AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC. 
Dear Mr. O'Callahan; 
This correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your facsimile transmittal dated October 9, 
2000, as well as serve to confirm our telephone conversation of October 12,2000. I apologize 
that I was not able to respond cither yesterday, or the day before, to your facsimile transmittal, 
however. I have been in Philadelphia on hearings. 
As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation, I am surprised at your suggestion that the 
deposition of Mr. Moore needs to be scheduled. Mr. Zager had scheduled the deposition of Mr. 
Moore in this case quite some time ago to proceed in California. However, he took no efforts to 
have an out-of-state commission issued by the Utah Court and the deposition did not go forward 
because Mr. Moore was not served with legal process. As you know, Mr. Moore is no longer 
employed by any defendant in this case and, therefore, I do not have any ability to produce him 
pursuant to notice. 
Mr. Zager has requested on multiple prior occasions that we stipulate that deposition transcripts 
of various individuals taken in other cases be used in this case with the same force and effect as 
though said depositions were taken in this case. We have repeatedly declined that request. 
Accordingly, I must again advise that I am unable to stipulate that you may use prior deposition 
transcripts from other cases at time of trial in this case. 
As we discussed, I am quite concerned that there is now a request to conduct lay witness 
discovery long after discovery cut-offs have passed. As you know, there have been multiple 
expert depositions all over the country at considerable expense to all concerned. It seems to me 
to be quite inappropriate that any additional lay discovery from the liability perspective should 
take place at this time. Clearly, I do not believe that any of us wants to incur the time, trouble 
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and expense to re-depose any of the liability experts. Clearly, such a course of action would be 
required if additional lay liability discovery takes place at this time. 
I trust this correspondence accurately confirms the substance of our telephone conversation of 
October 12, 2000, and is completely responsive to your facsimile correspondence of October 9, 
2000. Should you desire to discuss this issue further, please do not hesitate to contact the 
undersigned. Thank you for your continuing courtesy and cooperation herein. 
MSS:kjc 
cc: John R. Lund, Esq./SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Royal 1. Hansen, Esq./MOYLE & DRAPER 
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, California 92691 
Telephone: (949)206 0550 
JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing 
and American Water Heater Co. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARTE ALARTD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 980905332 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, Judge Anne M. Stirba 
INC., 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. KENT NELSON, et al., 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
AMERICAN'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
REGARDING FORMER TESTIMONY 
Third Party Defendants. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff has indicated that she intends to offer the testimony of at least three witnesses 
who were deposed or testified in a proceeding other than this one. Plaintiff has taken no fact 
depositions in this case and also identifies no trial witnesses who are or were employees of 
American. She apparently hopes to prove her claims of liability and punitive damages based on 
testimony given at other times in other cases. 
With regard to that testimony, it should not be admitted unless and until plaintiff 
demonstrates that (1) the declarant has been unavailable as a witness as that term is used in Rule 
804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence; (2) the document purporting to contain the testimony is properly 
authenticated under Rules 901 and 902, Utah Rules of Evidence; (3) that the testimony comes 
from a hearing or deposition "taken in compliance with law;" and, (4) at the time and place the 
testimony was given, American had "an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony 
by direct, cross, or redirect examination."1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs witness list identifies four depositions, and the exhibits from those 
depositions, out of a case called Ellis/Mitchell v. American Water Heater Co., which is a case filed 
in Tennessee against American Water Heater Company dba Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. 
2. The first of these depositions is of a Mr. Ron Carbone who, at the time of he 
deposition in November of 1998, was employed by American Water Heater Company as Senior 
lOf course the former testimony must also be relevant, non-hearsay and otherwise 
admissible; however, until plaintiff specifies precisely what testimony she is offering, it is 
unworkable to assert such objections. 
-2-
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Vice President of Finance and Administration. Mr. Carbone came to work at American in July of 
1996, well after the manufacture and sale of the water heaters at issue in Ms. Aland's case. 
3. The next deposition is of Mr. Henry Jack Moore, who was purportedly deposed in 
Ellis/Mitchell on January 8, 1999. Plaintiff also identifies the trial testimony of Mr. Moore from 
that case. Mr. Moore was, for many years, employed in the engineering department of American 
Water Heater Company or its predecessors, acting as vice president of engineering from 1981 
until 1996. Mr. Moore is no longer employed by American and had retired by the time he testified 
in Ellis/Mitchell. 
4. With regard to Mr. Moore, Ms. Alarid actually did undertake to depose him in this 
case. She issued a notice for that deposition to take place in Plaza Del Rey, California on March 
9, 2000. However, Ms. Alarid made no arrangements for Mr. Moore to appear and was later 
informed by American's counsel that American was not able to require Mr. Moore's appearance. 
5. Other than this aborted attempt to depose Mr. Moore, American is unaware of any 
steps taken by Ms. Alarid or her counsel to arrange for Mr. Moore or the other declarants to be 
available at the trial of this matter, or at a pre-trial deposition. Indeed, Ms. Alarid's counsel has 
never asked American for information about how to reach or located these declarants. 
6. The final two depositions proffered by plaintiff are of Ms. Deborah Hilton and Mr. 
James Berkely, both purportedly taken in Ellis/Mitchell on November 17, 1999. Ms. Hilton is a 
litigation assistant with custody of certain claims files and Mr. Berkeley, at the time of his 
deposition, was working as a Senior Products Safety Engineer. However, Mr. Berkeley did not 
-3-
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start his employment with American until May 1, 1998, long after the manufacture of the water 
heaters at issue in this case. 
7. Ms. Alarid has never asked American to produce Ms. Hilton, Mr. Carbone or Mr. 
Berkeley for deposition in this matter. Her counsel have traveled literally back and forth across 
the country for depositions of other witnesses. 
ARGUMENT 
L RULE 804 PRECLUDES THE ADMISSION OF FORMER TESTIMONY 
UNLESS THE PROPONENT ESTABLISHES THAT THE DECLARANT 
IS UNAVAILABLE, WHICH REQUIRES DEMONSTRATION OF A 
GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO SECURE THE WITNESS' PRESENCE. 
A witness is only "unavailable" under Utah law if a good faith effort was made to secure 
the witness's presence at trial. State v. Oniskor. 510 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah), cert, denied. 414 U.S. 
861 (1973). The Utah Supreme Court has characterized the unavailability requirement as 
"stringent" and held that "in order for a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it must be 
practically impossible to produce the witness in court." State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 111.1-12 
(Utah 1989). 
In State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah 1987), this rule was interpreted to mean that a 
prosecutor should have utilized the available procedure for procuring the attendance of an 
out-of-state witness at a criminal trial and his failure to do so meant the witness was not 
"unavailable" as that term is used in Rule 804. 
Likewise here, there were any number of ways for Ms. Alarid's counsel to have obtained 
an order compelling out-of-state witnesses to appear and testify, if not within Utah then in their 
place of residence. Given the amount of traveling done by the lawyers in this case, it would 
-4-
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hardly have been an imposition for Ms. Alarid's counsel to have conducted trial depositions of the 
witnesses in question. Their failure to make any such effort should not now be rewarded by 
allowing them to characterize these witnesses as unavailable. 
Ms. Alarid is not proposing to just use these depositions for impeachment, she apparently 
intends to use them to prove some part of her case in chief As will be argued below, equity and 
the right to foil and fair development of the facts require that she develop the testimony in this 
case, with regard to these water heaters, their dates of manufacture and sale, their design, and this 
accident date. 
IL RULE 901 AND 902 REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH THE 
AUTHENTICITY OF ANY FORMER TESTIMONY SHE INTENDS TO 
OFFER 
While the authenticity of a document is not often an issue, here it is. There may be many 
editions or versions of a deposition, some signed, some not, some with the witness' changes, 
other without. Indeed, this is the rationale behind the practice of keeping a deposition under seal 
until the court grants a motion to publish it. For this reason, American will insist that plaintiff 
take appropriate steps to meet the authenticity requirements of Rule 901 and 902. 
HI. SIMILARLY, PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW THE TESTIMONY TO HAVE 
BEEN TAKEN "IN COMPLIANCE WITH LAW." 
The exception to the hearsay rule for former testimony is quite explicit. The only former 
testimony that can be admitted is: "Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or 
a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same 
or another proceeding . . . " Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
-5-
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Here, it is not self-evident that the depositions Ms. Alarid proffers were taken pursuance 
to proper and timely notice and other procedures. Unless that is established, the former testimony 
should not be received. 
IV. WHOLESALE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY FROM A DIFFERENT 
LAWSUIT UNDERMINES THE PRINCIPLE OF CROSS EXAMINATION 
THAT IS EXPRESSLY PRESERVED IN RULE 804(bim. 
Ms. Alarid should not be allowed to simply read in the depositions of four witnesses from 
a different case in order to establish the facts that are essential to her claims against American. 
The exception for former testimony is only available if "the party against whom the testimony is 
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." Rule 
804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
While American concedes that it was represented at the time the earlier testimony was 
developed, it plainly did not have the same motive or opportunity to develop the testimony that it 
would have in this case at the time of trial. There is no showing of a substantial similarity 
between the issues and evidence in Ellis/Mitchell and this case. Indeed on the face of it, that case 
involved a different make of water heater, much less a different year of manufacture, etc. At least 
some of those witnesses whose testimony is proffered were not even employed by American at 
relevant times. It cannot be said that American had the same reasons and opportunity to question 
those witnesses as it would have if those witnesses were called in person at the trial of this case. 
If the court were to hold otherwise, it would create an intolerable precedent. It would 
require that a product liability defendant anticipate every possible use of its employees' testimony 
-6-
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in all future cases and require that defendant to develop that testimony in cross examination in 
each and every deposition or trial. It would place a party like American in the catch-22 position 
of either asking its own employees every conceivable question in every deposition given or risking 
the use of that deposition in a later trial without the fiill story told. 
Here, if Ms. Alarid were proffering an isolated piece of testimony from someone who was 
difficult to find or depose, it would be one thing. However, she proposes to introduce these four 
depositions, lock, stock and barrel, as the primary proof of her case.2 That type of use of former 
testimony, even if Ms. Alarid could overcome the other problems addressed above, is not 
authorized by the rules and should be prohibited. 
DATED this J day of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
John R^fcund 
KardlTPettit 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
N:\19944\l\dcposition.mem 
2Regardless of the court's ruling on this issue, "[fjormer testimony should not go in the 
jury room in either written or electronic form." Utah Evidence Law, Boyce and Kimball, p. 8-80 
citinz State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF AMERICAN'S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING FORMER TESTIMONY 
was served by mailing, postage prepaid, on the *? day of April, 2001, on the following: 
Mitchel A. Zager 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake city, UT 84114 
and 
5580 LaJolla Blvd. #83 
LaJolla, CA 92037 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Thomas V. Girardi 
James G. O'Callahan 
GIRARDI KEESE 
1126 Wilshire Blvd. 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Royal I. Hansen 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Armstrong World Industries, 
Inc. 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main #700 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Attorneys for Eagle Hardware & Garden, Inc. 
Daniel McConkie 
KIRTON & MCCONKIE 
60 East South Temple #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Kent Nelson 
John Mangum 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple #1100 
P.O. Box 11808 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Attorney for Kent Nelson 
Gary E. Atkin 
311 South State, #380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for 3rd Party Defendant Gomez 
Gail Mikolash 
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
801-964-6100 
GIRARDI | KEESE 
Thomas V. Girardi (36603) 
James G. O'Callahan (126975) 
1126 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
213-977-0211 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy deck 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ANNA MARIE ALARID 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al. 
Defendants. 
ARMSTRONG WORLD 
INDUSTRIES, INC., 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. KENT NELSON, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF ANNA MARIE 
ALARID'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING 
FORMER TESTIMONY 
Civil No. 980905332 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff may seek to introduce at trial former deposition or trial testimony of 
former employees of American Manufacturing. Much of the controversy at issue here 
stems from the former testimony of Henry Jack Moore. Mr. Moore was the Vice 
President of Engineering for American from 1981 to 1996 during the years in which the 
water heaters at issue in this case were made. Mr. Moore was deposed on January 8, 
1999 in the Ellis/Mitchell v. American Manufacturing case and subsequently gave 
testimony at trial in that case. 
Plaintiff has attempted for many months to set a deposition date for Henry Jack 
Moore. Counsel for American has refused to produce Moore for a deposition and has 
instructed plaintiff not to make ex parte contact with one of their former employees. (See 
Exhibit A) Plaintiff again contacted counsel for American in October of last year to set 
the deposition of its former employee, Mr. Moore. Again, American refused to produce 
Mr. Moore for a deposition. (See Exhibit B) 
The deposition and trial testimony of American's former employees is admissible 
evidence. Not only is it evident that Mr. Moore and the other employees are unavailable, 
as they are located outside the subpoena power of the Court and considering American 
has refused to produce them for deposition, but the former testimony is also clearly a 
party admission. Plaintiff will be able to authenticate the deposition and trial testimony 
and offer the same as a non-hearsay document. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 8, 1996, Rudolph Gomez, the manager and maintenance person of 
eight apartment units in Salt Lake City, located at 936 and 940 South Lincoln Street, was 
removing and installing new outdoor carpet at both locations. While working at the 940 
South Lincoln apartment landing, Mr. Gomez was assisted by his daughter Anna Marie 
Alarid. Anna was picking up old pieces of carpeting after her father had removed it from 
the floor. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. As Mr. Gomez had just finished laying all of the carpet on the landing , he 
saw a fire originate from underneath the doors of the utility closet on the second story 
landing. Two gas-fired water heaters manufactured by American Appliance were located 
inside the utility closet. The fire quickly spread from the door of the utility closet to the 
rest of the landing. Anna Marie was still on the landing when the fire broke out. Mr. 
Gomez grabbed his daughter and tried to run down the stairs. Before they could escape 
down the stairs, an explosion blasted Anna Marie and her father to the bottom of the 
stairs and into the front yard. 
3. While Mr. Gomez suffered burns on his hands, arms and legs were from the 
fire, Anna Marie sustained third and fourth degree burns to virtually every part of her 
body, including her legs, forearms, hands, face, neck and upper chest. She was in the 
hospital for 31 days after the accident and doctors performed full skin grafts over the 
course of three separate operations to both of her arms, hands, fingers, upper chest, both 
legs, both feet, the left side of her face and her left eye. 
4. Plaintiff has attempted to depose defendant American's former employee 
Henry Jack Moore. Mr. Moore is extremely familiar with American's policies and 
procedures concerning water design during the time the water heater's at issue were 
made. Plaintiff has noticed the deposition of Mr. Moore but American has effectively 
prevented the deposition from going forward, claiming Moore was a former employee 
and should not be contacted ex parte. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW TO PRECLUDE FORMER 
TESTIMONY GIVEN BY DEFENDANT EMPLOYEES UNDER OATH. 
By refusing to produce Mr. Moore for deposition and effectively preventing 
plaintiff from contacting Mr. Moore on its own, American has waived its right to contest 
the offering of former employees deposition or trial testimony. Plaintiff has tried for over 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a year to set the deposition of Henry Jack Moore. Counsel for American instructed 
plaintiff not to contact Mr. Moore directly because his testimony involves his knowledge 
gained while an employee for American. (See Exhibit A) Based on this representation, 
plaintiff formally noticed Mr. Moore's deposition. American refused to produce Moore 
at this time. 
This case was mediated in October of last year. Again plaintiff requested that 
American produce Mr. Moore for a deposition. (See Exhibit B) American to date still 
refuses to produce Mr. Moore for a deposition. Plaintiff has made a concerted effort to 
take Mr. Moore's deposition in this case. American's argument that plaintiff should have 
found another way to get their former employees deposition is not well taken, especially 
considering American's lack of cooperation in this matter. 
Defendant American has consistently maintained that Mr. Moore could not be 
contacted ex parte because the substance of his testimony concerned knowledge gained 
while he was an employee at American. Although American claims that Mr. Moore 
retired in 1996, American has continued to treat Moore as an employee. As such, Mr. 
Moore's former testimony in the Ellis case may also be considered a party admission and 
not hearsay. Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
American claims that it would be prejudiced by the offering of former testimony 
because it has not been given the opportunity to cross examine this witness with this case 
in mind. This argument is absurd considering American has attempted to stop Moore's 
deposition from taking place since the beginning of this case. If American was truly 
concerned about having the opportunity to cross-examine Moore with the Alarid case in 
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mind, it would have agreed to produce Moore for deposition. American has waived this 
argument. 
Moore's former testimony does not involve case specific facts that would require 
further cross-examination by American. Moore's testimony involves the generic history 
of American's knowledge of explosions and bum incidents associated with the 
conventional gas fired water heater. His testimony does not involve facts specific to the 
Ellis case. 
Moore lays the foundation for plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. He has 
indicated in sworn testimony that American knew of the high incident of consumer bums 
associated with the conventional style water heater and make a conscious decision to not 
implement available alternatives. Two key passages illustrate Moore's testimony 
concerning American's generic knowledge of defects in the conventional water heater 
that plaintiff seeks to introduce in this case. 
Q. Did your company make conscious decision not to enclose stands with the 
standard gas-fired water heater? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that conscious decision was made certainly before 1990, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that conscious decision was in part made on the basis of the added cost 
of the stand, isn't that right? 
A. That was one of the reasons. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. Any your company knew—let's talk about in 1990 that if the water heaters 
had been installed on stands that would reduce the liklihood that somebody gets burned, 
right? 
A. It could reduce some of the instances, yes. 
Q. Any you made a conscious decision not to include that safety device with 
your products, right? . . . . 
A. Yes. 
Q. Any when you made that conscious decision, did you all know that persons 
would continue to be burned as a result of ignition of flammable vapors as long as this 
standard model design of water heater was being sold. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And had you all made that decision to include the stand with your product, 
the safety device, then that would have effected the profits of your company, would it 
not? 
A. It would have effected the sale of the product, yes. 
Q. And ultimately effected the profits of your company, isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
[Deposition of Henry Jack Moore, Ellis v. American Water Company, 135:7-137:6] 
American's knowledge of the high incident of burning accidents involving conventional 
gas-fired water heaters is critical to plaintiffs cause for punitive damages. Henry Jack 
Moore provides the timeline for American's awareness of the risk associated with the 
conventional water heater. 
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Q, And were you aware in the 1970s of actual instances of people being 
involved in fires with floor-mounted, gas-fired water heaters? 
A. Our company? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I believe it was the 80s before I knew of any. 
Q. And from the time that you became aware in the 1980s, would that have 
been the early 80s? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from the time that you became aware of actual instances involving 
gas-fired, floor-mounted water heaters up until the production of this particular unit 
involved in this case in 1990, did your company produce any water heaters othat than 
those that drew air from the bottom of the unit? 
A. We made some other products, yes. 
Q. I am talking about water heaters that drew air from other areas other than 
the bottom of the unit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So your company had the technology, and, in fact, was actually making 
water heaters that drew air from other regions or other sources? 
A. Direct vent water heaters, yes. 
[Deposition of Henry Jack Moore, Ellis v. American Water Company, 171:18-172:20] 
American can hardly dispute the validity and accuracy of the deposition testimony 
cited above and throughout the deposition that took place on January 9, 1999 in Ellis. 
American provided plaintiff with a copy of the Henry Jack Moore deposition in response 
to a discovery request for documents. Defendant American has waived any argument 
concerning the authenticity of a deposition that it provided to plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff reserves the right to augment its opposition with any oral argument 
permitted by the Court at the hearing for this matter. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff 
Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests that the Court deny American's motion in limine 
in its entirety. 
DATED: April 9, 2001 GIRARDI AND KEESE 
JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN 
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff 
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MlTCHBI, ZAGER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3687 WEST 4.7Q0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64118 
TELEPHONE (601) 964-6100 
F A X 064-6*111 
February 14, 2000 
Michael Sutton, Esq, 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viego, CA 92691 
Tel: (949) 206-0550 
Fax: (949) 206-0560 
RE: ALARID V. AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC. 
Dear Mr. Sutton: 
You have previously informed me not to contact Henry Jack 
Moore directly, since his testimony involves his knowledge gained 
while an employee for American. Therefore, please arrange to have 
Mr. Moore available for deposition at a place of his convenience. 
I have presently set his deposition for March 9, 2000. 
I received a message from Marge, Judge Stirba's clerk, in 
reply to my request for clarification of the Scheduling Order 
regarding the requirement of providing an Expert Report by the 3-
17-00 cut-off date. 
It is now my understanding that "designate" means either a 
report or availability of an expert ready to be deposed. 
As you know, we have provided a report for each expert named 
and have, therefore, complied with the Court's Order. Since you 
have not provided expert reports, please have your experts 
available for deposition. If any of these dates are inconvenient, 
please let me know and we can reschedule those depositions. 
Following the taking of your experts' depositions, you may 
take the deposition of our experts. 
MZ/lbz 
FAXED 2/14/00 to (949) 206-0560 
cc: John R. Lund, Esq. 
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October 9, 2000 
VIA FACSIMILE & U.S. MAIL (949) 206-0560 
Michael Sutton 
Sutton & Murphy 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, CA 92691 
Re: Alarid v. American 
Dear Mr. Sutton: 
It was a pleasure to meet you at the mediation in Salt Lake City. I am sorry that we 
were not able to resolve our differences on the case. 
We still need to set up the deposition of Henry Jack Moore unless your client stipulates 
to allow us to use his prior transcripts at time of trial. 
Would you get back to me as soon as possible with your client's decision? 
Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation in this matter. 
With kind regards, 
60TJ«*~-
Jarrtfes G. O'Callahan 
JGO:cat 
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, California 92691 
Telephone: (949)206 0550 
JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
SaltLake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing 
and American Water Heater Co. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
vs. OF AMERICAN'S MOTION IN 
LIMINE REGARDING FORMER 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE TESTIMONY 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 980905332 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, Judge Anne M. Stirba 
INC., 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. KENT NELSON, etal., 
Third Party Defendants. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INTRODUCTION 
In response to American's motion seeking to preclude use of depositions from other cases, 
plaintiff tries to sidestep her own failure to complete fact discovery in this matter by blaming 
American's counsel. The record shows that American was fully responsive to plaintiffs efforts to 
depose Mr. Jack Moore and that plaintiff simply never followed through with that deposition and 
never attempted to depose any of the other individuals whose depositions she now seeks to use. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules of Evidence to suggest that a party can waive 
objections to evidence in the manner argued by plaintiff Plaintiff does not even attempt to 
explain how she can make the required showing of a good faith effort to secure these witnesses 
for trial. Nor does she articulate how American had a similar motive to question in the 1999 fact 
depositions of another case as it would have at the trial of this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff made a single attempt to take Mr. Moore's deposition in this case and 
then twice failed to follow-up on American's suggestions for completing that deposition. 
2. Plaintiff actually issued a notice for Mr. Moore's deposition to be taken in Playa 
Del Rey, California on March 9, 2000. See Notice of Depositions, attached as Exhibit A. 
3. This notice was issued on February 14, 2000 by Mr. Zager's office, the same day 
that Mr. Zager asked Mr. Sutton to help arrange for Mr. Moore's attendance. See Exhibit A to 
Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition. 
4. Mr. Sutton promptly and clearly responded on February 17, 2000. Nearly a month 
before the scheduled deposition, Mr. Sutton wrote: "I do not have the ability to require [Mr. 
-2-
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Moore's] attendance at deposition " As a courtesy, Mr. Sutton offered to try to reach Mr. Moore 
and determine if he would agree to appear at the deposition voluntarily. See Letter dated 
February 17, 2000, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
5. Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager were together in Salt Lake City on February 18, 2000 
for the deposition of Dr. Morris. Following that deposition, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager discussed 
the Moore deposition and Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager that it was uncertain if Mr. Moore 
could be reached because he travels quite a bit in his retirement. Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager 
that the safest thing for him to do was to utilize the available procedures to have an out-of-state 
subpoena prepared for service on Mr. Moore. In the fall of 1999, American was required to take 
similar steps to obtain Mr. Daniel Gomez' deposition in Minnesota, despite Mr. Gomez being 
related to the plaintiff. 
6. To American's knowledge, the plaintiff took no steps thereafter to get Mr. Moore 
to his deposition as noticed. The March 9 date came and went without the deposition taking 
place. American is aware of no other effort by plaintiff, nor even mention of the interest in 
deposing Mr. Moore before the discovery cut off in this matter. 
7. Similarly, American acknowledges that Mr. O'Callahan again mentioned a 
deposition of Mr. Moore after the case did not resolve at mediation, in a letter dated October 9, 
2000. However, plaintiff again fails to acknowledge that American promptly and clearly 
responded. See Mr. Sutton's letter to Mr. O'Callahan dated October 12, 2000, attached as 
Exhibit "C." Mr. Smith reminded Mr. O'Callahan that Mr. Zager had noticed a deposition of Mr. 
Moore some time ago but had taken no steps to secure his attendance. Mr. Sutton again pointed 
-3-
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out that he had no ability to produce Mr. Moore as Mr. Moore was not currently employed by 
either defendant in the case. Further, Mr. O'Callahan's request came long after the completion of 
discovery in the case, including expert depositions. Again, American is not aware of any effort 
thereafter by plaintiff to address their apparent interest in having Mr. Moore deposed. 
8. Mr. Sutton's October 12, 2000 letter further establishes that the plaintiff has 
known all along that she would not be able to rely on Mr. Moore's deposition from an earlier 
case. Hestates: 
Mr. Zager has requested on multiple prior occasions that we 
stipulate that deposition transcripts of various individuals taken in 
other cases be used in this case with the same force and effect as 
though said depositions were taken in this case. We have 
repeatedly declined that request. Accordingly, I must again advise 
that I am unable to stipulate that you may use prior deposition 
transcripts from other cases at the time of trial in this case. 
SeeExhibitC. 
9. In sum, there is little doubt that the plaintiff has known all along that formal steps 
would be necessary to assure Mr. Moore's attendance at a deposition and also that American 
would not stipulate to the use of his deposition or those of other witnesses from prior cases. 
ARGUMENT 
t PLAINTIFF WAS FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO 
DEPOSE M R MOORE AND SIMPLY ELECTED NOT TO TAKE THE NEEDED 
STEPS. THERE HAS BEEN NO WAIVER BY AMERICAN OF ITS OBJECTION 
TO USE OF DEPOSITIONS FROM PRIOR CASES, 
As the attached letters indicate, American's counsel has promptly, clearly and consistently 
stated that American could not voluntarily produce Mr. Moore's attendance at deposition. As a 
former employee, Mr. Moore cannot be ordered to do anything by American. This was made 
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quite clear to plaintiffs counsel. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, American never did a thing to 
stop her from deposing Mr. Moore. 
Although plaintiff claims to have "tried for over a year" to set the deposition, she cannot 
point to any meaningful step taken to assure Mr. Moore's attendance. Each time that American 
explained its inability to make Mr. Moore attend, plaintiff did nothing. Even when American's 
counsel suggested a way to secure his attendance, plaintiff did nothing. This is despite a current 
assertion that Mr. Moore's testimony is essential to her case. Now plaintiff seeks to have her 
inaction become grounds for charging American with waiver, to have her inaction somehow 
suffice as a "good faith effort" to secure Mr. Moore's attendance. 
This is plainly not the intent of Rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. The case law cited in 
American's initial memorandum establishes that a party must do substantially more than simply 
write a few letters to the opposition before being able to rely on the "declarant unavailable" 
exceptions. 
Further, plaintiff has not shown that American had any motive to cross examine Mr. 
Moore or the other witnesses during the depositions in the prior case, much less a motive similar 
to the one it would have at the trial of this case. Plaintiff flatly ignores this requirement of the 
rule. 
United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2nd Cir. 1993), demonstrates the meaning of the 
"similar motive" requirement. There a criminal defendant tried to use testimony given by two 
witnesses at grand jury proceedings involving the same case, i.e., Mafia bid-fixing among concrete 
construction companies in New York City. Although the witnesses had testified to the grand jury, 
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by the time of trial they were asserting a privilege against self-incrimination and therefore 
"unavailable." 
The prosecution successfully argued that the former testimony should be excluded because 
it did not have the same motive to cross examine these witnesses in front of the grand jury as it 
would have during the trial. The court noted that this is often a fact-intensive inquiry. It 
explained: "The test must turn not only on whether the questioner is on the same side of the same 
issue at both proceedings, but also whether the questioner had a substantially similar interest in 
asserting that side of the issue." Id. at 912. Since the prosecutors during the grand jury 
proceeding did not want to develop the testimony of these witness in a manner similar to their 
expected questioning of the witnesses at trial, Rule 804(b)(1) could not be used to introduce the 
grand jury testimony. 
The former testimony proposed by plaintiff has the same unmitigated problem. It cannot 
be said that when Mr. Moore and the others were deposed in some prior case, the attorney 
attending the deposition for American had a motive similar to the motive American will have at 
trial in this case. Indeed, it is a widely-held practice that neither plaintiff nor defense counsel 
cross-examine their own witnesses at deposition. 
If the rule were otherwise, if a plaintiff were allowed unbridled use of depositions from 
one case to present her case-in-chief in another case, then discovery practice would have to be 
widely different. Faced with a risk that the company witness' deposition would be used in lieu of 
live testimony at trial in not one but many cases, it would become incumbent on defense counsel 
to fully establish all relevant aspects of the defense case known to that witness. 
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Not unlike the prosecutors in DiNapoli, American's attorneys during discovery 
depositions in another case had very different motives to ask questions than will American's 
attorneys at the trial of this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, as well as those stated in American's initial memorandum, American 
respectfully submits that its motion to preclude plaintiffs proposed wholesale use of depositions 
from a prior case should be should be granted. 
It should be noted that plaintiffs opposition is silent with respect to plaintiffs use of 
transcripts other than Mr. Moore's transcript (i.e., transcripts identified in defendant's Exhibit List 
- Ron Carbone, James Barkeley and Deborah Hilton). One can only presume that said omission is 
based upon defendant's decision to abandon any attempt to utilize those depositions. 
DATED this I f ~ day of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN^QRTINEAU 
John R. LuiyK' 
KaraL. Pettit 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater 
Company 
N:\19944\l\DEPOSIT.REP 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2001 
HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
**PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS** 
THE COURT: That takes us, I guess, next - unless 
somebody has anything else, we're on to hearing about Joseph 
Fandey. The only worry I have on this one, I guess, to start 
out with, Mr. Sutton, is how do I know what this fellow's going 
to say, when and if he's called as a witness? 
MR. SUTTON: That's something that I've struggled 
with, your Honor, and I've struggled with how it is that 
Mr. Fandey even gets placed as an expert in this case. 
Mr. Fandey, as the briefs indicate, worked with the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission for many years, was involved in 
governmental investigation and interaction with a host of 
different consumer products, to include water heaters. 
It appears that Mr. Fandey is being proffered by the 
plaintiff on two different theories and to accomplish two 
things for the plaintiff at time of trial: one, to suggest that 
the water heaters as designed and manufactured were defective; 
and secondly, to address the historical purview of what 
happened between the water-heater industry, which is comprised 
of multiple manufacturers, and the CPSC. 
There does not appear to be much from Mr. Fandey that 
we can demonstrate from his deposition testimony that deals 
with American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation or American 
1 
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1 Water Heater Company or either of them in particular. The bulk 
2 of his testimony deals with what happened between his office 
3 and the water-heater industry in general. 
4 He then forms the opinion — and I think it's in this 
5 basis that he's offered as an expert by the plaintiff — that he 
6 thinks, in his opinion, that the water-heater industry knew 
7 that there was a problem with their design. I'm not sure where 
8 one goes to school or where — or what discipline one is to 
9 offer opinions about what one knew or didn't know, and that's 
10 what we're struggling with by way of this motion. 
11 There is a fire, a cause of origin, and a 
12 mechanical-engineer expert that the plaintiff has designated 
13 that we've deposed by the name of John Hoffman in Warren, 
14 Michigan. And I believe, at least the way it's been presented 
15 to us, that Dr. Hoffman is primarily going to handle the 
16 product-design issue, so if we strip that away from Mr. Fandey, 
17 at least preliminary for purposes of discussion, it appears 
18 that his only role is that as offering opinion as to his belief 
19 as to what the water-heater industry knew, didn't know, or 
20 should have known. And so we are very much asking for a 
21 preliminary determination by this Court as to the scope of the 
22 expert testimony that this witness will be permitted to give at 
23 time of trial. 
24 THE COURT: So you'd like to break it apart in at 
25 least two areas, his regulatory history and — you don't know 
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how you stand on whether or not he's an expert on whether it 
was designed properly 
MR. SUTTON: 
opinions — 
THE COURT: 
MR. SUTTON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. SUTTON: 
Mr. Zager can correct 
! probably the bulk of 
or not? 
Well, he did offer some design 
Right. 
— at the time of his deposition — 
Right. 
— but my belief is that probably - and 
me if I'm wrong — my belief is that 
the design criticisms are going to be 
proffered by Dr. Hoffman, not by Mr. Fandey. 
: THE COURT: 
you right now what I 
And so you're not looking for me to tell 
think about Fandey as an expert on design; 
you're just worried right now, as we speak, about his expertise 
on this history regulating the industry? 
MR. SUTTON: I'm worried about both, because I don't 
think Fandey even qualifies as an expert on design — 
THE COURT: 
MR. SUTTON: 
THE COURT: 
history? 
MR. SUTTON: 
THE COURT: 
at all today? 
MR. SUTTON: 
Okay. So -
— but my primary concern — 
Right now we're just talking about 
That's fine. 
And you want to go to defective now, or 
I'd like the Court's rulings on both, 
3 
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1 preliminarily before trial. 
2 THE COURT: So I think I understand a little bit 
3 about the history concept. Why is he not capable to talk about 
4 design and so forth? 
5 MR. SUTTON: It -
6 THE COURT: He is an engineer, I'm told. 
7 MR. SUTTON: He is an engineer. 
8 THE COURT: And he seemed to have been around a long 
9 time, like you say twenty years or whatever? 
10 MR. SUTTON: He's also a lawyer. 
11 THE COURT: Well, that says a lot for him, doesn't 
12 it? 
13 MR. SUTTON: I'm sorry? 
14 THE COURT: Does that add to his credentials? 
15 MR. SUTTON: In front of most jurors that I see 
16 across the country, I think it would probably detract from his 
17 credentials. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. So what do you think about him as 
19 an expert on the design? 
20 MR. SUTTON: Well, he's never designed a water 
21 heater. He's never manufactured a water heater. He's never 
22 designed the component parts into a water heater. He really 
23 has no particular engineering background other than his 
24 experience in interaction at CPSC. 
25 THE COURT: But he has a degree in engineering. 
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MR. SUTTON: He does. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you think one has to design 
and/or manufacture? No. 
MR. SUTTON: No. 
THE COURT: You're not going that far? 
MR. SUTTON: I'm not going that far. 
THE COURT: So what's his flaw in his credentials? 
You'd like — he's probably got enough to at least talk about 
design. 
MR. SUTTON: I would agree, your Honor, that the bulk 
of the arguments that we're talking about as it relates to 
design probably goes to the weight the trier of fact should 
afford to his testimony, as opposed to keeping him out of the 
room completely. My main concern as it relates to design is I 
don't think plaintiff should be afforded two bites of the apple 
and be able to present two different experts that are going to 
come in and say the exact same thing; we believe that this 
water heater as designed and manufactured is defective. 
THE COURT: Well, there's no rule that says they 
couldn't do that. Right? 
MR. SUTTON: Well, it would be cumulative, your 
Honor, and I think again you have discretion to serve as the 
gatekeeper to make sure that the plaintiff is not taking 
multiple bites from the same apple and extending the length of 
the trial portion. 
5 
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1 THE COURT: Fair enough. 
2 Well, Mr. Zager, what do you think? This history 
3 thing doesn't seem to impress me a lot, but it strikes me that 
4 one could deal with an industry but not know what particular 
5 members of the industry knew or didn't know. 
6 MR. ZAGER: Well, your Honor, I think it's important^ 
7 to first point out that American, the defendant in this case, 
8 was represented by Jack Moore, who we'll hear about later in 
9 another one of defendant's motions, with the water 
10 subcommittee. They were involved with the — working closely 
11 with the CPSC in developing standards. And Mr. Fandey has the 
12 unique position of being — as a member for twenty some-odd 
13 years with the CPSC, to see that the lack of changes — albeit 
14 in the water-heater industry, to see the problems that have 
15 been existing for some thirty-plus years with these water 
16 heaters. 
17 And so he's in an ideal position, which is one of the 
18 reasons we retained him as an expert, through his vantage point 
19 to talk about what these manufacturers, including American, 
20 knew about the defects in these water heaters and their failure 
21 to do anything about these water heaters. It goes to the 
22 knowledge of the defendant. And again, like the other motions 
23 before the Court, this is another motion that basically goes to 
24 the weight of the evidence at the time of trial. 
25 THE COURT: Well, I see this just a little bit 
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differently, 'cause this one strikes me as how does Fandey know 
what American knew or should have known? How does - he said, 
"Well, we go to meetings together"? 
MR. ZAGER: There were meetings at American and was 
represented. 
THE COURT: This Moore guy is there. He's an agent 
for American? 
MR. ZAGER: Correct. 
THE COURT: And we tell them to do A, B, and C, and 
they don't do A, B, and C? 
MR. ZAGER: Or at least that there was discussions 
about the — that there was approximately one baby a day in 
America for the last fifty years being burned in one of these 
water-heater situations, that — 
THE COURT: So did the CPSC create some new 
guidelines? 
MR. ZAGER: No, they didn't. Unfortunately, it 
appears that a lot of these standards seem to have been 
controlled by the manufacturers. They seem to have been able 
to control their own standards as to what was done with these 
water heaters, that they have a lot of power, that they were 
members of a large group, and that they are effectively able to 
control what was done within their own community. These are 
some of the kind of things that Mr. Fandey can address. 
THE COURT: So - and I don't mean to be rude - so 
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1 what you want to do is get into a policy debate about why the 
2 CPSC did or didn't create regulations? 
3 MR. ZAGER: Part of the discussion will be -
4 THE COURT: You see that was a function of a trial on 
5 a product-defect case? 
6 MR. ZAGER: Well, you know, even one of the motions 
7 that the Court Ifm sure has reviewed already is the one that 
8 I creates, at least according to the defendants, a presumption — 
9 THE COURT: Rebuttable presumption, huh? 
10 MR. ZAGER: - that there is no defect in the water 
11 heater because it complied with standards. Now, that makes — 
12 so it certainly opens the door for Mr. Fandey to talk about, 
13 well, who was really setting these standards and what was 
14 really done by these water-heater manufacturers and what was 
15 American's role over the course of the history in influencing 
16 the standards and in failing to comply with the known dangers. 
17 There were letters that were circulated. Mr. Fandey 
18 was on the board involved directly with the water-heater 
19 companies, informing them, sending letters, correspondence, 
20 attending meetings. So I think without his help a jury may be 
21 left in the dark as to whether this is an oncoming problem, 
22 whether this is something that just came about now, whether 
23 American had really done what it needed to do over the course 
24 of time to improve its water-heater system. 
25 And he's in an ideal position to comment on this 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because the letters are there. They are self-authenticated. 
He's been at meetings. Hefs been at testing sites alongside 
them with manufacturers, including American. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just - so I'm clear. He's 
not going to say that there were standards that the CPSC had 
that American didn't comply with. 
MR. ZAGER: No. 
THE COURT: He's going to talk about what he thinks 
standards should have been, why they weren't what they were, 
and how American knew of other problems, but since there 
weren't standards, didn't live up to this higher level. Is 
that kind of how I see it? 
MR. ZAGER: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is that how I understand your 
argument? 
MR. ZAGER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sutton, anything else right now? 
MR. SUTTON: Just by way of history, so that the 
Court does have some additional input on the inquiry just made. 
Mr. Fandey left the CPSC in 1994. One of the last things he 
did was write a paper that is referred to as the white paper — 
THE COURT: The white paper? 
.-•••'•- MR. SUTTON: White paper. - that he was critical of 
the water-heater design and has suggested to CPSC and his 
higher-ups that CPSC should mandate some design changes with 
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water heaters. Once Mr. Fandey left the CPSC -
THE COURT: That was in '94? 
MR. SUTTON: In '94. And from a date standpoint, 
itfs interesting to note that that is about the second time, 
the second water heater involved at this apartment building was 
manufactured and placed into the stream of commerce. After 
Mr. Fandey's white paper was considered by his higher-ups at 
CPSC, CPSC made the determination that this was not a 
water-heater-design problem, that this was a consumer-abuse and 
misuse-of-flammable-vapor problem, and elected to take no 
action at that time. 
Mr. Fandey, since leaving the CPSC and starting his 
law practice in New Mexico, has spent approximately 20 percent 
of his time, by his estimation, traveling around the country 
serving as an expert witness for plaintiffs' attorneys only, 
talking about what he thinks CPSC should have done differently, 
could have done differently, and continuing, in my estimation, 
to do his best to torpedo the water-heater industry, and that's 
what I think plaintiff attempts to accomplish by use of 
Mr. Fandey in this case at time of trial. 
It seems to me that Utah rule of evidence, Rule 602, 
which requires a witness to have personal knowledge of what 
happened before he can get on the stand and talk about that, is 
going to serve as a significant bar to Mr. Fandey here, because 
again he wants to talk about the industry in a whole. 
10 
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THE COURT: Well, when you say personal knowledge, "I 
was there, but I didn't deal with a specific defendant," I see 
a problem. 
MR. SUTTON: This is what the industry did, and by 
implication American was bad. And if you go through the reams 
and reams of documents produced by Mr. Fandey at the time of 
his deposition, and which find their way into the plaintiff's 
exhibit list here, there are — because they're so voluminous, I 
don't want to make the representation that there are no 
documents, but there are precious few documents, if any, that 
exist that talk about the letter exchange between CPSC, 
Mr. Fandey, and American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation or 
American Water Heater Company directly. So this is a situation 
where plaintiff seeks to, through Mr. Fandey, hold one 
manufacturer responsible for Fandey's implication of the entire 
industry. 
THE COURT: Mr. Zager. 
MR. ZAGER: Yes. I'm glad Mr. Sutton brought that up 
because he reminds that, in fact, Mr. Fandey has qualified as 
an expert on these very issues that we're talking about through 
courts throughout our nation. He's testified about exactly the 
kind of things that we expect him to testify to, that he 
testified at deposition to, that he has — 
THE COURT: What's the theory on which he makes 
that - I mean the court's finding that he ought to be 
11 
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testifying. What's the — I mean, how can this be? 
MR. ZAGER: Well, first of all, your Honor, he -
THE COURT: He's talking about - maybe I 
misunderstood, but if you characterize it, it seems to me 
what's happened is he's talking about a view he had that is not 
consistent with the CPSC. I mean I don't see why that makes -
him an expert. That's the part I'm not coming to grips with. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, your Honor, as much as — 
THE COURT: I mean he's saying — let me — he's saying 
"I wanted standards. The CPSC didn't, therefore these guys 
should have been held to the standard." And that doesn't sense 
to me, but it seems more confusing, prejudicial, all those bad 
things. Why do they let him in? Do you have any — 
MR. ZAGER: Well, your Honor, first I'd like the 
point that the defendant would like us to think that these 
water heaters are somehow wholly different from manufacturer to 
manufacturer. One water heater is generically pretty much the 
same as all of them, and one of the basic problems is that this 
pilot light is only a few inches off the ground and should be 
raised to 18 inches off the ground because the fumes are 
heavier than air and travel along the floor, which is what 
happened in our case. 
So when one water heater causes a fire, had it been 
an American water heater with the pilot in the same location, 
you'd have a fire in that instance too. Mr. Fandey is again in 
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the unique position- This is why the courts have let him 
testify as he has throughout the country, and he's qualified as 
an expert on these very issues before. In fact, this is how we 
learned of him. Because regardless of what the CPSC ultimately 
did because of their pressures — and I don't all the ins and 
outs and how they work, and maybe Mr. Fandey will be able to 
help us with some of the questions you have at time of trial, 
but these manufacturers in our country have a great financial 
and other powerful means through their memberships of often 
controlling what the government groups do or don't do. 
And Mr. Fandey sits in the position of — and his own 
frustration when he was with the CPSC of seeing the defect, 
seeing the problem, and seeing for years and years nothing 
being done to correct the problem. 
THE COURT: Good, all right. 
*Second motion* 
THE COURT: Now, the third one I have had to do with 
former testimony. I guess this is Mr. Moore. 
MR. SUTTON: Well, the way the motion was originally 
drafted, it deals with Mr. Moore, it deals with a fellow by the 
name of Ron Carbone, it deals with Debra Hilton, and it deals 
with James Berkeley. Those four depositions from a case in 
Tennessee called Ellis have found their way onto plaintiff's 
exhibit list, and I think it would be important for the Court 
to know that not a single employee of either defendant was 
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deposed in connection with this case. 
THE COURT: Now, Moore was an old employee. What's 
Carbone? 
MR. SUTTON: Carbone is a financial guy. He was the 
vice president of sales. 
THE COURT: But he's of the American Appliance? 
MR. SUTTON: He was. He's no longer employed. 
THE COURT: How about Hilton? 
MR. SUTTON: Hilton is employed by Southcorps USA, 
Inc., which is a company that manages human services, 
litigation, that type of thing, for many defendants — or many 
other companies, American being one of them. And James 
Berkeley, a former employee, was a — I forget his exact title, 
but it had to do with installation. 
THE COURT: Well, these are all folks that once had 
something to do with your defendant. Okay. 
MR. SUTTON: With the exception of Ms. Hilton. She 
has never been employed — 
THE COURT: I believe that - evidently some 
management thing. 
MR. SUTTON: Yes. It appears, from what plaintiff 
has suggested in terms of trial presentation, that instead of 
taking depositions in this case, plaintiff wants to just come 
in and start reading from depositions taken in other cases — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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MR, SUTTON: - we're concerned about. 
THE COURT: Mr. Zager, why don't you lead off on 
this. This is an unusual - I don't think I've heard the theory 
that we'll take depositions from another case and use them in 
this case. That doesn't seem fundamentally fair. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, your Honor, first of all, I think 
the Court needs to know that we're not dealing with just 
depositions, we're dealing with — 
THE COURT: Trial testimony. 
MR. ZAGER: — trial testimony. 
THE COURT: Let's say that's it, and it doesn't seem 
fundamentally fair. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, your Honor, I've made extensive 
efforts to contact the defendant and ask him for the 
opportunity to produce Mr. Moore. I asked him if we could 
contact him on our own. He said, "No, we're treating him as 
one of our employees, one of our people. I'd appreciate it if 
you didn't make direct contact with him," so we abided by that. 
That's all confirmed in the written letters back and forth. We 
did notice up the deposition. Mr. Moore was not produced for 
the deposition. 
THE COURT: What year was that? Two thousand 
something? 
MR. SUTTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. ZAGER: Also, all of these depositions - Ifm a 
little confused with the Debra Hilton one. I'm not sure I 
recall anything with her - but defendant's counsel maybe 
correct - I didn't believe I heard her name before. It may 
just be that I forgot. 
But James Berkeley, Ron Carbone, and Henry Moore were 
all provided to us in the course of discovery. We did a motion 
to produce, and those depositions were provided to us by the 
defendant. To say that they didn't have an opportunity to 
fully cross-examine, or redirect, if you will, because these 
are, in fact, defendant's own employees, they're friendly 
witnesses at their beck and call, is a little misleading, 
because certainly at the trial, where punitive damages were 
found and awarded against defendant American, one of the 
keystones to the award of punitive damages was the testimony of 
Mr. Moore. 
The testimony of Mr. Moore is not really that 
specific in nature but talks about what American knew about the 
defect, what the cost would have been to include an 18-inch 
stand to be sold with the water heater, for instance, that the 
cost was 10 to $12, that American knew they were selling large 
numbers of water heaters each year but only a small number of 
water-heater stands because they weren't packaged together, and 
that basically the bottom line was they didn't take steps to 
make their product safer because it would have cost them and 
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would have cut into their profits. So they decided that money 
was more important than the welfare and the safety of our 
people. 
He certainly is unavailable for trial. He lives 
outside the jurisdiction of the court to subpoena him for 
trial. We did make efforts, as I have mentioned earlier, to 
take his deposition — 
THE COURT: When you say efforts, when I read it, it 
struck me that you asked once, it didn't happen, and somebody 
talked about rescheduling and it never happened. Is that all 
the effort that you made? 
MR. ZAGER: Well, we asked, first of all, to have 
direct contact with him. We were instructed that no, he is 
an — 
THE COURT: Right. But you got it set up -
MR. ZAGER: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: - and something happened that it didn't 
occur, "cause he didn't come that day or something. 
MR. ZAGER: Did not come, right. 
THE COURT: "Cause I guess they - at least the 
defendant's position is he wasn't served the proper way? 
MR. ZAGER: Wasn't served at all. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. So it doesn't happen - you 
realize, I guess, at that point that you're going to have to do 
something more specific to get him there, but you never do it. 
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MR. ZAGER: Yeah. He had multiple residences. We 
were told he was often out of the country. To hunt this man 
down and take his deposition for the purpose of simply reading 
his prior testimony into another record seemed to be 
impractical and fruitless. What we would have done simply is 
say, "Mr. Moore, did you say in your deposition X," and we 
would have basically read the old trial transcript or 
deposition into the new deposition and received an identical 
copy of the same deposition that we already had, and that 
doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense. It's also — we 
can't — 
THE COURT: Your theory was you would depose him and 
then, since he wasn't available, you were going to get the 
deposition? 
MR. ZAGER: Right. This deposition and trial 
transcript is something that's been relied upon by our experts 
in their opinions. It's not like we're talking about an expert 
that the defendant doesn't have hands on with. They can talk 
to him any — 
THE COURT: Well, no, I mean you're talking about 
issues that don't seem to me to be a little germane. I mean we 
have to deal with this case as if it is a case separate from 
everything else, don't we? I mean am I mistaken that — are we 
just saying that we haven't any other kind of case you'd feel 
comfortable doing this approach, using testimony from another 
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case here? 
MR. ZAGER: Sure, your Honor. First of all -
THE COURT: You're sure - oh, I'm sorry. You're sure 
you want to do this. That was a dumb question. 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, for us -
THE COURT: What rule allows this? 
MR. ZAGER: Well, it's a party admission, first of 
all. He's a party, an employee of the defendant, who they are 
treating as an employee and a party, instructing us not to 
contact him. These were statements made about knowledge he had 
acquired — 
THE COURT: A party admission usually is a way to get 
around admitting something that occurred in the event you're 
talking about as against a hearsay objection. 
MR. ZAGER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. We're not going to whether or not 
this is hearsay; we're going to whether or not you should be 
allowed to substitute the whole record for the — you know, the 
party, the test of the witness who can present himself in front 
of the jury. I mean we're told often that the fact finder is 
to look at the demeanor, and that's a part of everything that 
the fact finder determines. What you seem to be saying is it's 
okay not to have that as a element, his personal appearance, 
just have him read the cold record from a case not even 
involving this event. 
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MR. ZAGER: Well, your Honor, it would — it's 
impossible for us to bring Mr. Moore to trial. The defendant 
can certainly bring him to trial and has before. He's a 
defendant — he is a defendant. He's a defendant's employee. 
He's unavailable; he's outside our jurisdiction. If we had 
gone around the world to get ahold of Mr. Moore and take his 
deposition, we'd still be in the same problem of reading his 
deposition into the court because he'd be unavailable for 
trial. We can't force him to be here unless the Court makes 
such an order, which we would welcome. 
But the defendant isn't prejudiced in any way. The 
defendant is the one who's holding all the cards. They can 
bring Mr. Moore to trial if they want. It's the plaintiff who 
is hand-tied in this case and unable to bring Mr. Moore to 
trial because the Court doesn't have the subpoena power over 
Mr. Moore, who is an out-of-state witness. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. ZAGER: Our efforts to get Mr. Moore to 
deposition for the purpose of reading the old deposition into a 
new deposition for this case have been thwarted by the 
defendant, who has failed to cooperate and produce Mr. Moore 
and has also instructed us not to contact Mr. Moore directly. 
So to allow them to profit from their refusal to cooperate in 
producing Mr. Moore seems to not be an equitable situation. 
Mr. Moore, as the defendant knows, is the heart of 
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plaintiff's punitive claim. He testifies directly, as he did 
in the Ellis case, where again punitive damages were awarded 
against the defendant, generically about the knowledge that 
American had, similar to what Mr. Fandey's testimony will be, 
the knowledge that American had over the years of their defect 
in their design and the ways that the design could have been 
fixed, and the cost-benefit analysis that it was plausible and 
feasible to fix the defect, and that it was solely because of 
the moneys and profits that American thought they might suffer 
if they made these changes that people like my client continued 
to be injured. 
Furthermore, it's the defendant who provided us with 
these depositions through our request for production of 
documents, and these are party admissions. These are matters 
that we discussed in the deposition, which defendants employees 
had knowledge during the time that they were employed with the 
defendant. 
So the only issue that I see really here is whether 
the Court is going to allow, first of all, the experts to 
testify about matters that they reviewed, which include these 
trial transcripts and depositions, that they are certified. We 
went through the trouble of getting those trial transcripts and 
depositions stamped and certified as authentic documents, that 
they have an indicia of reliability, that they were taken at a 
time - and certainly the trial transcript - at a time where 
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defendant had every motive and interest, the same as in this 
case, to redirect or cross, if you will, their own employee. 
So it's not defendant who's been put at — in a 
difficult position with respect to the testimony from these 
witnesses; it's the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Sutton? 
MR. SUTTON: Several comments I choose to make, your 
Honor. First off, there's been a misstatement by Mr. Zager as 
to what happened in Ellis. The Ellis case did not result in a 
punitive-damage verdict against either American entity. The 
case resulted in a compensatory verdict. The issue of punitive 
damages had been bifurcated. Before the trial was completed, 
the case settled. There was never a punitive verdict issued in 
Tennessee on the Ellis case. 
With respect to Mr. Moore, history is important. 
Mr. Moore retired from American Water Heater Company in 1996. 
He does maintain residences in two different states. He 
travels a lot in his retirement, fortunately for him. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. SUTTON: I told Mr. Zager that I would inquire -
as is communicated in the letters that you have as exhibits to 
the moving papers, the opposing papers and the reply papers — I 
told Mr. Zager that I would make effort to determine whether or 
not Mr. Moore would voluntarily present himself for purposes of 
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1 deposition. But I also told Mr. Zager that I did not have 
2 confidence that Mr. Moore would do that, and that if Mr. Moore 
3 was such an important witness that he probably should take the 
4 necessary steps to get an out-of-state commission issued so 
5 that Mr. Moore could be subpoenaed for deposition in either 
6 California or Tennessee. 
7 That was never done. Instead, the deposition date 
8 comes. There's been no legal process, no attempt by the 
9 plaintiff to get legal process issued by way of an 
10 out-of-state-commission motion before this Court and the 
11 subpoena issued either in California or Tennessee, and the 
12 deposition does not go forward. 
13 At that point, the case was still far away from where 
14 we are now, and plaintiff had more than an adequate opportunity 
15 to attempt to reset that deposition and do so, compelling 
16 Mr. Moore to show up for deposition, and that was never done. 
17 And I think that's significant because, if there was testimony 
18 that was going to be presented to this Court due to the 
19 unavailability of a witness, it should be testimony that was 
20 taken within the confines of this case, a deposition at this 
21 case. 
22 To suggest that American had a similar motive when 
23 Mr. Moore was being deposed in some other case and then require 
24 us to litigate the issues, the factual circumstances, the 
25 product that was involved in that some other case, Ellis, in 
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this courtroom in Salt Lake City I believe is very 
inappropriate. 
For Mr. Zager to suggest that he got the deposition 
of Mr. Moore from us is not telling you the complete picture. 
The discovery history on this file is as follows. Mr. Zager 
sent us requests for admissions, asking us to admit the 
accuracy of the deposition transcript that he had from 
Mr. Moore, Mr. Carbone, and Mr. Berkeley. Because of 
differences in the deposition transcript that Mr. Zager 
supplied vis-a-vis the deposition transcripts that I was able 
to obtain from counsel that represented American in the Ellis 
case, we denied the authenticity of the documents supplied by 
Mr. Zager by way of those discovery responses. 
Once we denied the authenticity of those transcripts 
supplied by Mr. Zager, discovery was re-propounded by Mr. Zager 
that said, "Send us copies of the deposition transcripts you 
have as it relates to Moore, Carbone, and Berkeley." 
THE COURT: Well, when you say deposition, do you 
mean, trial? 
MR. SUTTON: No, I mean deposition. 
THE COURT: Deposition. 
MR. SUTTON: And at that point, the deposition 
transcripts that I had received from counsel representing 
American in Ellis were then forwarded to Mr. Zager pursuant to 
his discovery request. So to suggest that the deposition 
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transcripts were first given to him by us is not a complete 
accounting of what really transpired in discovery in this case. 
I would agree that Mr. Moore is unavailable at time of trial 
because he is a resident of California and Tennessee, but 
again, that harkens back to should plaintiff be permitted to 
simply go out and find deposition transcripts from other cases 
involving different-model water heaters, involving different 
factual circumstances, involving different flammable vapors 
involved, and willy-nilly be able to just submit them in this 
case in order to prove plaintiff's case in chief? That's what 
sought to do here. 
Now, to the extent that we were successful — and I'm 
not confident that we would be — to the extent that we were 
successful in bringing Mr. Moore in as a witness during 
defendant's case in chief, then I suspect that he's on the 
stand, then there may be viable grounds for inquiry to be made 
of other testimony that Mr. Moore had given upon other 
occasions when he's here in court and can explain to the jury 
his other testimony, and that may be fodder for 
cross-examination. 
That's not what we're talking about here. What we're 
talking about here is plaintiff proving plaintiff's case in 
chief by a cold document from another case. And I would 
submit, your Honor, that if Mr. Moore is so important to the 
plaintiff's case, should plaintiff be rewarded for plaintiff's 
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inaction in not taking the deposition that should have been 
taken in this case? The issues in this case are unique. The 
factual circumstances in this case are unique. 
I can represent to the Court that Ellis did not 
involved a carpet adhesive as the flammable vapor, as it does 
here. Ellis did not involve an adult plaintiff, as it does 
here. There are many factual disparities between the Ellis 
case and this case, and that is important for the Court to 
consider, I think, in terms of making the decision that the 
Court needs to make. 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, if the Court please, and 
Mr. Zager, could I make one additional point on that subject? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LUND: The thought I have is that, you know, 
representing corporate defendants on a fairly regular basis, if 
your Honor were to allow this, then I have this situation where 
now my corporate representative is getting deposed in a case 
tomorrow, and I'm not, I guess, concerned with only that case 
anymore. I have to be concerned that whatever he says in that 
deposition, even though it might have some relevance to another 
case down the road, is going to be his testimony not only in 
that case but in all the cases that follow. 
It sort of creates a super deposition, if you will, 
that. I don't have any way to know what do I need to follow up 
with in the way of questions during that deposition to be sure 
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I've got a complete statement from that fellow that's going to 
be used throughout, you know, the rest of the cases. And you 
expressed some concern for the fundamental kind of unfairness 
of going forward in this way, and I think that illustrates it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Zager. 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, the only thing unfair about 
any of this is that the plaintiff has been put through the 
arduous task now of having to find and retake a deposition 
that's already been taken. We're not just talking about a 
deposition, as Mr. Lund points out, but we're talking about a 
trial transcript, where they have every motive to present 
whatever evidence in their favor at time of trial, or why go to 
trial. I mean that's the purpose of trial is to win your case. 
The facts that are different in the Ellis matter, I'm 
not sure that we have to examine those, because the things 
we're talking about are numbers in large extent, you know, what 
would be the cost for fixing the designs so this type of thing 
that didn't happen. I don't think it matters whether it's 
gasoline or carpet adhesive, and that's going to be again 
argued in one of the defendant's other motions about similar 
incidents. 
But what's similar and all that's required, I 
believe, is that we're talking about fires caused by flammable 
vapors ignited by a pilot light that isn't raised 18 inches off 
the ground. And that's the identical situation we have here. 
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Common sense dictates, if plaintiff was to hunt down Mr. Moore 
and eventually find him and force his deposition in wherever we 
were able to locate him at the time, that we would simply read 
the old deposition into a new booklet that would now have our 
case heading on it but would basically be sum and substance of 
the deposition we already had before, or the trial transcript 
we already had before. 
Now, if the Court thinks that's what we need to do, 
we certainly have six weeks between now and the time of trial 
that we can go ahead and do that, I imagine. But it would seem 
to be a waste of time and a waste of money and a waste of 
everybody's effort, because unless Mr. Moore made new changes 
to a deposition and trial transcript, which would be highly 
unlikely because he had every opportunity to make those changes 
following his first deposition and his trial testimony. Unless 
he lied during a trial, we can all expect that we're going to 
have a replica deposition or trial transcript to what we 
already have, and it would seem to be nonsense to require the 
funds in locating Mr. Moore, the time and effort to fly to a 
foreign place to read one deposition into another. It just 
wouldn't make any sense. 
I'd be interested to know what discussions Mr. Sutton 
had with Mr. Moore. Of course I'd expect that he'd probably 
claim the attorney-client privilege, because that's what 
Mr. Moore is; he's a client. And to say that it's unfair 
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because they don't have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Moore is 
ludicrous. I mean he's had - Mr. Sutton has had the ability to 
call Mr. Moore. Ifm sure Mr. Moore will follow every direction 
Mr. Sutton gives him, and if they want to produce him at time 
of trial to explain the document, that's fine. They have that 
opportunity; we don't. We don't have a way of getting him 
here. He's their - he's on their team. 
Again, I think, like so many of the other motions, 
this also goes to the weight of the testimony, I think, because 
these are party admissions and statements against interest and 
because our experts have in fact relied upon the sworn 
testimony of Mr. Moore that the arguments presented by 
defendant that they didn't have a motive to question Mr. Moore 
at the time of trial certainly is ludicrous. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
*Ruling* 
THE COURT: All right. Let's go back and - I guess 
when we're done here, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Lund, you guys have to 
prepare the order, so let's go back and rule on these, and then 
we'll talk about this final pretrial and see what we need to do 
there. 
(This portion not requested to be transcribed) 
THE COURT: The next one we have is Mr. Fandey and 
the issue of his - the extent of his testimony. Because of the 
ruling I'm going to make on the one that we just discussed, 
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this rebuttable presumption, it's clear to me that Mr. Fandey 
cannot be allowed to talk about what the CPSC did or didn't do 
and why they did or didn't do that. Number one, it would go 
against the clear statutory intent that the - and I can't 
remember the code section. 78- was it? 15- some odd — 
MR. SUTTON: Six. 
THE COURT: I don't remember the numbers, but I mean 
if you have a rebuttable presumption based on a statutory 
enactment, and to have somebody come in here and say, "Well, I 
worked at another agency. We did it another way," that is 
confusing, and it seems to me to go against the clear intent of 
the way our legislature viewed these things ought to be 
handled. 
I don't have any problem with Fandey talking about an 
expert on what makes a good water heater and why these may or 
may not have been good water heaters, defective, whatever, but 
I see no room in this trial for his history in dealing with the 
whole industry, as opposed to a specific manufacturer. 
And it seems to me that if the industry's got some 
flaws, then it implies some problem with this defendant, which 
it seems to me is way confusing, brings in so much that the 
trier of fact would be just unable to separate the industry 
from these defendants, what they may or may not have done. 
On the other hand, Mr. Zager, it's clear to me that 
if Fandey has some direct discussion with these folks about 
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some standard they haven't lived up to, that would be 
different, but I can't let him talk about what he thinks the 
world ought to be, as opposed to what it actually was. 
MR. ZAGER: Can he talk about, your Honor, what took 
place in the (inaudible) meetings where American was 
represented by Henry Jack Moore? 
THE COURT: Well, help me understand how - well, 
you'd have the hearsay problems obviously, but how would that 
be relevant to whether or not these folks lived up to 
guidelines? See, that's what I'm not getting. 
MR. ZAGER: Just as to their knowledge of the 
problem. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean that's what we get to, is 
whether or not it's a problem, and I guess what I am loath to 
do is have Fandey say, "I am a government employee. I had a 
different view of what things ought to be, but the government 
never adopted that." I think we'll only get "I had a different 
view." And so I'm not going to let him talk about this 
history, and if American was there and he had a different 
version of the world, but nobody else opted to follow that 
version, then I don't think that's admissible evidence. 
And it harkens back to this idea I have that this 
issue of the rebuttable presumption creates, in Utah at least, 
some standard by which these things have to be gauged. And if 
they follow what the government has applied as the rule, then I 
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don't think we can have somebody talking as Fandey - you 
intimate he will talk about meetings where "I talked about a 
different thing I wanted, and it was never adopted, but I 
talked about it, therefore you knew about it." 
So that's my ruling there* 
Do you want me to be more specific, Mr. Sutton or 
Mr. Lund? 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, to just take the wording on 
it, could I suggest that we indicate that motion is granted 
except to expert opinions regarding design of the product? 
THE COURT: Design and — I guess, yeah, design and 
safety of the product as it was on the market, or something 
like that, yeah. 
MR. ZAGER: And how about other occurrences and — 
THE COURT: Well, I think that's a different motion, 
isn't it? 
MR. ZAGER: Will Fandey be allowed to address those 
issues? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't understand quite what you 
mean. 
MR. ZAGER: If we bring in other incidents, of a 
specific incidence, which expert do we bring that in? Do we 
bring that through Fandey? Do we bring it through Hoffman? 
THE COURT: Well, did Fandey has direct knowledge of 
these things? See, I mean I guess the problem we're going to 
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have on these, we're going to bring in a bunch of stuff is, how 
does it come here, and I don't know that I can anticipate my 
ruling on that unless you tell me with precision how it's going 
to be presented. Do you see what I'm saying? 
MR. ZAGER: I do. I guess -
THE COURT: Does Fandey say, "You know, I read in the 
Journal of Water Heater Science X happened"? Well, that's 
maybe not too good a way to get it in. But if somebody says, 
"You know, I was a party to this case and X, Y, Z happened," it 
seems to me Fandey can render an opinion. He hears the facts; 
he gives you an opinion on it. Isn't that what an expert does? 
MR. ZAGER: Yeah. It seems that we'll have -
THE COURT: He can be an expert that way, but how you 
get the facts in it seems to me isn't before me right now, and 
it'd be a little premature for me to guess what it's going to 
be like at the time of trial. 
Then we have this question of former testimony, which 
to me is a pretty troubling one in a lot of ways, but I agree 
with Mr. Zager this fellow is outside the arena, outside the 
purview of our court to force him to come and testify. But 
it's pretty clear to me as well that the defendant's position 
is right. He could have been deposed in ways such that the 
issues of this event could have been preserved and brought to 
this forum, rather than using this witness from another case, 
this witness or Carbone. And by this witness, Moore seems to 
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1 be the one most concerned with it, or Hilton or Berkeley. 
2 I can't, from the evidence that - if I can say it's 
3 evidence, the documentary evidence here — see that the 
4 defendants have thwarted the plaintiff's efforts to get this 
5 witness. It's clear to me from reading the materials that the 
6 defendants were never going to agree to have the testimony from 
7 these other cases allowed in. So the plaintiff had to know 
8 that Moore had to be deposed. 
9 Now, if he wasn't being produced in the way that 
10 somehow it's intimated "We're going to produce him," and I'm 
11 not real clear what that meant, like "We're going to drive him 
12 there," whatever, but if that hadn't happened, which evidently, 
13 Mr. Zager, you think it didn't, then your remedy is, you know, 
14 I can compel his attendance and get the court to issue some 
15 process. I don't exactly the mechanics of how you get it 
16 enforced in California, but you didn't do that. I guess, in my 
17 mind, is something that you've just decided not to do. 
18 And I guess underlying all of this is my feeling that 
19 this is so fundamentally unfair. I mean what Mr. Moore may 
20 have said in one action doesn't mean he'll say it today or 
21 tomorrow or the next week. And I think Mr. Lund makes a good 
22 point. You don't know where exactly any deposition is ever 
23 going to lead you, any trial is ever going to lead you, if 
24 people can later on take transcripts from those events, bring 
25 them cold into another event, and say, "You know, he said it 
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this time. We're now going to use this as evidence.'' So I 
can't allow that to be done for those reasons. 
Mr. Zager, do I need to be more clear for you? 
MR. ZAGER: Yes. Maybe we're asking for some 
extraordinary relief here, your Honor, but we certainly do have 
six weeks until the date of trial. I would ask that the Court 
allow us then to schedule this one deposition of Mr. Moore and 
go through the arduous task of simply reading the old trial 
transcript into the new deposition. I think we — 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask. You're making kind of 
a motion here on the fly? 
MR. ZAGER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: How do the defendants respond to that 
request? 
I guess to open the discovery for this one witness. 
MR. ZAGER: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. SUTTON: Your Honor, there is I think a massive 
problem with that, that being that the way the discovery was 
ordered before, the lay discovery had a cutoff date, and then 
the expert discovery had a cutoff date. There have been 
multiple expert depositions taken all over the country in this 
case at multiple expense to all — or considerable expense to 
all parties. To suggest, now that all the expert discovery 
having been completed, that we now should now revisit lay 
discovery, I think that it's not just a question of getting 
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back to the lay discovery and having Mr. Moore's deposition 
taken. The domino then continues to fall, because then the 
experts have to be redeposed as well. I think it's a 
minefield. I mean clearly, with all due respect, if this was 
an issue, as I argued before — 
THE COURT: Let me do it this way. I don't mean to 
cut you off, but I think the easier way is I'm not going to 
rule on it. It's not in front of me. 
I'm going to let you make a motion, Mr. Zager, and 
we'll see where it goes. I mean that's the only way to do it, 
I sometimes think, if the parties will agree, it's fair to go 
after it, but if you're not going to agree, then they have to 
be able to respond to motions you might make, and we'll see 
where that leads us. 
Anything else I need to be specific, Mr. Lund or 
Mr. Sutton, on that issue? 
MR. ZAGER: Okay. Your Honor, I'd like to know if 
any of the statements made by Mr. Moore can be used by the 
experts, having reviewed those documents, and whether these 
would be seen as party admissions, which would certainly — 
THE COURT: See, I think clearly I'm not thinking 
they are party admissions. Otherwise, it would be admissible, 
Help me understand what your expert — now, if I understood it 
right, Moore was to tell us that these folks knew they were 
doing bad and should have done differently. 
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MR. ZAGER: That's exactly what he testified to. 
THE COURT: So is there some expert who is going to 
opine that this water heater is defective because they knew 
they weren't making money on it or something? I — 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, he says in plan language 
that -
THE COURT: Well, Moore said this, but how does the 
expert need to piggyback Moore to come to some conclusion? 
MR. ZAGER: Well -
THE COURT: It seems to me the expert makes his 
analysis independent of Moore's statement, "Yeah, we knew about 
it, and it cost us more to do it this way." The expert is not 
relying on Moore, is he, to tell us that this is a bad product? 
MR. ZAGER: Well, some of these incidents, it's much 
more informative to the jury to know that the defendants — 
THE COURT: I'm not arguing about the -
MR. ZAGER: Okay. 
THE COURT: - information to the jury, because if 
that were true, then I'd want Moore's deposition to come in. 
Maybe somebody out of Tennessee who didn't have a good 
experience with these guys. I mean, you know, the path is 
never ending if what I want is the jury to hear informative 
material. What I need is fairness. What I need is everybody a 
chance to quiz these folks. I need the fact finder to be able 
to look at the deposition in this case. So my need is 
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different than yours. 
What I'm saying to you, though, is that - are these 
experts basing their opinion somehow on Moore? 
MR. ZAGER: Sure. They're -
THE COURT: I think if they are, if that's going to 
be the foundation, they're going to have a problem, because if 
these folks object, I'm going to say, "You know, unless you've 
talked to Moore in the context of this case, I don't think it's 
admissible." That he said something in another case doesn't — 
that's the substance of where I'm coming down on that. 
MR. ZAGER: Okay. And I'm not -
THE COURT: That doesn't have anything to do with 
this case. 
MR. ZAGER: I just not sure I understand how Moore's 
testifying that the cost of making a stand is 10 to $12 — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. ZAGER: — somehow varies in this case. 
THE COURT: It's not the issue of it's varied, 
Mr. Zager. It's the issue of how is it presented, in what form 
did these folks have a chance to talk to him, and more 
importantly, I get to this issue of who knows where a ruling 
like you ask me to make leads me, or the courts. If this were 
to be the standard rule, if you had, you know, in 19- — I don't 
know. I mean I can't get into examples ^cause I'm not very 
inventive on that issue. But it leads you into a morass of 
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you'd never have a live witness in any of these cases, it seems 
to me. You'd just say, "Well, he said it three years ago. 
Therefore, he'll say it today. Therefore, let's not do 
anything." I don't think that's the way our system's set up. 
MR. ZAGER: Certainly -
THE COURT: So what he changed, how you've got to do 
it, those are issues you will have to flush out, but I don't 
think that that's what our rules contemplate. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, certainly some of his testimony is 
so generic that the cost of the stand then is the cost of the 
stand at the time of our incident, and — 
THE COURT: You say that; I don't know that. You 
believe it to be true. That's what the system's about, I 
guess, two sides fighting to come to what is true, and unless 
you're in the context of this case, it doesn't seem to me it's 
a correct, fair, or appropriate fight. 
MR. ZAGER: So I guess we need to file a motion to 
allow us to take the deposition of Mr. Moore, since he is the 
heart of our punitive claim, and we intend — 
THE COURT: And I don't know what you're going to do. 
I'm just saying — 
MR. ZAGER: That's what we'll do. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(End of requested transcript) 
(c) 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 17, 2001 
HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON PRESIDING 
*PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - MOTION AND RULING ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES* 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Next was the punitive damages. Did I 
read this right, Mr. Sutton? You say he hasn't alleged enough 
and therefore he hasn't answered my discovery and he's saying 
8 i he'd have to have been in another realm not to know I wanted to 
hit you up for punitive damages. 
MR. SUTTON: Well, your Honor, my gripe here is that 
11 | we ask by way of specific discovery what is the basis for which j 
12 | you think that you're entitled to punitive damages against 
13 | either of the manufacturers. We're told when we preliminarily 
asked that that discovery is continuing and plaintiff will 
supplement. 
16 | THE COURT: Right. 
17 | MR. SUTTON: Plaintiff then supplements on two 
18 ; separate occasions. He files no further response of any kind 
with respect to either of the - or any of the involved 
interrogatories, 30 through 33. To this day we don't have a 
specific indication from plaintiff's counsel as to the basis 
22 j upon which, the documents upon which, the witnesses upon which 
i 
23 | the punitive damage claim is based. The plaintiff suggests 
j 
24 j that, well, you guys are big boys and you should be able to 
25 ; figure that out and I don't think that is what the discovery 
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act in this State contemplates. I 
It appears in reviewing the Rules of Civil Procedure 
here as well as the Annotated Code here, that plaintiff has an 
obligation to present with clear and convincing evidence the I 
basis upon which punitive damages are alleged and that 
obviously that's a very serious charge against a civil 
defendant and one that we seek at this stage on the eleventh 
hour before the trial is commenced to be stricken from the j 
case. j 
THE COURT: Okay. | 
Mr. Zager? 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, we have had numerous | 
discussions and although they weren't in written form, 
basically the defendant is arguing form over substance. ! 
Furthermore, the response to that interrogatory was a claim of j 
work product privilege where basically the defendant was | 
i 
i 
attempting to get into the mental impressions of the ; 
plaintiff's attorney. j 
MR. SUTTON: We didn't say that. We said we'll tell j 
you later. 
MR. ZAGER: No, it was also, if the Court looks at j 
the discovery, we also answered a work product privilege and 
defendant broadened our motion to compel there in the discovery ; 
i 
i 
period but really that kind of leads us astray a bit because I 
we've had numerous discussions even at the mediation which 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Judge Daniels handled regarding punitive damages and the basis 
for our demand to settle this case. Defendant has long known 
that the heart of plaintiff's punitive damage claim is the 
testimony by Henry Jack Moore which I am looking to see -
THE COURT: I knew you were, yes. You asked me to. 
MR. SUTTON: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Is it there? 
MR. SUTTON: Yeah, it says what you said it says. 
9 ] THE COURT: That's always comforting. 
10 
11 
12 
MR. ZAGER: Defendants have known all along what the 
basis of our claim is. It's the stuff that the family has 
testified to, it's the deposition testimony of our expert, 
| 
13 j Hoffman, as to the defendant's knowlegge of the ongoing and i 
i i 
14 • widespread nature of the problem and it's at the heart of the j 
15 ! plaintiff's claim and the basis of the plaintiff's claim is the'| 
16 i testimony of Henry Jack Moore which defendant so vehemently is 
i 
17 j trying to keep out of the trial. It goes to the notice, the 
18 j ongoing problem and, pursuant to Rule 26, we supplied all the 
19 j witnesses, all of the exhibits we intended to present at trial. 
20 | We certainly know it's not going to be Kent Nelson who is going 
21 I to be testifying on punitive damages, it's going to be 
I j 
22 j defendant's employees who have made admissions and then j 
23 j damaging statements, it's going to be our experts who they've j 
24 i taken their depositions who talk about the wide spread nature j 
I 
25 I and there is no surprise here and there is no harm there. We j 
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are still six weeks before trial and for anybody that was still 
guessing as to what the basis of our punitive damage claim is, 
there it is. Those are the ones that we intend to prove the 
punitive claim through. And, again, you know, if the defendant 
needed to file a motion to compel which obviously they didn't 
need to and they didn't file one, they would have learned what 
they've already known long and it's not like this is the first 
claim that Mr. Sutton or American has been involved in 
defending our claim for punitive damages. So, just like in the 
Ellis case, Henry Jack Moore was the basis for the punitive 
damage claim in that case and it's the basis in large part for 
our claim here. 
THE COURT: Anything else on that point, Mr. Sutton? 
MR. SUTTON: I would with the Court's permission like 
to address a couple of historical things here. Plaintiff's 
complaint in this case was filed on May 28, 1998. Those 
preliminary discovery responses that the Court just referenced 
were provided by the plaintiff on December 24, 1998, 
approximately seven months after the Court, after the action 
was filed. Indeed, there were objections on legal conclusion 
and work product grounds but notwithstanding those objections, 
plaintiff then says discovery is continuing and plaintiff will 
supplement in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. That never happened as it related to those 
particular interrogatories. For the plaintiff at this point to 
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! 
4 
5 
6 
1 simply say Dr. Hoffman and Mr. Fandy tell you why we think 
2 | punitive damages are appropriate. This harkens us back to 
3 ! their criticisms as to the industry in general without 
specification to America Appliance Manufacturing Corporation 
and American Water Heater Company in particular. As of right 
now we have nothing that is evidence in this case that suggests 
7 | the particular basis upon which punitive damages are sought and 
8 I I think your Code here absolutely contemplates that before a 
I 
9 j serious allegation such as punitive damages be presented to the j 
i 
i 
10 | trier of fact that fundamental fairness dictates that the 
11 | defendant have a clean basis upon which those charging 
12 | allegations are based. 
13 | THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Zager? 
14 j MR. ZAGER: Just briefly, your Honor. If there was 
I 
17 
20 
15 : any error it certainly is harmless error. Certainly the 
16 , defendant is arguing form over substance and the punitive claim 
as we've all known through mediation discussions, through 
discussions and arguments we've had personally over the phone, 18 
j 
19 j is that our plaintiff's claim is that the defendant has known 
long and well that their product was dangerous and defective in 
21 J not coming up with an alternative design, in not raising the 
i 
22 | pilot light eighteen inches off the ground and that numerous 
i 
23 j Americans were badly injured as a result of the defective 
24 | design which they knew about, which Henry Moore talked about 
25 | generically and that American made a conscious decision not to 
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make their product safer because they weren't going to make as 
much money. 
• * • 
RULING 
THE COURT: Let's see we've got the punitive damages j 
claim. This one to me is more a fairness issue. I think 
clearly the defendant's are not surprised by the punitive 
damages or its basis. I can't see that there's any harm for 
failure of the plaintiff to supplement their discovery requests 
here and it's clear to me, as well, the plaintiff still has the j 
i 
burden of proving all the elements of a punitive request. So | 
I 
for that reason I deny that motion made by the defendants to j 
preclude any evidence on the punitive issue. 
Mr. Zager, any more clarification for you? j 
MR. ZAGER: No, your Honor. 
MR. SUTTON: Your Honor - - I 
THE COURT: Mr. Sutton or Mr. Lund? j 
MR. LUND: No, your Honor. j 
i 
THE COURT: Mr. McConkie? 
i 
MR. MCCONKIE: On that point, sir, it's clearly my j 
understanding, and I think Mr. Zager made this representation j 
i 
in court, that they are not pursuing any type of punitive claim1; 
l 
against Mr. Kent Nelson or any of the Nelsons. j 
i 
THE COURT: It sounds to me like Nelson and Armstrong j 
are gone. 
6 
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I 
II MR. MCCONKIE: They're gone. 
2 I MR. ZAGER: And Mr. McConkie states it correctly. 
3 | THE COURT: Okay. 
4 I (End of requested transcript) 
5 
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requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages 
to the best of my ability. 
Signed this 7th day of March, 2002 in Sandy, 
Utah. 
Carolyn Etficksoh 
Certified^Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2002 
'UBLIC 
<*CKSON 
r i.i.W'WAY 
EXPIRES 
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, California 92691 
Telephone: (949) 206 0550 
JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing 
and American Water Heater Co. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS 
vs. ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17,2001 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., 
Civil No. 980905332 
Defendants. 
Judge Michael R. Burton 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, 
INC, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W.KENT NELSON, etal., 
Third Party Defendants. 
FILED DISTRICT C0URT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Oe* 
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This matter came before the Honorable Michael R. Burton on September 17, 2001 for a 
hearing on nine pending motions. Mr. Mitchell A. Zager appeared on behalf of plaintiff. Mr. 
Michael S. Sutton, Sutton & Murphy, and Mr. John R. Lund, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
appeared on behalf of defendants American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and American Water 
Heater Company. 
Having read all memoranda filed concerning the motions, having heard the arguments of 
counsel and now being fully advised, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. American's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Regarding Craftmaster Water 
Heater is denied. 
2. American's Motion in Limine Regarding Joseph Fandey is granted as to all 
subjects addressed in American's memorandum in support of its motion, except that Mr. Fandey 
will be permitted to testify as to any competent opinions he holds regarding the designs of the 
water heaters at issue in this case. 
3. American's Motion in Limine Regarding Former Testimony is granted. 
4. American's Motion to Exclude Testimony Regarding Correctional Officer Lost 
Earnings and Capacity is granted. 
5. American's Motion in Limine Regarding Plaintiffs Proposed Exhibits is denied 
without prejudice. As particular exhibits are proffered at trial, the court will consider American's 
objections. 
6. American's Motion in Limine to Disclose Plaintiffs Settlements to the Jury is 
granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is ordered to provide American with all documents 
concerning the settlement with Armstrong World Industries and to do so within five days of the 
-2-
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date of this order. Plaintiff will not be required to disclose the terms of her settlement with 
ValueCare. The court will consider proposed instructions to the jury regarding how much 
information about the settlements will be given to the jury. 
7. American's Motion in Limine Regarding Preclusion of Other Incidents is denied 
without prejudice. There will need to be a showing of substantial similarity and if competent 
evidence of other incidents is proffered at trial, the court will consider American's objections. 
8. American's Motion in Limine Regarding Punitive Damages is denied; however, 
American is not precluded from challenging the sufficiency of plaintiff s proof of punitive 
damages if and when that evidence is disclosed. 
9. American's Motion in Limine for a Rebuttable Presumption of Non-Defectiveness 
is granted. ^ . 
DATED this of WC/ \ ' ,2001. 
BYJHE COURT: 
N:\I9944\1\0RDERLIM.WPD 
Michael R. Burton 
District Court Judge 
-3-
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>flfCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
801-964-6100 
GIRARDI | KEESE 
Thomas V. Girardi (36603) 
James G. O'Callahan (126975) 
1126 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
213-977-0211 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ANNA MARIE ALARID 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., 
Defendants. 
ARMSTRONG WORLD 
INDUSTRIES, INC., 
et al. ; 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
T O . 
W. KENT NELSON, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
) PLAINTIFF ANNA MARIE 
) ALARID'S MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RE-
) OPEN DISCOVERY TO TAKE THE 
) DEPOSITION OF HENRY JACK 
) MOORE 
) Civil No. 980905332 
) Judge Michael K. Burton 
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f INTRODUCTION 
W The testimony of defendant American Manufacturing's former employee Henry 
Jack Moore is critical to this case. Plaintiff calls upon the equitable power of this Court 
to re-open discovery for the limited purpose of ordering the deposition of Henry Jack 
Moore. Plaintiff has previously attempted to depose Mr. Moore, but defendant American 
refused to cooperate and produce this witness. Rather than continuing to waste time and 
money tracking Mr. Moore down all over the country, plaintiff decided to rely on Mr. 
Moore's former trial and deposition testimony. Plaintiff reasonably relied on the 
admissibility of Mr. Moore's former testimony and intended to offer this testimony at 
trial. 
This Court has now ruled that plaintiff may not use Mr. Moore's former testimony 
at trial. Plaintiff must now seek to depose Mr. Moore before trial. Mr. Moore was the 
Vice President of Engineering for American from 1981 to 1996 during the years in which 
the water heaters at issue in this case were made. Mr. Moore is overly familiar with 
American's knowledge of the defect at issue in this case. Since his departure from 
American in 1996, Moore has maintained a quasi-employee relationship with American. 
Counsel for American, Sutton and Murphy, have cautioned Plaintiff not to contact 
Mr. Moore because his testimony involves knowledge gained while employed at 
American. See Zager letter attached as Exhibit A. However, when formally presented 
with a deposition notice for Mr. Moore, counsel for American claimed they had no ability 
to produce a former employee. See Sutton letter 10/12/00 attached as Exhibit B. 
Counsel for American seems to decide when or if they will produce Mr. Moore in any 
given case. Plaintiff will be extremely prejudiced if not given the opportunity to depose 
Mr. Moore and introduce his testimony at trial. 
Plaintiffs problems in deposing Henry Jack Moore are hardly unique. Many other 
firms throughout the country have experienced the same stall tactic. Mr. Moore 
consistently evades service until American decides to produce him. See Affidavit of 
Judie Bristo attached as Exhibit C. 
2 
\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ja ARGUMENT 
Hurtsw of liberal spirit of Rules, courts should be disposed to grant such discovery 
Ihiecomplish full disclosure of facts, eliminate surprise, and promote settlement. 
^jagmir^^^^^ & ° - R - C o - n 9 6 L ED Mich) 29 FRD148*5 FR Serv 2d 586< 
9. Henry Jack Moore Continues to Maintain an Employee Relationship with 
Defendant American Manufacturing. 
|f Since Mr. Moore departed from American in 1996, counsel for American has 
consistently maintained a working relationship with Moore. Mr. Moore is the former 
Vice President in charge of engineering and design involving the particular gas-fired 
water heater at issue in this case. Counsel for American has produced Mr. Moore in more 
than 20 water heater burn cases throughout the United States. Moore's own deposition 
testimony conclusively demonstrates he maintains and employee relationship with 
American. 
• In Fulmer v. Craftsmaster, Mr. Sutton produced Henry Jack Moore in his capacity as 
a former employee of American Manufacturing. Moore indicated that he was being 
paid by Southcorp USA (American Manufacturing) for his testimony. (41:20-42:6) 
See Exhibit D. 
• In Ellis v. American Water Heater. Mr. Moore again sat for deposition upon request 
from American. Mr. Moore stated that it was his practice to cooperate with his 
former employer when asked to sit for a deposition. Moore testified that he had never 
declined American's request to sit for a deposition. See deposition transcript of Henry 
Jack Moore, 26:7-19 attached as Exhibit E. 
It is blatantly obvious that American, by and through its counsel, produces Mr. 
Moore for deposition on an ad hoc basis. Mr. Moore is not a former employee by any 
sense. American continues to pay him for his testimony. American continues to provide 
him counsel to represent the company's best interest. However, for some inconceivable 
reason, American has decided to battle plaintiff in this case over producing Mr. Moore. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[oore Is Scheduled to be Deposed in October 2001. 
reason to believe that Mr. Sutton has not been forthcoming about his 
Mr. Moore. Mr. Sutton has recently set-up the deposition of Henry Jack 
ie taken on October 11, 2001 in the case Nolan v. Eagle Manufacturing. See 
sr dated 7/24/01 attached as Exhibit F. In his July 24, 2001 letter, Mr. Sutton 
Jkto produce Mr. Moore without the need for a deposition subpoena. It is 
iding that counsel would vigorously oppose the deposition of Moore in the instant 
se, claiming Moore to be an unreachable former employee, and simultaneously agree to 
produce Moore in the Nolan case. The argument that Moore is an unreachable former 
employee is clearly without merit. 
Generally, a corporation is not required to produce a former employee because the 
company no longer maintains control over the employee. DeLetelier v. Republic of Chile 
(2nd Cir. 1984) 748 F.2d 790, 795. The general rule does not apply here. American 
maintains substantial control over where, when and in which case, Mr. Moore will testify. 
Mr. Moore's designation as a former employee is truly a misnomer considering he is still 
being paid by American and represented by American's corporate attorneys. 
Moore's Testimony is Extremely Relevant and Plaintiff Will be Prejudiced if 
not Allowed to Depose Him. 
Moore was the Vice President of engineering for defendant, American 
Manufacturing from 1980-1996. Part of Mr. Moore's duties and responsibilities as Vice 
President was the safety and design of gas-fired water heaters. Mr. Moore was 
responsible for the design of the water heater itself. See Deposition transcript of Moore, 
p.7-8, Ellis v. American. 
As the chief engineer for American, Moore knew about the problems associated 
with gas-fired water heaters igniting flammable vapors. He has testified previously that 
his company, American, knew about these problems and consciously chose to disregard 
safer alternatives. See Deposition transcript, 135:7-137:6, Ellis v. American Water 
Company. 
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fy looking for fairness and justice. Plaintiff tried to depose Mr. 
Court's intervention. Defendant would not cooperate. Rather than 
^wrangle with American over this issue, plaintiff sought to avoid further 
ion by offering Mr. Moore's prior testimony in this case. Moore's testimony is 
^specifically concerning American's knowledge of a defect in the conventional 
water heater. See Moore Deposition Transcript, Fulmer v. Craftmaster, 43:19. 
laintiff continues to firmly believe that Mr. Moore's testimony will mirror testimony he 
^as given in a multitude of other cases, including Ellis and Fulmer. 
Lifting the discovery cut-off for the limited purpose of taking Mr. Moore's 
deposition will not prejudice American. Mr. Moore's testimony does not effect any of 
the other experts in this case. Plaintiffs experts have already relied on Moore's 
deposition testimony from prior cases in formulating opinions in this case. Those 
opinions will not change. Taking Moore's deposition is simply a formality at this point. 
Both plaintiff and American know exactly what Mr. Moore will say. There is no reason 
to expect his testimony about American's knowledge of water heater defects to change in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court re-open 
discovery for the limited purpose of ordering the deposition of Henry Jack Moore. 
DATED: September 25, 2001 GIRARDI AND KEESE 
JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN 
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff 
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MlTCHBL ZAGER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3607 WGST 4.700 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE C«TYf UTAH 34118 
TELEPHONE (801 > 064-6100 
PAX 9H4-6111 
February 14, 2000 
Michael Sutton, E6q. 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viego, CA 92691 
Tel: (949) 206-0550 
Fax: (949) 206-0560 
RE: ALARID V. AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING, INC. 
Dear Mr. Sutton: 
You have previously informed me not to contact Henry Jack 
Moore directly, since hi6 testimony involves his knowledge gained 
while an employee for American. Therefore, please arrange to have 
Mr. Moore available for deposition at a place of hie convenience. 
I have presently set his deposition for March 9, 2000. 
I received a message from Marge, Judge Stirba's clerk, in 
reply to my request for clarification of the Scheduling Order 
regarding the requirement of providing an Expert Report by the 3-
17-00 cut-off date. 
It is now my understanding that "designate" means either a 
report or availability of an expert ready to be deposed. 
As you know, we have provided a report for each expert named 
and have, therefore, complied with the Court/s Order. Since you 
have not provided expert reports, please have your experts 
available for deposition. If any of these dates are inconvenient, 
please let me know and we can reschedule those depositions. 
Following the taking of your experts' depositions, you may 
take the deposition of our experts. 
Sinaerely, 
Ltchel Zager 
Attorney a t La\ 
MZ/lbz 
FAXED 2/14/00 to (949) 206-0560 
cc: John R. Lund, Esq. 
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TtAKE CITY, UTAH 84118 
j * ^ *4-6IOO 
AttoraeyW for PLAINTIFF(S) CASE * 980905332 
DECLARATION RE: DILIGENCE 
1* the undersigned, declare as follows: 
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. I have personal knowledge of the facts set 
forth in this declaration and I could and would competently testify to these facts if called to do so in a court of law. 
On May 3,2001, Our office was hired to serve Henry Jack Moore, Jr., a Deposition Subpoena for a deposition in the 
case of: Fox vs. Puglise (Ventura Superior Court Case No. CIV 194309). We have had difficulty in trying to serve 
Mr, Moore in the past and have also been hired to serve him m other cases, which werealso very difficult due to die 
fact of Mr. Moore's avoiding service. Below is a list of attempts for the above case, Special measures had to be taken 
to and effect service on Mr. Moore at his residence of 7573 West 82nd Street. Playa Del Rey, CA 
May 5,2001 @ 6:00 p.m No answer at door - again we attempted @ 8:00 p.m. lights on inside, but no answer. 
May 6,2001 @ 7:30 a.m No answer at door. 
May 7,2001 @ 2:06 p.m Knocked on the door a lady answered stated that Henry Moore, Jr., was not at his 
residence but in Tennesse for 2 months and she was house sitting and would not give any other information. We did 
not believe her because she asked us why we need Mr. Moore before she told vs he was m Tennesse. 
May 8,2001 @ 10:00 a.m No answer at the door, we could hear somebody inside. We knocked louder but no one 
would come to the door. 
May 10,2001 @ 3:45 p.m No answer at door. Returned again @ 8:00 pjn no answer at door, the lights were on. 
Knocked again but still no answer. Our client cancelled the service because we were out of time to effect service 
properly. 
On August 20,2001 our office was hired to to serve Henry Jack Moore, Jr., a Deposition Subpoena in the case of 
Nolan vs. Eagle Manufacturing Case (Merced Superior Court No. 144728). 
August 21,2001 @ 6:00 p.m. We knocked on the door, no answer. 
August 22,2001 @ 10:15 ajn We knocked on the door, no answer, we went again @ 6:00 p.m no answer. 
August 24,2001 @ 2:30 pjn We knocked on the door, no answer we coulkd hear movment inside, knocked louder 
but still no answer. 
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.CRAFTMASTER WATER HEATER C O . , 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THB 
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KELLY FULMER and 
CHRISTINA FULMER/ 
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CRAPTMA8TBR WATBR HEATER CO, 
at al., 
Defendants. 
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Deposition of HENRY JACK MOORB, 
JR., taken on behalf of Plaintiffs at 
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beginning at 10:00 a.m. and ending at 
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BY: MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
10 | 26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, California 92691 
ll| (714) 206-0550 
Also Present: 
ED HACKNEY 
12 
13 
14 
15 J Videopgrapher: 
16 I ANDY NATION 
ESQOIRB COMMUNICATIONS LTD. 
17 | 2100 North Broadway, Suite 210 
Santa Ana, California 92706 
18 | (714) 569-3373 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disclosure that purportediy was made by the Fulmers; 
is that right? 
A No, 
Q Yes, I am correct? 
A You are correct. 
Q So therefore you did not review a list of 
the documents that were presented by the Fu liners to 
the defendant in this case; is that right? 
A No, I have not. 
Q When did you first learn about fires 
where it was reported that flammable vapors were 
ignited by this standard model gas-fired water heater? 
A This particular unit here? 
Q Well, the standard design. 
A You are asking how far back? 
MR. SUTTON; If you don't understand the 
question, just tell him that you don't understand it. 
TUB WITNESS: Okay, I really don't understand 
exactly what you are asking. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
•' V Q I have one ijuestion for you. 
Do you have an attorney Bitting here? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Sutton is your attorney? 
A yes. 
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Q You have retained Mr. Sutton? 
A Yea: 
Q And are you paying Mr. Sutton? 
MR. SUTTON: Objection. Call* for an 
attorney-client communication. Instruct him not to 
answer. 
BY MR, DOWNING: 
Q Is anyone paying Mr. Sutton on your 
behalf? 
MR. SUTTON; Objection. Foundation. Also 
calls for an attorney-client communication. Instruct 
him not to answer, 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q Have you had conversations with anybody 
other than Mr. Sutton about retaining Mr. Sutton7 
MR. SUTTON; Or some other attorney. 
MR. DOWNING: Oh, 1 am not sure that an 
attorney that worked for his former corporation would 
qualify. He may be an attorney. I'm not saying he's 
, not an attorney. I'm just saying I don't thinK that's 
i ^
 going to get into the attorney-client privilege. 
MR, 8UTTQN: Okay. Your question? I am sorry. 
YcMR, DOWNING: 
Q My question is have you discussed 
staining Mr. Sutton with any persons other than 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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* 
Mr. Sutton? 
A NO. 
Q Has anyone suggested that you retain 
Mr. Sutton? 
MR. SCJTTOK; Excluding any conversations that 
you have had with me, of course. 
MR. DOWNING: Oh, sure, sure. 
THS WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q when did you retain Mr. Sutton? 
A When I was given notice of the 
deposition. 
Q How were you given notice of the 
deposition? 
MR, SUTTON: Objection-
BY MR- DOWNING: 
Q Other than conversations with Mr, Sutton, 
how were you given notice of the deposition? 
MR. SUTTON: That assume8 facts not in evidence 
that there was some method other than conversations 
with me. 
MR. DOWNING: I guess he could have just 
answered and said that there were none other. 
THE WITNESS: None other, 
Y KR, DOWNING: 
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Q Who have you spoken to about giving this 
deposition other than Mr. Sutton? Who have you spoken 
to about giving this deposition other than Mr. Sutton? 
A Mr. Hackney. 
0 when did you speak to Mr. Hackney about 
giving a deposition? 
A December. 
0 December of '97? 
A Yes. 
Q Did Mr. Hackney provide you with any 
documents after December of 199 7? 
A No. 
Q Was Mr. Hackney in the meeting yesterday 
that you had with Mr. Sutton? 
A Yes. 
Q Who else was present in the meeting? 
A Steve Murphy. 
Q Who else? 
A That was it. 
Q Are you being compensated in any way for 
. coming here to give the deposition? 
A Yes. 
Q How are you being compensated? 
A Being paid. 
Q And who is paying you? 
41 
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A Southcorp. 
Q Southcorp USA? 
A Yea. 
Q And what is your agreement with Southcorp 
USA with regard to payment? How much? 
A $150 an hour. 
Q And when does chat start and whan does 
that stop? It's from the time that you left your 
home? 
A Yes. 
Q From the time that you left your home in 
California or Tennessee? 
A California, 
Q From the time that you leave until the 
time that you return; is that right? 
A Yes, portal to portal. 
Q Portal to portal-
Have you had any other meetings with 
regard to this case with anyone other than coming here 
and meeting with Mr. Sutton in this deposition? 
A No. 
Q Have you billed anyone for any of your 
time in this matter yet? 
A No. 
Q This agreement to pay you the SI50 an 
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hour, that would bo *ie« . 
w a be also, you add any costs that you 
incur? 
A
 Any expenses. 
Q Do you have an a c c e n t with Southcorp 
USA that they «re to pay your 1P0,I A 
H y y o u r le9«l expenses for 
Mr, Sutton? 
» • SUTlw, Objection. va9ue. ^ l g u o u l l , 
irrelavant. 
5fou can answer. 
THB WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q How long have you known that this 
«oor-nounted standard model ga8-fire<J w a t e r n W e r 
has a *usceptiMlity Cf i g n i t i n g flamrnable v a p o r e ? 
MR- SUTTON: objection. Argumentative, assumes 
facts not in evidence. 
You may answer. 
MR. DOWNING: Let me rephrase it. 
Q Does this standard floor-mounted 
gas-fired water heater have the susceptibility to 
ignite flammable vapors? 
< MR. SUTTON: Same objections. 
You may answer. 
hl
- THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Y
 MR. DOWNING; 
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
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KARA L. PETTIT (A8659) 
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing 
and American Water Heater Co. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REOPEN 
DISCOVERY TO TAKE THE 
DEPOSITION OF HENRY JACK 
MOORE 
Defendants. 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, 
INC., 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
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vs. 
W.KENT NELSON, etal., 
Third Party Defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If Plaintiff "wasted time and money tracking Mr. Moore down all over the country," it is 
certainly not a matter of record. Other than issuing a Notice of Expert Depositions that included 
Mr. Moore's name amongst several expert witnesses, Plaintiff has not made any efforts 
whatsoever to depose Mr. Moore. In fact, she has not attempted depose any employee or former 
employee of Defendants. During the over three years that this case has been pending, Plaintiff 
noticed up Mr. Moore's deposition on only one occasion in March of 2000, right before the 
March 17,2000 cutoff. However, she did not follow through with this deposition. After 
Plaintiffs counsel learned that Defendants could not compel Mr. Moore's attendance at the 
deposition, Plaintiff decided not to depose him. Plaintiff did not issue a subpoena for Mr. 
Moore, nor did she try to locate and serve him. Plaintiff simply let the date come and go, without 
doing anything at all. 
It would be extremely unfair and prejudicial to Defendants to allow Plaintiff to reopen 
discovery to depose Mr. Moore on the eve of trial, especially in light of the fact that she 
apparently intends to use his testimony as the "heart of her punitive damages case." Punitive 
damages are a serious and extraordinary measure. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to depose Mr. 
Moore during the almost two year fact discovery period. However, she chose not to depose him. 
Instead of developing evidence through depositions, Plaintiff decided to take a gamble that she 
could introduce prior deposition or trial testimony from other cases as evidence at the trial in this 
case. Ever since Plaintiff first raised the issue of Mr. Moore's deposition via written discovery in 
August of 1999, Defendants have informed Plaintiff that they objected to using the previous 
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testimony as evidence in this case. This notwithstanding, Plaintiff did not ever seek a ruling 
from the Court as to whether or not the previous testimony would be admissible in this matter. It 
would be fundamentally unfair to place the burden of responding to new evidence on Defendants 
at this late hour simply because Plaintiff took a gamble and lost. 
Plaintiff apparently intends to have her experts rely on Mr. Moore's testimony. 
Consequently, after Mr. Moore's deposition, Mr. Fandey and Mr. Hoffman would have to be 
redeposed to learn how their opinions were affected by Mr. Moore's testimony. Defendants still 
do not know what punitive damage evidence Plaintiff intends to present at trial, much less what 
testimony she will elicit in this regard from Mr. Moore. If Plaintiff is allowed to develop 
punitive damage evidence at this late stage, it is only fair that Defendants similarly be allowed to 
develop opposing evidence and defenses. It is prejudicial and unfair to put Defendants in the 
untenable position to scramble hurriedly to effectively accomplish all of this in the two weeks 
before trial simply because Plaintiff failed to avail herself of the opportunity to obtain and 
preserve this testimony back in March of 2000. For these reasons, Defendants respectfully 
request that this Court deny Plaintiffs motion to reopen discovery to depose Mr. Moore. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 28, 1998 the Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. 
2. After several stipulated extensions, March 17, 2000 was the last day for fact 
discovery. See September 13,1999 Scheduling Order, attached as Exhibit A. 
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3. On February 14,2000, Plaintiff issued a Notice of Expert Depositions which also 
indicated that Mr. Moore's deposition would be taken in Playa Del Rey, California on March 9, 
2000. See Notice of Deposition, attached as Exhibit B. 
4. On this same day, Mr. Zager wrote to ask Mr. Sutton to arrange for Mr. Moore's 
attendance at the deposition. See Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reopen Discovery. 
5. On February 17,2000, Mr. Sutton promptly and clearly responded: "I do not have 
the ability to require [Mr. Moore's] attendance at deposition." As a courtesy, Mr. Sutton offered 
to try to reach Mr. Moore and determine if he would agree to appear at the deposition voluntarily. 
See Letter dated February 17,2000, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
6. On February 18,2000, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager were together in Salt Lake City 
for the deposition of Dr. Morris. Following that deposition, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Zager discussed 
the Moore deposition and Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager that it was uncertain if Mr. Moore 
could be reached because he travels quite a bit in his retirement. Mr. Sutton informed Mr. Zager 
that the safest tiling for him to do was to utilize the available procedures to have an out-of-state 
subpoena prepared for service on Mr. Moore. 
7. To Defendants' knowledge, Plaintiff took no steps thereafter to get Mr. Moore to 
his deposition as noticed. Plaintiff did not issue a subpoena. Plaintiff did not seek an order for 
out-of-state service. March 9,2000 simply came and went without the deposition taking place. 
Defendants are aware of no other effort by Plaintiff, nor even mention of the interest in deposing 
Mr. Moore, before the March 17,2000 fact discovery cut off in this matter. 
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8. Other than the February 2000 Notice of Expert Depositions that include Mr. 
Moore, Plaintiff did not make any effort whatsoever to depose even a single employee or former 
employee of Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff only conducted one non-expert deposition in this case, 
which was the first half of Kent Nelson's deposition. Plaintiffs apparent strategy was to rely on 
evidence developed by plaintiffs in other water heater cases in other jurisdictions. 
9. During the months of May and June of 2000, the parties conducted numerous 
expert witness depositions. The last expert deposition took place on July 6,2000. 
10. Since the discovery cutoff expired, this trial has been scheduled to go on three 
occasions: June 20,2000, August 8, 2000, and May 7,2001. The trial is currently set to begin 
October 29, 2001. 
11. Plaintiff first raised the issue of Mr. Moore's previous testimony via written 
discovery in August of 1999. At this time, Defendants objected to the authenticity of the 
deposition transcripts. Moreover, throughout this case, Defendants repeatedly have stated their 
position to Plaintiff that she could not use prior deposition or trial transcripts as evidence for her 
case in chief. See October 12, 2000 letter from Mr. Sutton which states: 
Mr. Zager has requested on multiple prior occasions that we 
stipulate that deposition transcripts of various individuals taken in 
other cases be used in this case with the same force and effect as 
though said depositions were taken in this case. We have 
repeatedly declined that request. Accordingly, I must again advise 
that I am unable to stipulate that you may use prior deposition 
transcripts from other cases at the time of trial in this case. 
See Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen Discovery. 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9. At the September 17,2001 pretrial and motion hearing, Mr. Zager alleged that Mr. 
Moore's testimony was the heart of Plaintiffs punitive damages case. Mr. Zager also indicated 
that Plaintiffs experts relied upon Mr. Moore's previous deposition testimony in reaching their 
opinions in this case. However, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs experts could not rely upon Mr. 
Moore's testimony, unless it was given in the context of this case. 
10. At the September 17, 2000 hearing, the Court also stated that it did not see that 
Defendants had thwarted any efforts by Plaintiff to secure Mr. Moore's attendance at a 
deposition. Additionally, the Court remarked that Plaintiff could have compelled Mr. Moore's 
attendance, but it was just something Plaintiff decided not to do. 
ARGUMENT 
IT WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR AND PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS 
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO DEVELOP NEW PUNITIVE DAMAGE EVIDENCE ON 
THE EVE OF TRIAL WHEN SHE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESERVE MR, 
MOORE'S TESTIMONY DURING THE ALMOST TWO YEAR FACT DISCOVERY 
PERIOD WHICH EXPIRED IN MARCH OF 2000. 
The discovery rules promulgated in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to 
eliminate last minute surprises and ensure that parties are aware in advance of the evidence their 
opponents will be producing at trial. For instance, Rule 26(a)(4) requires parties to provide their 
opponents with final witness and exhibit lists at least thirty (30) days before trial. Moreover, 
although scheduling orders should never be so inflexible as to not accommodate exigencies that 
may occur, they are necessary to expedite the flow of cases through the court system and should 
not be lightly disregarded. See Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993). The Arnold Court 
upheld a trial court's refusal to consider an expert affidavit attached to a summary judgment 
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memorandum on the ground that it was filed in derogation of the scheduling order entered eight 
months earlier, and in view of the fact that the party had not at any time asked to be relieved of 
the time requirement of the order. Id 
With only two weeks left before trial, Plaintiff asks this Court to reopen fact discovery 
although the cutoff expired one and one-half years ago.. Thereafter, numerous expert depositions 
took place. The last expert deposition of Ed Karnes, third-party defendant's expert, occurred on 
July 6, 2000. Both fact and expert discovery have been closed for well over a year. Plaintiff 
cannot credibly claim that this is an exigent circumstance. This is not a situation where Plaintiff 
did not know of the existence of the witness and therefore, could not have taken his deposition 
during the discovery period. Here, Plaintiff simply chose not to follow through on the deposition 
of Mr. Moore after learning that Defendants could not compel his attendance at a deposition 
because he was a former employee. Plaintiff made no efforts whatsoever to secure his attendance 
at the deposition and no subpoenas were ever issued in this case for Mr. Moore. 
The Tenth Circuit has outlined the relevant factors used by courts in deciding whether to 
extend or reopen discovery: Ml) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) 
whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was diligent in 
obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the foreseeability of the 
need for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and 
6) the likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence." Smith v. United States, 834 
F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1987). In Smith, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's denial of the 
plaintiff taxpayer's request to reopen discovery to conduct depositions. The trial court denied the 
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request because the taxpayer had eight months during discovery in which to take the depositions, 
the request was made approximately three weeks before trial, and the discovery was not relevant 
to the narrow issue to be tried. Id The Tenth Circuit held that the trial judge acted well within 
the range of allowable discretion in denying the taxpayer's motion. Id at 170. 
THE FACTORS SET FORTH BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT CLEARLY SHOW THAT 
REOPENING DISCOVERY AT THIS LATE DATE IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN THIS CASE. 
In analyzing these six factors with respect to the case at hand, it is clear that these 
considerations weigh totally against Plaintiffs request to reopen discovery to depose Mr. Moore. 
The Trial Would Likely Begin Less than One Week after Mr. Moore's Deposition. 
First, the trial is imminent and is scheduled to begin on October 29, 2001. By the time 
the deposition could perhaps even be scheduled and occur, it mostly likely would take place with 
less than one week before trial. Moreover, this is not a one-day trial for which Defendants could 
quickly prepare. It is anticipated that the trial in this matter will take four weeks. This is a 
products liability case involving numerous expert witnesses, and both compensatory as well as 
punitive claims. 
In October of 2000. Defendants Informed Plaintiff that They Objected to Reopening 
Discovery to Depose Mr. Moore. 
Second, Defendants oppose this request, and Plaintiff was on notice of their position back 
in October of 2000, approximately one year ago. Mr. Sutton relayed in his October 12, 2000 
letter to Plaintiffs counsel, that Defendants would oppose the reopening of discovery to depose 
Mr. Moore because it was well past the March of 2000 discovery cutoff, and additional expert 
discovery would be required thereafter. This notwithstanding, Plaintiff took no action and did 
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not ask the Court to reopen discovery to depose Mr. Moore at that time. Instead, Plaintiff 
decided to rely on her assumption that she would be able to introduce the prior transcripts as 
evidence in her case in chief. 
Defendants Will be Prejudiced if Plaintiff is Allowed to Develop New Evidence on the 
Evepf Trial. 
Third, Defendants will be unfairly prejudiced if discovery is reopened at this late 
juncture. Until now, Plaintiff has made no real effort to develop testimony from any employee or 
former employee of Defendants. In fact, the only fact witness the Plaintiff deposed was Kent 
Nelson. Defendants have prepared their case to respond to the evidence that Plaintiff has 
developed in this matter. Defendants have not prepared their case to respond to evidence that 
plaintiffs in other cases may have presented. 
Plaintiff seeks to depose Mr. Moore to develop evidence for her punitive damages claims. 
Defendants still do not know what punitive damage evidence Plaintiff intends to present at trial, 
much less what testimony she will elicit in this regard from Mr. Moore. Consequently, it is 
unknown how Defendants will need to respond to new testimony developed by Plaintiff. 
Defendant may need to designate additional former employees as witnesses or additional 
documents in response to evidence developed by Plaintiff in Mr. Moore's deposition. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel has previously stated they intend to have their experts 
rely on Mr. Moore's testimony. Consequently, after Mr. Moore's deposition, Mr. Fandey and 
Mr. Hoffman would have to be redeposed to learn how their opinions were affected by Mr. 
Moore's testimony. It is prejudicial and unfair to put Defendants in the untenable position to 
scramble hurriedly to effectively accomplish all of this in the two weeks before trial simply 
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because Plaintiff failed to avail herself of the opportunity to obtain and preserve this testimony 
during the almost two year discovery period. 
Plaintiff Made No Effort to Secure Mr. Moore's Attendance at a Deposition in this Case. 
The fourth and most egregious factor is that Plaintiff did not exercise diligence in 
obtaining this discovery within the guidelines established by the Court's scheduling order. The 
complaint in this matter was filed on May 28,1998 and the discovery cutoff was extended on 
several occasions. Pursuant to the last revised scheduling order, fact discovery ended on March 
17,2000. During this entire time, the only effort Plaintiff made to depose Mr. Moore was to 
notice up his deposition on one occasion for March 9,2000, one week prior to the cutoff. 
As this Court noted on September 17,2001, although Plaintiff knew she had to do 
something to secure Mr. Moore's attendance at this deposition, she did not do anything to try to 
get him there. Plaintiff did not issue a subpoena. Plaintiff did not seek an order for out-of-state 
service. Nevertheless, Plaintiff tries to blame Defendants for not "producing" Mr. Moore, 
instead of acknowledging her own lack of diligence. Plaintiffs memorandum is completely void 
of any reference to any effort made on Plaintiffs behalf to secure Mr. Moore's attendance at a 
deposition. Instead, the memorandum discusses some other individual's efforts to serve Mr. 
Moore with a subpoena in an unrelated case, in another jurisdiction, over a year after the 
discovery cutoff in this case. 
In lieu of developing testimony in this case, Plaintiffs counsel made a strategic decision 
to rely upon prior testimony of Mr. Moore and other former employees of Defendants that other 
plaintiffs obtained in other unrelated water heater cases. Plaintiff did not attempt to depose any 
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of Defendants' employees or former employees. It would be unfair to penalize and prejudice 
Defendants because Plaintiffs counsel now believes their decision was unwise. 
From the Very Outset of this Case. Plaintiff Knew She Wanted to Have Testimony from 
Mr. Moore and Knew that Defendants Would Object to Her Using Mr. Moore's Prior 
Testimony from Other Cases. 
Fifth, Plaintiffs counsel obviously foresaw their alleged need for Mr. Moore's testimony 
during the time allowed for discovery by the court. Plaintiffs counsel stated that Mr. Moore's 
testimony is the "heart of Plaintiff s punitive claims." Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel has been 
aware all along that Defendants would object to the admission of Mr. Moore's prior deposition or 
trial testimony from other cases. Nevertheless, Plaintiff made essentially no efforts to depose 
Mr. Moore. Nor did Plaintiff seek a ruling from this Court as to whether or not the prior 
testimony would be admissible. Defendants should not be the ones to bear the burden of 
Plaintiff s case strategy decisions. 
Although Mr. Moore's Testimony May be Relevant, the Plaintiff Had Ample Opportunity 
to Preserve this Evidence, and By Choosing to Not Depose Mr. Moore. She Created the 
Alleged Prejudice She Now Claims Would Occur if Her Motion to Reopen is Denied. 
Last, although Mr. Moore's testimony may ultimately be relevant to the punitive portions 
of Plaintiff s claims, it is not relevant to her compensatory claims. Moreover, the prejudice and 
fundamental unfairness evident in the preceding five factors far outweigh any relevance it may 
have considering the totality of the circumstances. If Mr. Moore's testimony is so crucial to 
Plaintiffs claims, why did she fail to avail herself of the opportunity to depose him during 
discovery? Because she cannot identify any efforts that she took to secure Mr. Moore's 
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attendance at a deposition, Plaintiff makes an unwarranted attack on Defendants' counsel, 
blaming him for failing to voluntarily "produce" Mr. Moore at the deposition in March of 2000. 
However, the record shows that Plaintiff made absolutely no efforts to follow through on 
a deposition of Mr. Moore. In fact, Plaintiff made no efforts to preserve the testimony of any fact 
witnesses other than Kent Nelson. Plaintiff's strategy in this case has been to rely upon evidence 
that other plaintiffs have obtained in other, unrelated water heater cases. Defendants have 
prepared their case accordingly. It is unfairly prejudicial to Defendants to force them to reopen 
discovery to not only to depose Mr. Moore, but to develop defenses to this new testimony, as 
well as to redepose the experts in this case who will rely upon Mr. Moore's testimony, on the eve 
of trial, especially regarding claims as serious as punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny Plaintiff's motion. 
DATED this of October, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JohnR. Lund 
KaraL. Pettit 
N:\I9944\I\MOOREOPP.WPD Attorneys for Defendants American 
Appliance Manufacturing and American 
Water Heater Co. 
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I must say that I was offended by the allegations made in your July 19,2001, coirespondence. It 
seems that you and I have always been able to work amicably on cases, despite our 
disagreements as to the factual basis and histrionics presented by various claims, I am aware of 
no efforts made by Mr. Moore, at any time, in any case, to evade service of any subpena. As you 
know, Mr. Moore is retired, maintains residences in more than one (1) stale, and frequently 
travels as part of his retirement In the event you have bad difficulty in the past effectuating 
service of a Deposition Subpena upon Mr. Moore, I am confident that that difficulty was based 
upon Mr. Moore's retirement status and frequent travel, as opposed to any volitional attempt by 
hin to evade service. Notwithstanding your mis-characterizations to the contrary, which seem to 
take on a personal vent against Mr. Moore, we are willing to afford you the courtesy and 
cooperation previously described in this correspondence. It seems that personal accusations 
and/or vendettas will serve no useful purpose in terms of cooperative handling of this litigation. 
In terms of your accusations thai my legal assistant did not respond to you as expeditiously as 
you would have preferred, please be advised that bonafldc efforts to contact Mr. Moore were 
being made, as we had promised you we would do, following your telephonic request and prior 
to your July 19,2001, correspondence. Unfortunately, given Mr. Moore's retirement and travel 
status, we were unsuccessful in discussing your request with him such that we could obtain his 
authority to provide you the assurances that have been given in this correspondence. I apologize 
that we did not move as quickly as you would have liked. 
I am hopeful that we can remove the persona] charges from this litigation as we move forward. 
Thank you for your anticipated courtesy and cooperation in this regard. 
MSS:kjc 
cc: Henry Jack Moore, Jr. 
Scott R. Phillips, Esq/SOUTHCORP USA, INC. 
Dean M. Robinson, EsqVLOW, BALL & LYNCH 
Steven P. Burke, Esq,/SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD 
Christopher W. Larapc, Esq./TENENB AUM, LAMPE & FROMSON 
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^chacl S. Sutton 
Thomai M. Murphy 
JoatphA. Haodnx 
Pittioki.Wehaie 
PttarT.CoUrosn 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
Attorntyi aft U w 
26056 Accro 
KCiuion Vicjo, CA 92691-276* 
Takphonr (949) 206-0550 
Facsimile: (949) 206-0560 
E-Mail: wtton*murphy@picbtl).net 
Intern*: www lawyenxom/iuitw>4tm\irp|.y 
12)002 
IfflFfiCT 
JUL 2 7 2001 
T5U U L b ^ 
Erin R.TOtaatWtr-—*••••• • • • • • 
MaicJ.D EJlti 
S. Moniquc Jama 
July 24, 2001 
V ^ M a q ^ 4 / 4 ? H ^ 
Edward F. Downing, ill, Esq. 
GAUTHIER, DOWNING, LABARRE, 
BEISER&DEAN 
3500N.HuiIcn Street 
Mctaire, LA 70002 
RE: NOLAN VS EAGLE MANUFACTURING 
Dear Ed: 
This correspondence will acknowledge receipt of your facsimile transmittal dated July 19,2001. 
Preliminarily, please be advised that it will not be necessary for you to effectuate service of a 
Deposition Subpona upon Mr. Moore with respect to the October 11,2001, deposition date 
heroin. I have discussed your desire to proceed with the deposition of Mr. Moore with respect to 
this case with him and I have now received his authority to voluntarily produce him for 
deposition in this case without necessity of service of a Deposition Subpena. At this juncture, 
October U, 2001, is a good date on both Mr. Moore's calendar and my own. However, given 
the fact that the deposition date is approximately three (3) months away, something may develop 
on either Mr. Moore's calendar, or my own, that will render that date inconvenient. If such a 
development occurs, you will promptly be notified. If it becomes necessary to change the 
deposition, you will not be required to serve Mr. Moore with a Deposition Subpena, so long as 
you will be cooperative with us in terms of a revised date and time for the deposition. Both Mr. 
Moore and I do desire that the deposition take placo in my office, whether it proceeds on October 
11,2001, or some other date. By virtue of these agreements made by me on behalf of Mi. 
Moore, please confirm that your office and Mr. Lamped office will take no steps to effectuate 
service of a Deposition Subpena upon Mr. Moore. I am particularly interested in your assurance 
that process servers will not interact with Mr. Moore's wife, son, or any other family members. 
It would seem that given the assurances that I have provided in this correspondence, than any 
attempt to interact with Mr. Moore or any of his family members would be harassive. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 980905332 
™«'DISTRICT COURT 
JAN 3 0 2Q02 
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BEFORE 
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Sandy, Utah 84092
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; OCTOBER 12, 2001 
HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Let's see, Mr. Zager, you get to lead 
off, 
MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Is that right? 
MR. SUTTON: I believe so. 
MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Your Honor. Has the Court had 
the opportunity to review the motions and the attachments to 
plaintiff's motion? 
THE COURT: Yes. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. ZAGER: Plaintiff believes there are several 
reasons that the Court should use its broad discretion in 
exercising its equitable powers in the interest of justice to 
accomplish a just and fair result and plaintiff requests the 
Court to permit in it's motion the taking of the deposition of 
defendant's employee, Mr. Moore, or essentially to reconsider 
its earlier ruling excluding Mr. Moore's prior trial transcript 
testimony for some of the reasons that I'll present here today. 
First of all, plaintiff reasonably relies and had 
relied, she believed that the prior sworn testimony of Mr. 
Moore would be admissible. Plaintiff will demonstrate that 
there will be no surprise nor prejudice to the defendant by 
permitting the deposition to proceed at this time and that the 
1 
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evidence contained or anticipated to be received, will be 
highly relevant and in fact, critical to plaintiff's case and 
that there'll be no unfairness to the defendant. 
By way of background, plaintiff believed that the 
prior deposition and trial transcript of Mr. Moore would be 
admissible in this case for several reasons, those found in the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 8012 an admission by a party, 
opponent where Mr. Moore unlike what was represented that Mr. 
Moore is no longer employed by the defendant. It's true that 
Mr. Moore is retired from his previous position as the Vice 
President and Safety Engineer, but I will present evidence 
today to the Court that Mr. Moore is in fact still on the 
payroll and still receives a salary from the defendant for 
giving depositions related to information he obtained while 
being an employee of the defendant. As a party opponent, no 
subpoena was ever necessary, simply the Notice of Deposition 
would have been sufficient for the defendant to produce Mr. 
Moore. Plaintiff also relies in Rule 803-24. I'm sure the 
Court is familiar where transcripts in this case are 
trustworthy. They're offered to prove materials facts. 
They're probative and the defendant has known of the contents 
of Mr. Moore's testimony for over three years. Utah Rule of 
Evidence 804, although requiring unavailability and, in fact, 
Mr. Moore is outside the subpoena power and jurisdiction of 
this Court, 804-1, former testimony of a witness where the 
2 
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defendant had a motive at trial. Here certainly defendant did 
have a motive to rehabilitate Mr. Moore at time of trial* 
We're not talking about simply a deposition here, but an actual 
trial proceeding. 804-3, a statement against interest and 
804-5, again, where the information is trustworthy and 
probative. 
In fact, the Court should aware that plaintiff's 
experts in their prior depositions, have already relied upon 
the prior testimony of Mr. Moore. Again, plaintiff believes 
that her reliance on the admissibility was reasonable and it 
was not until this Court's recent ruling in response to 
Defendant's Motion in Limine that plaintiff realized that she 
would then be required to take Mr. Moore's deposition and 
plaintiff acted promptly, notifying, in fact, defendant at that 
hearing of her intentions to open discovery to take the 
deposition of Mr. Moore. 
I also contacted Mr. Sutton and let him know of our 
intentions and asked him if he would cooperate to try and get 
Mr. Moore's deposition and dates set up in the event that the 
Court allowed the deposition to go forward, in fact, Mr. Moore 
testified yesterday, voluntarily at Mr. Sutton's office, again, 
referring back in his deposition and ratifying his testimony in 
the Ellis matter. 
It's critical for the Court to know the relationship 
that exists between the defendant and Mr. Moore. The last time 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
we were in Court, Mr. Sutton, I believe was less than candid 
with the Court when he presented the image that Mr. Moore was 
someone that the defendant had no control over and that he 
could not require Mr. Moore to voluntarily attend. In a letter 
from Mr. Sutton to me, it was made clear that if we were to 
proceed forward on Mr. Moore's deposition that Mr. Sutton would 
need two days, not one day, to block out his calendar because 
one of the days would be used to prepare Mr. Moore for the 
deposition the next day, clearly showing that Mr. Moore would 
do more than simply attend pursuant to a subpoena, that he 
would voluntarily present himself at Mr. Sutton's office the 
day before or at whatever date he and his attorney agreed on to 
prepare Mr. Moore for deposition and, in fact, it's also clear 
that Mr. Sutton is Mr. Moore's attorney, has been his attorney 
in other deposition against the defendant, American, and that's 
presented in the attachments which I'm sure the Court has 
reviewed. In fact, the defendant in every case where Mr. Moore 
testifies where American is a Defendant, Mr. Moore is 
represented by the same attorney who is the attorney in the 
case in chief and that defendant not only pays Mr. Moore $150 
to testify from portal to portal as an expert, not a lay 
witness, but also provides Mr. Moore and pays for his 
representation by the attorney on the case. 
In Mr. Moore's deposition at Page 26 in the Ellis 
matter, Mr. Moore has testified that he always is agreeable to 
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1 presenting himself voluntarily for depositions in the twenty 
2 odd cases that he has testified for. He has never refused to 
3 testify and again, I think the Court and myself, for some 
4 period of time, were misled in believing that Mr. Moore was the 
5 problem in not showing for the deposition. In fact, Mr. Moore 
6 testifies that he is always agreeable to voluntarily present 
7 himself at depositions. 
8 Further evidence of the control the defendant has 
9 over Mr. Moore again was related in the fact that Mr. Moore 
10 would show up early, as I've mentioned. In connection with the 
11 deposition taken yesterday, it's odd that Mr. Sutton sent a 
12 letter to Mr. Downey who is the attorney for the plaintiff in 
13 the Nolan matter where Mr. Moore testified yesterday at Mr. 
14 Sutton's office voluntarily and that letter cautioned the 
15 attorney, Mr. Downey, not to subpoena Mr. Moore and in fact, 
16 told Mr. Downey in that letter if he was to subpoena Mr. Moore, 
17 Mr. Sutton would deem that to be harassment. So the opposite 
18 stance was taken cautioning not to subpoena Mr. Moore, that 
19 that would be harassment. 
20 We intended to use, if we were required, if the 
21 Court, you know, simply couldn't order Mr. Moore to appear as a 
22 party in the event that we cannot use the prior trial 
23 transcript, we intend to use this same process server as the 
24 one used in Nolan, the one that Mr. Moore had a problem with, 
25 some question of whether he evaded service, which prompted Mr. 
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Sutton's letter cautioning, please do not subpoena Mr. Moore 
because this particular process server would somehow be deemed 
harassment. We intend to use the same process server. I told 
that to Mr. Sutton. Still, Mr. Sutton refused to voluntarily 
present Mr. Moore for a deposition. 
The bottom line I think that we're looking at here 
and I know the Court had some concern with introducing 
deposition or trial testimony in this case because the jury 
would not have the benefit of being able to observe the 
demeanor and candor of Mr. Moore at trial. We're no further 
along if we were to take Mr. Moore's deposition anew because we 
cannot require Mr. Moore to show up at trial, so we would just 
be introducing a new deposition versus the previous trial 
transcript into evidence. The jury is not going to be any 
further benefitted because Mr. Moore still will not be 
compelled to appear. It is only the defendant who controls 
their own party to have him appear in the court. We cannot do 
that. I imagine that if the testimony is permitted by the 
Court to be used, you can probably anticipate that Mr. Moore 
will be brought here as a witness by the defendant who 
exercises control over Mr. Moore as their client. 
Furthermore, the testimony given by Mr. Moore which 
the Court has now had an opportunity to see, is generic, is not 
case specific. His testimony is about what he knew and what 
the defendant knew about their product for years and years, 
6 
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about the inherent dangers and about the cost issues involving 
what profit they would loose if they made their product safer, 
for instance, by including water heater sands. It's clear that 
the testimony given three years ago by Mr. Moore is going to be 
a lot fresher in Mr. Moore's mind that it is now, that the 
testimony is going to be a lot more probative and more reliable 
taken three years ago and the Court should be aware that 
plaintiff does not seek to discover any new evidence or 
anything that has not been contained in that deposition. We 
will not go outside the parameters of that deposition or trial 
testimony. We will not seek to discover any new evidence. We 
will only seek to have Mr. Moore basically ratify, as he did 
yesterday, the testimony that he gave in the Ellis matter, 
generic, non-specific case testimony which was fresher in his 
mind several years ago than it probably will be now. We simply 
intend to read the old testimony, the admissions, the 
declarations against interest or however you want to define it, 
his testimony into a new booklet. 
Under these circumstances, we would ask the Court to 
reconsider allowing us to use the prior trial transcript 
testimony that Mr. Moore has previously given, but if the Court 
feels that we need to re-read that testimony, that generic 
testimony into a new deposition booklet, then we would ask the 
Court to order the defendant to produce his client without the 
necessity of subpoena at his office at a time prior to trial. 
7 
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Obviously, the last leg that we would propose, is 
that if the Court required us to again hunt Mr. Moore down at 
this time and track him down, it's pretty clear now that Mr. 
Sutton knows his whereabouts, knows where Mr. Moore can be 
served, has been in constant contact with him, just saw him 
yesterday and probably the day before for preparation of this 
deposition and that they cooperate in having Mr. Moore served 
and not evading service. 
Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Before you sit down, give me a little 
insight on why you think 801, 803 and 4, apply. Maybe I 
misunderstand but I thought those were rules that apply to 
define or create exceptions for what we call, hearsay. I'm not 
real clear how they apply to this little discussion we're 
having today. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, Your Honor, if in fact, Mr. Moore, 
because he still is paid $150 by the defendant to testify in 
matters from portal to portal— 
THE COURT: Let's assume that's true. 
MR. ZAGER: Let's assume he's a party? 
THE COURT: Let's assume all that's true, what does 
that have to do with you wanting either to depose him at this 
late date or - I guess my question really is, why did you 
recently rely on the idea that testimony he'd given in another 
case, in another jurisdiction, other parties, would suddenly be 
8 
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admissible here? What precedent is there for that? I'm not 
arguing that those rules you described don't exist. I 
understand they do. Where has it ever been done? Yeah, we're 
going to take the testimony from a case out of Tennessee and 
say, here, we'll read it to you, ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury? I thought - maybe, this is more editorial, but I thought 
maybe the reason the jury was here was to measure the reliable 
of the witness and you seem to be saying to me, you know, I 
just thought we didn't have to go through that. Is there a 
case where this kind of process is used? 
MR. ZAGER: First Your Honor, there's nothing we can 
do to require Mr. Moore — 
THE COURT: Let's set aside that part. Where in 
anybody's history, guide me - I guess I'm trying to ask you to 
help me. Tell me where this is sanctioned. You take, you 
know, trial testimony where they're essentially not the same 
case, not the same jurisdiction, and say, Well, we'll use that 
in our trial? Where is this done? Where is this upheld? Is 
there like case authority for this proposition? We'd like this 
to be the way the world works? I mean, I guess, I confess to 
you, it was such an astonishing thought to me, that I never 
noticed it before. Where is this done before? 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, I guess I'd like to just 
point simply to the rule and say that Rule, for instance, 801 
and 2, talks about admissions by party opponent when the 
9 
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document containing the admission is one that's genuine, 
trustworthy, and has guarantees of reliability and one that was 
taken at a time when the defendant had a similar motive to 
cross examine or rehabilitate the witness and our position is 
what greater moment would a defendant have to rehabilitate 
their own witness from damaging testimony than at trial and so* 
if in fact, Mr. Moore is a party to the lawsuit and has made 
declarations against interests or admissions in a sworn 
document during the time of trial, dealing with non-specific 
case information but basically just what he knew about what the 
defendant knew about their product, that it just seems so clear 
that that kind of sworn testimony at a time when the defendant 
had every opportunity and motive to cross examine and 
rehabilitate that witness, that there would be no question that 
that kind of evidence is exactly what is intended by the rule, 
that it's not hearsay and that it is admissible because the 
written document, albeit the trial transcript, what greater 
guarantee of trustworthiness can you have than a party making a 
damaging statement under oath at time of trial? 
THE COURT: Well, I can answer that. It seems to me 
that every trial is a different event. One could argue, I 
think, quite readily that, and I don't know anything about the 
Ellis case, but one could say, Well, in Ellis we thought we had 
a lock on xx' or we thought we were losing on yy'. It just 
seems to me that each of these things is a beast unto itself 
10 
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and your argument seems to say, Well, anytime I go to trial, I 
ought to be ready for every contingency and my point is, every 
trial is a different event and I'm sorry, I guess, I now see 
what you're saying but I think we have such a different view, 
it's just - my answer to your question, is they are just such 
different animals that maybe you have no motive. Maybe you've 
conceded some points. Maybe you just, for trial strategy in 
that trial, want to do nothing. I don't know why it is Mr. 
Zager, but it seems to me without much effort, somebody can 
think up a lot of reasons why you don't do, in that particular 
instance, what you might want to do here. 
MR. ZAGER: In 20 depositions given by Mr. Moore in 
cases involving the Defendant American, Mr. Moore testified the 
same, that American knew the product was dangerous and they 
didn't fix it for these reasons. In fact, on Page 135 of the 
Ellis - "And your company knew, let's talk about in 1990, that 
if the water heaters had been installed on stands, that would 
reduce the likelihood that someone would get burned." And the 
answer given on the following page was, "It could reduce some 
of the instances, yes." "And you made a conscious decision not 
to include the safety device with your products?" The answer 
is yes. And that is not going to change if we take his 
deposition tomorrow and it didn't change yesterday when his 
deposition was taken in the Nolan case and it didn't change in 
the 20 other cases, but if the Court is troubled that we need 
11 
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to take that testimony for a 21st time again. There's no 
unfairness to the defendant to allow us now to take that 
deposition. The defendant has long known that the testimony -
we do not intend to go outside the parameters of the questions 
that were already asked and if the Court finds that, in fact, 
because Mr. Moore is being paid by the defendant for these 
depositions and is in fact controlled by the defendant and is 
in fact a party even though he now longer has his position as 
Vice President of Safety, then he should have been produced 
when we noticed up the deposition without the need for a 
subpoena and it was only because of Mr. Sutton's misleading 
statements and he comes before the Court, I believe with 
unclean hands, that Mr. Moore wasn't presented voluntarily as 
Mr. Moore has testified he always presents himself voluntarily. 
So one must wonder why in one case, the attorney for the 
defendant will not present Mr. Moore and in another case, not 
only will he present Mr. Moore but caution the other attorney 
not to subpoena him. 
It seems to be Your Honor, that it's not Mr. Moore 
that is the problem nor Mr. Moore that is making a decision as 
to why he is voluntary or not, it seems to me that it is the 
attorney for the defendant who is deciding whether or not to 
produce Mr. Moore at his own whim and for his own reasons. 
THE COURT: As you now speak, I guess I suddenly see 
where - I started from really a different premise, Mr. Zager. 
12 
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My premise was you were going to call Mr. Moore as a witness. 
I guess you never intended to. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, you can't, he's outside the 
subpoena power of the Court. 
THE COURT: I didn't ask you -
MR. ZAGER: We would love to. 
THE COURT: You're not going to have any witness but 
a person that's within the subpoena power of this Court for 
your case in chief? 
MR. ZAGER: Well, we have our own experts but not 
hostile witnesses. I don't see — 
THE COURT: Okay. But I guess what I never heard 
from you, you asked Moore to come and he said nah, never on a 
bet. 
MR. ZAGER: Defendant instructed us that we were not 
to contact Mr. Moore. We were to make no contact with Mr. 
Moore. We abided — 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me think this through with 
you. I guess the way I suppose you prepared for trial - and 
this is my fault because I made a supposition - you'd get a 
list of folks. These will all come, this one won't. We tried 
to get this one, he said this and then if you can't get them, 
you might come to the Court and say, well, hey, Judge, we can't 
get them so can we do 'a' or *b'. But I guess you just leaped 
over that spot and (inaudible) you said, Well, he's not going 
13 
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1 to come; therefore, we're going to use this and that's how we 
2 proceed. Have I kind of seen inside your mind because I always 
3 thought that what you do is ask the guy to come so that we 
4 could see - that's really what I was hoping was the premise of 
5 this whole exercise. 
6 MR. ZAGER: Actually Your Honor, I was hoping that we 
7 would have had the opportunity to call Mr. Moore directly and 
8 ask him if he'd come to trial. Unfortunately, we could not do 
9 that -
10 THE COURT: Now, when you were told not to, is there 
11 a reason you didn't approach the Court and say, you know, we 
12 need this guy, we want this guy, they aren't letting us talk to 
13 him, what's our solution? Is there a reason that wasn't done? 
14 I'm just thinking out loud with you because here we are, you 
15 know, two weeks before this is to kick off and what I now 
16 understand you want to do is take the deposition for purposes 
17 to use here in trial because you don't think this guy wants to 
18 come. Although you have no evidence, is that fair to say? 
19 You've not asked him and you haven't asked for permission to 
20 ask him, other than talking with Mr. Sutton? I'm not arguing 
21 that. 
22 MR. ZAGER: I guess I have to say, Your Honor, that 
23 as attorneys we're well aware of the ethical obligations and 
24 the legal ramifications of practicing law. 
25 THE COURT: Let's say then, okay, I think I know 
14 
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where you're going. You didn't want to ruffle Mr. Sutton's 
feathers. If you can't get through him what you want, is there 
a reason you didn't come to me and say, here's my problem? I 
say me, but I mean some are here long before me. Here's my 
problem. I need to this guy, what's the plan? And Sutton 
could be here and he could tell us A, B and C. Why not? That's 
where it's getting past me. 
MR. ZAGER: Why not, because we are aware that when 
witnesses are beyond the subpoena power of this Court they 
cannot be brought to trial and if we came to the judge, 
yourself or whoever was on the bench at that time, and said 
Your Honor, we want Mr. Moore to be here at trial, which we 
would welcome now. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ZAGER: We didn't believe, knowing the law as we 
do, that the Court had the power -
THE COURT: I'm not arguing that I could force it. 
That's not my argument. My argument is, there are other ways 
to do it, just as you described. There are, let's suppose in 
this case, or I guess, this new method that you say others -
well, you haven't ever said that. You haven't said anybody 
else has ever done it, what you're proposing, but there's 
another method I guess. Why aren't these things brought to our 
attention before two weeks before a calendar? That's what's 
disturbing to me, it's the shortness of the time. It seems to 
15 
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me that there should have been notice before, sorry, 
MR. ZAGER: And Your Honor, I imagine it's because 
we've relied on our understanding that party admissions are 
always, they would be brought in if it's contained in a 
document as I've described earlier and when the defendant is 
the one who blocks out attempts to contact the defendant, then . 
it also bears some blame in the situation that we're in right 
now and when the witness lives outside the subpoena power of 
the Court — 
THE COURT: I'm not arguing I can compel him. 
MR. ZAGER: So, I mean, there were reasons for our 
actions in each instance. Maybe we knew too much about the law 
and should have just come in here and asked the judge, what can 
you do for us? But we thought we had something that was solid, 
apparently the Court has taken a different view on that. Six 
weeks ago, six weeks prior to trial, the last time we were in 
Court, we let the Court know that in response to your ruling, 
that we'd be back here again asking the Court for the 
permission. Sure, it's now two weeks before trial because of 
having to file a motion or response time, the Court's calendar, 
but nonetheless, Your Honor, we're not talking about re-
deposing anybody else other than Mr. Moore. We think he should 
have been presented at a time when he was a party without the 
need for a subpoena. He wasn't. I don't think we're alone in 
this situation that we're here right now. I think a lot of 
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1 this has been caused because Mr. Sutton has been less than 
2 candid about his relationship and control and character of Mr. 
3 Moore as someone whose on the salary, still receiving a salary 
4 as a party affiliate of the defendant, and right now we're 
5 asking the Court to use its broad discretion in terms of 
6 fairness with the discretion the Court has because we're going 
7 to get the same statement of what the guy knew, what Mr. Moore 
8 knew when he was working for the defendant. He's testified to 
9 it about 20 times. Did you know that your product was unsafe 
10 if it wasn't on an 18 inch stand? That's not going to change 
11 regardless of - that's a non-case specific, it's generic. We 
12 promise the Court that we will not go outside the testimony 
13 that's already been received and basically we'll go through the 
14 task, if the Court deems it appropriate to simply, read the old 
15 deposition into a new deposition or hopefully walk in and 
16 hopefully Mr. Moore will have reviewed, during his preparation 
17 with Mr. Sutton the prior deposition and we'll say, is 
18 everything you said in Ellis still the same? And we're done. 
19 THE COURT: Well, we approached it a little 
20 differently, but that's fair. I see what you're saying. I 
21 understand your points. 
22 MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Sutton? 
24 MR. SUTTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 With respect to Mr. Zager's comments that deal with 
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the use of the transcript and the various rules of evidence, I 
would simply point out to the Court that it appears that that 
attempts to rehash or revisit a prior motion with a prior 
ruling by this Court. There is no such relief that is 
requested as part of the moving papers with respect to this 
hearing and I would respectfully submit that that relief is not 
something — 
THE COURT: Caught you by surprise, huh? You didn't 
every think he'd raise that again. 
MR. SUTTON: Well, I thought that if was going to 
raise it, that he would fairly put us on notice of that so that 
we could brief it again, if need be. 
Secondly, I'd like to state that if Mr. Zager is 
sincere in his position that Mr. Moore should have been 
produced following the failed March 9, 2000 deposition because 
he was a party affiliate and that no deposition subpoena was 
required, there are certainly procedures that could have been 
filed subsequent to March 9, 2000 to bring that to the Court's 
attention and to seek an order in that regard. That was never 
done. 
Mr. Zager has attempted to make me the bad guy in 
terms of this history and suggests that I have — 
THE COURT: It's easy isn't it. Haven't you lived in 
California? Haven't we been over this before? 
MR. SUTTON: We were Your Honor and-
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THE COURT: That issue is easy. 
MR. SUTTON: You're causing me some concern that you 
keep bringing that up but — 
THE COURT: Do you drive around here very much when 
you come? 
MR. SUTTON: It seems like I've been here a lot. 
THE COURT: Have you driven much, like on the 
freeway, they've got a few billboards. It's says, it's the ; 
California cheese. It says something like, it's not weird, 
it's just from California. 
MR. SUTTON: I've seen it. 
THE COURT: I mean, you know, so you know I guess 
people outside your fair state think - although I think it is 
jealousy. I think you're right. I think everybody thinks — 
MR. SUTTON: Not everyone, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No, I mean there is a lot to be said for 
you and some against you I guess but no one can argue that it 
isn't quite a place. So, I'll leave it behind maybe. If it 
bothers you. 
MR. SUTTON: Well, with respect to the issue of me 
being the bad guy — 
THE COURT: Well, you know, we expect Mr. Zager to 
say that and we expect you to say I'm not the bad guy, but go 
ahead though. 
MR. SUTTON: It concerns me that accusations and 
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charges are being made to my trial judge that I don't have a 
history of appearing before and I don't have a relationship 
with, and I take those charges quite seriously. I want to 
assure you that there are indeed times when I have been able to 
produce Mr. Moore without necessity of subpoena and the Nolan 
deposition that went yesterday, is a perfect example of that. 
There was one very significant difference in the Nolan case. 
If you look at my confirming letter to Mr. Downey, the 
plaintiff's attorney in that case, those arrangements for Mr. 
Moore's deposition were made approximately 90 days ago, in July 
of this year. Mr. Moore's history in terms of deposition has 
been to cooperate as he indicated at deposition. His history 
has been to make himself available without necessity of 
subpoena if indeed if comports with his retired lifestyle, with 
residences in two different states and very frequent travel 
which all of us I think, should hope to have a retirement like 
he does. 
THE COURT: You bet. 
MR. SUTTON: In this case, despite the accusations 
that were being made, I did attempt, as I promised Mr. Zager I 
would, to reach Mr. Moore to find out if, notwithstanding his 
history, if Mr. Moore would make himself available for 
deposition on very short notice at this time. 
THE COURT: He lives mainly where? California 
somewhere? 
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MR. SUTTON: His testimony yesterday, was that he is 
a resident of the State of Tennessee, legally; that he 
maintains residences in both California and Tennessee. 
THE COURT: So hefs a little - those are the two 
spots he's mostly in, okay. 
MR. COLE: Those are the two spots he's mostly in. I 
will tell you that Mr. Moore was given the opportunity to make 
himself voluntarily available. I enquired as to whether I 
could represent to this Court and to Mr. Zager that I could 
produce him for purposes of deposition in this case. Mr. Moore 
wanted to know what the time window was and when I told him 
that the motion was to be heard today and I told him that the 
trial was slated to start on October 29th, his response to me 
was I have vacation planned during that time period. It has 
long standing been set and I don't want to mess that up. Had 
there been diligent efforts and followup by plaintiff following 
March, 2000, my prediction, although I can't be sure, is that 
Mr. Moore would have cooperated and agreed to a date that 
worked on his calendar either in Tennessee or in California, 
but that followup from plaintiff didn't happen. And I think 
the focus for purposes of this motion, is not what Mike Sutton 
did or didn't do, but what the plaintiff did or didn't do and 
that record is very, very clear about what the plaintiff didn't 
do. The plaintiff had adequate opportunity to compel proper 
legal process to take Mr. Moore's deposition in this case and 
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preserve his testimony, particularly if it was testimony that 
the plaintiff thought was so very important, and as Mr. Zager 
has described at our last hearing, was the heart of plaintiff's 
case. I don't understand how we can be here two weeks before 
trial suggesting that this is the most critical witness to 
plaintiff's case, but yet, two and a half years of discovery 
past without any effort by plaintiff to schedule that 
deposition other than to send me a notice and two letters 
saying will you set it up. That's the extent of the effort 
that was made contrasting with what lawyers have done in other 
cases in terms of long standing scheduling in advance that 
comports with Mr. Moore's schedule, that comports with 
everybody's schedule so that it can be something that is done 
on a relaxed schedule that comports with his retirement plans 
as opposed to somebody's delay becomes Mr. Moore's crisis. 
As it relates to the issue of prejudice which is the 
last thing I want to talk about, Mr. Zager would suggest that 
there is no prejudice if you order the deposition to go at this 
late hour because of several reasons, one, there is an 
expectation that we know exactly what Mr. Moore is going to say 
and that his testimony is not case specific but generic in 
nature. I would submit to you that if you look at the 
manufacturing date of the water heaters involved in this case, 
we have one that was manufactured in 1991, we have one that was 
manufactured in 1994. I was not the defense lawyer in the 
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Ellis case so I cannot and will not make a representation to 
you as to the exact date of manufacture of that water heater, 
but I have been informed that that is a water heater that was 
built before 1991. I don't know how long before but to the 
extent we are talking about corporate knowledge, corporate 
decisions, things that happened as it relates to when water 
heaters are manufactured, there are indeed case specific issues 
that deal with when the water heaters are manufactured in this 
case vis-a-vie when the water heaters were manufactured in 
Ellis or any other case. 
Secondly, I will represent to the Court that although 
there's no transcript available yet, there was some re-visiting 
of Mr. Moore's testimony in the Ellis deposition and in the 
Ellis trial during his deposition yesterday and there were some 
occasions when Mr. Moore indicated that the testimony that he 
had previously provided was not correct, that he had either 
made a mistake or the court reporter had made a mistake and for 
that reason, I don't think there is any absolute guarantee that 
the testimony will be on all four corners now, with what it was 
in Ellis and I think the very concern that the Court has about 
what party's, litigant's, motives are for examination and cross 
examination at a time in another case, comes back to be 
pronounced significance in another case, in another venue, are 
things that should be controlling here. 
The bottom line is the time for discovery in this 
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case expired a year and a half ago. The prejudice that we have 
at this time is we're two weeks before trial, Mr. Lund and I 
should be engaged in all kinds of trial preparation, not lay 
witness depositions. If this deposition goes forward there 
will be a domino effect. It will be our request that we be 
given leave to take the depositions of Mr. Hoffman and Mr. 
Fandy, the two experts and I think a ruling granting the 
ability of the plaintiff to depose Mr. Moore at this point, 
will definitely put the October 29th trial date at risk. 
That's the fifth trial setting. We should be, at this 
position, posed to try our case. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Zager? 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, some of these trial settings 
bring up the last point were requested continuances by the 
defendant when the matter was set for jury trial, the defendant 
was the one who asked for additional time. And I'd also point 
out that it's a red herring to say that there'll be a domino 
effect because these plaintiff's witnesses Hoffman and Fandy 
have already relied when they gave their depositions on the 
testimony of Mr. Moore and if the defendant seeks to re-take 
their deposition for whatever reason, we will produce those 
witnesses without the need for subpoena and we'll have them 
available at the time and place that the defendant chooses, so 
I don't see that as a big issue. 
It's interesting to see that Mr. Sutton now stands 
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before the Court and complains that we didn't give them enough 
time to produce Mr. Moore for what I anticipate will be the 
Court's order allowing us to take his deposition, that he 
doesn't have enough lead time, that had we given him more 
notice he would certainly have voluntarily appeared because on 
March 9, 2000, that was the very request. We noticed his 
deposition. We sent out notice of deposition. We asked Mr. 
Sutton to voluntarily produce Mr. Moore and March 9, 2000 was 
certainly more than three months from the time that we stand 
here now, to produce him if they were going to do so. So, for 
Mr. Sutton to say that, if we only had more notice, we would 
produce Mr. Moore when he didn't do so back on March 9, 2000, 
said Mr. Moore would not voluntarily appear. Again, this is 
the kind of legal jargon that troubles me throughout this case. 
Is the Court following my argument that on March 9 — 
THE COURT: Well, I am now, I'm just trying to get a 
little - I mean I was just looking at these. I'm now kind 
of curious of the phraseology of the "can't produce him on the 
9th". Is that one of these exhibits? 
MR. ZAGER: Yes, it is. That would be, Exhibit A is 
my letter asking them, confirming that you previously informed 
me not to contact Mr. Moore directly since his testimony 
involves knowledge gained while employed with American, 
therefore, please make Mr. Moore available for a deposition at 
his convenience. I set his depo for March 9. Actually that 
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was back on February 14th of 2000 and then Mr. Sutton replies, 
as you know - this is Exhibit B. I'm sorry Your Honor, second 
paragraph. 
THE COURT: Is that the October 12th letter? 
MR. ZAGER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Second paragraph. 
MR. ZAGER: Second paragraph, last sentence, "As you 
knowr Mr. Moore is no longer employed by any defendant in this 
case and therefore, I do not have any ability to produce him 
pursuant to the notice." Now, that's exactly opposite what Mr. 
Sutton is saying now. Mr. Sutton is saying now, sure, we would 
produce him. He's our client. We control him. He's on 
salary. I assume that's what he's saying. That's in the 
evidence. But Mr. Zager didn't give us enough notice. 
THE COURT: Well, maybe we don't have him here but 
there must have been something that took place around March, 
2000. 
MR. ZAGER: We went forward with other depositions. 
THE COURT: No, no, no. 
MR. ZAGER: Okay. Sorry. 
THE COURT: I want to know about him rejecting. Any 
of those exhibits here, do you know? I'm just curious how he 
responded to your request. 
MR. SUTTON: Your Honor, it's our Exhibit C to the 
memorandum. 
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THE COURT: Your what? 
MR. SUTTON: Our Exhibit C to the memorandum opposing 
the -
THE COURT: C? 
MR. SUTTON: There was a letter from me, Your Honor, 
to Mr. Zager three days after his February 14th letter. 
THE COURT: February 17? 
MR. SUTTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I just want to look at that. 
MR. ZAGER: That would be Paragraph 2, Your Honor, 
second sentence, "according I cannot have any ability to 
require his attendance at deposition. I am in the process of 
attempting to serve Mr. Moore, whether or not he will 
voluntarily present himself for deposition at a date, time and 
place mutually agreed" and of course, then the October 12 
letter, "I don't have the ability to produce him." 
THE COURT: Mr. Sutton, your response? 
Didn't they ever followup, Mr. Zager, here on this "I 
am in the process of attempting whether he will or will not 
voluntarily present himself. As soon as I've discerned it, I 
will advise you." 
MR. ZAGER: I'm not sure whether there were letters 
back and forth in between or discussions. I know there was a 
deposition of one of the doctors where I — 
THE COURT: See, I'm not into that. Anybody followup 
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on that? 
MR. ZAGER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Tell me about it. 
MR. ZAGER: We asked Mr. Moore - I mean Mr. Sutton 
again if, you know, when and where and when and will he produce 
him and we were finally met with the response on October 12 
that he's not going to do it. 
THE COURT: Okay. And what did you do in response to 
their October 12 letter to you, well, it's not going to happen 
the way you thought? 
MR. ZAGER: At that time -
THE COURT: That's when you concluded on using the 
old stuff? 
MR. ZAGER: — at that time we opened up the evidence 
code and determined that pursuant to the rules which we have 
already discussed before the Court, which not until six weeks 
ago, or four weeks ago, or mid-September, the Court advised us 
we had misplaced reliance upon the rules of party admissions 
and declarations against interests and documents which were 
sworn to where the defendant had an opportunity to rehabilitate 
and cross examine. We relied on those evidence code 
provisions. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ZAGER: And now, you know, we understand that the 
Court doesn't accept our reasoning in those cases so, you know, 
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1 we're before the Court asking the Court to use its broad 
2 discretion to at least accomplish what is fair which is to 
3 allow plaintiff to take the deposition of Mr. Moore at this 
4 time to satisfy the requirements of this Court. We still can't 
5 bring him here as a witness, in fact, the Court's probably not 
6 going to see Mr. Moore unless the Court allows us to take that 
7 deposition at which point in time, I'm sure, the defendant will 
8 exercise it's control over their client and employee, Mr. 
9 Moore, to have him attend here at the trial. 
10 But, I also think, and you know, this is just one 
11 statement. Did your company make a - and this is again - "Did 
12 your company make a conscious decision" - I'm reading from the 
13 Ellis deposition on Page 135, Line 7, "Did your company make a 
14 conscious decision not to enclose stands with the standard gas 
15 fired water heater?" Yes, was the answer. "And that conscious 
16 decision was made certainly before 1990, wasn't it?" Yes. 
17 Now, our water heaters are after 1990, so there isn't a problem 
18 there with the dates. They've made this decision before our 
19 water heaters were built, not to enclose these stands with the 
20 water heater, not to have people be aware that through the 
21 enclosure of these stands to raise these water heaters — 
22 THE COURT: Haven't you made huge assumption that 
23 that was the end of their ever visiting the issue? I mean, I 
24 don't mean to be advocating one way or the other, but isn't it 
25 possible that they could have revisited the issue? 
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MR. ZAGER: They don't. 
THE COURT: Maybe the week after? 
MR. ZAGER: They don't do that. You can buy their 
stands and our experts can testify - I mean our experts can 
testify -
THE COURT: You know they've never done that. 
MR. ZAGER: Our experts can testify now that when 
they go into a Home Depot, the stands are sold separately from 
the water heater at the time in 1991, '94 and throughout this 
case. Our experts can testify to that. We just wanted to know 
what the defendant knew prior to our water heater being built 
and prior to this accident and that testimony is not going to 
change yesterday when he testified in the Nolan matter. It was 
his testimony when he testified 20 times and if we take his 
deposition, his testimony will be the same unless he says, 
"Well, you know, I was paid by the plaintiff's lawyer to say 
this, but the high likelihood, Your Honor, is that he said 
under oath 20 other times and 20 other depositions, is what 
he's going to tell us. And I know that the Court is somewhat 
troubled by the time constraint now and I don't know what the 
remedy for that is short of continuing the trial date or 
allowing plaintiff to take this deposition, but Your Honor, 
this is a critical deposition. If we've made a fatal error 
here, we ask the Court to relieve us of that error in the 
interest of justice. Anna Marie Alarid is the plaintiff in 
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this case. She's been burnt almost 40 percent of her body. 
She is permanently scarred for life. I have many other cases. 
Mr. Sutton has more cases than myself, I'm sure. Anna has one 
shot at this, Your Honor. If we've made an error in this case, 
we ask the case, in the interest of justice, to relieve us of 
that error by allowing us to take Mr. Moore's deposition. 
THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Zager. 
MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sutton do you want a last word? 
Fatal request of the lawyer inviting the last word. 
MR. SUTTON: The only comment I would make, Your 
Honor, is this. The moving papers are void of any type of 
relief to set aside any error that the plaintiff's attorneys 
may have made. For the suggestion to be made that this came as 
a complete surprise is misplaced. The letters from myself to 
Mr. Zager and to Mr. 0'Callahan, his associate counsel, made 
clear that it was always our position that what they were 
proposing in terms of use of that testimony, was inappropriate 
and something that we were not prepared to stipulate to, so I 
don't think that your ruling could have taken them completely 
by surprise because that is the position that we had been 
articulating all along. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'd have to agree with Mr. Zager that 
clearly, I think I have the broad discretion and fairness, I 
guess, unlies all that we try to do in the court and I'd agree 
31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with you entirely that, at least from what I've heard from your 
prospective Mr. Moore's testimony is very relevant to all that 
you hope to present at trial. I don't think I can quite agree 
with you that there wouldn't be any prejudice because I don't 
know that I agree totally with Mr. Sutton that he's got to re-
depose everyone, but when we're to open up discovery again, it 
seems to me there is some argument here that prejudice could 
evolve. I don't dismiss it outright. It seems to me that 
maybe could be enumerated, but, I guess where I'm really stuck 
is kind of two things that maybe even before fairness, kind of 
rule where I think I have to go on this one is that the system 
that we operate in, for good or for ill, is the system that we 
have. It's pretty clear that in this case, there was an order 
restricting time frames for discovery and that: as we all know, 
is long past being done. One could argue he had to reasonably 
rely upon these transcripts being admissible. Without being 
able to tell me today wherever, where in any place has this 
ever happened? I mean I understand the consequences, well, 
I'll go over it. I understand the admission by party opponent 
but these are not opponent parties when these admissions were 
made. I mean, these rules, it seems to me talk about in the 
context of the ones you referred to, the 800s, when the two 
parties are facing off. They weren't facing off in any of 
those instances you described, therefore, I don't see how 
anybody could have thought, well, you know, gee, that's just 
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going to be admissible. If you had worried about that as an 
issue, it would have been easy to come and make a motion to 
allow production or presentation of that material in the trial. 
So, I honestly can't side with you on the idea that you ever 
reasonably relied. I know you relied, but I don't think it was 
reasonable that they'd be admissible and as I look at the 
history, the exhibits, it seems to be clear, that there should 
have been, could have been more followup on this issue of what 
Mr. Moore, when he was going to available and what we had to do 
to dispose him in this case. 
So because the trial is two weeks away, because it's 
been continued so often, because we, on this end, the Court, 
made quite an effort to set aside four weeks that you folks 
want. Because of all that and because I don't think there's 
reasonable reliance because we operate in a system where you 
know, we set up parameters, discovery deadlines. We try and 
follow them. Those things are a year and a half old. It's 
just not the right time, it's not the right situation for this 
request to be granted so I'm denying the motion. 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. ZAGER: Defendant's have asked for a continuance 
prior to this. Plaintiff's never have asked for a continuance 
of the trial date. If we ask for a continuance of the trial 
date to accomplish the taking of this deposition for it's 
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monumental value and in the interest of fairness and justice, 
it seems that if defendant's were permitted to receive a 
continuance of the trial date, that plaintiff should also be 
afforded the same courtesy and I would be allowed to at least 
continue the trial date on - this is the first time the 
plaintiff's have ever asked that the trial date be continued. . 
THE COURT: Now, we're going to go back to where we 
were at the end of our last hearing and I appreciate, Mr. 
Zager, that it is fair for you to ask that right now, and I am 
just anticipating maybe rightly or wrongly, the Sutton response 
which would be, it's not before you judge. Here's my problem. 
I appreciate that that's what you may have in mind, but it's 
not in front of me right now and I've got into trouble before 
doing things and what I get most in trouble for is trying to 
accommodate everybody, do the things that seem to me to be 
right and easily done, when not everybody at the table is 
reading from the same menu and if you're asking for a 
continuance, I'm just going to answer, it's not in front of me 
right now. 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, when the defendant asked for 
a continuance at the close of the motion involving whether this 
matter was going to be set for a bench or a jury trial, which 
was before Judge Medley, there was no continuance on the table 
or motion for continuance at that time either and defendant's 
request for a continuance was granted at that time even though 
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it was not before the court at this time so it seems to me and 
I understand Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Here's the problem, I'm not Medley and 
maybe he hasn't had the fun experiences I have doing things 
when each party wasn't prepared. That's my bottom line, is 
that the notice provisions of our rules are there to give 
parties notice. If you don't have notice, I think a fair 
argument can be made, we're not ready to address it. 
MR. ZAGER: May I ask the Court because of the need 
to prepare for trial at this time, the Court would now know the 
basis that we would be asking for a continuance, that we'd 
asking for a continuance for the opportunity to give us more 
time in fairness to the parties, so that Mr. Moore's deposition 
could be taken. Would the Court believe— 
THE COURT: Here's one problem we have, even if I 
gave you a continuance, let's say I did, don't I have to bust 
down the deadline for discovery that's past, what was it? 
March, 2000? 
MR. ZAGER: For this one purpose of taking this one 
deposition. 
THE COURT: Right. I mean, what would have changed 
between your request to continue and you're still going to have 
to get permission to depose him. What am I going to say then 
next time you ask me? You're going to say it's relevant and 
I'm going to agree. You're going to say fairness says and I'm 
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going to say, well yeah, it sound like it would be fair. We're 
going to run up against why you didn't during the deadline and 
we're going to run up against I guess the prejudice would be 
done away but we're going to run up against why you didn't 
during the year and a half or two years that you had to do 
discover and I think I'm still going to come out in the same 
place. So I don't know that continuing the trial gives us a 
chance for you to depose Mr. Moore. 
MR. ZAGER: It would get rid of any question that the 
Court had regarding prejudice. It would certainly be within 
the Court's discretion then regardless of the reason that 
plaintiff didn't move forward, it would still be completely 
fair to all the parties because we'd have extra time, 
additional time, and so the only remaining issue would be the 
one that the Court just described with why the plaintiff didn't 
move earlier and it would seem that that would not outweigh the 
need for fairness and justice. I could also purport to the 
Court that I believe that plaintiff might be able to present 
her case in less time and that the month is probably a very 
conservative estimate in terms of the length of the trial and 
that if plaintiff could in some way could shorten the time that 
she would need to prepare, maybe we could keep the Court still 
on schedule and begin the trial, you know, a week after it's 
already scheduled for. 
THE COURT: All right. I guess I'm not going to make 
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the decision today. I'm inclined not to continue. I don't see 
any reason to given the rulings. I mean, I agree that they're 
adverse to you, Mr. Zager. I'm not so obtuse that I don't see 
that, but on the other hand, I don't know how I could make the 
rulings because in the back of my mind, I know where they're 
leading. I've got to make the rulings and then I think 
eventually you're going to get to the point where you want this 
continuance and having gone down the path that I have, I think 
I'm not going to have to continue this. We're just going to go 
ahead. This has been sitting too long. We've turned away a 
lot of other folks who wanted to go to trial sooner on the 
theory that during this month of November to be with you folks. 
I think if you make the Motion to Continue, I think it highly 
unlikely that I'm going to grant that. 
MR. ZAGER: And do you think the Court would have the 
power to order Mr. Moore to attend trial? 
THE COURT: I don't. I don't see how I could. Like 
you say, that was the building block upon which you built the 
house that I eventually said, Well, I don't see how you built 
it like that, but that's the first building block, he can't 
come. He won't come. So it then seems to me you have to do 
some other things that you should have done but you didn't do 
them and they have objected to certain ways you want to handle 
it after not doing it. I agree with them and that you didn't 
do it, you know, I guess you have to live with the strategies 
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you've chosen. I guess that's the — 
MR. ZAGER: The Court has also reviewed the 
attachments that we talked about where on several occasions Mr. 
Moore was alleged by process servers to be evading service and 
the amounts expended? That's all been reviewed before the 
Court? 
THE COURT: No. I mean, I saw that. That appeared 
to be another case. See, I'm looking at the facts in this 
case, Mr. Zager, which I take to be essentially some time in 
March, 2000, you folks wanted to depose him, he wasn't 
produced. It seems to me then, March, 2000, plaintiff had a 
duty to come to the Court and say, give us more time, expand 
the discovery period, allow us to do this, allow us to do that. 
You chose a path in this that I don't see justified by anything 
that is normally done in the practice of preparing for and 
presenting a trial and you know, I could totally wrong. I 
mean, I'm not arguing I'm right, but I am for good or for ill, 
the judge in this case and so having made those decisions, you 
now are stuck with a set of facts that I have to deal with and 
they leave me - I mean, it seems to me I don't: have any other 
choices right now. 
Any other questions right now? 
MR. ZAGER: No Your Honor, we just, you know, I 
thought this was a way to avoid any possible prejudice or 
whatever. 
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THE COURT: You've got a good point. 
MR. ZAGER: With all due respect -
THE COURT: No, no. I don't know if there are errors 
and let me just say, if I've made errors, they're clearly 
prejudicial to you. I mean, I would concede that in a 
heartbeat. At least on one aspect of your case, I don't know 
about compensatory damages, I don't know about that. I guess 
on this argument that there ought to be some kind of punitives, 
it seems to me, yeah, they had a knowledge and they were at 
fault and you followup that line of reasoning, yeah. I mean, 
it seems to me that if I've made an error it's clearly 
prejudicial so you know, no, I'm not - I mean, you wouldn't 
offend me at all if you appeal to whoever there is to appeal 
to. I don't know who you appeal to anymore. I guess you just 
start one place and they toss it off to other places. No, I 
wouldn't mind at all. I'd welcome the review. I'd welcome 
(inaudible). Thanks both of you. 
MR. SUTTON: Thank you Your Honor. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
(c) 
39 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Michael 
K. Burton was transcribed by me from a videotape 
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 27th day of January, 2002 in Sandy, 
Utah. 
fei^^ 
Carolyn Etickson 
Certifiea Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2002 
NOTARY PUBUC 
S I N W UT 8409 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab 13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
G K G I R A R D I | KEE S E 
LAWYERS 
October 19, 2001 
r
^0DISTHICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
. OCT \ M 2001 
/SALTLAfCE 
Honorable Michael K. Burton Y- ' ' 
CoUlTY 
Third District Court of Salt Lake City ^ °*»**Cto* 
450 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Alarid v. American Manufacturing et al. 
Dear Judge Burton: 
The Court has recently ruled in favor of defendant's motion in limine to exclude the 
former testimony of Henry Jack Moore. Plaintiff anticipated offering the deposition 
and/or trial transcript of Henry Jack Moore, a former employee of defendant, from a 
similar water heater defect case styled Ellis v. American Water Heater Company. Utah 
Rule of Evidence §804 provides an exception to the hearsay rule for former testimony of 
an unavailable witness. Plaintiff intended to offer Moore's trial transcript given under 
oath in a similar water heater defect case. 
The Washington Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of former testimony of an 
unavailable witness in Foster v. Fibreboard Corporation (1989) 779 P.2d. 272, 55 
Wn.App.545. The issue in Foster was whether or not the plaintiff was exposed to certain 
asbestos products at a Seattle shipyard in 1945. The defendant Owens-Illinois contended 
that it did not distribute the asbestos product in question until 1947. The trial court 
allowed Owens to admit the deposition testimony of a line worker who had manufactured 
the product in question in the early 40's. This worker had given a deposition in a 
coordinated asbestos proceeding but had not given a deposition in the Foster case. The 
deposition transcript was admitted because the declarant was unavailable, the deposition 
had been taken in compliance with the law, and the prior proceeding was similar in 
nature. Id. at 276. The Washington Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's ruling, 
focusing mainly on the similarity requirement. The court held that even though the 
deposition was given in a different matter, the circumstances were similar enough to 
satisfy the rule. Essentially, the court determined that had the deposition been given in 
the Foster case, the testimony would have been the same. See id. at 277. 
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October 22, 2001 
Page 2 of2 
The unavailability requirement has been interpreted, in part, to mean that the witness is 
absent from the state at the time the deposition is being offered. Rule 32(a), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. See also F.R.C.P. 32(a) In Brown v. Prior (1998) 954 P.2d 1349, the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that the plain meaning of rule 32(a)(3)(b) allows for 
the admission of deposition when the witness is absent from the state. "We hold that 
absence of the deponent at the time the deposition is offered is sufficient to allow the 
deposition into evidence, and the party offering the deposition need not proffer an excuse 
for the failure of the deponent to appear." Id. at 1352. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Henry Jack Moore's residence outside the state of Utah 
satisfies the unavailability requirement of rule 32(a). Furthermore, plaintiff submits that 
Moore's prior trial testimony was given under substantially similar circumstances to the 
instant case and therefore meets the section 804 exception to the hearsay rule. 
Respectfully, 
KEITH GRIFFIN 
Cc: 
Michael Sutton via facsimile 
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1 ; SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2001 j 
2 i HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3
 ( **PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - FIRST FOUR MINUTES 
4 j RELATING TO HENRY JACK MOORE** j 
I ! 
5 ! THE COURT: How would you like to do this, Mr. Zager? j 
6 Do you have any preference? I don't have a clue, so... 
7 j MR. ZAGER: A couple of outstanding issues. I don't j 
8 know if the Court, I'm sure the Court has received our letter 
9 to the Court regarding yet that trial transcript of Henry Jack 
10 : Moore. I remember last we were here the Court -
11 . THE COURT: A never ending question, huh? 
12 ' MR. ZAGER: - inquired whether there was a case 
13 ' where- : 
! 
14 j THE COURT: You guys have gone to 1940- Was that the 
15 • year? 
1 6 ' MR. ZAGER: I don't believe so, no. 
i 
17 ' THE COURT: 1947, (inaudible) , 
18 i MR. ZAGER: Much more recent than that. Yeah. There 
19 ; was a reference -
20 ' THE COURT: More recent? 
2 1 ', MR. ZAGER: Oh yeah. That case was actually won in 
22 ' 1989, a rather recent case. Just one case that we happened to 
i 
23 '; come across where, in fact, a prior deposition was, in a very 
24 ' similar case to the one that we have here, a product liability 
i i 
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1 
2 
case, where generic testimony that was non-case specific, an 
asbestos case was used in a subsequent trial where the parties 
3 : had an opportunity and motive to develop the earlier testimony j 
4 in a former trial, I remember the Court had asked, Mr. Zager, 
5 ' if you could just show me one case and so - . • 
6 | THE COURT: I don't know that I said, in fact, i 
7 : (inaudible)• 
8 i MR. ZAGER: And so we stopped at one. 
9 ! THE COURT: We had a (inaudible). 
10 | MR. ZAGER: Didn't want to burden the Court. 
11 : THE COURT: Well, here's the only problem I have with! 
12 j what you say. I think it clear that he would be one who would 
13 ; be described as being unavailable, but the problem I have is 
14 ' that the last line on page 1, "Essentially the court determinedi 
15 j that had the deposition been given in the posture case, ! 
16 ! testimony would have been the same." And I don't think I've 
17 I ever come to that conclusion. I don't think 1 have a way to get 
18 there. I don't know how a judge did that, but though we've i 
19
 : argued that it has this condition, reliability and the fact !, 
20 ; that it would have been this way and they had a reason to pose 
21 ! it. I think there's still on the other side questions that 
22 ! could be raised about why they did what they did or didn't do, 
23 ; therefore, because it's not in this case I don't think I come 
i 
24 •' to the conclusion that it would have been the same. 
25 1 MR. ZAGER: But Your Honor -
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THE COURT: That's where we part our company. 
MR. ZAGER: And in the trial transcript that we 
attached as an exhibit, the excerpts from the actual trial i 
where Mr. Moore testified, there was certain evidence where he 
had testified to again and again and again, including just the j 
day before that hearing on October 11th where the testimony was 
essentially the same as to what American knew about the number ; 
i 
of injuries that were caused in these flammable vapor fires 
involving water heaters. Generic information about what j 
American knew about not making conscious decisions not to put 
the water heater on an 18 inch stand, the cost of the water 
heater, certain information again that American knew that would : 
not change and hadn't changed in the 20 depositions he did ; 
before this case and which was non-specific and generic ; 
information. So to the extent that the testimony was non-case , 
specific as in the Foster case, we thought the case would very 
well parallel the case that we have here. 
THE COURT: I think I understand that you believe 
that. I have no doubt you do. 
Then what else Mr. Zager? Anything else right now? ! 
(End of requested transcript) I 
(C) ' 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al„ 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 980905332 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, Judge Anne M. Stirba 
INC, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. KENT NELSON, et al. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
AMERICAN'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
REGARDING JOSEPH FANDEY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Joseph Fandey should not be permitted to offer unqualified opinions. Moreover, even to 
the extent Mr. Fandey may have adequate qualifications, he should not be permitted to offer 
opinions that are unreliable, as that term is applied in the Utah law of expert opinions. In 
addition, as a former employee of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, certain portions of 
Mr. Fandey's expected testimony are factual rather than expert. That testimony should be limited 
to matters about which Mr. Fandey has personal knowledge. He should not be permitted to 
testify as a general historian. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Fandey is licensed as an attorney in Maryland and New Mexico. He first 
became licensed in Maryland in 1984 or 1985. He does specialize as an attorney but his practice 
is limited to primarily business law. Depo. of Joseph Fandey, pp 5-7. 
2. In 1973 he received a bachelors degree in mechanical engineering; but, he has 
never been licensed as a professional engineer, nor as a plumber or a gas fitter. Id. p. 17. He does 
not belong to any organizations or societies that relate to mechanical engineering. Id. p. 17. He 
has never published in any trade journals. Id. p. 19. 
3. Mr. Fandey has never designed a water heater, or even a component part for a 
water heater. Id. p. 40. Similarly he has never been involved in the manufacture of a water heater 
or a component part for a water heater. Id. With regard to consumer products, Mr. Fandey has 
never been the designer of a consumer product of any kind. Id. p. 38. 
-2-
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4. He does not hold himself out as a fire cause and origin expert, a human factors 
expert or a biomechanics expert. Id. pp. 32-33. 
5. For some portion of his working life, Mr. Fandey was an employee of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission. Id_. pp 55-59. In that employment, Mr. Fandey was 
involved in considering safety concerns with a wide variety of consumer products, including both 
contact adhesives and water heaters. Id. pp. 61-64. 
6. With regard to product liability litigation involving water heaters, Mr. Fandey has 
only ever testified on behalf of persons claiming design defects. However, he anticipates that 
defendants will want to retain him as to some of the new water heater designs, as a former 
"opponent" and "critic" of the older designs. Id. pp. 84-86. 
7. In his deposition and expert report, Mr. Fandey opines that American "maintained 
a conscious and knowing disregard of the safety of others;" yet, he does not explain any method 
or procedure he used, nor any expertise, to come to that conclusion. 
8. Similarly, Mr. Fandey opines that American could have come up with design fix 
they now have developed back in 1976, referencing ignition resistant design. Id. p. 82. He offers 
no basis for this opinion. He has no expertise to conclude when and how a water heater 
manufacture could have developed an alternative design. Indeed, he had not even examined 
American's ignition resistant design so as to begin to understand what it entails. 
9. Essentially, the plaintiff will try to use Mr. Fandey as an opinionated historian to 
recount the history of interaction between the water heater industry in general and the CPSC. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
L RULE 702 AND APPLICABLE CASE LAW LIMIT MR FANDEY'S 
OPINIONS TO THOSE SUBJECTS ON WHICH HE IS COMPETENT 
AND ON WHICH HE HAS RELIABLY APPLIED SCIENTIFIC OR 
TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO DRAW A CONCLUSION. 
The trial judge acts as a gatekeeper, and thus, has the responsibility of carefully 
scrutinizing proffered expert evidence. Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999). If 
permitted, Mr. Fandey will become nothing more than a second advocate for the plaintiff, 
speaking from the witness stand rather than from counsel's lectern. 
The pertinent inquiry for the court is this matter is whether American manufactured and 
sold a water heater that was unreasonably dangerous and defective. Persons trained in 
engineering design and manufacturing are the ones who can evaluate that. Instead, plaintiff 
proffers a former government official who has no actual experience in designing or making 
anything. 
The right to offer expert opinions is proscribed by Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which provides that "[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise." Thus, an expert must possess specialized knowledge about the subject on which 
he is testifying through skill, experience, training, or education, before he can be called a qualified 
witness. 
Courts generally limit expert testimony to those topics within the expert's specific area of 
expertise: 
-4~ 
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The capacity is in every case a relative one, i.e., relative to the topic 
about which the person is asked to make his statement. The object 
is to be sure that the question to the witness will be answered by a 
person who is fitted to answer it. His fitness, then, is a fitness to 
answer on that point. He may be fitted to answer about countless 
other matters, but that does not justify accepting his views in the 
matter at hand. 
Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d 33, 37 (10th Or. 1975) 
(upholding trial court's decision excluding metallurgist's testimony concerning metal pipe 
manufacturing standards when he had no manufacturing experience). A physician trained in one 
specialty cannot testify regarding treatment in a different specialty. Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 
P.2d 94, 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, an individual does not become an expert in an area simply because he has read and 
studied documents about the subject area on which he is to testify. Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 
943 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Applying these concepts to Mr. Fandey, one must first consider if there are any relevant 
questions in this case that he is fit to answer. He is certainly not fit to answer questions about 
water heater design, simply because of his general involvement in monitoring the safety of various 
consumer products. 
As far as his opinion about whether American "consciously and knowing disregarded the 
safety of others," where does one go to become an expert in diagnosing a corporation's frame of 
mind? Certainly Mr. Fandey has no such training. Indeed, it is doubtful that any expert could 
contribute more on this than the objective trier of fact who hears the facts about American's water 
heater designs. 
-5-
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Rule 702 requires that the proffered opinion must be an application of scientific, technical 
or other specialized knowledge possessed by the expert. American respectfully submits that Mr. 
Fandey is not applying his training and education, rather he is expressing his personal views and 
opinions. This should not be permitted. 
EL RULE 602 LIMITS ANY FACTUAL TESTIMONY BY MR. FANDEY TO 
RELEVANT MATTERS ABOUT WHICH HE HAS PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE. 
To the extent Mr. Fandey is not offering qualified, competent expert testimony, plaintiff 
may argue that he can provide factual background about how water heater designs have 
developed over the years and what the water heater industry in general has done, or not done, to 
address the flammable vapor hazard. 
To begin with, such testimony should not be allowed from any witness unless it can be 
connected to the defendant in this case. Depending on how plaintiff presents her case, it may not 
be relevant what another manufacturer did or knew. 
Further, as to Mr. Fandey, it is expected that plaintiff will try to have him provide a 
general history of interactions between the water heater industry and the CPSC. In this respect, 
his testimony must be limited to those matters about which Mr. Fandey has personal knowledge. 
This is the clear constraint of Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, which states: "A witness may 
not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness 
has personal knowledge of the matter." 
If Mr. Fandey actually sat in a meeting with a person established to be an employee of 
American and can therefore testify based on personal knowledge about something that occurred in 
-6-
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the meeting, then his testimony would meet the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602. If 
however, he attempts to testify about such a meeting which he did not attend, his testimony 
should not be admitted. 
DATED this 3 ~ day of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
John R. Lund 
KaraL. Pettit 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
N:\19944\1\FANDEY.MEM 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE ; 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al. ; 
Defendants. ] 
ARMSTRONG WORLD ] 
INDUSTRIES, INC., ) 
Third Party Plaintiff, ) 
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W. KENT NELSON, et al., '. 
Third Party Defendants. ; 
) PLAINTIFF ANNA MARIE 
) ALARID'S MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN'S 
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) Civil No. 980905332 
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INTRODUCTION 
American attempts to challenge the reliability of the opinions offered by plaintiffs 
expert, Joseph Fandey. American has no basis to characterize Mr. Fandey's opinions as 
unreliable. Mr. Fandey worked for the Consumer Product Safety Commission for 
approximately nineteen years. He managed the engineering programs associated with gas 
fired appliances for over ten years. Mr. Fandey was originally hired by the CPSC as a 
mechanical engineer in 1975 and continued to use his engineering skills throughout his 
tenure with the CPSC. 
Fandey has a wide base of knowledge concerning the water heater industry and the 
design of the conventional gas-fired water heater. Aside from being a mechanical 
engineer, Fandey has designed a wide-variety of products for various governmental 
agencies. Fandey has received numerous honors and awards for mechanical engineering 
during his employment with the CPSC. 
Fandey is intimately familiar with the governmental standards, regulations, 
evaluations and reports concerning the conventional gas-fired water at issue in this case. 
Fandey's testimony concerning the water heater industry is important to explain the 
goings-on of the water heater industry, a field largely dominated by the water heater 
manufacturers. Fandey will testify about American's knowledge of water heater defects 
and conscious disregard for the safety of consumers, an essential element of plaintiff s 
claim for punitive damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs expert, Joseph Fandey is a mechanical engineer and served as a 
mechanical engineer in various positions with the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission for approximately nineteen years. 
2. From 1975 through 1978, Fandey was a program manager for the 
development of standards and processing of petitions under the CPSA and other acts 
administered by the CPSC. (Exhibit A) 
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3. Fandey worked as the Engineering Branch Chief for the CPSC from April 
1980 to September 1988. In this position, Fandey managed the research activities 
supporting regulation and enforcement of consumer safety. This work was primarily in 
the area of architectural safety, including gas-fired appliances. (Exhibit A) 
4. Fandey became a senior engineer and project manager at the CPSC in 1988. 
He served as the project manager for Fire and Burn related activities from 1989 to 1994. 
5. Fandey is a qualified mechanical engineer with specialized knowledge 
concerning the evolution of the conventional gas-fired water heater and the developments 
in the water heater industry over the last twenty-five years. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FANDEY IS COMPETENT TO OFFER EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BOTH 
WATER HEATER DESIGN ISSUES AND ISSUES CONCERNING THE WATER 
HEATER INDUSTY 
Rule 702, Utah Rule of Evidence, provides that expert testimony may be offered 
to the trier of fact if the expert's technical, scientific or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue. The rule is broadly phrased. The 
fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" 
and "technical" but extend to all specialized knowledge. Federal Advisory Committee on 
Rules, F.R.E 702. 
The proper situation for expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of 
assisting the trier. "There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be 
used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained laymen would be qualified to 
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without 
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in 
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the dispute." Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 414, 418 (1952). When opinions 
are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of 
time. 7 Wigmore § 1918. Fandey's testimony is relevant and helpful to explain 
American's knowledge of the defect in the conventional gas-fired water heater. 
American claims that because Fandey has never designed a water heater, he is not 
qualified to testify as to the defects in the water heater design. In Rogers v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., (1997, DC Dist Col) 971 F.Supp 4, the court held that plaintiffs expert's 
opinions on alternative safety features for a milling machine were admissible even though 
the expert had not worked on milling machines. The expert had drawn his opinions on the 
safety features of the milling machine from his experience working with a company that 
performed safety analyses on the machine. 
Joseph Fandey gained an extensive base of knowledge concerning water heater 
design during his nineteen-year tenure with the CPSC. The CPSC has commissioned 
various studies and tests regarding the conventional water heater. As detailed in 
Fandey's report, attached as Exhibit B, the CPSC conducted numerous tests to determine 
the effect of elevating the air-intake in the conventional water hater. (Fandey Report, 
page 2). Fandey was privy to this testing as the Project Manager for Gas-Fired 
Appliances from 1989 to 1994. 
Jospeh Fandey provides a specialized degree of knowledge on the water heater < 
industry that is essential to understanding this case. Despite defendant's characterization, 
this case is not a simple product defect case. The water heater industry has long known 
that floor-mounted water heaters are inherently dangerous. Plaintiff intends to show at 
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trial that American, a leading manufacturer in the industry, disregarded safer alternative 
designs despite knowledge of serious safety concerns. 
American's Position in the Water Heater Industry 
American insinuates that it was not an active participant in industry meetings 
concerning water heater standards and testing. This suggestion is plainly false. 
American, through its representative Henry Jack Moore, was a member of the ANSI Z21 
water heater subcommittee. American, in conjunction with other water heater 
manufacturers, effectively controlled the industry standards concerning water heaters. 
The manufacturers had the power to block any change to the conventional water heater 
design by virtue of its presence in the ANSI committee. (Moore Deposition, 151:5-12) 
Fandey's testimony is important to reveal what the water heater industry knew about 
combustion fires and when they became aware of this problem. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff reserves the right to augment her opposition with any oral argument 
permitted by the Court at time of hearing on this matter. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff 
Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests that the Court deny American's motion in limine 
in its entirety. 
DATED: April 9, 2001 GIRARDI AND KEESE 
JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN 
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff 
5 
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Joseph Zaid Fandey, Esq. 
P.O. Drawer 32 
112 East 1st Street 
Truth or Consequences, New Mexico 87901 
Office 505-894-4436 
Facsimile: 505-894-7213 
E-mail: joczaid@zianet.com 
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ASSOCIATES, LLc June 1994 through present 
Safety Consultant/Member 
Provide litigation support services including expert witness services. Areas of particular 
expertise include gas appliances (especially gas water heaters), stairs - ramps - landings, ladders, 
athletic equipment (including football helmets., baseball bats, baseball chest protectors and other 
padding), snowmobiles, architectural and structural safety (including urea-formaldehyde foam 
insulation), in-door air quality, swimming pool drowning and diving accidents and spa safety. 
U.S, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION Aug. 1975 through June 1994 
Senior Engineer/Attorney September 1988 through June 1994 
Served as senior agency advisor in the area of indoor air quality and other environmental matters 
as well as Project Manager for Fire and Burn related activities. Coordinated technical efforts of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and 
Department of Energy (DOE) with those of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). 
Reviewed both planned and on-going regulatory research to ensure that the work produced by 
the various research efforts would be unlikely to conflict and would be legally sufficient to 
withstand judicial scrutiny. Had occasional assignments with additional duties as a staff attorney 
in the Office of General Counsel or as a trial attorney in the Directorate for Compliance. 
Engineering Branch Chief, April 1980 through September 1988 
Working under the procedures and requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 
and Consumer Products Safety Act (CPSA) managed the research activities supporting 
regulation and enforcement of consumer safety. This work was primarily in the area of 
Architectural Safety including gas fired appliances. Negotiated and managed contract 
requirements supporting the needed research. Served as an expert witness and trained others to 
be expert witnesses. Briefed senior staff of the Commission, Commissioners, officials of other 
agencies and industrial representatives on the progress and status of research. 
Standards Coordinator August 1975 through May 1978 
Was a program manger for the development of standards and processing of petitions under the 
CPSA and other acts administered by the CPSC. Coordinated with the various bureaus and 
offices within CPSC to assure that the work needed to meet legal and technical requirements was 
provided. Established and maintained constructive relationships with key members of industry 
and other government agencies. Participated in select committees and made public addresses. 
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Consumer Product Safety Associates 
P.O. Diawcr 32 
Truth or Consequences, NM 87901 
505-894-4436 
Fax:505-f94.721? 
November 12,1999 
Mitch Zager 
Attorney at Law 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
He: Preliminary Report - Aana Marie Alarid v. American Water Heater Co. 
Dear Mr. Zager: 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with disclosure information, including my opinions in 
ihe referenced case. As the case develops, I may supplement the report. 
Background information, 
I am a mechanical engineer. My relevant background includes serving as a safety engineer/manager 
within the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission for a period of about nineteen years. That 
experience included managing the engineering programs associated with gas fired appliances for 
over ten years. Other than official documents for the CPSC, and reports in litigation, I have not 
authored any publications during the last ten years. My time is compensated at the rate of $ 150 per 
hour. The data and information forming the basis of my opinion include all related documents 
reviewed during the time of my tenure at CPSC including, but not limited to. all briefing packages 
authored by myself or my successors, the information developed at CPSC regarding water heaters, 
the studies conducted on behalf of the water heater industry by AD. Little, the National Fire 
Protection Association Handbooks (NFPA) on the National Fuel Gas Code and Liquified Petroleum 
Gases. 1 have reviewed and considered case materials, depositions, etc. for this and other cases. For 
historical confirmation I have also considered telephone interviews 1 have had with Donald McKay, 
former Voluntary Standards Manager for CPSC, Carl Bledchmidt, fomier director of Product Defect 
Investigation and Correction for CPSC and with Jack Langmead, former technical director for the 
Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association (GAMA). I would refer to official documents from the 
CPSC file, which 1 understand have been produced by American Water Heater Co. or have been 
supplied in response to FOI A requests directed to the CPSC. A partial listing of these materials is 
included as an attachment. 
WATER HEATERS 
Background 
The Gas Water Heater Manufacturers, and its member manufacturers, including American Water 
Heater Co.. through their industry organization, GAMA, have known about the hazard of ignition of 
flammable vapors by gas water heaters since before the beginning of the CPSC [in October. 1972]. 
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Administration) had studied the epidemiology of fires and explosions associated with water heaters 
and held discourse on the possible elimination of these hazards with GAMA. At that time, and for 
many years thereafter, the industry took the position that the fires were not the fault of the 
equipment but instead were a function of inappropriate human behavior in using or storing 
flammable liquids and vapors around water heaters. This argument held off serious examination of 
the equipment itself, by the CPSC staff, through several project managers and the beginning of my 
own term as such, until staff was given a presentation of experimental work done in preparation for 
plaintiffs product liability litigation in which elevated water heater ignition was compared with 
heaters placed on the floor. Shortly thereafter CPSC staff sent a "White Paper' to the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) sub-committee on water heater standards. In that white paper, 
staff recommended that the sub-Committee develop a product safety standard ro reduce or eliminate 
the risk of injury presented by these water heaters due to their defective design. The design defect 
identified was that conventional water heaters take their intake (combustion) air directly off the 
floor. Staff suggested that such intake (and flame height) should be at least eighteen inches off the 
floor. The sub-committee formed a special working group whose purported charter was to examine 
the problem and suggested solutions and to make recommendations to the sub-committee. 
The approach taken by the working group was to attempt to disprove the efficacy of the corrective 
methods which had been brought to their attention. In addition GAMA proceeded to develop some 
consumer information pieces. At the urging of Jack Moore, now retired from American Wa.er 
heater Company. A.D. Little was contracted by GAMA to do a series of tests which examined 
elevation, quantity of gasoline spilled and proximity of gasoline spills to the water heater. Even 
though the experiment was modified during the course of the tests with no real justification |to 
create multiple spills, to spill larger quantities of gasoline, and to use grossly elevated floor and 
room temperatures] the tests basically showed that the raising of water heater flame and air intake 
would reduce the number of fires and explosions associated with these products and thereby reduce 
Ibe number of deaths and injuries caused by gas water heaters. The A.D. Little tests also showed 
that elevation alone would not prevent all of the fires if a lot of gasoline was spilled close erough to 
a water heater of conventional design. The most important result of the test was a demonstration 
that when a water heater was not elevated it would almost always ignite spilled gasoline but when it 
was elevated the risk of fire was greatly reduced. 
At the same time the GAMA tests were going on, CPSC was also conducting tests to determ ne the 
effect of elevating the air-intake. In order to do this and examine a potential retrofit possibility, 
placed a piece of fourteen-inch "roof-dashing" around the water heater and sealed it at the floor. A 
fan was used to produce the same "draw" as a normally burning water heater and gasoline vapor 
concentrations were measured at the "flame front." These tests showed that even this barrier greatly 
reduced the risk of fire by not allowing the vapor concentrations to reach the "lower explosive limit'' 
(LEL) at the flame-front in most cases. It is interesting that Rheem's patent #5.085,205. filed 5/9'91 
was essentially the same idea as that tested by CPSC. It is even more interesting that in spite of the 
existence of the CPSC testing which demonstrated the effectiveness of the idea/Rheem withheld 
this important safety device from the public and finally ''dedicated" it. 
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On the morning of one of my briefings to the Commission, the President of GAMA called to tell me 
that thev (GAMA) had also run barrier tests (two mns) and that they quickly got fires. I immediately 
called the American Gas Association (AGA) Laboratories in Cleveland, where the tests had been 
run. and learned that in both cases the barriers had not been sealed to the floor and that measurable 
or observable amounts of gasoline had run under the barriers. Under such conditions, there was 
effectively no hairier and it was not surprising that fire conditions were reached. I found it 
.nteresting that GAMA had not disclosed this defect in the tests and that they continued to u;.e the 
misleading reports to try to disprove the barrier theory in their presentations to the Commiss.on after 
my retirement. On the other hand, it was totally consistent with the rest of their effort: At the time 
that the problem was first pressed on them, they responded with poor labeling. When the problem 
was again pressed, they responded with improved labeling. Upon the third and much more vigorous 
pressing (and this time for product standards) they responded with decent information and 
educations materials but no real efforts to improve the safety performance of the equipment. At 
each turn, they seemed to respond with the minimum effort which they calculated might take the 
pressure off of their industry. The hundreds of people who were being burned-up were apparently 
insufficient to motivate them to improve their standard products or installation practices. 
Even after the industry was routinely selling so-called "sealed combustion" or "direct vent" systems 
(these would have eliminated the vast majority, perhaps all, of the fires and explosions) they 
persisted in their attempts to maintain the status quo as to conventional water heaters. It was the 
insensitivity of the water heater manufacturers to the plight of the victims which caused suc-.i a 
negative reaction from the CPSC staff, particularly when demonstrated methods to reduce or 
eliminate the hazard were in existence. The staff was haunted by photos of the victims showing the 
degree of injury and obvious pain of these victims, yet the industry was unmoved to correct the 
design of the water heaters. They were, however, moved to change the rules of the ANSI 7.-21 
whereby a similar presentation could not be made again without the specific approval, in advance, of 
the sub-committee chairman. The industry also went to some expense to demonstrate that the 
"fixes" which had been suggested would not prevent all of the accidents and then professed no 
further interest in pursuing them. Their approach seemed to be that if an suggested method could be 
shown to be unsuccessful in preventing even one fire, then the method was to be rejected. 
Discussion 
As discussed above, it is my opinion that the gas industry, including American Water Heater Co. has 
long known that by installing a conventional water heater directly on the floor, a useful product is 
turned into a defective one. The defect is that, by design, the air (which the flame must have in 
order to bum the fuel) is drawn from directly off of the floor. At first glance, where the air is taken 
from doesn't seem to present much of a problem, unless and until you think about the environment 
into which a water heater is installed. They are installed into homes where many chemicals 
including flammable and poisonous chemicals are stored and used. They are installed into garages. 
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inio utility rooms, into kitchens and other rooms and areas of the house. Many flammable vapors 
are known, by the industry and others involved in science, to be heavier than air; however, many 
consumers do not know or think about those facts. They also do not typically interact with their 
water heaters except when the water heaters are not working. Therefore, the water heater is not on 
the mind of most consumers during any activity that does not directly involve the water heater. 
When people wash cloths they may think about the washer but they will not likely think about the 
water heater or the hazards it can present unless they regularly run out of hot water. 
For several years, "sealed combustion'* or "direct-vent" gas water heaters have been offered wherein 
combustion air was drawn in from outside the residence. These were considered by the industry to 
be 'high end" products and when CPSC staff recommended to GAMA that these could be used as 
the ''standard product*' to eliminate or greatly reduce the risk of the fires that were injuring so many 
people each year, they answered with the general statement that many consumers could not afford 
them. There did not appear to have been any examination of the economics of scale and its effect on 
pricing , When this analysis is made, a product which previously appeared too expensive can 
suddenly be competitive when it is produced in large numbers. 
The industry largely relics on its labeling and information campaign for safety coverage. However, 
in February 1976 GAMA admitted thatxi... the only time most people find out what type of furnace 
or water heater they have is when for some reason the unit fails to provide the desired service." That 
obsen ation is as true today as it was in 1976 and before. Labeling on water heaters will not be 
effective in eliminating most fires, injuries and deaths associated with water heaters igniting 
flammable vapors. Water Heaters are unique among the major appliances found in the home — it is 
not a product with which a consumer interacts on any reasonably consistent basis — similar to an 
electrical supply (wiring) system. It, however, presents a continuous hazardous condition of likely 
ignition of any flammable vapor with which it might come into contact. 
There are a number of ways to keep gasoline from getting under the water heater including a Rhecm 
patented barrier mechanism similar in concept to the one tested by CPSC labs. In addition, my 
review of reports of testing done with Firexx and the Bowen burner, both had successful tests where 
gasoline was spilled under the water heater yet no ignition occurred. 
The economic analysis done by CPSC indicated that the installer's charges of $35 to install the 
water heater on a stand would have been a cost-effective safety remedy. 
The concept of that manufacturers would rely on the homeowner to follow safety guidelines as well 
by reading the manual, is, of course false on its face. Consider that the instructions make reference 
to standards which are not included in the owners manual. Such reference is of little or no value 
'What this means is that, where only a few of a particular model arc manufactured, the eosts of 
development, tooling and construction have to be recovered over only the few units; however, where many 
are ni8de, these same costs can be recouped over the entire production, thereby lowering the "per-unit" costs. 
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because most consumers and many installers will not have them. This lack of access is an item 
which has been discussed by the industry such that while they know of its ineffectiveness they feci 
lhai ihey need to be "covered" and therefore included reference to other standards so that they can 
claim that they have covered the subject. 
The training that installers receive is generally "on-the-job" training. The process of installing a 
water heater is not complicated. It is not reasonable to expect that installation instructions will be 
examined by installers unless there is something which they have not seen before associated with a 
particular piece of equipment. Basically, three pipes and a vent are disconnected and reconnected. 
Only if something unexpected were introduced would it be reasonable to expect any inquiry. In my 
own experience in having water heaters installed in property I owned, water heater installers, even in 
areas like Washington, D.C. [home of the AGA and GAMA headquarters], did not know (much less 
.n small towns or communities) that Water Heaters need to be installed on stands in garages or other 
places where flammable vapors are likely to be encountered. Installers are always in a better 
position to know of the requirements than is the consumer because they furnish it and arc in actual 
interaction with the unit whereas the typical consumer only looks at the Water Heater when it 
doesn't work. 
Only after the staff of the Consumer Product Safety Commission recommended that mandatory 
standards be developed did the Water Heater Industry seriously attempt to examine how to nake a 
safer water heater. The American Water Heater Co. recently announced that they have developed 
such a water heater and were honored for being the first to do so. However, we have been unable to 
find any of the units available on the market. It is interesting to note that it took only five years after 
the industry agreed to develop such a product. Had they done so in the early 1970s, thousands of 
people would not have been killed, disfigured or injured by the ignition of flammable vapors, 
including Anna Marie Alarid. 
Conclusion 
The water heater industry in general and American Water Heater Co, in particular has maintained a 
consistent, conscious and knowing disregard for the safety and welfare of their customers in the face 
of repeated urging by the government agency charged with the responsibility for consumer product 
safety (CPSC). They had the ability to greatly reduce or eliminate the risk of injury from ignition of 
flammable vapors by using other existing products (closed combustion or stands) or any other 
design which would elevate the flame source or eliminate the need for floor level intake air for 
combustion. They refused to do so. 
Very truly yours, 
Joseph Z. Fandey 
Consumer Product Safety Associates, LLC. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR, FANDEY IS NOT QUALIFIED TO OPINE ABOUT 
THE DESIGN OF WATER HEATERS SIMPLY BECAUSE 
HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
THE INDUSTRY AND THE CPSC. 
Is a crossing guard qualified to opine on the proper design of a roadway? This is the role 
attorney Fandey has played with regard to water heaters. Plaintiff offers no indication that Mr. 
Fandey has training, expertise or specialized knowledge about any aspect of water heaters other 
than a historical study of the interface between the CPSC and the Gas Appliance Manufacturers 
Association (GAMA). He should not be permitted to give opinions about design alternatives 
based solely on this single facet of expertise. 
The design of a water heater, or any other product, involves many factors and only one of 
those factors is its historical development. Design includes consideration of the proper and 
reliable function of the product. It includes consideration of the various environments in which 
the machine may operate. It includes a consideration of the useful life of the product and its 
economic feasibility. The concern for consistent and efficient manufacture of the product must 
also be addressed. 
Without any actual knowledge or experience concerning these many factors, Mr. Fandey 
seeks to offer myopic opinions from the standpoint of regulatory history alone. This is all he can 
do because his life's work has been in various roles "supporting regulation and enforcement of 
consumer safety." 
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That Mr. Fandey may be familiar with other design considerations from having read about 
them does not suffice. This is the plain holding of Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P. 2d 943 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), where an emergency room doctor sought to give opinions about the standard of care 
for cardiologists based on his readings. The court disallowed those opinions, based in part on the 
following: 
To allow a doctor in one specialty, retained as an expert witness, to 
become an "expert" on the standard of care in a different medical 
specialty by merely reading and studying the documents in a given 
case invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with unreliable 
testimony. 
Id. at 947. 
Mr. Fandey could no more design a water heater than could any number of the lawyers 
involved in this case. Like them, his knowledge of water heater design is book knowledge, not 
personal knowledge. Moreover, there is no indication that his involvement with water heaters has 
touched on any aspect other than historical considerations. Just as a crossing guard may think 
there is a way to change an intersection, Mr. Fandey's review of accidents involving water heaters 
may give him an idea about how to change them, however, it does not qualify him to give an 
opinion about improper design. 
POINT H 
PLAINTIFF SEEMS TO CONCEDE THAT MR. FANDEY 
CANNOT BE AN EXPERT ON WHO "KNOWINGLY AND 
RECKLESSLY DISREGARDED." 
Although it is not said explicitly, plaintiff seems to agree that Mr. Fandey does not qualify 
as an expert on whether American should be liable for punitive damages. In criminal cases, 
-3-
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certain experts with training in psychology or psychiatry are permitted to testify about an 
accused's state of mind. However, nothing in Mr. Fandey's background or preparation of this 
case would supply him with that type of basis for a similar 
It is conceivable that Mr. Fandey could offer an admissible piece of factual testimony 
about American's involvement in some meeting to which he was also a party. Perhaps he even 
recalls some admission against interest made by an American employee. To this extent, Mr. 
Fandey may be an appropriate percipient witness. 
However, that does not make his opinion admissible. Plainly, it is up to the finder of fact 
to conclude if the proof shows that American knowingly and recklessly disregarded the safety of 
others. That is the ultimate question as to American's liability for punitive damages. An expert is 
not permitted to simply tell the jury what result to reach. See Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corp., 820 P. 2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This issue is properly within the province of the 
finder of fact to decide by application of common knowledge and experience to the facts adduced. 
POINT in 
MR. FANDEY'S TESTIMONY BASED ON PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN, THE DEFENDANT IN 
THE CASE. 
A brief review of Mr. Fandey's report and plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to this 
motion suggests that plaintiff seeks to have Mr. Fandey attack the entire water heater industry. 
His report would apply with minor edits regardless of what water heater maker was named as 
defendant. 
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Plaintiff has made no attempt to limit Mr. Fandey's testimony to his personal knowledge 
of American's conduct. Yet it is the conduct of American's upper management, and that alone, 
which will be material to an assessment of punitive liability against the company. 
Plaintiff seems to concede that Mr. Fandey must have personal knowledge in order to 
testify as a percipient witness. However, she suggests that Mr. Fandey's general historical 
knowledge is relevant. Unless Mr. Fandey is testifying to matters that are established to have 
involved American, his factual testimony should be precluded. Particularly when the plaintiff is 
seeking to punish a defendant, not just obtain compensation, careful application of Rule 602 is 
warranted so that the defendant is not punished for the wrongs of others. 
/7* DATED this / / day of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSElSWhMARTINEAU 
JohnR. 
Kara Ly 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater 
Company 
N:\19944\l\Fandey.rep 
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American moves the Court for an order excluding numerous exhibits identified by plaintiff 
which are inadmissible hearsay for which the plaintiff has developed no foundation. This motion 
is supported by the accompanying memorandum and Rules 803 and 703, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
To the extent this motion is granted, American requests that counsel be admonished to refrain 
from mentioning any inadmissible evidence in opening statement or otherwise, and that counsel be 
ordered to instruct all witnesses to refrain from mentioning the evidence while testifying. 
DATED this $ ~~ day of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
John! 
KaraL. Pettit 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
N:\19944\1\RULE803.MOT 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff proposes a total of 131 exhibits in this matter. Several of the proposed exhibits 
have multiple subparts. Proposed exhibits 24 through 127 include a plethora of letters, minutes, 
reports, studies and other documents dating back to 1967. American objects to the introduction 
of such materials unless and until plaintiff has laid an adequate foundation and overcome the 
obvious hearsay problems with these materials. As will be argued, those objections are not 
overcome simply by having plaintiffs expert rely on these materials as a basis for their opinions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs list of proposed exhibits is attached as Exhibit A. This list was first 
produced to American's counsel on March 1, 2001 when counsel met in accordance with the 
court's scheduling order. 
2. The list includes various reports, letters, meeting minutes and other documentation 
that generally recount the history of efforts by the water heater industry, certain government 
committees and the CPSC to address safety issues related to flammable vapors around gas 
appliances. The documents do not specifically identify the involvement of American in such 
events. The documents do not address the particulars of the design of the water heaters involved 
in this matter. 
3. There has been absolutely no effort in this case to connect any of these materials to 
American or to the water heaters involved in this case. In point of fact, plaintiff has not 
conducted a single fact deposition in this matter, specifically she has not deposed any engineer or 
employee of American. 
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4. Moreover, plaintiff does not list any employee of American as a witness at trial. 
5. Apparently the only witnesses who will be called to testify about American's 
liability will be plaintiffs two retained experts, Mr. Fandey and Mr. Hoffman. Both of these 
gentlemen purport to rely on these various memoranda and reports as the basis for their opinions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED EXHIBITS ARE HEARSAY DOCUMENTS THAT 
DO NOT FALL WITHIN ANY HEARSAY EXCEPTION, 
Plaintiffs proposed exhibits are hearsay documents. They contain multiple out of court 
statements which plaintiff intends to use to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Rule 801, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. For example, plaintiff may offer a memorandum discussing the hazards 
of flammable vapors around gas appliances and showing that it was sent to someone at American. 
She will be hoping to use this to convince the jury that American knew of those hazards. She is 
offering the memorandum both to prove the existence of a hazard and to prove that American 
knew of that hazard. Hence, she is offering the memorandum to prove the truth of that matter 
asserted. 
If plaintiff had elected to depose American in this matter, she might have asked whether ( 
American was aware of a certain hazard by a certain day, or whether American actually received a 
certain memorandum. No such evidence is in the record. Unless these exhibits fall within an 
exception to the hearsay rule, they should be excluded. 
Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence, lists exceptions to the hearsay rule, at least a few of 
which have applicability to the documents proposed by plaintiff. Rule 803(6) permits the ( 
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admission of records of regularly conducted activity. However, to use this "business records" 
exception, the plaintiff must provide foundational testimony from a custodian or other qualified 
witness. That person must be able to testify that the record was kept in the course of regularly 
conducted activities as a matter of routine practice and that it was made at or near the time by a 
person with knowledge of those activities. American is unaware of any witness to be called by 
plaintiff who can provide such foundation for the documents. Similarly, Rule 803(8) permits the 
admission of certain public records reflecting the activities of that office or agency; however, 
American is unaware of any witness to be called by the plaintiff who can lay such a foundation for 
the proposed exhibits. 
Rule 803(18) permits the admission of certain learned treatises. If any of the studies and 
reports on plaintiffs exhibit list are found in "published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets" which 
are considered to be reliable authorities, then this exception to the hearsay rule might be 
employed. However, the exhibit list proposed by plaintiff does not indicate that any of the reports 
or studies were published in the type of publication anticipated by this exception. 
POINT H 
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT BECOME ADMISSIBLE 
SIMPLY BECAUSE AN EXPERT RELIES ON IT. 
Plaintiffs liability case against American will apparently be the testimony of two retained 
experts, Mr. Joseph Fandey and Mr. John Hoffman. She has not designated any employee of 
American as a trial witness. These experts cannot be used to prove plaintiffs case with 
inadmissible evidence. 
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>& DATED this 3 - d a y of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JohnRj^nd 
Karaf^Pettit 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF AMERICAN'S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED EXHIBITS was served by mailing, postage prepaid, on the day of April, 
2001, on the following: 
Mitchel A. Zager 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake city, UT 84114 
and 
5580 LaJolla Blvd. #83 
LaJolla, CA 92037 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Thomas V. Girardi 
James G. O'Callahan 
GIRARDI KEESE 
1126 Wilshire Blvd. 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Royal I. Hansen 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Armstrong World Industries, 
Inc. 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main #700 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Attorneys for Eagle Hardware & Garden, Inc. 
Daniel McConkie 
KIRTON&MCCONKIE 
60 East South Temple # 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Kent Nelson 
John Mangum 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple #1100 
P.O.Box 11808 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Attorney for Kent Nelson 
Gary E. Atkin 
311 South State, #380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for 3 rd Party Defendant Gomez 
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, California 92691 
Telephone: (949) 206 0550 
JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing 
and American Water Heater Co. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARJX), 
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REPLY MEMORANDUM EN SUPPORT 
vs. OF AMERICAN'S MOTION EN 
LIMINE REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE PROPOSED EXHEBITS 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al., 
Defendants. Civil No. 980905332 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, 
INC., 
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vs. 
W. KENT NELSON, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff concedes that exhibits containing out of court statements must fall within an 
exception to the hearsay rule in order to be admitted at trial. However, she downplays the scope 
of the problem. It is indeed difficult to separately address each document on the exhibit list 
because there are 131 different numbered descriptions of exhibits, many of which contain several 
subparts. 
By way of further illustration, consider the 22 items listed as Exhibit 26 on the plaintiffs 
list. Exhibit 26 is described only as: "Joseph Fandey, 1970-1976 Flammable Vapors Materials." 
It includes four items described only as "Letter" with a date. It appears to contain articles and 
reports from a variety of sources other than the CPSC where Mr. Fandey worked. All of these 
documents are out of court statements falling within the definition of hearsay found in Rule 801. 
There are undoubtedly incidents of hearsay within hearsay to the extent the articles and reports 
are gathering information from elsewhere. 
The admission of any of these materials depends upon the plaintiff showing how each 
proffered document has some materiality to the issues being tried in this case. The defendant in 
this case is American, not every water heater company that ever corresponded with the CPSC. 
Further, the water heater in question was manufactured in 1991, which may make materials 
published thereafter irrelevant. Mr. Fandey's files up through 1998 are included in the list. 
Plaintiff seems to concede that these files and records are not admissible simply because 
Mr. Fandey says that he relied on them. She claims that she is not trying to use her experts as a 
front for hearsay documents. American contends that the central purpose of Mr. Fandey's 
-2-
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testimony will be to introduce the historical facts contained in his files. In point of fact, Mr. 
Fandey has done little else to form his opinions in this matter. 
The real test of this comes in application of Rule 703's proscription on what can be used as 
the basis for an expert opinion. That Rule only allows an expert to base his opinion on the type of 
materials that are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." Obviously an expert 
in the design of water heaters should not be relying on what he reads in the newspaper to support 
his opinion. See, generally, Barson v. KR. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, American stands on its general objection to the plaintiffs exhibit 
designation and will make more specific objections to the exhibits as they are offered at trial. 
DATED this * f day of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
R. L u n J ^ 
LL. P6ttit 
John 
Kara: 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater 
Company 
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expert opinions. 
My client would object to him being called as a 
witness for the following reasons: He was never identified in 
discovery responses served by the plaintiff in this case that 
would have specifically sought out his identity. In December 
of 1998, plaintiff served discovery responses that did not list 
Mr. Long in response to inquiry about witnesses to be used at 
the time of trial, expert witnesses to be used at the time of 
trial or persons who arrived at the scene after the incident. 
Those discovery responses were supplemented by the plaintiff in 
May of 1998 and there was still no reference to Mr. Long. 
In November of 1999, pursuant to prior scheduling 
order, plaintiff was ordered to produce all expert witness 
reports. There was nothing from Mr. Long in the expert witness 
reports. And as recently as April 26, 2001, when the final 
pretrial order was signed by this court, Mr. Long did not 
appear on plaintiff's witness list nor, for that matter, did 
anybody from the Salt Lake City Fire Department. 
For those reasons, because Mr. Long has not been 
identified — 
THE COURT: Anything general like a firefighter maybe 
or anything like that? 
MR. SUTTON: No, Your Honor. For those reasons, it 
would be our motion that Mr. Long be precluded from testifying 
this morning and particularly precluded from offering expert 
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1 opinions. 
2 THE COURT: If he werenft allowed to testify — 
3 MR. SUTTON: I recognize that, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: I guess that would be a — so you're 
5 saying on the chance that I let him do it, you don't want him 
6 to talk about expert stuff? 
7 MR. SUTTON: That's correct. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. O1CALLAHAN: Your Honor, Mr. Long at the time was 
10 a member of the Salt Lake City Fire Department. He was 
11 involved and in charge of the investigation pertaining to this 
12 fire. One of the reasons that we have to call him is that — 
13 his name doesn't appear in the incident report itself but he 
14 was the one responsible for it, and that's according to the 
15 person who signed off on it and who we did identify. That is 
16 Mr. McKone who we made reference to previously, so this is — 
17 in other words, if we brought in, I guess he's Commander 
18 McKone, Commander McKone would have to say, Well, the person 
19 who actually oversaw this was Mr. Long. So this is really to 
20 some extent foundational for what Mr. McKone would say with 
21 respect to the fire incident report. 
22 The fire incident report is something that their 
23 experts have relied on and have reviewed for purposes of their 
24 testimony. So this is foundational and, to the extent that 
25 there has been some challenges or concerns with respect to the 
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investigation that was undertaken, we want to play that out for 
the jury. But he is a — 
THE COURT: How about going to the issue — the issue 
raised is we have rules of discovery, the rules of discovery, 
as I understand them, say essentially, if you donft tell me who 
you1re going to call, then you canft call them. So that seems 
to be the problem. It's not who is he, what's he doing. Isn't 
that the problem? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I would — 
THE COURT: Isn't that the problem raised by the 
motion? I've heard your words, but they don't go to the 
motion. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, the fact is that we were 
not aware that Mr. Long was the preparer of this report and we 
did not anticipate that he would be a witness. 
THE COURT: So you were going with McKone and McKone 
at some point tells you it's really Mr. Long? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Mr. McKone told us that on Monday 
morning when we had subpoenaed him. And he said the person 
that actually did the — 
THE COURT: That really knows about this is Mr. Long? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Right. And on that basis, obviously 
if we were to bring Mr. McKone in here — 
THE COURT: All he'd say is --
MR. O'CALLAHAN: See Mr. Long. 
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1 THE COURT: How about the promptu of Mr. Sutton's 
2 concern Long is suddenly going to be some sort of expert 
3 fellow? Not that he couldn't be, but that he now will be? 
4 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Well, Your Honor, I would merely 
5 bring him in to establish what investigation that he undertook.^ 
6 The conclusions or the summaries that are contained in his 
7 J report, I think that to the extent that he's a public official 
8 who's created a public document under Evidence Code 803-8, the 
9 document itself would be entitled to be introduced into 
10 evidence because it in fact would not be barred by the hearsay 
11 rule. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sutton, anything more? 
13 MR. SUTTON: The comment I would make, Your Honor, to 
14 my knowledge, the only document that has been prepared is an 
15 J approximately one and one-half page typewritten narrative that 
16 I believe Mr. McKone was the author of. I do not believe that 
17 document sets forth any opinions and conclusions with respect 
18 to the fire. 
19 THE COURT: Well, let's get to that. What is the 
20 document you are going to have Long submit? 
21 MR. O'CALLAHAN: It's the Fire Incident Report that's 
22 part of the state reporting system that the City of Salt Lake 
23 I and every other — 
24 THE COURT: Does Sutton know about this report? 
25 MR. OfCALLAHAN: Yes, his experts have it in their 
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1 files. 
2 THE COURT: So I'm confused, Mr. Sutton, when you say 
3 it's some kind of narrative. Are we talking about the same 
4 thing? McKone evidently signed it, but — 
5 MR. SUTTON: No, we're not talking about the same 
6 thing. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. So why would you say there's only 
8 one thing? 
9 MR. SUTTON: There is a one and one-half page 
10 narrative report. 
11 THE COURT: That McKone signed? 
12 MR. SUTTON: Nobody signed it, but it's my belief 
13 I that it was authored by Mr. McKone. 
14 THE COURT: So let's set that aside. He wants 
15 J something else in which he calls the Fire Incident Report. 
16 I MR. SUTTON: Okay. Then there was some statistical 
17 Utah Fire Incident Reporting System documents that were filed 
18 I that basically indicated — 
19 THE COURT: Is that the thing we're talking about? 
20 MR. OfCALLAHAN: Yes, Your Honor, that's the thing 
21 that their experts have in their files, which I think everybody 
22 has seen. 
23 THE COURT: You saw that, right, Mr. Sutton? 
24 MR. SUTTON: I have seen these documents. 
25 THE COURT: Does it say who authored that? 
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1 MR. LUND: Your Honor, may I hand it to you? 
2 MR. SUTTON: It says at the bottom, "Officer in 
3 charge of incident: B. Gene Warr." And then it says, "Member 
4 completing, submitting or reviewing report: D.M. McKone, 
5 Battalion Assistant." 
6 THE COURT: All right. McKone will tell us that Long 
7 created the report, that's your proffer? 
8 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Yes, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: All right. So you would object to this 
10 I report. You knew it existed though; right? 
11 MR. SUTTON: I did know that it existed, yes. I need 
12 to look I guess at the exhibit list as to whether they 
13 proffered it as an exhibit there. And to the extent that it 
14 does reflect opinions on it germane to this inquiry, 
15 Your Honor, I will represent to the Court that it says, "Form 
16 of heat of ignition: Pilot light," singular. Then it says, 
17 "Type of material: Carpet adhesive. Form of material ignited: 
18 Multiple forms." 
19 THE COURT: Meaning that's what got burned? 
20 MR. SUTTON: I don't know. 
21 THE COURT: A lot of things got burned, is that — 
22 MR. SUTTON: Right. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. O1Callahan, he is just going 
24 to tell us he prepared the report and did the investigation? 
25 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Correct. 
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THE COURT: Are you going to ask him to opine to what 
caused the fire? 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: No, Your Honor, I!ll ask him what he 
undertook to prepare this particular document and ask him what 
he put in there based on his investigation. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other problems, 
Mr. Sutton? 
MR. SUTTON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lund has arisen. 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, because of 803-8, the public 
records exception, we had some discussion about that yesterday, 
I actually have prepared a brief little summary of some law on 
803-8. And one of the things about 803-8 is in subsection (c) 
about public records it says that in civil actions you may 
include, despite the hearsay rule, factual findings resulting 
from and investigation made pursuant to authority granted by 
law unless the source of information indicates lack of 
trustworthiness. 
So our position would be that with regard to the 
UFIRS document itself, leave aside whether this witness 
testifies — 
THE COURT: With regard to what, now? 
MR. LUND: It's the Utah Fire Incident Reporting 
System, UFIRS, that the factual observations recorded on that 
are indeed appropriate under this hearsay exception, but that 
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1 I the conclusions reached by the government in that report are 
2 excluded by this. 
3 THE COURT: So you'd have the report but somehow have 
4 to excise portions? 
5 MR. LUND: The standard thing on a police officer's 
6 J report is that he recorded the — 
7 I THE COURT: I mean if we're talking criminal cases 
8 I nobody lets reports in. But — 
9 MR. LUND: No, I'm talking — we let in the fact that 
10 I he knew what the weather was that day because he observed it 
11 I that day, but don't let in the fact that he determined — 
12 THE COURT: Who was at fault, huh? 
13 I MR. LUND: Yeah. So here I think the observations he 
14 makes are fine, but the conclusions he reaches would be 
15 I excluded. 
16 J THE COURT: Because it would be hearsay? 
17 J MR. LUND: Because it would be hearsay and — 
18 THE COURT: And the problem we have is that nobody 
19 I told you that he was going to testify so you're unprepared to 
20 I question him. 
21 All right. Well, it seems to me the only way I can 
22 rule is to allow him to testify about what he did, what he saw, 
23 but not to tell us what he thinks happened, why it happened, I 
24 guess, conclusions. 
25 I Does that make sense, Mr. O'Callahan? 
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MR. O'CALLAHAN: Yes, Your Honor, although --
THE COURT: Do you understand it, not — do you 
understand it? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I understand what the 
Court has said. 
THE COURT: Because I think the fact that he isn't 
divulged to the other side as he's going to be the witness and 
we're going to rely on him to tell us A, B and C puts him at a 
disadvantage to prejudice their position because they weren't 
able to inquire of him before today what he might be saying so 
they can't meet the evidence. But I think these — I get the 
sense we're all agreeing that it could come in another way, you 
know, what he did in the way of investigation, what he found 
and what he saw, but the conclusions he draws from that we'd 
have to keep out because those are the kinds of things that 
they'd be able to challenge if they'd been prepared, which they 
couldn't be because they didn't know about it. Okay? 
Mr. Zager has a thought. Mr. Zager, since I upset 
you yesterday by not listening to you, please stand. 
MR. ZAGER: If we could just have a moment, Your 
Honor, I'd like to confer with counsel. 
THE COURT: Sure. Make the record. 
(A side-bar conference was held off the record.) 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I just want to put 
Mr. Long on, go through his testimony and — 
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1 THE COURT: Find out what he 'saw, what he did, but 
2 not what he thinks happened? 
3 MR. OfCALLAHAN: And, Your Honor, the fact that there 
4 was a report that was prepared pursuant to his investigation, I 
5 think that is a fact, the report was prepared, although I 
6 understand that — 
7 THE COURT: I mean you can see why the conclusions 
8 can't come in? If you want to admit it, that's fine, but we're 
9 going to have to probably excise it. And that could be an 
10 exercise we could engage in at some point if you want. 
11 If he makes conclusions and if they get in without 
12 being tested by the other side, which they aren't prepared to 
13 do, that's the problem. 
14 MR. OfCALLAHAN: That's what cross-examination is all 
15 I about. 
16 I THE COURT: It is, but that's why you have discovery, 
17 so you can prepare for that. Right? 
18 MR. O'CALLAHAN: You know, obviously — 
19 THE COURT: Well, I'm not saying you've got the upper 
20 hand other than he's reached some conclusions that you may or 
21 may not like and now it seems to me we have to approach it that 
22 way. 
23 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: Anything more right now? 
25 MR. SUTTON: There is. I don't know how long — 
1 A 
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1 deputy, United States Marshal, and along with that we had to 
2 carry a minimum of 48 hours a year of training. Not only 
3 locally but we also had to do it nationally, so I attended the 
4 I National Fire Academy. I attended the ATS training on fire 
5 J investigations. 
6 J Q What's the National Fire Academy? 
7 A The National Fire Academy is in Emmitsburg, Maryland, 
8 it's part of the US Fire Administration. And that's where 
9 firefighters travel to attend the different various topics on 
10 fire investigation, fire inspections, code enforcements, 
11 incident command structures, interpersonal dynamics and so 
12 forth. 
13 Q During the course of your years as a fire 
14 investigator and the training that you received, did you come 
15 to learn certain principles of fire investigation? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Could you outline in layman's terms what those 
18 principles were? 
19 MR. LUND: Your Honor, calls for a narrative. I'm a 
20 little concerned about the scope of the testimony. 
21 THE COURT: It's the easiest way to get at it. And I 
22 guess if it becomes too rambling, I'll allow Mr. Lund to call a 
23 halt to it. 
24 THE WITNESS: Well, again, in fire investigation, it 
25 deals with the dynamics of what fire does in a building or what 
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1 fire does in a vehicle or wherever you?re investigating the 
2 fire. Fire has a simple process where it uses heat, fuel and 
3 oxygen to combust, to keep it going. So what happens is the 
4 fire crew comes in and they put the fire out by extinguishing 
5 it. So we go in as fire investigators and try to determine how 
6 the fire started. By doing that, the first thing that they 
7 teach you is to go to the point of most destruction, 
8 MR. LUND: This is my problem, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Go question by question. 
10 I MR. LUND: And, Your Honor, we would be happy to 
11 stipulate that Mr. Long is qualified as a fire scene 
12 investigator, since this is just foundational as to what he did 
13 I and saw there. 
14 MR. 0!CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I think for the benefit 
15 J of the jury in terms of the testimony — 
16 THE COURT: I think you're entitled to overlook the 
17 I stipulation and move to credibility of the witness, sure, 
18 MR. OfCALLAHAN: Thank you. 
19 Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Mr. Long, you indicated that the 
20 first thing that you do in the process of investigating a fire 
21 I is to go to the point of greatest destruction? 
22 A That's where it ends up leading you to, the point of 
23 J most destruction. What you do is you go to the point of least 
24 destruction to the point of most destruction. So you go 
25 around — let!s say for example it's a structure, a building. 
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1 You go around the outside and you look at all the different 
2 indicators to show where the possibility or where the fire came 
3 from and eliminate all those, and then you go inside. And then 
4 I after you go inside you go to the point of most destruction, 
5 and that pretty much indicates where — there's two things that 
6 happen where the fire started, or there might be a fuel load, 
7 like a couch or something that could have burnt that made it 
8 look like where the fire started. 
9 Q So going from the point of least destruction to the 
10 point of greatest destruction, do you undertake certain types 
11 I of inspection along the way, measuring char depth or things of 
12 that nature? 
13 A Yes, it's been done, yeah. 
14 Q After you get to the point of greatest destruction, 
15 what does that point enable you to do, to determine the point 
16 of origin? 
17 A Well, the fire's an oxidizer, so when it oxidizes, it 
18 burns. When it burns the wood it's like looking at a fireplace 
19 or a camp stove. Once you burn that wood it's going to turn 
20 J into what's called pyrolysis and it's going to turn into 
21 pyrolysized wood or burnt wood. So the more it burns the more 
22 you're going to go to the depth of char or the deepest of char. 
23 So that's why we go to the depth of char or the point of most 
24 destruction. 
25 Q And what do you do when you get to the point of most 
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overhauling and had left the scene before you started going 
through and doing your routine investigation? 
A That's usually what I do. I think they leave a 
crew — they leave a crew on all the scenes to make sure I — 
if I find any fires or smoldering, then they help me with the 
investigation. Not help me with the investigation, but help me 
put out some of the fires. 
Q In case it hasn't really been completely put out? 
A Yeah. 
Q Was there any particular order to the photographs 
that were taken? I guess if we — if you looked at the 
negatives, would that give you a clue as to — 
A The outside photographs — the outside were taken 
first. 
Q Maybe you could separate out the photographs that 
were taken on the outside first and then maybe organize them in 
the way that you actually took those. 
A Now, if you want, we could copy them with the 
negatives, if you want. 
Q Okay. Do you want to do that to confirm that you — 
and I note one thing is that all the photographs have a date in 
the bottom right-hand corner. Is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And they all reflect July 8th, 1996? 
A Are you — you're not going to — 
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official business that you were undertaking on behalf of the 
City of Salt Lake? 
A Yes. 
Q I take it back, there are 24 photographs. And for 
the record, I've marked them as 131-1 through 131-24. 
Now, in your investigation, if you'd take us through 
those photographs maybe you could describe starting with 131-1 
and going through them what the photograph depicts and why you 
thought that it was significant for you to get a picture of 
that. 
A Do you mind if I get up and show the jury what I'm 
showing them so they can have a better understanding? 
THE COURT: Any objection to — 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, I think there's no objection 
to the admissibility. With regard to the question posed, if 
the witness could simply be clearly understanding that he's not 
to state a conclusion or determination he made, he's simply to 
use the photos to explain what he saw, then that's probably 
going to be the quickest way to proceed. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. 0'Callahan? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I think that the jury is 
also entitled to know why he took that particular photograph, 
what he thought was significant in the photograph. 
THE COURT: Well, that gets us to the problem that we 
discussed for a half an hour before. Yeah, you may believe 
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1 that. We had a discussion off the record but let's just, since 
2 we can't get around it without anybody bringing it up, as to 
3 J whether or not you should be allowed to state some 
4 J conclusions — and it's not that you're not qualified, it's for 
5 wholly different procedural reasons that I'm not allowing you -
6 J to state conclusions. 
7 J So for purposes of what you're describing there, it 
8 would be fine to go over and show it to the jury, but just 
9 I describe what you saw, and if it results in a conclusion, I 
10 don't want to know why you took the picture. 
11 THE WITNESS: Right. I will do that. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 THE WITNESS: There was a five-gallon adhesive can 
14 that was left at the fire scene, and this is the top from 
15 J underneath. 
16 This is the lid of — the same lid, the five-gallon 
17 with a label on it. 
18 This is just part of the firefighting activity 
19 showing that the firefighter — building, the attic for 
20 extension of the fire. 
21 This is the doorway with the firefighter in it, I 
22 shouldn't have done that, but of where the fire was fought. 
23 This is a four-plex and there's two levels on the 
24 upstairs and two levels downstairs. And these are the two 
25 doors that go into the water heaters. 
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MR. LUND: May we know which water heater? 
THE COURT: I think you can cross-examine him on 
that. 
MR. LUND: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: And 24 is just the, "Do not occupy, 
unsafe for occupancy." 
Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Now, No. 20 that you referred 
to, Mr. Long, which water heater does that depict, the one on 
the left or the one on the right? 
A The one on the right. Hold on, just let me look real 
quick like. This would be the one on the right. 
Q Okay. What did you do to make the determination that 
the water heater on the right had suffered more damage than the 
water heater on the other side? 
MR. SUTTON: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. OfCallahan, if that is not a question 
that calls for a conclusion, help me with what it is. 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: I want to understand in the process 
of investigation what he used to make the determination that — 
THE COURT: The determination is, in other words, a 
conclusion. Is that fair to say? And I thought the purpose of 
our discussion earlier today was that, for the reasons at least 
I thought were important in the process of all of this, that 
former — what were you, Chief Long? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
A\ 
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THE COURT: Former High Honcho Long. 
THE WITNESS: Fire investigator, 
THE COURT: Not that he's not capable, but I have 
ruled that he can't today give us his conclusions. I believe 
that's — I mean it seems to me that's what you are asking him 
to do, so I'm going to have to sustain the objection. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) Well, in this particular case 
did you as part of your investigation seek to understand the 
spread of the fire that occurred? In other words, did you try 
to, as part of your investigation, analyze where the area of 
least damage occurred and where the area of greatest damage 
occurred? 
A The area of greatest damage was in — 
MR. SUTTON: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So the answer is, yes, you did, or, no, 
you didn't. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) Okay. And this is something, 
again, that you undertake in every fire investigation? 
A Yes. 
Q And were the photographs that you took intended to 
document that investigation? 
A Yes. 
Q And besides taking photographs, what other things did 
4 0 
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THE COURT: Where was that? 
THE WITNESS: It was on the second landing. 
THE COURT: And where physically on the landing? 
THE WITNESS: It was around the floor area. 
THE COURT: The floor of the landing? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And did you determine if it had been 
started or set intentionally, yes or no? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And was it intentional? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Beyond that, I mean I've tried to think 
about what conclusions he can come out with that I think are 
kind of led to by the facts, but beyond that, Mr. 0fCallahan, 
if we're going to get into conclusions, every time he jumps up 
I'm going to sustain them. And I've made the reasons clear, I 
hope. 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) When you say "the landing area," 
would that include the utility closet that's on that — 
A That would be the area — that whole area would be 
the area of origin. 
Q Okay. Were you able to identify the area of greatest 
damage on the landing? 
MR. SUTTON: Same objection, Your Honor. 
MR. LUND: Same objection. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 Q (BY MR. 0!CALLAHAN) Now, following your 
3 investigation there at the scene, what did you do next with 
4 respect to your activity on this particular matter? 
5 A There again, I took the photographs of it, I checked 
6 with Mountain Fuel or Questar, I spoke to the technician to see 
7 if everything was working — functioning properly in the 
8 business to see if there were any natural gas leaks, any 
9 electrical problems, and none had occurred. So once we got 
10 done with that we pretty much stopped and turned it back over 
11 J to the owner. There again, we were worried about the 
12 spoliation issue more than anything else because we want to 
13 leave that in a — pristine, or as good as we can. 
14 Q Do you remember when you were doing your 
15 I investigation that Mr. Peterson came back to the scene? 
16 A I believe he did, yeah. 
17 J Q Was he with you when you were taking the photographs? 
18 I A No, he was up at the hospital at the time. 
19 J Q The record in the investigation report narrative that 
20 J you have there indicates that he returned at about 1330 hours. 
21 I Is that consistent with your recollection? 
22 A Yeah. 
23 Q And at the time when he returned, did you discuss 
24 with him your findings? 
25 A We both went over what we saw, yes. 
AK 
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about so far is what Mr. Fandey knows about these are the 
Americans1 knowledge of what was going on. Is that a fair 
thing to say? We don't need to know everything hefs going to 
tell us. 
MR. SUTTON: No, I think we just need to know — 
THE COURT: How he knows what he knows if he knows 
it? 
MR. SUTTON: Exactly. 
THE COURT: Any question on what we're trying to 
inquire into right now? 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Yes, Your Honor. He was deposed, he 
gave a report in this case, and I am not — it seems to me this 
is ground that's already been tilled. He either knows or he 
doesn't know. 
THE COURT: Right. Well, I guess what I'm worried 
about is if he says he knows, you get into it, and when he's 
examined on cross-examination it turns out he knows because Bob 
and Carol told him about it. That's what I'm worried about, in 
all candor. 
MR. ZAGER: Just admonish him that he's — 
THE COURT: That he's got to know what I'm worried 
about? I'm not trying to be flippant, but — 
MR. ZAGER: Well, I'm — 
THE COURT: So I'm saying, let's call him, let's do 
the voir dire. That's my decision. If you don't like it, 
Cf\ 
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1 And, you know, I don't know what else you want, if I know 
2 about. I mean I participated in the meetings with them, so 
3 I've got quite a bit of knowledge about them. 
4 Q Your knowledge is attending meetings that a 
5 representative of American Appliance was also in attendance? 
6 A In part, yes. Also, the meeting minutes of that are 
7 close to the government and others of the GAMA water heater 
8 division meetings. 
9 J Q Let's separate those first. The GAMA meeting 
10 minutes, were those meetings that you personally attended? 
11 I A No. As I said, they were closed to us. 
12 I Q So what happened at those meetings you would have- no 
13 J personal knowledge, other than your review of whatever the 
14 I minutes said? 
15 A Right. 
16 I Q Okay. What meetings did you personally attend that a 
17 J representative of either American Appliance or American Water 
18 I Heater was personally present? 
19 I A A number of meetings with Henry Jack Moore. 
20 I Sometimes he would sign in as American, sometimes he would sign 
21 I in as Mor-Flo. These were ANSI committee meetings, ANSI 
22 Z21.10.1 subcommittee. I also ran into him in other 
23 subcommittees of GAMA Z21. 
24 Q Are you able to differentiate with your memory as to 
25 I the meetings that Mr. Moore was there as the representative of 
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1 I American Appliance separate and apart from the meetings he was 
2 there as the representative of American Water Heater? 
3 A He — no, I don't know that, I know that I would 
4 look at the meeting members and I could tell you who he signed 
5 in for, but he was representing American and Southcorp and the 
6 whole — Mor-Flo, the whole nine yards. He was the main guy 
7 when I was working with him. 
8 Q Did you ever have any personal conversations with 
9 Mr. Moore wherein he discussed with you his unique or 
10 particular knowledge regarding flammable vapor ignition 
11 I hazards? 
12 A I had conversations with him at the meetings, they 
13 were not separate meetings, separate occasions during the 
14 I meeting period, but just as we're having a conversation now in 
15 a I guess quasi meeting scenario, we had discussions like that 
16 then, yes. 
17 Q Is it your intention to testify today with respect to 
18 any particular statements that you heard Mr. Moore make at any 
19 time? 
20 I A More perhaps conduct, I don't — discussions of the 
21 I occurrences at the meetings and the knowledge that they had 
22 I because of their participation. I don't believe I'm going to 
23 be talking about particular quotes or anything like that. 
24 Q Is Mr. Moore the only person from either American 
25 Appliance or American Water Heater Company that ever was in a 
£*3 
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allows me to infer a lot of stuff, like the memo that was a 
record of the telephone conversation between Henry Jack Moore 
and a Mr. McFarland telling them what they thought they needed 
in terms of a study, and then the AD Little After Action report 
where they said, well, we did the things — it didn't say it in 
these terms, but it basically said, we proved what Jack Morris 
said we needed to have. 
Q Were you or were you not a participant in the 
McFarland/Moore telephone conversation? 
A Oh, I was not, all I had was the memo, but it 
reflects pretty much what their state of mind was. 
Q At least that is your impression? 
A For sure. 
Q As you testify today is it your intention to recount 
any direct conversations you had personally with Mr. Moore? 
A I think we already answered that and the answer was 
no. 
MR. SUTTON: Okay. I think that's all I have on voir 
dire, Your Honor. 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, I have one isolated subject. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LUND: 
Q You mentioned, Mr. Fandey, the name Mor-Flo. 
A Right. 
Q And you've mentioned Mr. Moore as the main person, 
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1 MR. LUND: Okay. 
2 I THE COURT: Do you want to ask any questions of him? 
3 MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor, do I need to? 
4 THE COURT: I don't know. I don't have a clue. 
5 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. OfCALLAHAN: 
7 Q Mr. Fandey, your contacts with Mr. Moore came in the 
8 context of your work with the CPSC; correct? 
9 A Yes, sir. 
10 Q And you remember various committees that Mr. Moore 
11 was a member of; correct? 
12 A Yes, sir. 
13 Q And Mr. Moore, during the course of your association 
14 I with him on those committees, represented himself to be there 
15 on behalf of a number of entities; correct? 
16 A That's correct. 
17 Q And those entities included American Appliance and 
18 I American Water Heater Company; correct? 
19 I A Often he was only signed in as American, but yes. 
20 MR. O'CALLAHAN: All right. Thanks. That's all I 
21 have. 
22 THE COURT: Should we excuse Mr. Fandey for a minute 
23 and we'll do our oral argument? 
24 Mr. Sutton? 
25 MR. SUTTON: Your Honor, I would submit to the Court 
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1 that based upon the voir dire, it is very clear that Mr. Fandey 
2 J does not have personal knowledge with respect to what was done 
3 or not done, what was known or not known by either of the 
4 J defendants. The attempted testimony that is going to be 
5 I proffered to the jury is, this is my conclusion as what they 
. 6 I should have known, and I think that that is inappropriate. 
7 THE COURT: You don't think itfs fair for him to say 
8 J X from that company was there and Y was discussed, why not 
9 that? 
10 J MR. SUTTON: Well, we have no foundational showing — 
11 J for example, how do we know that Mr. Moore was in the room, how 
12 do — 
13 THE COURT: If he can!t get that far, that's fine, 
14 I but he seems to think he can. He said Moore was there and this 
15 I is what we talked about. Why isn't that appropriate? 
16 J MR. SUTTON: There's no foundational showing that 
17 J even if Moore was in the room that he understood it, that he 
18 I knew it, that he took it back to the company, that it was 
19 discussed with upper management. 
20 THE COURT: Fair. So? I'm just asking you, so what? 
21 MR. SUTTON: The particular discussions in the 
22 meeting, Your Honor, I would submit to you are hearsay. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. SUTTON: How does Mr. Fandey recount what went on 
25 I at those meetings without there being a hearsay problem? 
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1 hearsay rule? I'm not aware of this one. Guide me on that 
2 I one. The notice exception to hearsay. 
3 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, again, it's not being 
4 offered for the truth of the matter but notice of the facts. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. If it isn't a fact, is 
6 it untrue? What I'm getting at is, you're saying, I'm not 
7 saying it's the truth, I just want to tell you it's the fact. 
8 I mean those are kind of synonymous, aren't they? 
9 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Well, I think that that's the 
10 purpose of the hearsay — the exception to the rule when it's 
11 I being offered for purposes — 
12 THE COURT: I mean I think there are exceptions to 
13 hearsay as you say when they aren't offered for the truth, when 
14 they're like foundational, when they're getting us to a point. 
15 But in all candor, aren't you offering it for the truth of the 
16 matter that Moore knew this is what the status of the world 
17 was? 
18 I mean I guess this is one of Mr. Lund's fine 
19 distinctions, the truth of the matter you're trying to 
20 J establish is that Moore knew this, and I guess you're not 
21 offering it for the truth of what Fandey says. It seems to me 
22 they're so intertwined you can't get around it by saying it's 
23 not offered for the truth. I'm sorry, but you're — Rule 803 
24 somewhere — 
25 MR. O'CALLAHAN: I think it's — yeah, 803-24 has the 
no 
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1 I general exception. 
2 MR. LUND: Well, let's get away from 803-24, that's 
3 the one that requires notice of use of the noticeable 
4 I exception, we've got to get — 
5 1 MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, these are meetings talking 
6 J about what are the problems with these water heaters. There's 
7 I no other motive at these meetings other than to try to solve a 
8 I problem dealing with water heater dangers. They're attended by 
9 I manufacturers, the statements made at these meetings, what 
10 I defendant calls hearsay statements, are statements made to make 
11 I our society a safer place by dealing with problems related to 
12 I water heaters. Now, section 24 clearly is exactly those kind 
13 I of statements covered under 803-24. The statements are made 
14 I with a guarantee, the statements are made for a purpose other 
15 J than lawsuits and for no other motive other than to surround it 
16 I by a guarantee of trustworthiness to deal with fundamental 
17 I problems dealing with water heater dangers. 
18 THE COURT: How about sub (b), Mr. Zager, which says 
19 I this: "The statement is more probative on the point for which 
20 I it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can 
21 J procure through reasonable efforts." What if I concluded that 
22 J a reasonable thing to do would have been to interview the 
23 I recipients of this information and reject Moore, for one, 
24 somebody like that? And I could have concluded that that would 
25 I have been a reasonable thing to do in reparation for this 
73 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 trial. That not being done, you failed if I concluded that 
2 way, in sub (b) which is one of the elements that would have to 
3 be established for Rule 24 to take effect. 
4 MR. ZAGER: Well, Your Honor, I'm not sure — I see 
5 where the Court's going with that and that would bring us a 
6 full circle back to — 
7 THE COURT: I guess I'm going back full circle 
8 because — 
9 MR. ZAGER: In response to that, I don't think (b) 
10 really qualifies the time at which the reasonable efforts are 
11 made. I think it could easily be interpreted that the 
12 reasonable efforts are those that need to be made at the time 
13 I of trial, and I think this court has already held that 
14 J Mr. Moore is unavailable at trial, certainly he's within the 
15 J sole control and disposal of the defendant. 
16 THE COURT: I didn't conclude that, sir. I concluded 
17 J that he's unavailable for trial because this court has no 
18 J jurisdiction to force his appearance. That's my conclusion. 
19 MR. ZAGER: That's correct. So at this point in time 
20 as we argue the applicability of 803, Section 24, then at this 
21 particular time the most reasonable efforts that can be made to 
22 bring in this type of testimony is to allow Mr. Fandey to talk 
23 about those trustworthy statements made at these meetings where 
24 Mr. Moore attended. 
25 THE COURT: So if your argument is that 803-24 is how 
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1 it gets in, I'd have to conclude I don't agree with that 
2 interpretation of it. So unless there's another exception to 
3 the hearsay rule, it seems to me I'm — if I'm saying 24 is not 
4 the route in then I'm not going to allow it in. 
5 Any other argument on it from the plaintiffs? 
6 MR. OrCALLAHAN: Your Honor, yeah, I'd also say that 
7 it's a — Mr. Fandey could testify that he had a present sense 
8 impression that Mr. Moore was present, that he was 
9 I participating in the meeting, that he was listening to the 
10 discussions that occurred, and that there is — that he 
11 believed that Mr. Moore was having impressed upon him the 
12 J information being communicated. 
13 THE COURT: I don't mean to be rude, but isn't it 
14 fair to say, then, that Fandey could also say, I also have the 
15 present sense impression that Mr. Moore disregarded it and 
16 I Mr. Moore is a cheating liar? I mean isn't it true that if I 
17 let you do what you're saying there is no limit to what 
18 J Mr. Fandey can say? Is there a limit to what a guy — that's 
19 J the way the rule is — what a guy can say, this is my present 
20 sense impression? 
21 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I think — 
22 THE COURT: I mean is there any limit? Where would I 
23 I draw the line? 
24 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I think that the line, 
25 J first of all, would be drawn by virtue of the objections that 
I K 
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1 A Bachelor of Science and mechanical engineering. 
2 Q After you completed your education there, did you go 
3 into the work force? 
4 I A I did. 
5 Q And could you tell us what you did following your 
6 graduation? By the way, what year did you take your degree in 
7 mechanical engineering? 
8 A '73. 
9 I Q Could you give us some idea as to what you did over 
10 the next couple of years? 
11 A Well, I was working for Atlantic Research, I believe, 
12 I at the time I got my degree — no, I'd moved on by then, I was 
13 at Washington Technological Associates and I was designing 
14 equipment for government agencies. And I did some design work 
15 in some consumer products, like we did a hair dryer design that 
16 I participated in. I helped to design a mixture of blades for 
17 a very complicated mixture for using solid propellants and for 
18 pharmaceuticals — not pharmaceuticals, but cosmetics that had 
19 to be real resistant to exposure. I designed some bridge 
20 cranes for use of the Polaris Poseidon Program, designed other 
21 equipment for training sailors. And then I worked for a time 
22 at a place called Data Design Labs where I was responsible for 
23 developing the logistic support programs for the new Trident 
24 submarines out of Vanguard, Washington. 
25 Q In 1975, did you go to work for an agency of the 
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federal government? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What agency was that? 
A The Consumer Product Safety Commission. 
Q And that's a federal agency; correct? 
A It is. 
Q Did the CPSC have a particular goal or mission? 
A Our charter was to reduce or eliminate unreasonable 
risks of injury from consumer products. 
Q And when you initially went to work there, what 
position did you take? 
A For personnel purposes I was a mechanical engineer; 
in terms of a job function, I was a project manager. I was 
actually called a standards coordinator, but the function was 
project manager. 
Q And at the outset, what project were you responsible 
for managing? 
A Well, at the outset we were mainly doing petitions. 
And I had petitions in sports and recreation, I had petitions 
in poisons, flammability, I even had a petition to ban on 
Anthrax at the time, some fabrics that were coming in from 
overseas that had Anthrax in them. 
Q And how long did you remain a standards coordinator? 
A Until the agency was reorganized in — I believe it 
was f78. 
as 
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Q And in 1978, you undertook a new position? 
A Yes, I was transferred into the engineering 
department where most of the standards coordinators went. 
Q And in the engineering department were you given 
particular responsibilities? 
A Yes. Initially, I was the person in charge of sports 
and recreation equipment and had ancillary assignments in the 
area of home appliances, and we called it household structures 
organization. That's what it was called, but it was primarily 
home stuff, from insulation to appliances. 
Q What title did you have in the engineering 
department? 
A Initially it was engineer, then it was senior 
engineer, then I was a branch chief. 
Q Somewhere along the way during your career at the 
CPSC, did you go to law school? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And when did you start law school? 
A I believe it was in f79. 
Q And when did you receive your degree? 
A I believe that was f83. 
Q And that was from the University of Baltimore? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. How long did you remain a senior engineer in 
the engineering department? 
Q £ 
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1 A Until I became a branch chief, and that was about — 
2 gosh, about two years after the reorganization. 
3 Q That would have been 1980, '81? 
4 A Something on that order, yeah. 
5 I Q And how long were you a branch chief? 
6 A I was a branch chief for about ten years. 
7 I Q And what branch were you in charge of? 
8 A Household structures branch. 
9 I Q Could you give us some idea of what products were 
10 under the domain of the household structures? 
11 A Yes. We were responsible for a lot of products, 
12 I stairs, ramps and landings, architectural blazing, gas 
13 appliances, insulations — 
14 J Q Did you say insulation? 
15 I A Yeah, like formaldehyde foam insulation band was done 
16 j in our group, 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 J group. 
23 Q And why was that? 
24 I A Because the hazards associated with those are 
25 primarily electrical. 
Q Within the area of gas appliances, could you tell us 
what particular household products fell under your purview? 
A Well, stoves, furnaces, water heaters, gas logs. 
Anything that was gas powered was in our group. The electrical 
stuff was in a different group, in the electrical engineering 
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Q Right, every one has a specific number that may run 
into three or four digits; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q But they're all ANSI Z21 — 
A Subcommittees, right. 
Q Okay. Well, if you could tell us the products, that 
would be fine. 
A Control valves and controls was one of the 
subcommittees; furnaces was another subcommittee; water heaters 
was another; pool heaters; a little bit of involvement with the 
stove folks. And I was involved with people working on the 
labeling subcommittee. ANSI came out with some labeling rules 
and I was involved in that work too. 
Q Was that a Z21 committee or was that under a 
different ANSI? 
A That was a more global committee, yeah. 
Q Now, focusing in particular on the ANSI subcommittee 
that dealt with water heaters, when did you initially become 
involved with that? 
A The first time would have been around the time that I 
became a branch chief, late f70, early !80s. 
Q And what was the nature of the contact that you 
initially had with that particular subcommittee? 
A The first contact had to do with explosions of water 
heaters, having to do with pressure and temperature sensing. 
Q ? 
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1 to guide standards or influence them to do other things was not 
2 J intense until the early eighties. 
3 J Q Okay. And would you personally attend meetings of 
4 J the subcommittee whenever you were able? 
5 A I attended a great number of them, yes, especially 
6 after f90. 
7 J Q And as a result of your attendance at the committees, 
8 I did you become acquainted with other members? 
9 J A Yes, I did, to one degree or another, yeah. 
10 MR. LUND: May have some effect on evidence which was 
11 I that he was a member. I think the statement today has been 
12 J he's involved — 
13 THE COURT: Excuse me? 
14 J MR. LUND: I move to strike to the extent he's 
15 J referring to himself as a member until that's established that 
16 I he's actually a member of one of these committees. 
17 THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
18 I Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) Go ahead. During the years when 
19 I you were attending meetings of the ANSI subcommittee on water 
20 I heaters, did you become acquainted with individuals from 
21 J various water heater manufacturing companies? 
22 A I did. 
23 Q Did you become familiar with somebody who was a 
24 representative of American Appliances Company? 
25 A I became familiar with Henry Jack Moore, who — 
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1 Q Hold it. Did you also become acquainted with someone 
2 who was represented to be the representative of the American 
3 Water Heater Company? 
4 A Henry Jack Moore. 
5 Q Is it correct to say that the same person who 
6 I represented American Appliances was also the representative for 
7 J American Water Heater Company? 
8 MR. LUND: It's leading, Your Honor. 
9 I THE COURT: Sustained. 
10 Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Did the American Water Heater 
11 I Company have a representative, at least during the years that 
12 I you were involved, who was a person other than the 
13 representative of the American Water Heater Company? 
14 A He would — Jack Moore would sign in as American a 
15 lot of times, sometimes he would sign in as Mor-Flo, and 
16 sometimes he would sign in as American Appliance. He was the 
17 only member that I knew of that was associated with them. From 
18 time to time they may have had one of his assistants or 
19 something, somebody else from the company there, but they 
20 weren't the official representative. 
21 Q But when Henry Jack Moore was at a water heater 
22 subcommittee meeting, you saw him as a representative of both 
23 American Appliances and of the American Water Heater Company? 
24 A Yeah, at that time we didn't distinguish him and we 
25 took him at — as all of those. 
J 
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1 I just volunteered, needs to be stricken. 
2 Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Now, the Gas Appliance 
3 J Manufacturers Association was a group that you had contact with 
4 as a result of your position at the CPSC; correct? 
5 A That's correct. 
6 Q And in particular you had contact with the 
7 organization called GAMA with respect to issues that dealt with 
8 I water heaters; correct? 
9 A Yes. 
10 I Q And, again, that was just part of something that fell 
11 J within your responsibilities as the chief of the branch dealing 
12 with household structures? 
13 A That's correct. 
14 J Q Now, with respect to GAMA, were you invited to their 
15 I meetings? 
16 A Oh, no, not to GAMA, no. 
17 J Q Now, would you have meetings with representatives 
18 I from GAMA on occasion? 
19 I A Frequently, yes. 
20 I Q Would you also receive material from GAMA that they 
21 wished you to review? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q And, again, the material that we're talking about had 
24 to do with water heaters; right? 
25 J A Well, many things, but also water heaters, yes. 
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Q At least when you dealt with the group that focused 
on water heater issues, that was the nature of the material 
that was being provided to you? 
A Correct. 
Q And to your knowledge, did the American Water Heater 
Company have a representative in GAMA? 
A Yes, they did. 
Q And who was that? 
A Generally it was Henry Jack Moore. 
Q How about American Appliances, did they have a 
representative to GAMA? 
A Not that I could distinguish from Henry Jack Moore. 
Q So, again, it was the same situation where Henry Jack 
Moore was wearing more than one hat? 
A That's what it appears to be, yes. 
Q Now, I want to ask you about a subcommittee meeting 
that took place in November of 1991, a meeting of the water 
heater subcommittee group of ANSI. Do you recall a meeting 
that took place at that time? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And do you recall at the meeting in November of 1991 
a presentation was made to the group? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And who made that presentation? 
A An attorney out of New Orleans by the name of Ed 
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Downing. 
Q 
meeting? 
A 
Q 
going to 
Was Henry Jack Moore in attendance at that particular 
He was. 
Let me place in front of you what we'll mark — I!m 
mark it as 135, if that's okay with Marci. 
THE CLERK: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Marci's lost control of the process, so 
she's letting you — J 
Q 
front of 
recognize 
A 
Q 
Edward F. 
Standards 
(BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Mr. Fandey, let me place in 
you what's been marked as Exhibit 135. Do you 1 
this particular document? I 
Yes, I do. 
All right. And this is titled, "Presentation of 
Downy before the ANSI Z21.10.1 Subcommittee on | 
for Gas Fired Water Heaters," and then it has the 
date of November 13th, 1991 and the location, Cleveland, Ohio? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
document. 
Thatf s correct. 1 
Okay. Now, it has a table of contents; correct? 
Right. 
And then it — 1 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, I object to the content of the 
It's a hearsay document, it has not been received 
into evidence and the witness is now being asked about the 
content o f it. 
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1 he provided distributed to all the attendees? 
2 A There were 40 copies of the materials and those were 
3 all distributed. The meeting — the subcommittee members all 
4 got copies and guests and others were allowed to get what was 
5 left. 
6 Q And what was the material that Mr. Downing provided 
7 I to those in attendance, including Mr. Moore? 
8 A Well — 
9 MR. LUND: Hearsay. 
10 THE COURT: Sustained. I mean the question assumes a 
11 fact that is in evidence that Mr. Moore was there and another 
12 J fact not in evidence that Mr. Moore received a copy of the 
13 J report, so the objection is sustained. 
14 You are not to answer the question. 
15 Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) To your knowledge, was Mr. Moore 
16 I provided with a copy of this material that is placed in front 
17 of you? 
18 A Yes, as were all the members. 
19 Q So could you tell us what material was in the packet 
20 that Mr. Downing presented to all those in attendance? 
21 MR. LUND: Hearsay. 
22 THE COURT: And Ifm going to sustain that, unless you 
23 can give me a reason why not, Mr. 0fCallahan. 
24 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Sure, Your Honor. Mr. Downing — 
25 THE COURT: An exception to the rule, perhaps? 
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A No, anybody could go — can even now go to the 
committee meetings, but we were guests. They wanted to be 
working with us and we worked with them, but it wasn't per se 
invitational. 
Q At the time of Mr. Downing's presentation, he 
provided material to the committee members; correct? 
A Right. 
Q And were there minutes of the committee meetings 
kept? 
A There were. 
Q And were you provided with copies of the minutes of 
the subcommittee meetings on water heaters? 
A On a regular basis, yes. 
Q And as you received them, would you look at them to 
verify that what had transpired had transpired? 
A Almost always. There were a couple — a few times 
Ifm sure where I didn't get to in time. 
Q Now, with respect to the presentation made by 
Mr. Downing, do you have a copy of the minutes that were 
generated from that meeting? 
A I don't know if it's in here or not. I have a copy 
in my own files and I have the transcript of the presentation 
that was produced. And I think that may be in here. 
Q Hold on one second. 
The materials that were provided by Mr. Downing, did 
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there and sees a binder, sees he's drinking out of a white 
cup — 
MR- LUND: Understood. 
THE COURT: I appreciate that might be — yeah, my 
preference is a white cup. I think that is not hearsay in the . 
sense that it!s not a statement of anybody offered for the 
truth. It's not a statement. 
Go ahead, Mr. 0'Callahan. 
Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Did Mr. Downing provide studies 
that had been done by the National Fire Protection Association? 
A He did. 
Q And what did the particular NFPA study that he 
provided to the committee deal with? 
MR. LUND: Objection, Your Honor — 
THE COURT: I'll sustain that now. Now we're getting 
him reciting something prepared by somebody else, an 
out-of-court statement, so that's sustained. 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) Did the material that 
Mr. Downing provided to the members of the subcommittee become 
the subject matter of discussion at subsequent subcommittee 
meetings that you were in attendance at? 
A It did indeed. 
Q And what aspects or what was it from Mr. Downing's 
presentation that was subsequently the subject matter of 
discussion? 
n i 
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1 MR. LUND: Hearsay. 
2 MR. SUTTON: Objection. 
3 THE COURT: If we're going to talk about the 
4 specifics, therefore, itfs hearsay. Sustained as to the 
5 J objection. 
6 Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) When the subsequent matters were 
7 discussed, when the subject matter of Mr. Downing1s 
8 presentation was discussed at later meetings, were there 
9 minutes of those discussions maintained? 
10 A There were, at least at the ANSI level. 
11 I Q And minutes of those meetings, would they reflect 
12 your attendance as well as the attendance of other members? 
13 A Yes, they would. 
14 Q And would those minutes reflect the nature of the 
15 J discussions that were had at the meetings? 
16 A They would. 
17 I Q And if we were to look at the minutes regarding 
18 I various meetings that took place of the ANSI subcommittee 
19 I meetings from about 1980 on, would they reflect various 
20 J materials that were provided to those in attendance at the 
21 J meetings? 
22 I A They would usually be attached to the minutes. 
23 I Q And would they be attached in their complete form or 
24 I would they be attached in a summarized form? 
25 I A The attachments would generally be complete, at least 
1 1 1 ; 
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as to things that were pertinent to that particular meeting. 
But things like videotapes and other graphic kinds of things 
might not be attached in their entirety. 
Q With respect to the presentation that Mr. Downing 
made, did he also include videotapes as part of his 
presentation? 
A He did. 
Q And in terms of the material that Mr. Downing 
provided to the committee, did some of that then become 
attached to the minutes of the meeting that occurred? 
A My recollection is that most of it did, yes. 
Q And do you have a specific recollection as to any 
materials that Mr. Downing presented to the committee that then 
became attached to the minutes and sent on to those who were in 
attendance at the meeting? 
A The people that were in attendance at the meeting, 
the members, all received copies of his presentation. 
Subsequently, the transcript of his presentation was included 
in a bound folio that included the videotapes and all the 
attachments also and that went out to all the members, everyone 
present. 
Q And when you say it went out to all the committee 
members, what do you mean? 
A I mean all the members of the ANSI subcommittee and 
many of the other people that were there received copies. I 
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believe all the people there, but I can't swear that they got 
it because I didn't check with them. 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, on that subject, could I voir 
dire and make a foundational objection? 
THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 
VOIR DIRE EX3MENATI0N 
BY MR. LUND: 
Q Mr. Fandey, you're saying now that certain materials 
were sent to all members of the ANSI Committee; right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Do you have some personal knowledge, Mr. Fandey, that 
Mr. Moore received a set of those documents? 
A I have personal knowledge that he received the 
documents that were presented at the meeting. 
Q But you have no personal knowledge as to what he may 
have received thereafter about Mr. Downing's presentation? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
MR. LUND: I'll move to strike his testimony about 
those materials as irrelevant unless it's connected to 
Mr. Moore. 
THE COURT: I don't think it's irrelevant. He's 
talking about a meeting, we've not had about two words from 
Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore does not strike me as the focus of what's 
been presented so far, so I mean either everything we've been 
talking about the last hour is irrelevant or this is relevant, 
117 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 so overruled. 
2 Go ahead, Mr. OfCallahan. 
3 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Mr. Moore was in attendance at 
5 I the November 13th, 1991 meeting, you have personal knowledge 
6 that he received the material that's there in the binder before 
7 you; correct? 
8 A With the exception of the transcript of the meeting, 
9 I yes. 
10 Q And you're saying "the transcript," that contains 
11 actually the text of what Mr. Downing said when he was there? 
12 A That's correct. 
13 Q Other than that, all the materials that are in there 
14 you have personal knowledge that Mr. Moore received them? 
15 A That's correct. 
16 Q Did you see him with that particular document in 
17 front of him? 
18 A I did, and I saw him with individual parts of it that 
19 were passed around separately. 
20 Q Now, this particular document, which was then 
21 provided to the members of the subcommittee and in greater 
22 length later on, would you be able to identify which documents 
23 were given to Mr. Moore at the meeting based upon what you have 
24 in front of you? 
25 A I believe so. 
1 1 Q 
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Q All right. Could you tell us, identify the documents 
that Mr. Downing provided to Mr. Moore among others at the 
meeting? 
A The first was — the first set of documents were 
photographs of burn victims, children that had been burned up 
by these things. 
MR. SUTTON: Your Honor, objection, motion to strike. 
THE COURT: Sounds like we're going back to the same 
ground we covered and an objection was made and we got into the 
specifics of what's in the presentation, it sounds like that's 
now at least how he's interpreted your question. So either 
he's not responding to the question or he's now giving us some 
hearsay information. So I think I have to sustain the 
objection. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Well, Your Honor, I believe this 
would qualify under 803-6 because it's a record of a regularly 
conducted meeting. 
THE COURT: I don't have any evidence before me that 
this is a record of a meeting. It's got to be a memo or report 
made during the meeting shown by a custodian or qualified 
witness that would keep a memo of the report. There isn't a 
report. This is some stuff somebody hands out, it's not a memo 
or minutes created. There's no evidence that these are the 
minutes. All it is is something somebody created. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: It was created but it provides 
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Q What was it about the Downing presentation that 
enabled you to conclude that there was a technologically 
feasible fix available? 
MR. SUTTON: Objection, Your Honor, calls for 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: I think you're asking him to tell us what 
Mr. Downing told him, that's hearsay. Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) What were the factors that led 
you to conclude sometime in 1991 that there was a technically 
feasible fix available? 
A There was a video demonstration that we were shown 
which indicated that that was a possibility. 
Q And could you tell us what it was about the video 
demonstration that led you to conclude that was a possibility? 
MR. SUTTON: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, I think our problem, 
Mr. 0'Callahan, is what you're asking Mr. Fandey to do is relay 
for us to the jurors here today information that can be 
processed through him, it seems really clearly a case of 
hearsay. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I'm merely asking him to 
describe what he saw. The witness's perception would not be 
hearsay, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, that's the problem. I think that's 
why we have the rule. It's not that Fandey won't tell us 
1 OA 
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truthfully what he saw, but itfs filtered by his experience so 
the poor jurors here get it second or third hand. That seems 
to me to be the purpose of the rule, so that this filtering 
doesn't occur. So I can't see that it's not hearsay. If it's 
not hearsay, why isn't it? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: By your logic nobody could ever 
testify to anything that they saw because it's all filtered by 
the individual. 
THE COURT: Okay, very good point, unless he was the 
direct witness. But all he saw was somebody else's 
presentation. Now we get to hear what that presentation is 
about. It sounds like you've interpreted my standard to be 
something you can't overcome, so sustained. 
MR. SUTTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll quit talking. I tried to do that 
earlier, but I'll be better. 
Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) During your years at the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, did you become aware of 
tests that had been undertaken with respect to the ignition of 
flammable vapors as to water heaters? 
A Yes. 
Q And how did you become familiar with tests that had 
been undertaken of that type? 
A We participated in the design of certain tests and we 
conducted others of our own. 
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1 Henry Jack Moore on that subject. He was very vocal in the 
2 meetings about the Downing presentation, but not specifically 
3 I to me. 
4 Q You overheard Mr. Moore as a member of the 
5 subcommittee discuss the Downing material? 
6 A It was more of a policy level discussion than the 
7 J specifics of the presentation. 
8 Q What do you mean it was more of a policy level 
9 I discussion? 
10 A As a result of that presentation, the committee 
11 changed its rules so that no presentation could be made by a 
12 nonmember unless the presentation had been previously approved 
13 J by the chairman of the subcommittee. 
14 Q And was that a change in rules that Mr. Moore 
15 J supported? 
16 A Yes. 
17 I Q And did he indicate why he supported that change in 
18 the rules? 
19 MR. LUND: That would be hearsay. 
20 THE COURT: Any reason why that wouldn't be hearsay? 
21 MR. OfCALLAHAN: Yes, Your Honor. He's the corporate 
22 I representative and could be an admission against interest. 
23 MR. LUND: I'm not sure how his statement about the 
24 J rules against interest whoever he represents — 
25 THE COURT: I'm not worried about admission — is he 
1 0 Q 
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a party opponent? Therefore, it's not hearsay, neither 
representative of one of these agencies? At least that's the 
evidence we have, so overruled. Go ahead and answer the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Will you repeat the 
question? 
THE COURT: The question was what did he say? 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) What did you hear Mr. Moore 
saying? 
A Well, Mr. Moore expressed the opinion that this 
presentation was made to set up the industry for punitive 
damages and not really to solve the problem, and he didn't want 
to have anymore of those kind of presentations. 
Q Did Mr. Moore indicate at any of these meetings 
whether or not he believed that elevating the pilot light and 
burner on water heaters would be a good idea? 
A I don't recall him ever saying he thought it would be 
a good idea. 
Q Do you ever recall him saying it would be a bad idea? 
A Well, the comments, and I can't — 
THE COURT: I think this is a yes or no question. It 
would be good if he answered yes or no and you might ask him, 
if it's appropriate, what the next question is. I think that 
allows the other side to make appropriate objections. 
So, yes, you heard him say something about it or, no, 
i *an 
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1 information — 
2 THE COURT: Well, I mean whatever form you picked. 
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 I THE COURT: I think the foundation is there. Do you 
5 have any objection? 
6 MR. LUND: Yes. Just that subsection (b) is really 
7 by analogy the firefighter that sees things at the scene and 
8 reports them pursuant to duty as matters observed. The content 
9 I of this document is not matters observed by some employee of 
10 CPSC, it is rather some data they've collected and reported. 
11 It is not an observation of the public entity. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. Any other thoughts, 
13 Mr. O'Callahan? 
14 MR. OfCALLAHAN: Yes, Your Honor. Obviously the data 
15 I had to be compiled and reviewed by a member of a government 
16 I agency and then it was then published by the government agency. 
17 THE COURT: And I think this is what 803-8 
18 contemplates, so it's admitted, No. 47. 
19 (Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 47 
20 I was received into evidence.) 
21 Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) The other document that you have 
22 there, which is the Calspan Report, which has been marked as 
23 Exhibit 4 9, that was something that Mr. Downing presented to 
24 the members of the subcommittee in November of 1991/ true? 
25 A That's correct. The abbreviated form, right. 
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think it's clearly offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: All right. That is not the 
intention for which I offered it, but further — 
THE COURT: I know, you don't believe that but I 
found that that's what it was for. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Further, Your Honor, this particular 
document was done pursuant to a request of the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission and is a report that they had requested be 
generated and then was subsequently published with their — 
THE COURT: I don't recall the foundation who laid 
that one. I mean I don't remember somebody saying what you now 
say happened. 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) Okay. Mr. Fandey, if you'd take 
a look at that document, it's called the Calspan Report; 
correct? 
A 
Q 
A 
believe. 
Well, it's done by Calspan. We refer to it --
What is Calspan? 
It's a research organization out of Boston, I 
Q Does it indicate on the front page of that document 
who commissioned the report? 
A Well, the Consumer Product Safety did it under 
contract. 
Q And subsequent to this, was the document published 
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and disseminated? 
A Yes, by CPSC. 
Q My next question: Was it diseminated and published 
by CPSC? 
A Yes. 
MR. O1CALLAHAN: Your Honor, on that basis, I'd move 
that particular Exhibit 4 9 into evidence. 
THE COURT: And the exception is? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: As a government publication, as well 
as — well, you told me I couldn't do it as providing notice, 
so — 
THE COURT: Right, you wanted it not to be — 
Mr. Lund or Mr. Sutton? 
MR. LUND: I think — I guess we're talking — I have 
cited to Your Honor the state in (b) — exceptions for things 
prepared by the person employed by the agency, cases 
regarding — 
THE COURT: Must be a public official who made the 
report in the open scope of his or her duty, but our supreme 
court says about 803-8 — any response to that, Mr. OfCallahan, 
because this would not appear to have been prepared by a public 
official in the scope of their duty. 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor, I believe Preparation 
Broadest Terms who published and who disseminated it, and if it 
was published and disseminated by the CPSC, I believe that that 
1 R7 
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would satisfy the criteria under the evidence code. 
THE COURT: All right. I think following the 
reasoning in the case that the defendants have cited which 
appears to be captioned State against JS, the state of the 
interest of WS and the pursuing — it's a Court of Appeals 
case, 939, P 2d, 196. I think it's pretty clear that this does 
not fit within that exception, at least as defined by what I 
understand our Court of Appeals to be saying in that case. So 
the objection to its admission is sustained based on my reading 
of that case. 
MR. O1CALLAHAN: Your Honor, the next document I'm 
going to provide to Mr. Fandey I've marked as Exhibit 138. 
Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Let me ask you, Mr. Fandey, is 
that a publication from the US Consumer Product — 
A Yes, sir, it is. * < 
Q And what's the subject matter of that document? 
A Fire Hazards Associated with Gas Water Heaters. 
Q And what's the publication date? 
A November of 1982. 
Q And is that a document which was generated during the 
time of your tenure? 
A Yes, it was. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I'd like to move that 
particular document into evidence at this point. It's a 
government publication. 
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THE COURT: Any objection there? 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, may I look at the document? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, I'd object to it until it's 
established that this is a record of the regular activities of 
CPSC as opposed to some specialized report or summary of 
somebody else's activity. If it's established this is indeed a 
record of the regular activities of the government agency, I'd 
have no objection, but I don't think that foundation is here. 
Q (BY MR. O'CALLAHAN) Mr. Fandey, did you testify 
earlier that one of the concerns of the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission was household appliances? 
A Yes, household products, right. 
Q And water heaters would fall under that particular 
category? 
A That's correct. 
Q And the CPSC was charged with evaluating the safety 
of that particular product, among others? 
A Yeah. Yes. 
Q And from time to time, did CPSC undertake studies and 
publish those studies regarding particular safety issues 
regarding particular appliances? 
A That's correct. 
Q And is that what that document is? 
A This is a publication of the Department of 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Lund will want to look at it. 
2 MR. LUND: May I ask a question of voir dire on this 
3 subject? 
4 THE COURT: Without even looking at the paper? Sure. 
5 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. LUND: 
7 I Q You don't have any direct specific personal knowledge 
8 I that this document or the one before it were ever received by 
9 J American Appliance Manufacturing, do you? 
10 J A I donft know what they received. It was available to 
11 I them. 
12 MR. LUND: It's got the same kind of content 
13 information I had a problem with on the last exhibit, so if we 
14 could defer on that. 
15 THE COURT: The objection is that it contains some 
16 hearsay that you think ought not be allowed in? 
17 MR. LUND: Plus I'll add the relevance objection. 
18 Q (BY MR. O' CALLAHAN) Mr. Fandey, let me place in 
19 front of you a document that we'll mark as Exhibit 142. And 
20 this is a United States government memoranda; correct? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And from the Consumer Product Safety Commission? 
23 I A It's to the Consumer Product Safety Commission from 
24 the staff. 
25 Q And what's the subject matter of that document? 
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A Gas Heating Systems Year-End Report 1982. 
Q And was that again published by the commission? 
A It was. 
MR. O1CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I!d move that document 
into evidence as well. 
MR. LUND: I object to that on relevance. Your Honor 
previously ruled that this witness should not function as a 
CPSC historian and there's been no attempt to connect these 
documents, in particular this one, to anything that has to do 
with this case. 
THE COURT: Mr. 0fCallahan, how does it get to this 
case? 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor, it goes to the case 
because these are documents generated, published by the United 
States government regarding the products that are at issue in 
this lawsuit. And as has been testified to, this information 
was generally published and disseminated and available to 
anyone in the public, which would include manufacturers. 
THE COURT: Can I see — 
THE WITNESS: Sure. 
THE COURT: Does it have a date, is it f82? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And No. 140, where did it get to? Did he 
leave it with you? Do you have the No. 14 0? Thanks. 
I think given the dates of these Exhibits 139 and 
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140, 142, I think to be consistent with the pretrial ruling 
No. 139 that was previously admitted, along with 140 and 142 
have to be excluded for the very reason that I talked about 
initially almost three weeks ago. 
Q (BY MR. OfCALLAHAN) Mr. Fandey, you have testified 
that as of 1980 you became involved with the water heater 
industry in your capacity as a senior engineer and branch 
manager of the Consumer Product Safety Commission; correct? 
A Right. 
Q And is it correct that during the years that you were 
involved with the industry or involved with the CPSC in the 
particular area dealing with water heaters that you had — or 
that rather the commission had various documents published that 
pertained to the safety of water heaters? 
A That's correct. 
Q And in addition, there were various concerns that the 
CPSC had with respect to fires that were initiated or ignited 
by water heaters of flammable vapors; correct? 
A That's correct. 
MR. SUTTON: Objection, Your Honor. I believe this 
is violative of the Court's prior ruling. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess he's laying a foundation or 
something. I don't know where it's going so I think it may be 
getting there but I don't know that it has, so overruled right 
now. 
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have had 
MR. 
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am, 
MR. 
SUTTON: Actually, it was me. 
COURT: I mean I've just got to take my hat 
in terms of the foresight and thought — 
off. 
O1CALLAHAN: So in other words, we don't need to 
Fandey here, but — 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
Mr. 
these things i 
them to 1 
COURT: Exactly. 
0'CALLAHAN: — there are various items — 
COURT: And had I allowed you to do it, you 
Fandey go through, as he did very ably, and i 
would 
say 
tfere generated by this agency. And had I allowed 
De admitted, you would have had them in. 
MR. 0'CALLAHAN: And there are other items as well 
which were items relating to either subcommittee meetings 
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the same 
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or to 
or GAMA publications that we would offer under J 
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COURT: Subcommittee meetings of the ANSI? 
0'CALLAHAN: The ANSI subcommittee meetings 
rated by the Gas Appliance Manufacturers 
COURT: The whole historical development of 
tfater heater? 
O'CALLAHAN: Correct, just so we could have 
f that. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although American has specifically asked plaintiff, via written interrogatories, to identify 
the facts, witnesses and documents that support her punitive damages claim, plaintiff has failed to 
identify a single witness or piece of evidence to support this claim. Plaintiffs discovery responses 
simply indicated that she would supplement her answers with a list of her punitive damage 
evidence. However, plaintiff has never supplemented these responses, and thus, has not disclosed 
any evidence to support her punitive damages claim. 
Moreover, even if plaintiff had disclosed evidence to support her punitive damage theory, 
the allegations as set forth in her Complaint do not rise to the level of conduct necessary for 
imposition of punitive damages. Prior to allowing the punitive claim to proceed at trial, this Court 
should require plaintiff to demonstrate that she has sufficient, admissible evidence to establish a 
prima facie basis for American's punitive liability under a clear and convincing standard. A 
separate hearing regarding the legitimacy and sufficiency of plaintiff s punitive damage evidence is 
especially warranted in light of Utah law which mandates that punitive damages should be 
awarded infrequently, and only in exceptional cases. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The first cause of action of plaintiff s complaint alleges that American acted "in wilful, 
reckless and conscious disregard of the safety" of plaintiff by "fail[ing] to utilize the state-of-
technology that was available at the time of manufacture for a pilot lighter raised to a safe 
distance above the floor." Complaint, ffif 23 and 24. 
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2. On or about October 26, 1998, American served discovery requests upon plaintiff. 
These requests contained several interrogatories which specifically asked plaintiff what evidence 
she knew of or possessed that supported her punitive damages claim against American. See 
American's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, Nos. 30-33, attached as Exhibit "A." 
3. On December 24, 1998, plaintiff provided answers to American's interrogatories. 
plaintiff responded in an identical manner to Interrogatories 30-33, as follows: 
Plaintiff objects to said Interrogatory on the grounds that it calls for a legal 
conclusion and work product. Plaintiff claims that discovery is continuing and 
Plaintiff will supplement in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Plaintiffs Answers to Defendants' (American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water 
Heater Co.) First Set of Interrogatories, attached as Exhibit "B." 
4. Although plaintiff did supplement her responses to American's interrogatories in June 
of 1999 and via a letter in August of 2000, she did not provide any additional responses to 
Interrogatories Nos. 30-33. Consequently, she has completely failed to identify any evidence in 
support of her punitive damage claim against American. See Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses 
to American's First Set of Interrogatories and August 24, 2000 Letter from Plaintiffs Counsel, 
attached as Exhibits "C" and "D." 
ARGUMENT 
L BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY RESPONSES FAILED TO 
IDENTIFY ANY EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HER PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
CLAIM, PLAINTIFF IS NOT PERMITTED TO PRESENT SUCH 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
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If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by 
Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, 
document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless 
or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 37 (emphasis added). 
Rule 26(e)(1) establishes that plaintiff was under a duty to supplement her responses. 
According to Rules 37 and 26, plaintiff shall not be permitted to present any evidence in support 
of her punitive damage claim because she failed to disclose any such evidence in response to 
American's interrogatories specifically asking for the same. See also, Stevenett v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (upholding trial court's exclusion of expert i 
testimony for failure to give complete discovery answer and supplemental response pursuant to 
Rules 26 and 37). 
< 
In October of 1998, American asked plaintiff, via Interrogatories Nos. 30-33, to identify 
the specific facts, witnesses and documents she knew of or possessed that supported her claim for 
punitive damages. Plaintiffs initial responses failed to identify any facts, witnesses or documents 
in answer to these interrogatories. However, plaintiffs answers indicated that she would 
supplement her responses in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Nevertheless, 
plaintiff has completely failed to supplement her responses to these interrogatories and has never 
identified the evidence or witnesses which allegedly support her punitive damage claim. 
Consequently, American asks this Court to exclude all of plaintiff s punitive damage 
i 
evidence pursuant to Rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which prohibit plaintiff 
from introducing any punitive damage evidence because she failed to identify such evidence in 
response to American's specific requests. ' 
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H. THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A PRIMA 
FACIE SHOWING THAT SHE HAS SUFFICIENT ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH BY A CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
STANDARD THAT AMERICAN ACTED MALICIOUSLY OR WITH 
RECKLESS DISREGARD TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. WHICH 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
Under Utah law, "punitive damages may be awarded only in exceptional cases" Gleave 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 671 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Behrens 
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original). The Utah legislature 
established a high standard for imposition of punitive damages: 
[P]unitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are 
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (l)(a). 
Therefore, Utah courts have recognized that punitive damages should be awarded 
infrequently and cannot be imposed for mere errors of judgment or negligence. See Gleave, 749 
P.2d at 670. "Notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition and failure to act absent more, do 
not support a claim of punitive damages." Orr v. Brigham Young University, 960 F. Supp. 522, 
531 (D.Utah 1994). 
Under these standards, plaintiff cannot prove that punitive damages are warranted against 
American in this case. In order to prevail on her punitive damage claim, plaintiff must show by 
clear and convincing evidence that American knew that the water heater design was unreasonably 
dangerous to the safety of others, and knowingly and recklessly disregarded this danger, which 
proximately caused plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiff has identified absolutely no evidence, clear and 
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convincing or otherwise, to support these claims. As discussed above, pursuant to written 
discovery, American specifically asked for, but plaintiff failed to reveal, any evidence that 
supported her punitive damage claim. 
i 
Moreover, even if plaintiff had disclosed evidence to support her punitive damage theory, 
the allegations as set forth in her Complaint do not rise to the level of conduct necessary for 
imposition of punitive damages. Plaintiff asserts that punitive damages should be imposed due to < 
American's "failfure] to utilize the state-of-technology that was available at the time of 
manufacture," Complaint fflf 23-24. However, a manufacturer does not have a duty to a 
i 
consumer to refrain from marketing a product because of, nor even a duty to inform the consumer 
of, a safer alternative. See Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah 1999). The Slisze 
court recognized that "[s]uch a burden might well act as a disincentive for manufacturers in the < 
development of safer products...." Id. at 321. 
In light of plaintiffs failure to identify any punitive damage evidence in her discovery 
< 
responses, coupled with the dubious basis she alleges for punitive liability, prior to allowing the 
punitive claim to proceed at trial, this Court should require plaintiff to demonstrate that she has at 
least prima facie evidence to support her punitive damage claim under a clear and convincing 
standard. A separate hearing regarding the legitimacy and sufficiency of plaintiffs punitive 
damage evidence is especially warranted considering that Utah law mandates that punitive 
damages should be awarded infrequently, and only in exceptional cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, American respectfully requests this Court to exclude all 
punitive damage evidence because plaintiff failed to disclose the same in her discovery responses. 
Additionally, American asks this Court to order plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of 
sufficient, admissible evidence to support liability for punitive damages under a clear and 
convincing standard prior to allowing the punitive damage claim to proceed at trial. 
DATED this 3 ^ d a y of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JohnR^^tffia 
Michael S. Sutton 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
N:\19944\l\KLP\punilim.mem 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE ; 
MANUFACTURING, INC., et al. ; 
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ARMSTRONG WORLD ] 
INDUSTRIES, INC., ) 
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) PLAINTIFF ANNA MARIE 
) ALARID'S MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN'S 
) MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING 
) PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
) Civil No. 980905332 
) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 8, 1996, Rudolph Gomez, the manager and maintenance person of 
eight apartment units in Salt Lake City, located at 936 and 940 South Lincoln Street, was 
removing and installing new outdoor carpet at both locations. While working at the 940 
South Lincoln apartment landing, Mr. Gomez was assisted by his daughter Anna Marie 
Alarid. Anna was picking up old pieces of carpeting after her father had removed it from 
the floor. 
2. As Mr. Gomez had just finished laying all of the carpet on the landing , he 
i 
saw a fire originate from underneath the doors of the utility closet on the second story 
landing. Two gas-fired water heaters manufactured by American Appliance were located 
inside the utility closet. The fire quickly spread from the door of the utility closet to the 
rest of the landing. Anna Marie was still on the landing when the fire broke out. Mr. 
Gomez grabbed his daughter and tried to run down the stairs. Before they could escape 
down the stairs, an explosion blasted Anna Marie and her father to the bottom of the 
stairs and into the front yard. ( 
3. While Mr. Gomez suffered burns on his hands, arms and legs were from the 
fire, Anna Marie sustained third and fourth degree burns to virtually every part of her 
body, including her legs, forearms, hands, face, neck and upper chest. She was in the < 
hospital for 31 days after the accident and doctors performed full skin grafts over the 
course of three separate operations to both of her arms, hands, fingers, upper chest, both 
legs, both feet, the left side of her face and her left eye. 
4. Plaintiff has determined through definitive engineering analysis, that the 
cause of the fire on July 8, 1996 was the ignition of extremely flammable vapors by a 
gas-fired water heater located in the utility closet on the upper landing at the 940 South 
i 
Lincoln apartment building. American Appliance manufactured both water heaters 
located in said utility closet. The source of the flammable vapor was the outdoor carpet 
adhesive, Henry 263, manufactured by Armstrong World Industries. The extremely 
( 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
flammable vapors emitted by the Henry 263 carpet adhesive ignited the pilot light and/or 
burner in the water heater and caused the fire. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HER PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN FULLY APPRISED OF 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FROM THE DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERTS 
Defendants contend that because Plaintiff did not supply detailed responses to 
Defendants' interrogatories, the Court should resort to the draconian measure of 
precluding her from presenting any evidence of punitive damages. This position is 
specious at best because Defendants are fully aware of the evidence that Plaintiff intends 
to present in support of her punitive damages claim. 
Rule 37(f), upon which Defendants rely, states in its entirety: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required 
by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to 
disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any 
other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, 
any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the 
jury of the failure to disclose, (emphasis added) 
Here, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has violated Rule 26(e)(1) as 
Defendants contend, such a failure to disclose would be entirely harmless because 
Defendants have been fully apprised of the evidence that supports Plaintiffs punitive 
damages claim by virtue of their extensive deposition discovery of Plaintiff s experts, Joe 
Fandy and John Hoffman. These two experts have testified inter alia that Defendants 
have known that the ignition of vapors from flammable liquids by the pilot light or burner 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of gas-fired water heaters has been a recognized hazard since the 1950 's. (See Part II 
below for a summary of this evidence) 
In addition, one must not lose sight of the purpose behind interrogatories—they 
are intended to apprise a party of the information and evidence that will be used against 
them at trial. Defendants have been so apprised. Simply because this information was 
not detailed for them in a supplementary discovery response does not entitle Defendants 
to escape from punitive liability for their fraudulent conduct. 
If the Defendants were truly concerned that they were not adequately informed 
about Plaintiffs punitive damages claim, then they should have made efforts to meet and 
confer or could have brought a motion to compel pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2)(B).1 Yet they 
chose not to, and have instead attempted to submarine Plaintiffs punitive damages claim 
on a mere technicality. This mere technicality is not sufficient reason to eliminate a 
viable claim for punitive damages. (See Part II below) 
However, should the Court be inclined to grant Defendants' instant motion, 
Plaintiff requests that the Court award a less harsh sanction, such as those provided in 
Rule 37(f), "including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order permitted 
under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of the failure to disclose." 
II. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES CLAIM 
In order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the acts 
or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of the rights of others. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1) [Emphasis 
Added]. 
1
 Rule 37(a)(2)(B) provides: "If... a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted 
under Rule 33 . . . , the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer . . < 
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As Plaintiffs experts will testify, the ignition of vapors from flammable liquids by 
the pilot light or burner of gas-fired water heaters has been a recognized hazard since the 
1950 's. The water heater manufacturing industry awareness of this problem is traceable 
to the 1960's or earlier when a law suit similar to this was filed in Arizona. In addition, 
the activities summarized below provided the gas fired water heater manufacturers with 
ample notice of the extent and severity of the problem. 
Using data from hospital emergency rooms, the National Electronic Injury 
Surveillance System (NEISS, August 1974) of the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) reported 38,000 water heater associated injuries during the 1973 calendar year. 
A significant number of the cases involved ignition of flammable vapors from gasoline 
and other flammable liquids by the water heater flame of gas and oil fired water heaters. 
In 1975, the CPSC published Fact Sheet No. 65 reporting that in one year over 
1200 persons were treated for burn injuries received in fire accidents involving gas fired 
water heaters. The data revealed that flammable solvents and flammable cleaning agents, 
which have vapors heavier than air, were ignited by the gas water heater pilot light or 
burner. The most serious accidents involved gasoline which was either used intentionally 
as a cleaning agent or was unintentionally spilled in the vicinity of a flame-fired water 
heater. The vapors of gasoline, which remain close to the floor, traveled from the source 
and were ignited by the water heater. Two factors were identified that led to an increased 
occurrence of accidents involving the ignition of flammable vapors and gas fired water 
heaters: (1) the location of the gas fired water heater, and (2) a lack of conscious 
awareness by the consumer of the standing pilot light at the base of the water heater. 
In 1974, the CPSC commissioned Calspan Corporation to research hazards 
associated with gas-fired appliances. Calspan published two reports: Identification and 
Classification of Potential Hazards Associated with the Use of Residential Flame-Fired 
Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes Dryers, and Ranges and Investigation of Safety 
Standards for Flame Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes Dryers and Ranges. 
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In the first Calspan report, the flammable liquid/vapor problem and gas fired 
appliances was emphasized. Unlike problems associated with the operation of 
appliances, this hazard was neither attributed to appliance misuse or defect, but the 
location (garage, utility room, basement) and the higher potential for use or storage of 
flammable liquids in those locations. Further, the location of the pilot light/burner 
and combustion air intake near the floor and the tendency of flammable vapors to remain 
and flow close to the floor, increased the potential for ignition. The report states that 
flammable vapors accounted for the majority of the injury producing accidents involving 
flame fired water heaters. 
After investigating the potential hazard associated with gas fired appliances, 
Calspan reviewed the related NFPA and the National Fuel Gas Codes. The existing 
standards, cautions and warnings were criticized as being inadequate in addressing the 
hazard associated with the storage or use of gasoline near gas fired appliance. The 
requirement by the National Fuel Gas code (ANSIZ223.11.31.6) to install gas 
fired water heaters eighteen inches from the floor in residential garages was not sufficient
 { 
to eliminate accidental ignition. To reduce the hazard associated with ignition of 
flammable vapors by gas heaters, the Calspan report suggested: (1) increase consumer 
awareness through education and bold labels , (2) prohibit installation of on-direct vent 
water heaters in high risk locations such as garages, and (3) make additional efforts to 
reduce the possibility of flammable vapors from reaching the pilot light such as a 
flammable vapors sensor. Subsequent analysis of data through 1994 by CPSC has shown 
that the labeling effort has not been effective. 
The results of the Calspan research was presented to the Gas Appliance 
Manufacturers Association (GAM A) in June 1975. GAM A distributed the Calspan 
reports to the member manufacturers and related task forces and working groups to i 
address all issues, including the flammable vapors problem. 
2
 In November 1975, the American National Standards Committee on Performance and Installation of Gas-Burning 
Appliances and Related Accessories (Z21) and the National Fuel Gas Code (Z223) addressed the flammable vapors ' 
problem and suggested a clear warning on the appliance manual to be attached to the water heater. 
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GAMA, in February 1976, acknowledged that the NEISS data showed that the 
major hazard associated with gas fired water heaters is the ignition of flammable vapors. 
GAMA also pointed out the Calspan critique of existing standards and noted the interest 
of the CPSC. The GAMA water heater division incorporated improved warnings 
regarding flammable liquids in the required installation and maintenance instructions 
with each water heater. GAMA focused on consumer education as the critical item and 
ignored engineering solutions to eliminate and/or mitigate the hazard. 
In 1987, the NFPA published a Special Report on Residential Structure Fires 
Involving Flammable/Combustible Liquids (1980-1984 Fire Experience). In this report, 
water heaters, classified under Areas of Origin, wee responsible for 5.5% of the fires. 
Water heaters, under the general classification of heating equipment led to 15.4% 
of the fires (13,560 fires per year) causing 26.0% if the injuries (1390 total civilian 
injuries), 11.8% of the deaths (182 total civilian deaths) and 13.5% of the dollar loss. 
In 1992, Rheem Corporation received a patent (filed in 1991) for a water heater 
design, specifically addressing the flammable vapors problem. In the patent, the water 
heater modification includes a floor supported horizontally enlarged drain pan with a 
height of 18" such that all combustion air delivered to the burner (still at floor level) is 
taken from a height at least 18 " above the floor. This design is often referred to as the 
"Rheem Bucket" or "bucket" design. 
The American Gas Association performed gasoline spill tests with electric water 
heaters, floor mounted gas fired water heaters, elevated water heaters and the 18" bucket 
design. The results of the AGA tests showed that flammable vapors were not ignited 
when water heaters were elevated or contained in the "bucket." 
The GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study commissioned the Arthur 
D. Little Laboratory (ADL) to (1) investigate the hazards associated with ignition of 
flammable vapors and (2) to compile a comprehensive database of incidents from which 
trends could be established. In addition, the analysis considered the activities and 
3
 Direct vent in this context was synonymous with sealed combustion chamber. 
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awareness of gas water heater installers and the consumer. A.D. Little identified seven 
scenarios which they estimated represented 80-90% of the gas water ignition of 
flammable vapor incidents. The results of the A.D. Little study show that elevation is an 
effective means for mitigating the hazard of ignition of flammable liquid vapors by gas 
fired water heaters. 
i 
The elevation of "conventional" water heaters to a position that places the 
combustion air inlet and burner and pilot light at least 18 inches above the floor has 
been used as a means to reduce the potential for the ignition of flammable vapors. The 
requirement for elevation has been a provision in the National Fuel Gas Code (NFPA-54) ( 
for more than forty years. The requirement for elevation specifies locations where 
flammable liquid vapors may be present. Safety Engineering Laboratories has conducted 
tests with water heaters in several different configurations simulating installations in ( 
garages, utility rooms and similarly enclosed spaces. In each of these tests, elevation of 
the water heater was sown to be effective in preventing the ignition of moderate spills of 
flammable liquids under a variety of circumstances. 
Another means of reducing the potential for the ignition of flammable vapors is by 
sealing the combustion chamber at floor level and drawing the combustion air from an 
elevated source or from outside of the room. A commercially available residential direct 
vent water heater has been available or more than ten years . A United States Patent was 
issued in 1972 for an elevated air intake gas fired water heater. This adoption of the 
existing water heater designs permits combustion air to be drawn from and exhausted to a 
location outside of the home or garage. When properly installed, direct vent water ^ 
heaters eliminate the potential for the ignition of flammable vapors from spills of 
flammable liquids in the room or area where the water heater is located. 
A modification of the direct vent design has also been shown to be effective in ( 
preventing the ignition of flammable vapors from spills near and under a water heater. 
This modification permits air to be take from the room in which the heater is installed but 
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at a level of four feet or higher. Combustion air taken from this level would not contain 
flammable vapors within the flammable range when flammable liquids are spilled. While 
this method, in theory, would not eliminate the potential for ignition of a flammable 
vapor air mixture it reduces the potential for an ignition to occur to a vanishingly small 
likelihood. 
Elevated, direct vent and modified direct vent water heaters have been tested and 
the results recorded and videotaped. In summary, the tests show that elevation of the 
water heater using an 18 inch stand (and the equivalent using an 18 inch tub or bucket) is 
an effective means for preventing the ignition of vapors from spills or flammable liquids. 
The tests also demonstrated that direct vent and modified direct vent water heaters are 
effective in preventing ignition of vapors from flammable liquids. The water heaters 
used in the testing and the water heater in the utility closet that caused this accident are 
essentially the same. Both have the pilot light/burner located close to the floor. Both 
have access doors for lighting the pilot which are not air tight. Both draw their primary 
combustion air through holes located on the bottom of the heater not more than two 
inches above the floor. The technology of taking combustion air from elevated sources 
or sources outside of the room in which the water heater is located has been known for 
more than 27 years. 
In addition to the testing conducted by Safety Engineering Labs, tests conducted 
by Arthur D. Little for the Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association (GAMA) 
demonstrated the effectiveness of elevation. In the A.D. Little testing, no ignitions 
occurred when spills of up to (1) 2 gallons wee initiated at distances of 30 inches or more 
from the elevated water heater in their large test room and (2) 1 gallon were initiated at 
distances of 28 inches or ore from the elevated water heater in their small test room. 
While some aspects of the A. D. Little tests were flawed with respect to realistic 
conditions the testing of and results from elevated water heater installations were 
consistent with results obtained by SEL and with results predictable based on engineering 
Sealed combustion chamber water heater for installation in "hazardous" locations have been available for more 
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and scientific principles. 
At the time the water heaters in the 940 Lincoln Street utility closet were 
manufactured (1991 and 1994), the technology and engineering applications were 
available to provide water heaters which either eliminated the potential for ignition of 
flammable liquid vapors or mitigated the likelihood of such ignitions. American 
Appliance Manufacturing Inc. and the gas fired water heater industry were well 
aware of magnitude of the problem from at least the mid-1970's yet did not 
attempt to eliminate or reduce the hazards through engineering design. It further 
became clear that the labeling to warn about the hazards was ineffective5. 
American 
Appliance Manufacturing Inc. and the gas fired water heater industry in general, 
became aware of the ineffectiveness of the warning approach to solve this problem as 
early as 1989. American Appliance Manufacturing should have and could have initiated 
retrofit activities to provide elevation for water heaters already installed and should have 
and could have pursued engineering solutions to this problem for new water heaters. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests that the 
Court deny American's motion in limine in its entirety. 
DATED: JULY 14, 2000 GIRARDI AND KEESE 
By: X^^f^g 
JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN 
Attomey(s) for Plaintiff 
than twenty-five years. 
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L PLAINTIFFS CONTINUED FAILURE TO DISCLOSE PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
EVIDENCE IS PARTICULARLY EGREGIOUS AND HARMFUL DUE TO THE 
QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIMS, 
Plaintiff asserts that her complete lack of response to defendants' discovery requests is 
harmless because defendants "have been fully apprised" of the punitive damage evidence she 
intends to present at trial. Plaintiff points to the depositions of her purported experts Joe Fandey 
and John Hoffinann to support this assertion. However, contrary to plaintiffs argument, neither 
of these witnesses testified as to any acts or omissions by either defendant. Mr. Fandey merely 
gave a history lesson on the CPSC's involvement with the water heater industry in general. Mr. 
Hoffinann's opinions appeared to primarily pertain to cause-and-origin, although he also 
discussed in general terms the history of the water heater industry and CPSC. Neither of these 
individuals had any knowledge of whether or what role either defendant played in history. 
Consequently, their deposition testimony does little to apprise defendants of plaintiffs punitive 
damage evidence. 
It is now almost the eve of trial and approximately two and one-half years have passed 
since defendants formally requested that plaintiff provide a detailed list of the evidence which 
supported her punitive damages claims, but to date, she has failed to do so. This motion could 
not even compel her to identify with any specificity her intended punitive damage evidence. 
Consequently, defendants continue to be in the dark about the evidence plaintiff hopes to present 
at trial to show that certain actions of defendants were willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent, or done with a knowing and reckless disregard to the safety of others. It further 
remains unclear which theory of conduct plaintiff even intends to pursue-she refers to both 
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"fraudulent conduct" and "reckless conduct" in her opposition memorandum. Plaintiffs failure to 
disclose this information has robbed defendants of their ability to develop a meaningful defense to 
her punitive damage claims. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to impose a sanction less harsh than exclusion of evidence. 
However, the plain language of Rule 37(f), coupled with the advisory committee notes to the 
1999 amendment which added this provision, make it clear that courts are required to exclude 
undisclosed evidence unless the sanctionable party can show substantial justification for non-
disclosure. The advisory committee notes explain: 
If a party fails to comply with the disclosure rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court to 
prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was harmless 
or there is good cause for the failure. The court may order any other sanction it 
determines to be appropriate and Rule 37(f) provides some examples. 
1999 Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26 (emphasis added). These advisory notes emphasize 
that although the presumption is to exclude the evidence, a court may impose additional sanctions 
as well. Significantly, the notes do not mention that a court may order other sanctions in lieu of 
exclusion. 
Moreover, plaintiff has not put forth any reason for the Court to deviate from the required 
sanction of exclusion in Rule 37. Plaintiff has not made any attempt to assert that good cause 
exists for her failure to disclose. Punitive damages claims are the most serious claims a party can 
raise in a civil case-they are akin to criminal charges. In light of this, plaintiffs complete failure 
to disclose any punitive damage evidence is particularly egregious and further justifies exclusion 
of such evidence. Plaintiff not only failed to provide any information whatsoever in response to 
-3-
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the interrogatories regarding her punitive damage claims, she lead defendants to believe she would 
provide the information in the future, but failed to do so. 
If plaintiff intended to seriously pursue her punitive damage claims, she should have 
ensured she complied with this basic discovery rule. Her failure to disclose is particularly harmful 
because it pertains to the most serious penalty that can be imposed in a civil case. Consequently, 
defendants respectfully request this Court to exclude all of plaintiffs punitive damage evidence 
pursuant to Rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IL PLAINTIFF HAS STILL NOT IDENTIFIED ANY EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS 
HER CLAIM THAT AMERICAN ENGAGED IN CONDUCT THAT WAS 
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS OR INTENTIONALLY FRAUDULENT. OR WITH 
A KNOWING AND RECKLESS DISREGARD TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. 
In her opposition memorandum, plaintiff alleges that there is "ample evidence" to support 
her punitive damages claim. However, the five and one-half pages that purportedly support this 
assertion, do not contain an iota of information regarding either defendant, or any actions by 
them. Instead, plaintiff reiterates a general history of CPSC's involvement with water heaters but 
fails to make any mention of American Appliance Manufacturing or American Water Heater Co. 
Plaintiff has identified absolutely no evidence, much less any that would rise to the required "clear 
and convincing" threshold, to support a punitive claim against either Defendant. 
Under Utah law, "punitive damages may be awarded only in exceptional cases'' Gleave 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 671 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Behrens 
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original). In order to prevail on 
her punitive damage claim, plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that defendants 
knew: (1) that a high degree of probability exists that the conduct would result in substantial i 
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harm; (2) that the conduct is "highly unreasonable or an extreme departure from ordinary care"; 
and (3) that a "high degree of danger is apparent." Gleave, 749 P.2d at 670 (quoting Behrens, 
675 P.2d at 1186-8). "It is not enough that a decision be wrong. It must result from a conscious 
indifference to the decision's foreseeable effect." Boyette v. L. W. Looney & Son, 932 F. SUPP. 
1344 (D. Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
Punitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and 
the like, which constitute negligence. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 
(Utah 1983), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 908 Comment B, at 465 (1979). 
Punitive damages may not be based solely on a finding of gross negligence or even recklessness. 
In addition, notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition and failure to act absent more does not 
support a claim for punitive damages. Orr v. Brigham Young Univ., 960 F. Supp. 522, 531 (D. 
Utah 1994). Furthermore, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly cautioned that "punitive damage 
may be awarded only if they serve society's interest in 'punishing and determining outrageous and 
malicious conduct which is not likely to be deterred by other means.'" 
In Boyette, supra, the court interpreted and applied Utah punitive damages law to support 
dismissal of punitive claims against a foam manufacturer because the manufacturer had complied 
with the governing OSHA regulations. See Boyette v. L. W. Looney & Sonf Inc., 932 F. SUPP. 
1344 (D. Utah 1996). The plaintiff in Boyette was a Thiokol plant employee injured in an 
explosion caused by polyethylene foam which leaked gasses while enclosed in the container 
without ventilation. The injured employee alleged punitive damages against the foam 
manufacturer and general contractor for failing to warn about the explosive nature of the foam. 
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The Boyette court determined that since the foam manufacturer met its duties under the applicable 
standards, its conduct could not constitute knowing and reckless indifference to the rights of 
others. Id at 1349. 
Similar to the manufacturer in Boyette, American met its duties under the applicable 
standards, and therefore, their conduct could not constitute knowing and reckless indifference to 
the rights of others. In light of this standard, coupled with plaintiffs complete failure to identify 
any evidence whatsoever in support of her punitive claims, prior to allowing the punitive claim to 
proceed at trial, this Court should require plaintiff to demonstrate that she has at least prima facie 
evidence to support her punitive damage claims under a clear and convincing standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, American respectfully requests this Court to exclude all 
punitive damage evidence because plaintiff failed to disclose or identify such evidence. 
Additionally, American asks this Court to order plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of 
sufficient, admissible evidence to support liability for punitive damages under a clear and 
convincing standard prior to allowing the punitive damage claim to proceed at trial. 
DATED this J__ day of April, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
N:\19944\l\KLP\rplypuni. wpd 
Michael S. Sutton 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
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1 
2 I NCREMER 07, 2001 
3 
4 
5 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * * * 
6 THE COURT: I think we're here to consider the 
7 defendant's motion regarding punitive damages. 
8 MR. LUND: Your Honor, I know the time is short, I'll 
9 be brief. 
10 A starting place to me would be the instruction that 
11 we've all agreed on regarding the standard of proof that is 
12 clear and convincing, and that is that for evidence to be clear 
13 and convincing it must at least have reached the point where 
14 there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth of the 
15 conclusion. So for this matter to go to jury, we need to have 
16 some basis upon which a reasonable mind could say the evidence 
17 I is at least to the point where there's no substantial doubt 
18 I that one or the other of these defendants acted willfully, 
19 I recklessly and with conscious disregard. And we've briefed I 
20 think the law that's pertinent in Utah on that subject. 
21 There's really two elements to this. First, leave 
22 aside the standard for a minute, let's just talk about the 
23 evidence of conduct. We know Jack Moore sat in a couple of 
24 meetings, we know some people from the CPSC thought that — 
25 well, we know Mr. Downing came and told those folks he thought 
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elevation would be a good idea. We know this Mr- Fandey from 
the CPSC thought elevation should be looked at- We also — I 
think one of my cases cites the fact that — the Jarvis case, 
these manufacturers are participating in addressing the 
complaint that's raised. They are in the meetings, they are 
listening to the proposals, they are involved in reading — at 
least they hear that there's studies. They put warnings on 
their product, they upgrade those warnings when the CPSC and 
GAMA developed a better warning. They ultimately come up with 
the flame guard solution in 1999. They are not disregarding 
this problem. More to the point, we don't really know what 
they're doing except that they've been in a couple of meetings, 
because the evidence doesn't allow us to determine what they've 
done past that. 
The second feature is that we've cited the Boyette 
case from Federal District Court of Utah as well as three other 
cases from other jurisdictions where the fact that the 
manufacturer is — the product does comply with the applicable 
government codes defeats a claim that it could be knowing and 
reckless, those are all summary judgments. And here the facts 
are unrefuted that these two products did comply with all 
applicable standards, there's nothing that the government 
expected be done that was not done by these manufacturers. 
I know time is short. Unless you have some 
questions, that's essentially our position, both lack of 
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1 evidence of any sufficient actions to support reckless 
2 disregard and, in any event, nothing that would overcome, at 
3 least under the clear and convincing standard, the fact that 
4 they have complied with the applicable government regs. 
5 I MR. ZAGER: Good morning, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Howdy. 
7 MR. ZAGER: As the Court is probably well aware, the 
8 standard of review in a directed verdict is much the same as 
9 that in a summary judgment, all the facts in dispute need to be 
10 assumed in favor of the plaintiff. And the evidence is here to 
11 support that this was in fact a dangerous and defective design, 
12 that it caused the injuries. And this court has, as I pointed 
13 out yesterday, briefly previously held in its ruling on 
14 Armstrong's motion, despite the fact that Armstrong's product 
15 met the standards was a case where punitive damages should go 
16 to the jury. And there are cases on point contrary to what the 
17 I defendant represents where compliance with the federal 
18 J regulations does not preclude a finding of recklessness or an 
19 award of punitive damages. That was held in the 10th Circuit 
20 in the Silkwood v. Kara-McKee Corporation case, which I'd be 
21 happy to present to the court. That proposition has also been 
22 stated in the restatement second of torts, Section 288(c), 
23 where the court in Salmon v. — I'm sorry, in Bruce v. 
24 Martin-Marietta Corporation out of the 10th Circuit stated, 
25 Generally speaking, compliance with regulatory standards may be 
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admissible on the issue of care but does not require a jury to 
find a defendant's conduct was reasonable. And in the Honda 
case referred to in Salmon v. Park, Davis and Company and also 
referred to in Raymond v. Regal Textile Corporation, Honda 
offered no persuasive reason why compliance will as a matter of 
law be merely admissible on the issue of whether the 
defendant's conduct is reasonable but an absolute defense on 
the issue of whether its conduct is willful, reckless or 
outrageous, again citing over to the Silkwood v. Kara-McKee 
case. 
The testimony from — I should also mention that in 
the Armstrong ruling by this court denying the summary judgment 
and allowing the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury 
there was clearly less evidence in that case, in that instance, 
than there is here. In this case we have testimony from 
experts Fandey and Dr. Hoffman to support a clear and 
convincing finding that the acts or omissions of Defendant 
American Appliance and Water Heater Company were a result of 
willful and malicious conduct or conduct that manifested a 
knowing and a reckless indifference and disregard of the right 
of others. 
Specifically, Dr. Hoffman testified that it has been 
common knowledge since at least the early or mid-seventies that 
raising water heater pilots at least 18 inches off the ground 
will most likely reduce flammable vapor fires in most 
n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 instances. Expert Joseph Fandey testified similarly and 
2 further testified that defendants, both of them, were 
3 represented at meetings prior to 1991 by Henry Jack Moore where 
4 American, by and through Henry Jack Moore, defendants gained 
5 knowledge that raising water heater pilots 18 inches off the 
6 ground was, if not a complete safeguard against flammable vapor 
7 fires, was certainly a significant safeguard in reducing 
8 flammable vapor fires. Notwithstanding the information, the 
9 defendants, over the many years, knowingly and willfully 
10 continued to manufacture and sell to the general public water 
11 heaters without an 18-inch stand with pilot lights only a few 
12 inches off the ground in reckless disregard for the safety of 
13 others. 
14 I Defendants, through the testimony of Hoffman and 
15 Fandey again, also knew well that 300 people a year were being 
16 burned and injured in flammable vapor fires ignited by water 
17 I heaters and intentionally continued to market their water 
18 J heaters, dangerous and defective water heaters, to the public, 
19 knowing that raising the water heaters 18 inches off the ground 
20 J would have prevented many of these tragedies. 
21 J It was clear that 18-inch stands had been available 
22 I and manufactured by manufacturers since 1977, according to 
23 J Dr. Hoffman. If elevated 18 inches off the ground, I believe 
24 lit was Dr. Hoffman's testimony that either there would have 
25 been no fire in this case or that it was more likely than not 
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thar; ;v. incident would have been avoided. 
. r- +!ie Neiss Report v:act. :n :-':>\. also 7 h-elie-e in 
the •-. .-^  .j.,i:. i--i- : : = I"-
 ; •:.:•• : - i . r . : :; ^-ma: was 
liable for its failure to use elevation safety devices r.ird tha4" 
these elevatioi 1 saieLv devices wen1 disousseH .md - •>::: LU Lue 
manufacturina aroup at Jarqe anl the defendant where they 
di-j-. -•••' : - • on H:, M TTit"-.-a11. t |iie,r^nt fi res, 
Henry Jack Moore, tl.- v. :e president: or safety 
en.:ii leer .. • *j? :--^en* ' * • • "T . *-v was a 
member o: ^AKA, attended most of t-.r.e Z21 meetings, according to 
Mr. E "ai id- :"• . • . * * •- *-- ussea nammable 
vapor issues related tc tires ignneo ; , .-at^r heaters. He 
kn*-w '"i
 ; - •. . * . t , , v - , Tr< - L11y i l a m m a b l e 
v a p o r s . E'aiid-\ T 1 : Morris specii ; :5.,y at meetings to raise 
.' ^r. 
Defendant American knew through Moore tha4- ^h* 
:: «
 4 4
 >•-• f • * y w±Lii i l a m m a b l e v a p o r 
f i r e s , t h e r e w e r e s t u d i e s aii'i repcits p r o v i d e d to A m e r i c a n 
:hi: < :>i i :;1 „ Moore that there was no decline xn : r ^ 3ri~s after r hn 
labeling. So the industry has known sin^° rn*-: n^ <- . - .-.'.. 
wou^cl include Defendant American, that raisinq wa*~: :.eater 
pilots 18 inches off the ground was effective in reaucit-;; * ri?--
j-iKenhood of flammable vapor fires. And certainly again in 
1991 pursuant to the Downing presentation Moore thought that 
the defendants were being set up for punitive damage cJ aims 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 where this information was again presented to American. 
2 The Gas Code has required since before 1970 elevation 
3 I of pilots 18 inches off the ground where flammable vapors were 
4 likely to be kept as a means for reducing the tragedies 
5 I suffered by Americans and flammable vapor fires. Despite the 
6 knowledge, defendants continued to knowingly manufacture and 
7 sell water heaters to the public without 18-inch stands. If 
8 water heaters in this case — and I believe in this motion the 
9 presumption of evidence should be in favor of the plaintiff, 
10 water heaters then would be found to be unreasonably dangerous 
11 and defective in their design, that the defendant knew of the 
12 defect and did nothing to guard against the dangers in the 
13 hierarchy of engineering as has been discussed throughout this 
14 case to either eliminate or guard against, and then they of 
15 J course then willfully and intentionally showed a reckless 
16 I disregard to the rights of others. 
17 J Dr. Karnes also testified that in 1990 water heater 
18 I label evidence, defendant's knowledge of the flammable vapor 
19 danger, the pictorial on the label shows flammable vapors 
20 igniting and burning people. 
21 And, finally, in the case of Gryc versus Dayton 
22 Hudson Corporation, the court held that manufacturers have a 
23 powerful hold over the means for discovering and correcting 
24 product hazards. Through the process of design, testing, 
25 inspection and collection of data on product safety performance 
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in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive access 
to much of the information necessary for effective control of 
da:.j- lacing gtodurt i-nnsunm] s. 
I. believe that there is ""mm a directed verdict 
sLct:rn. i n| i ind •' MI^T t - ns oi facts in favor of i;.e 
plaintiff, that there is ample evidence of a clear and 
iv un i nq n.v ' .* the defendant manufacturer • • 
produced a defective product, ' ha"- ^h^- knew for "ear? prior * 
in ; ' ; * , •• *- . i ^ 4 water heater- ..: the 
dangers involved, •" 4 *: m m e r o u s Americans suite: iro tragedv 
aii'l i . ' • ii defective product «-*•: • ntinued 
to market t h e n dangerous ami defective product to m e .r. e: 
puhl i c :i i 1 a reckless ai id knowing di sregard to the rights of 
ottiers . 
THE COURT: Let me understand, Mr. Zayei, wh_ . f this 
is the problem you describe, i*her^ ^° n o legislation * •...:,, j I; 
' / i n 1 1 i MI i \ i t i n n • ' • . • ' . ' • " ••••' ' ' • " :• 
MR. ZAGER: Well, the 
re certaii v ~ 5' • ^  •? 
support our position that tho reason mpr^- K; a*: absent of 
legislation and standards it because 1 ,m m .. j 
industry, the powerful group t m t m e y are, defective.* 
controls the standard-making pro-.' .- . - , in 1. 
standards which certainly don Tt ~m^e t m e m v e l :' standard 
required to make their products : --
groups where 80 percent of t h-: industry - is Joe tandey 
11 
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1 pointed out, the rule-making group is the industry and they can 
2 effectively block any changes. And in the case of Moore, in 
3 I the case of the Downing presentation, now exclude any other 
4 input from other outside sources to come in and recommend 
5 J changes. If you recall — 
6 J THE COURT: I didn't understand. When I said 
7 I "legislation," I typically meant why a municipality, county, a 
8 I state, a national law-making body. But your assertion is that 
9 I these people are controlled by what you describe as the 
10 I powerful manufacturing industry, is that what Ifm hearing you 
11 say? 
12 MR. ZAGER: And that's a good point, Your Honor, and 
13 a problem we have in our country and probably one that was 
14 recognized in the Silkwood case, where they held that just the 
15 fact that a product meets the federal standards does not 
16 preclude an issue of punitive damages. It's up to courts and 
17 attorneys when the federal legislation fails to protect our 
18 citizens to let juries and fact finders send a message to these 
19 manufacturers that the federal government has failed them and 
20 the manufacturers themselves have failed to provide the 
21 safeguards for the American people. 
22 THE COURT: Now, if I were to follow what you're 
23 saying, then, I'd have to be guided I guess by law in this 
24 state, and the defendants have cited this Behrens case. Do you 
25 think we have evidence that there was a high degree of 
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18 
1 probability that havina a water heater as designed would result 
2 in substantial narm tc ;omecne? 
; ZAGEP " :/ ur -••••, yes. 
THE COURT: ....;: aegree cf probabii -i.t\ . 
ZAGER: '* • iour Honor, almost a person a day is 
injured \: on-- r tries*- tires. 
rntiRT: ( •• i,y. And how many -- I mean how many 
water heaters :are there? 
EAGER: hen, I think there was testimony from 
10 our expert t.ia* tnere wis between 4n and * . -.. .,: \nese 
1 •:• y out tneie. But it a person a day i: t>ein^  
12 I . r urea in these for over the last 50 years, tnar :..- a 
1 , • -1* * : jitujer uf Americans injured, and maybe mote that 
14 were injureu in these water heater fires than were injured 
15 I •':• ^ into cases. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
1 MR. ZAGER: Ktrd p-: r\ r.. 
THE COURT: Auo descriD*-. :or me what 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
gtes- the second element of that test is that: :i 1: has tc: be 
hi-Ui y unreasonable 
ordinary care. Help 
you on that one. 
._,. ZAGER: 
sorry, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
zonduct or ai I extreme depar 1:I ire froi i: t 
me understand where your evidence supports 
I'm not sur- ~. follow that questioi I. I'm 
Okay. rIhe Behrens case is no: you looked 
1 * 
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1 at it, and you have three kind of standards, I mean three 
2 criteria, three elements of a punitive kind of case. One was 
3 there had to be a high degree of probability that what they did 
4 would result in substantial harm. You've described 300 every 
5 year out of 50 million homes is a high degree of probability, 
6 in your view. 
7 J Secondly, then, the second element is that it has to 
8 I be highly unreasonable conduct or an extreme departure from 
9 ordinary care. What's the evidence that this is highly 
10 unreasonable and/or an extreme departure from what one would 
11 describe — 
12 MR. ZAGER: Well, ordinary care would expect, I 
13 believe, a manufacturer to put out a product that was safe and 
14 that wouldn't cause injury. Thatfs the idea, that's the whole 
15 J basis for the hierarchy of engineering. And that it is 
16 unreasonable I think follows that if you have a product that 
17 you know is likely to cause harm to at least one person or 
18 almost a person a day, then it would seem unreasonable conduct 
19 to continue to put that product out when all that would be 
20 required for the fix or at least the guard against as required 
21 by that hierarchy of engineering would be to sell this water 
22 heater with an 18-inch stand. It would seem unreasonable 
23 conduct to continue selling the product as it is knowing that 
24 people are going to be injured by it, when all it took was to 
25 add an 18-inch stand with the product so that people would 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
install it so that the pilot light was 18 inches off tht 
ground, 
, COURT: And the last element I guess :;as 11 be a 
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. And n 
..,. yWhere? 
MR. ZAGER: to--]1., T ^Mr^ w<=> have testimony from 
Dr • tne iiumbei 01 natalities chat: occ^i wh«-- i 
person i^ r^um^i about ""heir body, depend^ncr on th^ir a-
tnei lactoib. JTULKI ^learh* aimo~L a person 
aa\ v%r.-r r,iey':> involved : ~ +"Kir VZPJ: :: :: re or this . : 
. -- we!ie not taxkino abcjf - product where someone's 
gen t~ get a little cu+ ' neir :inqer i: \ne\ • n 
a .';' * ;: we'ie talking about seri^u- injuries oir~n :^5uiring 
in fatalities herp. And a number a tnese are you:, ; • ..i:> 
you MIUW, oabies and Smalx children wr:u aic rlay:n:: w.. * • 
gasoline or some other volatile product neai 
So the injuries we're talking about in large part are occurring 
to children, innocent victims. 
THE COURT: Fair enough, Anything else you'd like to 
add? 
MR. ZAGER: No, Your Honor. 
T H E i "I NIK'I I I M I i J- / . 1 1 . 
Anything mcr- , . u n a ? 
I l l 1 l . ' . ' N I • _ . y . • •• 
MR. ZAGER: :* uaht approach the bench, Your 
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1 Honor, the Court may want our copies of these cases for its 
2 review, 
3 THE COURT: No, we can be instructed in 30 minutes. 
4 I don't have time to review it. I appreciate it, but last 
5 night I made it pretty clear that I had something at quarter to 
6 9:00 and at 9:00. I can listen, but I don't think I can be 
7 reading stuff. If my explanation of what we were going to do 
8 today wasn't clear, it wasn't a meditative day for me, 
9 MR. ZAGER: Right, it was my understanding we were 
10 going to present argument at 8:30, and I'm here with the cases 
11 in hand and I just wanted to offer them to the Court if — 
12 MR. LUND: It's about context. There's probably more 
13 than one car wreck a day, but Ford — to have that make sense, 
14 you've got to look at how many cars are out there. So let's 
15 say there's 400 accidents and let's say there's only 40 million 
16 water heaters out there. I think that's about 1 in 100,000 of 
17 those water heaters a year that's involved in some kind of a 
18 flammable vapor ignition. So when we turn to the element of a 
19 high degree of probability that there is going to be 
20 substantial harm, we have the exact opposite. We have the 
21 vast, vast majority of these heaters functioning without 
22 presenting a risk of harm. 
23 In context I think, you know, Mr. Fandey is really 
24 their guide to present there's any evidence of this and he did 
25 perceive a couple of minutes of meetings. I want you to know 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 I +-hat those meeting minutes in our view put this in context. 
2 l In September .-: ' v?_ , .;:., . - the latest specific 
3 I pit - : ; ^ wa^ the last meeting ~ L 
4 which this Mr. Moore was present, Mr. Fandey himself, their 
5 exper t, :i s recorded as 1 sis si i ig i i,oted that something needs to be 
6 done tn reduce these accidents out stating that itf <= not- known 
" I" i nvo] ,; ;' es a d< J sanae ui noc. Wei.] , ssers rery 
8 I expert even as a ,i.ast p<:im we have any specific information 
r • * :esign is appropriate, the codes 
remairi what; tney ar^. 
'':••-•
 i
 -smstrong, Armstrong, the evidence ner-
12 . s tha1- is a banned product, s~ T ^ r , f know how 1-he company 
13 '-. *• .: s4\s anywhere. Dr. Karnes said this u o good 
14 I labe, i *. s :; ^  positive force. Ultimate!; ;s terms nf there 
1 uo we even know who ±i ij witr: some 
16 standard of clear and convincing evidence vita; it is Mi I -loois 
1 sas, unpls-yed by:' We don't even barely know that to a point 
18 j where we could reduce it to a burden. 
3 I'll submit it, Your Honor, 
THE COURT i 1 t:hink t ol 1.owirig Behi ens, wh i ch, li ha* s. 
to do, I don't think there is a high degree of probability that 
the water heaters as designed wilJ result in subs l" ant Id I harm 
to someone. I don't think it's an unreasonable conduct or: an 
extreme departure from, ordinary caie because they follm Mi*.1 
statutes. And, though, Mr. Zager, 1 agree with the fact, that 
% n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if you're burned that is a very serious harm, I don't think 
that these products are used in a situation where a high degree 
of danger is apparent. 
For those reasons, since I don't think it follows the 
Behrens, I don't think that I can allow the jury to consider 
based on the evidence we have here an award of punitive 
damages. 
So we will recess until 9:30 and we'll reconvene. 
(A recess was taken.) 
(The jury entered the room.) 
(End of portion of transcript requested.) 
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NCMEMEER 05 , 2001 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Teena, tell the record that the jury has 
went away, Mr. Lund needs to talk to the court. 
MR. LUND: Thank you for waiting a moment. I was 
hoping this would be — I believe, and we111 have to tell them, 
I believe that may be the last witness that the plaintiffs are 
intending to call. And with that anticipation in mind, I'd 
like to hand Your Honor briefs we have in support of our what 
will be two motions for directed verdict at the end of the 
case. That's the only reason I wanted to — 
THE COURT: You wanted to get a jump on my — 
MR. LUND: Well, you can certainly do whatever you'd 
like with your lunch hour, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I can? Then how will I be prepared for 
the motion to — 
MR. LUND: I guess we could wait and have argument on 
those at another point, but those are motions that must be made 
at the close of their case. So anticipating that's coming up, 
I wanted you to know that that's coming up. 
THE COURT: Great. Is he right in his guess? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I would say yes, with 
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r xception that — and my belief is that the motion ^s oased 
,; :.ne tact that the --
THE COURT ^ I ' S ask one question at a 
:m- . T:: ;* trie ena cr your case? 
:':-. :-r* ior cross-examination. 
MR. ZAGER: t^ me daa something. 
THE COURT: /our cast; in cniei is over? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN -ni there are 3.1sc some — there's a 
. .. 1 lat Mr ' ii iias agreea we can introduce into 
10 (evidence, but. :\ \exn\t of liability, apart from. 
u ui case is done. 
12 
x / 
-« p 
on 
THE COURT: Okay, Long answer to a short question 
MR. LUND: If you want these now, I'M I hand tnem t.> 
• - if you'd rather have them after lunc^ .. :. -,:.z. +"hem to 
THE COURT- V A^'^ ncind ^hem whenever yon :.;- ; t-hpm, 
TnaiiK yuu, 
(A recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: I guess we're off, Mr. Suttoi i and 
M v T n inr^ 
23 
25 
Now, ynn 'vp r e s t e d , r i gh t . , Mr. 0 'C ' a l l aha i I? 
MR. ALLAHAr ! : € s , : :' : I 11: 1 1 o i i : r , 
THE COURT: And you've admitted, I guess, what other 
:s you were worried about: ? 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Yes, with the exception of a 
R 
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1 photograph that Mr. Sutton stipulated that we would 
2 subsequently be able to admit. 
3 THE COURT: You've checked with Marci to be sure 
4 about all the exhibits being — 
5 MR. O'CALLAHAN: I haven't done that, Your Honor, but 
6 I would expect we'd do that at the.end of the day. 
7 THE COURT: So I guess on to your motion, right, 
8 Mr. Lund? 
9 MR. LUND: Yes, Your Honor. There's two motions for 
10 directed verdict. The first one has to do with causation, and 
11 I don't know if you have had a chance to look at those memos. 
12 THE COURT: I did. 
13 J MR. LUND: Well, thank you. I apologize for those 
14 I not being available, but — 
15 J THE COURT: Lot a adieu about nothing, so it's not 
16 J your fault. 
17 MR. LUND: Even as of this morning, I guess who had 
18 the burden of proof of causation apparently seemed to be a 
19 moving target. I'm speaking of Ms. Alarid's testimony. Let me 
20 go back to the beginning. 
21 As a rule, as a fairly well-set subtle rule in most 
22 jurisdictions, including ours, it's the person making the claim 
23 that has the burden. And they have the burden on proximate 
24 cause as well as the other elements of their case. And we've 
25 cited, for example, the case involving the Hilton Hotel where 
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somebody gets killed in their hotel room and somebody sues the 
hotel because they've got inadequate security. The only 
problem is that nobody knows who committed the murder. And 
since there's no way to know if the inadequate security — this 
is Mitchell versus Pearson. There's no way to know that the 
inadequate security has really made a difference. For all they 
know, it was a friend that walked in and killed this person, so 
there's a lack of an ability to prove proximate cause. And 
that is, we believe, where the plaintiffs are in this case. 
A directed verdict motion at this juncture is 
essentially a summary judgement motion in terms of the standard 
you need to apply. Is there either such evidence that's so 
clear that reasonable minds couldn't differ or an insufficiency 
of the evidence such that the jury is left to speculate or 
guess about a critical element of the case. And that's our 
position with regard to proximate cause here. 
Most notably in the words of Dr. Hoffman on the first 
day, it's a matter of pure speculation which of those two water 
heaters ignited the fire. He does think it's one of them, but 
he cannot determine between them. And there's been no other 
evidence upon which a jury would be able to differentiate which 
of the two water heaters ignited. 
Now, I guess that's why three days into this trial on 
November 1 the plaintiffs decided that, no, this should be our 
burden to prove — disprove proximate cause. If you'll recall, 
•7 
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1 you had an interchange with Mr. 0'Callahan Friday morning, or 
2 Thursday morning, about Summers versus Tice, and now that's 
3 come full bloom. 
4 We argue in our memo, and I'll just briefly assert 
5 here again that, first of all, even if that were a valid point -
6 I of Utah law, and I'll get back to that, it's unfair to have the 
7 burden shift on. that issue midway through trial. 
8 Mr. 0'Callahan took on that burden in opening statement, he 
9 takes on that burden in his jury instructions that he has the 
10 burden of proof, and it isn't until his expert fails him on 
11 that that he decides it must be our burden because he can't 
12 prove it. 
13 So procedurally it seems that this would be something 
14 that we'd be entitled to know before we started the case. And 
15 I I mentioned a few things in the memo that I would have done 
16 different on behalf of American Water Heater if I'd known I had 
17 the burden. 
18 Most notably, Mr. 0'Callahan said in opening 
19 statement that not only was Dr. Hoffman going to pick the left 
20 water heater, but that that would be consistent with what 
21 government officials would say. We had one government official 
22 here, that was Mr. Long. Mr. Long was not — over my 
23 objection, not permitted to give opinions. 
24 THE COURT: Due to your objection. 
25 MR. LUND: Due to my objection. I would not have 
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made that objection, because I think Mr. O'Callahan was correct 
that that — Mr. Long's opinion was the left side, just like 
his own expert. So instead of trying to keep that evidence 
out, I guess if I'd had that burden I would have approached the 
case very differently in terms of proving this critical 
question of which water heater ignited. 
Probably more to the point and I think the most 
straightforward reason to reject their proposal to shift the 
burden is because that's not the Utah law. There is not a case 
in Utah that follows Summers versus Tice. There is three or 
four that have discussed Summers versus Tice under certain fact 
patterns, none of them have decided that case is an appropriate 
one to apply, Summers versus Tice. 
We cite the Clark case, which is a five-vehicle 
accident case where the plaintiff's expert says, well, all 
these drivers were careless, but I can't figure out which one 
actually caused the collision, even though they're all somehow 
involved. And that is a failure of the plaintiff's proof 
that's fatal to their case. 
The burden-shifting rule in Summers versus Tice is 
for a very tightly defined situation. The facts are, two guys 
are shooting a gun both at the same time, aiming the same 
direction. The bullet of one of them hits a person in the eye. 
They know it's either hunter A's bullet or hunter B's bullet. 
THE COURT: But it's no other bullet. 
a 
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1 I MR. LUND: Itfs no other bullet. And it's not partly 
2 J hunter A and partly hunter B, it's one or the other, alternate 
3 I liability, and under those facts they shift the burden. 
4 J I cited you to the Rutherford case out of California 
5 J where they define the elements of Summers versus Tice a little 
6 I more cleanly. And the thing they said that helped me a lot is, 
7 I we know that these two people that are in the case — or if 
8 [there's three, fine, there's three shooters — we know these 
9 I people who are in the case are the ones responsible and they're 
10 the only ones responsible, and it's either A or it's B. 
11 Now, the facts here simply don't fit that because 
12 there has been some assessment of proximate cause in this case, 
13 I it's implicit in the settlements that have been reached, in the 
14 I opinions that have been rendered about the glue having to be 
15 J part of the cause of this accident and proximate cause 
16 J language. The causes of this accident include Mr. Nelson's 
17 conduct, Mr. Gomez's conduct, the glue company's conduct, as 
18 I well as potentially the ignition of this vapor by one of the 
19 heaters. But it's simply not the fact pattern where Summers 
20 versus Tice should be applied, even if that were something you 
21 were inclined to do just by Utah law to that effect. That's it 
22 in a nutshell on that issue. 
23 J Do you want me to go to punitives or do you want me 
24 to answer questions or — 
25 THE COURT: Well, I guess we can't punish you if 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 you're not negligent, right, so we ought to solve one at a 
2 time. 
3 MR. LUND: Yeah. 
4 THE COURT: Refresh my mind about a statute. Wasn't 
5 there a statute that said in essence if you had lived up to the 
6 I code you had some protection — 
7 MR. LUND: Yeah. 
8 I THE COURT: So besides not wanting the burden 
9 shifted, is there any other basis? I mean I'm trying to think 
10 absent them shifting it to the two of you, you would also, I 
11 guess, assert there's no negligence been shown? 
12 I MR. LUND: Well, I think there are two aspects of 
13 J that. First of all, we're not arguing they have failed to come 
14 I forth with evidence of a defect in the design of the water 
15 J heater. They have Dr. Hoffman saying, I think it's defective 
16 I because it's not 18 inches off the ground. I assume question 
17 J one on the verdict form — 
18 J Leave out there's two water heaters for a minute. I 
19 I think question one on the water heater form is going to be, Was 
20 the water heater defective? And I think they've got evidence 
21 on that despite the fact that there is a rebuttable 
22 presumption — 
23 THE COURT: An instruction — 
24 MR. LUND: Going to have to deal with that, although 
25 it does raise a subject. This Summers versus Tice ruling is an 
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1 ultimately equitable ruling without shifting the burden, and 
2 the reason for it is, it isn't fair to the plaintiff that we 
3 know one or the other of these did this wrongful act and they 
4 shouldn't be able to both get off scott free and have the 
5 plaintiff be without any remedy. And I'd submit to you here we 
6 have the plaintiff already having a remedy against other 
7 parties and we have the remaining defendants being people that 
8 did comply with the code in terms of there being some equitable 
9 reason to overlook the need to prove proximate cause. 
10 THE COURT: All right. From the plaintiff? 
11 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Sure, Your Honor. The first thing 
12 I I'd like to point out is that in this case, just like in every 
13 J fire case, there is a fire triangle. There is a fuel source, 
14 I there is an oxygen source and there is an ignition source. In 
15 J this case, the issue is the ignition source. And our evidence 
16 I is that the ignition source came from the water heaters, either 
17 the one on the left or the one on the right. Under those 
18 circumstances, it's perfectly appropriate to apply the Summers 
19 versus Tice ruling. And by that what we are talking about is a 
20 design defect. It's not a manufacturing defect, it's a design 
21 defect, which makes it different from the Rutherford case. 
22 In our case, we presented evidence that was based on 
23 reasonable scientific and technical probability that the 
24 ignition source was from, first of all, one of the water 
25 heaters. In addition to that, Your Honor, there was also 
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1 evidence that the particular flames that were initially seen 
2 came from the doors that were on the left-hand side of the 
3 landing. 
4 And this is of significance because, first of all, 
5 there was testimony from Mrs. Alarid that the flames were from 
6 the left-hand side of the door; and, secondly, it was 
7 I Mr. Long's testimony that the most severely damaged water 
8 I heater was the one on the left-hand side. That provided 
9 evidence from which a jury could infer that that was the source 
10 of the fire, although certainly Dr. Hoffman's testimony left 
11 the issue as one that the jury could make such a determination 
12 at the close of evidence. 
13 Now, one of the things that the Court may recall is 
14 that there was originally a motion in limine that was intended 
15 I to bar any evidence with respect to the water heater on the 
16 J right side and the Court denied that on the basis that there 
17 I was testimony that it was not clear or our expert did not 
18 conclude that it was from the left or the right, and the Court 
19 said, well, you know, we'll let the evidence come in and then 
20 we'll let the jury decide that issue. And the reason I think 
21 that — or I suspect that the Court did that is that 
22 Dr. Hoffman testified in May of the year 2000, a year and a 
23 half ago, and gave the testimony, which is consistent with the 
24 testimony that he gave here during the course of trial. 
25 As the defendants point out that this is basically a 
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1 J motion for summary judgment, and I think that the Court should 
2 consider about why there was a delay on the part — or not a 
3 I delay but there was a failure to file a motion for summary 
4 I judgment during that year and a half when they had possession 
5 of Dr. Hoffmanfs testimony. And I think that the reason is 
6 J that even under circumstances such as the Webber case which 
7 I counsel cited, the court in Utah didn't say, we don't believe 
8 J that the case of Summers versus Tice was incorrectly decided, 
9 J what it said is that it is not appropriate under these 
10 circumstances. And in this case, with respect to the ignition 
11 J source, the only evidence regarding the ignition source will be 
12 I that it came from the water heaters. 
13 THE COURT: I don't mean to be rude, but the damage 
14 is not caused just by ignition. I mean what am I missing here? 
15 I You seem to be saying, if I understand you right, that we're 
16 going to somehow separate one element of the triangle and put 
17 you on trial for that, whereas if the other two elements of the 
18 I triangle aren't there ever, then you have no fire. 
19 I I mean it's like in my house today there's a water 
20 heater with a fire but there's no explosion and/or fire and we 
21 J aren't going to sue somebody for fire in my house. Do you 
22 follow my drift? I mean, yeah, there is a fire source, 
23 ignition source, but without these other things, nothing 
24 I happens. And you seem to be saying to me, Well, we're just 
25 going to focus on this one little triangle thing and 
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everythingfs cool. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Well, I think — 
THE COURT: I guess I!m just not seeing conceptually 
how you are seeing it. I'm not understanding, that's what I'm 
trying to say. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Well, I think that one of the things 
that we have here in this case that didn't exist at the time 
the Summers versus Tice was decided is that in the days of 
Summer versus Tice, 1948, contrib was a complete bar to 
recovery, and that is why Summers versus Tice was framed as it 
was. 
Since that time in California and Utah and in most 
states there has been a change in that showing that if there is 
any negligence on the part of the defendant — on the part of 
the plaintiff, it was a complete bar to recovery. In this day 
and age and in this case, the jury has already been told that 
there have been other tortfeasors who were involved in the case 
and that they have resolved their differences. So we're not in 
the same legal framework that existed at the time of Summer 
versus Tice. 
THE COURT: Sure, okay. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: So what happens through the 
apportionment process is that the jury is able to go through 
and make the determination with respect to those other parties 
or actors in the set. 
1 C 
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1 But with respect to the issue of ignition, and I 
2 think that Dr. Hoffman covered this, he said, if you don't have 
3 an ignition source, the warnings are not relevant. If you 
4 don't have the ignition source, the conduct of the others 
5 doesn't come into play. And certainly that's the focus of this 
6 case is leaving the pilot light and the burner at such a low 
7 level to the ground to provide the ignition source. And that's 
8 why I think that in the analysis of this case, given the 
9 Summers versus Tice analysis or given a causation analysis, 
10 it's appropriate to focus on the issue of ignition. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I mean — I'm sorry. I guess what 
12 I'm saying, he cites the Webber and these Clark cases which 
13 seem to say you just can't guess at who it is, you have to have 
14 evidence. And your only evidence will be, if I understand you 
15 right, is I saw it come out under one door and somebody else 
16 said one of these was burnt more than the other. 
17 MR. O'CALLAHAN: And — 
18 THE COURT: And from that, the jury will be asked to 
19 say it's the left-hand side or the right-hand side or whatever? 
20 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Certainly causation can be inferred 
21 by the jury based upon the evidence before it. If that 
22 evidence — if they base that upon that evidence knowing what 
23 I they now know about the likeliest source of ignition of the — 
24 THE COURT: And can I just ask you, how can a jury 
25 come to a conclusion an expert couldn't come to based on 
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exactly the same facts? I mean the expert says, I know what 
the jury knows, right, I mean he knew those things, didnft he? 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor, I — although I think 
that — 
THE COURT: He knew that somebody saw fire from the 
left side and one of them was burnt more, and I think that was 
specifically asked. 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: I don!t ~ 
THE COURT: Is that fair to say? 
MR. 0!CALLAHAN: I don't think that that was 
specifically asked. As I think the Court is aware, the 
identity of the fire investigators and the photographs and so 
on were not part of what Mr. Hoffman had available to him. 
THE COURT: Somebody did ask him about one of these 
is burnt more than the other, I think Hoffman had that in front 
of him. He can't come to a conclusion, but a jury should be 
allowed to infer — see, thatfs what I'm not following. 
MR. O1CALLAHAN: Well, Your Honor, I wouldn't leave 
it at Dr. Hoffman's testimony. I'd also point out that 
Mr. Long was eminently qualified to investigate fires and 
describe what he did and described what conclusion he reached 
with respect to which particular water heater had suffered the 
most damage. And in the context of his testimony on that 
subject, there's no reason that the jury couldn't infer, 
notwithstanding whether or not they accept Dr. Hoffman's 
17 
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1 analysis that he couldn't reach that conclusion, but there was 
2 substantial evidence provided by the plaintiff by way of 
3 Mr. Long that would allow the inference to be made that it was 
4 in fact the one on the left side rather than the right side. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else you want 
6 to add? 
7 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, the only thing that I 
8 would add is that I think that I'd like to brief the legal 
9 standard with respect to the application of Summers versus 
10 Tice. I had an opportunity to do some research during the 
11 break, and based on the limited research that I was able to do, 
12 I think that there is case law which would support its 
13 application under these circumstances. 
14 THE COURT: Where do you find such a case? The 
15 I reason I ask is, I have some help here in the building and they 
16 I looked, they can't find one. But — 
17 MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor, I would refer the Court 
18 I to a case called Abel versus Eli Lilly, which is a 1984 case of 
19 Michigan. It involved the application of Summers versus Tice 
20 in the product liability context. Your Honor, I believe it was 
21 a drug. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. What kind of drug, do you know? 
23 MR. O'CALLAHAN: I don't know that offhand. I 
24 just — I read a brief summary, but if I can — I111 give the 
25 cite, if thatfs of any interest to the Court. 
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THE COURT: So what you'd like me to do is just 
reserve my ruling on this? 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor, I think that we could 
brief the matter and provide you with some persuasive 
information on the subject. In any event, I think that 
certainly the testimony regarding the location from which the 
flame came, the testimony regarding the damage to the heaters 
should be sufficient to give the jury the opportunity to make a 
determination with respect to causation. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, if I might add something, Ifd 
like to also point out that there was a motion in limine filed 
by the defendant on this very point trying to have the 
determination that it was the water heater on the left that in 
fact caused the ignition. And the Court heard that motion, 
denied that motion, and basically let the case go to trial that 
either of the two water heaters could have been the cause and 
both defendants were involved in the case. 
I think it1s interesting that — it was Mr. Lund, I 
believe, who made the objection to Mr. Long!s conclusions that 
the fact it was the water heater on the left, when that would 
have benefited his client. I think that only goes to show 
again the nongenuine interest, the gamesmanship played by the 
defendants in separating the two defendants, because obviously 
that would benefit, quote, unquote, his client to have it be 
19 
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1 the water heater on the left that was the cause rather than the 
2 one on the right. 
3 If I hear Mr. Lund correctly, he says he wouldn't 
4 have made that objection to Mr. Long testifying had he known 
5 that it was the plaintiff's position that it could have been 
6 either of the two water heaters that caused the ignition. And 
7 that is, as I read the landmark case of Summers v. Tice, the 
8 very issue. The only two remaining defendants in the case are 
9 the two defendant manufacturers of the water heaters. Without 
10 the ignition, there would have been no injury, so basically it 
11 is a causation problem, or issue, I should say, which the 
12 application of Summers v. Tice is exactly on point as to a case 
13 I where there are two sole defendants involved in the lawsuit at 
14 this point in time and the evidence is such that the inference 
15 J can be made that either of the two are, as Mr. Hoffman stated, 
16 I potentially simultaneously both of the two water heaters 
17 I combined to cause the ignition. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
19 MR. LUND: Your Honor, just very briefly, what 
20 Mr. Zager just said about Dr. Hoffman is absolutely backwards. 
21 He said itfs not possible that both of them ignited at the same 
22 time. That was Dr. Hoffman's statement about could they have 
23 both started at the same time. 
24 And I guess the thing — I hope — I really do want 
25 us to do this right and I'm concerned that we think clearly 
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through this. And I heard Mr. 0'Callahan kind of move back and 
forth between two things. 
The threshold question is, is there enough evidence 
that one could determine proximate cause here on the basis of 
evidence or is it simply speculation? Because if there is 
enough evidence to kind of point at one of the heaters versus 
the other in a way that you think is not guessing for the jury, 
then Summers versus Tice has no application because it only 
comes into play if there's no way to prove the difference. 
So it seems to me the first question is, is it 
possible, and I respect your questions to Mr. 0'Callahan about 
how a jury could decide it if the expert can't. And I guess 
that's our position, it's probably not possible on the basis of 
the evidence in front of them, but there may have been other 
evidence that could have been elicited on that subject. 
I guess the second point is, again, there is not 
going to be a case, at least we could not find any, where you 
would take the Summers versus Tice concept and apply it to two 
remaining defendants in a situation where globally there has 
already been some sorting out. And ultimately either the jury 
is going to be guessing here or the plaintiffs are going to 
convince you to have the burden shift to us and then I guess 
we're going to have deal with the fact that there's no proof to 
disassociate one or the other. And I respect Mr. O'Callahan's 
interest in briefing it, the problem is, we've got to go 
21 
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1 forward with our case and know if we have a burden or not. 
2 THE COURT: When you say you've got to go forward, 
3 I'm thinking one solution for the moment is to get the input 
4 from everybody a little more clearly. Do you have people 
5 waiting in the wings that feel the need to go ahead today or 
6 I could you go tomorrow morning if we decide? 
7 MR. LUND: We could start it in the morning, if 
8 that's Your Honor's feeling. 
9 THE COURT: I was just thinking maybe if I 
10 got Teena to run me a copy of her handywork 
11 here from the last half hour and have a minute to think about 
12 it — a minute, I mean think about it and afternoon and the 
13 morning, that it might be better. I mean it seems to me that 
14 on your side there's no use going ahead and — what do you 
15 I folks think about that, giving me a chance to get the 
16 I information you think exists? 
17 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Sure, Your Honor. You know, the 
18 fact of the matter is I think it will probably take us a couple 
19 of hours to do that. We could submit that tomorrow morning. 
20 That would be fine. 
21 I know Mr. Sutton had mentioned earlier that he has 
22 an expert that he would dearly love to complete and send home. 
23 I don't know whether or not that's operative at this point in 
24 J time, but I'll defer to whatever the Court and counsel want to 
25 do. 
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MR. ZAGER: I would add one thing before we adjourn. 
Two things, actually. 
One, this doesn!t change much, both defendant still 
have every motive to prove that it wasnft their water heater 
that was the cause of the ignition, so I donft see how that 
would change with some other evidence that would have been 
brought up. Both defendants still have the same motive. 
Further, there is absolutely no evidence or any credible 
evidence that there was any other source of the ignition than 
one or both of the two water heaters. There's no evidence that 
it was the air furnaces. The evidence — 
THE COURT: I agree, Mr. Zager, but I don't recall 
anything that you could get to both of them. If one wanted to 
do that, how would one say, This is the peg upon which I placed 
my hat, both of you did it because... 
Give me any scenario you want from the evidence that 
we1ve had. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, in Summers v. Tice — 
THE COURT: Set aside Summers v. Tice. Pretend 
it's — what's it called, Alarid versus American Appliance, et 
al. You just give me any facts together that get them both in. 
I'm just curious what that — 
MR. ZAGER: Well, Your Honor, if I just might for a 
moment refer for a moment back — 
THE COURT: I'd rather not. Answer my question 
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because I want to see where you think it's leading me because 
that's the whole process. I have to think this through 
clearly. So you tell me what facts support your idea that both 
of them are responsible. 
MR. ZAGER: Well, the evidence is, Your Honor, that 
the water heaters, one or the other, or in the case of 
Mr. Hoffman the potentiality that it could have been a 
simultaneous ignition, although he said that would be 
unlikely — 
THE COURT: Hoffman said no to that. 
MR. ZAGER: Hoffman said that would be unlikely, it 
could have happened, but it is unlikely, is what he said. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ZAGER: We certainly know it was one of the water 
heaters. 
THE COURT: Let's assume you've — 
(Reporter had to interrupt.) 
THE COURT: Oh, just keep going. 
MR. ZAGER: Okay, just like the one bullet. There 
was one of the two defendants, one of the two water heaters 
that was the cause of the incident. 
THE COURT: All right. If that's your answer, that's 
fair. 
MR. ZAGER: I'm not sure if the Court — 
THE COURT: My question wasn't was it one of the two. 
OA 
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You said itfs both, and I said to you, tell me how you prove 
that. And all I want to know is what it is and you never 
answered the question. 
MR. ZAGER: I'll defer to Mr. 0!Callahan. 
THE COURT: Mr. 0fCallahan didn't say what you said. 
MR. ZAGER: I111 let him address that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. So I think the 
best plan is — where did Mick go — is to get them in here and 
tell them Ifve got to meditate. It's better for them to know 
what's going on. So I can either address them in there or 
bring them in, whichever you like. 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor, what do you think? 
THE COURT: Mick says bring them in. 
(The jury entered the courtroom.) 
(End of requested portion of transcript.) 
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NCWE*CER 06, 2001 
8:50 A.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * * * 
THE COURT: Mr, Lund, anymore from you today? 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, we've had an opportunity to 
review the plaintifffs memorandum, I have several remarks 
about it, but — 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. LUND: — we have not filed our own, as you've 
probably realized. Ifm going to take the four points they've 
got in order, and I think probably take a minute to deal with 
the facts that he's asserted and be sure that we know what — 
It's true Anna Marie testified she saw them out of 
the left door. Whatever Mr. Gomez is going to testify about 
isn't in evidence at this point, so I don't think that would be 
material. Mr. Long did make a statement when he had one of the 
photographs in his hand about which water heater had the most 
damage. He had photo 20 in his hand. If Your Honor please, 
I'll hand you photo 20 and also hand you photos 17 and 23. 
Although he said that was the water heater on the 
west, that's a misstatement. This is the photo that shows — 
photo 17 shows the water heater on the west and then you can 
see the blanket of the one on the east. And this is another 
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1 photo of the one with the blanket on it. Photo 20, which was 
2 I the one he had in his hand when he said it was the one with the 
3 I most damage is actually a photo of the water heater on the 
4 east. 
5 THE COURT: To the extent that you testified, yeah, 
6 J itfs probably not material. 
7 MR. LUND: I'm just pointing out that that is Exhibit 
8 I 20 that he had in his hand at the time. 
9 Mr. Long was expressly not permitted to disclose 
10 whatever determinations he made, so I don't know how that would 
11 I be much for the jury to use to go on. 
12 J Kent Nelson testified that he had no way of 
13 I remembering, he could not be certain as he sat there that the 
14 J flames came out of one door versus the other. I think those 
15 J are the pertinent facts that are suggested. 
16 I Regarding the points that are raised, I don't think 
17 J we have much disagreement with the plaintiffs about what the 
18 J standard review is on directed verdict and we discussed that 
19 J yesterday. I!m a little confused by the plaintiff's memo in 
20 the sense that on the one hand they're suggesting there's 
21 J enough evidence, I guess, for the jury to make a determination 
22 of which water heater ignited the fire. If that were so, then 
23 why would we be talking about Summers versus Tice? That 
24 concept only comes into play when it is not possible to make 
25 that determination, so their point that — I think that's the 
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fundamental question. First of all, is there enough evidence 
that the jury could make a determination. Our position on that 
has been stated. 
In the face of a cause of fire origin expert 
testifying, he cannot, in that it is speculation. Our 
submission remains that it is simply a matter of having the 
jury guess about something that the expert is not inclined to 
do. That expert did have the depositions, he did have the 
photos, and he's not inclined to make that evaluation. 
There is a case in Utah called K-Mart versus Beard 
where a plaintiff seeks to have a jury guess about whether 
certain medical injury was caused by a certain accident. And 
the case holds that that must be the subject of medical 
testimony. A doctor has to say in most cases — I can give you 
the case, if you want. 
There is another case and Mr. Sutton read it in the 
half hour we had, so if I could turn to him for a minute, 
there's another case called Walker versus Parish Chemical that 
sheds a little light on whether juries should decide things 
that seem to be in the realm of expert testimony. 
MR. SUTTON: Your Honor, the Walker case was a fire 
case that the proffered jury instruction was seeking a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction, and as part of the appellate court 
analysis there was a consideration as to whether expert 
testimony was needed with respect to something like fire cause 
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1 land origin. And it was indeed the Court's conclusion that 
2 expert testimony was necessary in that regard because fire 
3 cause and origin is not something within the realm of the 
4 common experience of lay jurors. That, frankly, is also a 
5 point that the plaintiffs make in their brief. They say that 
6 I the plaintiff may prove the causal nexus between the events 
7 I sued upon and the injuries suffered by lay testimony alone in 
8 J those cases in which general experience and common sense will 
9 I enable a layman to determine with reasonable probability the 
10 I causal relationship between the event and the condition. 
11 I would submit, Your Honor, that fire cause and 
12 I origin is not one of those subject matters that is within the 
13 J general experience and common sense of a layman to determine 
14 because Dr. Hoffman testified that he was unable to 
15 differentiate between the water heater on the left or the water 
16 I heater on the right as to the cause of the fire. 
17 I The plaintiffs are asking you to, not withstanding 
18 I that testimony, say, well, even though the expert couldn't 
19 determine it, there are some facts that the jury could hang 
20 their hat on, so let's submit it to the jury. And I think that 
21 that is a subject matter that you are charged to grant a 
22 directed verdict if you make the determination that this is 
23 indeed not one of those subject matters that is within general 
24 experience and common sense. 
25 THE COURT: What do you call the case again? 
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1 MR. SUTTON: The name of the case is Walker versus 
2 Parish Chemical, and the cite is 914, P2d, 1157. 
3 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. SUTTON: April 4, 1996. 
5 MR. LUND: The only other subject probably to talk 
6 J about then is the question of burden shifting in Summers versus 
7 I Tice, and I think we can largely stand on our memo there that 
8 J the plaintiffs have not supplied a Utah case that has, as we 
9 J stated, adopts or applies Summers versus Tice. 
10 J In the area of aggravation of preexisting conditions, 
11 we have a couple cases, Tingey versus Christensen and the 
12 I Robinson case that hold that the burden shifts on establishing 
13 I the harm or the cause of the harm, and that's 433(a) of the 
14 I restatement. There's nothing that adopts 433(b). 
15 I The only case that theyfve now cited in addition that 
16 I itfs not a Utah case is the Hood case about the two dogs and 
17 I the dog bite. And I guess the core — even thought that it was 
18 I appropriate that the Utah case, the Utah appellate court would 
19 I adopt Summers versus Tice. The remaining problem is, it isn't 
20 a set of facts that warrant the burden being shifted. And the 
21 reason for that is that where there's two dogs and nobody else 
22 (that's at fault and you've got to sort through it, that's like 
23 two hunters, both have shot a gun. Here it's as though we've 
24 got two dogs and a guy that let the dogs out and another one 
25 that aggravated the dogs, because we have not only these two 
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1 water heaters but we have the proximate cause analysis that 
2 incorporates Mr. Nelson's conduct, Mr. Gomez's conduct, the 
3 glue company's conduct. Ultimately under the Rutherford case 
4 in California the rationale for Summers versus Tice is that you 
5 I have two people and the complete and entire responsibility for 
6 the injury or the accident is with both of them, with one or 
7 J the other and not with people outside of that universe. And 
8 J that's just simply not the facts we have here. 
9 1 We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. 0'Callahan? 
11 MR. O1CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I think that what the 
12 J Court needs to focus on are the theories as to defect that we 
13 have against these defendants. And when I say "these 
14 J defendants," I use the term advisably. We are here, we have a 
15 I jury empaneled, they've heard evidence and evidence that would 
16 J allow them to make a determination as to which of these 
17 defendants' water heaters was responsible on the basis of the 
18 I fact that there is testimony that the one on — flames were 
19 seen coming from the left door, flames were seen coming from 
20 the right door. 
21 But I think beyond that, you know, the court has to 
22 look through this and see here we have a situation in which the 
23 defendants here were not separate defendants until the first 
24 day of trial. Throughout the course of this case, they're 
25 represented by the same lawyers, they retain the same experts, 
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there has been testimony that they have held themselves out to 
be the same entity. The products that are involved are the 
identical products with the same design, the same components, 
the same materials and the same defect. 
I think that in this case if the court looks at what 
the theory of defect is and the fact that in terms of the 
parties that are before the court at the present time, the 
theory against them is discrete. It's the same defect. 
Dr. Hoffman in his testimony said that he laid this 
problem at the feet of these defendants because if the flame 
were not — the flames from these pilot lights were not 
two inches from the ground that you never would have had 
ignition of this vapor, notwithstanding — 
THE COURT: He never went that far, did he? 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: He never used the word "never"? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: More likely than not, which is — 
THE COURT: He said that it reduces the causes but it 
doesnft eliminate them. Didn't he say that? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I think — 
THE COURT: So your argument that he said never had 
it — 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I believe he said that 
it was more likely than not at a minimum. 
THE COURT: He says they caused, I'm not arguing that 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 J you seem to say that he said, but for that, nothing like this 
2 J would have ever happened. If you raise it all is well. And he 
3 didn't ever say that. And maybe I just misunderstand what 
4 you1re saying. 
5 MR. O'CALLAHAN: Well, I think the point is that here 
6 I we have the same product with the same defect, they happen to 
7 I be next to each other. And these products are the cause of 
8 ignition. And that's a very discrete theory. There is nobody 
9 else that was ever involved in this case either as a party or 
10 J as a nonparty in whom there was an allegation that they were 
11 responsible for igniting this fire. So I think that if we look 
12 I and use the example in our papers of a — in Summers versus 
13 I Tice, a landowner who let the hunters come on their land in 
14 violation of the statute and then had settled out, that is a 
15 J different type of negligence than that which is alleged against 
16 the hunters in Summers versus Tice. And that makes it a very 
17 different situation in terms of the concerns that have been 
18 expressed historically. 
19 Again, the jury is going to be in a position where 
20 they will apportion fault amongst all the parties. That is 
21 different from the situation that existed in Summers versus 
22 Tice because at that time the law didn't permit that, not in 
23 California or anywhere else, as I understand it. So here the 
24 jury is going to be in a position to apportion fault 
25 appropriately. 
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1 And the other thing is that, you know, the defendants 
2 have not yet begun to put on their case. There is more 
3 evidence that is going to be before the jury. The Court's in a 
4 position where it can permit this matter to go to the jury and 
5 in the event that it finds after the jury returns a verdict 
6 that it is troubled by the result then it can always do 
7 something about it at that point. But it seems terribly unfair 
8 J when we do have evidence from which a jury could reasonably 
9 conclude that the fire was ignited by the water heater on the 
10 left and there's also evidence from which it could infer that 
11 it was ignited by the water heater on the right, that to throw 
12 us out of court completely would be massively unfair. 
13 By the same token, if the Court doesn't think that 
14 that is an appropriate — doesn't feel comfortable with that, 
15 I to deny us a Summers versus Tice instruction given the unique 
16 factual circumstances of this case would do an injustice. 
17 Because I think what the courts have focused on is the fact 
18 I that it is unfair to prevent a plaintiff from being fully 
19 compensated for its injuries because of a failure of proof 
20 when, as the court said in its footnote in the King versus 
21 Searle case, that it was clear in Tice that both defendants 
22 acted negligently in precisely the same manner and that one of 
23 the two defendants had to have been responsible for the 
24 plaintiff's injury. 
25 So what we have here is that one of the two — both 
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defendants are negligent, one of them was responsible for 
igniting the fire. And on that basis, it would be appropriate 
to shift the burden. And this is not a surprise to them, 
they've been aware of the evidence in the case and the 
testimony of the experts for quite some time. 
I think that certainly in the King versus Searle case 
and in the other cases that the court has had indicate that 
Summers versus Tice is a theory which has been accepted by the 
Utah courts, although not necessarily — apparently from the 
cases that we've read, it has never been requested to be 
applied in a particular case, at least at the trial level. At 
the trial level. 
THE COURT: What do you mean by the phrase it has 
been accepted but never applied? I'm not understanding. 
MR. OfCALLAHAN: All right. Your Honor, as I went 
through, for example, in the Clark case, there is a discussion 
in there about what evidence there was as to the cause of the 
particular plaintiff's injuries. And in its footnotes the 
court said in the Clark case that no one had asked for the 
application of the Summers versus Tice theory; therefore, we're 
not going to address that issue. It seems to me that the court 
was voluntarily raising that issue on its own, which would 
indicate that they were not foreclosing the use of that theory 
in Utah. 
By the same token, in the King versus Searle case in 
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1 footnote 3, there again is a discussion of Summers versus Tice 
2 which indicates that it would not be applicable under the 
3 circumstances presented in the facts of that case. 
4 One of the things that I think in all the cases that 
5 discuss Summers versus Tice is they say that it is factually 
6 specific to a particular set of facts that are presented. And 
7 in the case that was — the Webber case, there was no request 
8 I that Summers versus Tice be applied, at least as I read the 
9 lease, until it got to the appellate court level. I don't think 
10 J that there was any request at the trial court level that the 
11 theory be applied. And again, that was a case in which 
12 J different defendants against whom the same theory was being 
13 alleged had been let out of the case or it had judgments 
14 entered as to them and were not before the court on appeal. 
15 J So nowhere in any of the opinions is there an 
16 J indication that the Utah courts would not approve of Summers 
17 I versus Tice under a particular factually specific set of 
18 J circumstances such as what we have here. Rather, the 
19 discussions have centered around the fact that it wasn't raised 
20 at the trial court level during trial or during the course of a 
21 J motion for summary judgment. And I think in this case we have 
22 a different set of circumstances because the issue has been 
23 brought before the court at this level and it seems appropriate 
24 under the circumstances to apply it, particularly given the 
25 fact that there is a public policy interest, first of all, in 
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trial on the merits of the case and, secondly, on the fact that 
a plaintiff who is entitled to compensation be fully 
compensated. 
And you know, Ifm not sure if the Court has already 
reached a determination that this was a defective product and 
now it's concerned about, you know, the causation issue. This 
is the — the jury has to overcome those hurdles before it gets 
to the issue of causation. I!m sure the defendants are going 
to have some testimony on that particular point themselves. So 
I don't think therefs any reason that the Court should not 
permit the case to go forward from this point, given the 
standard that exists with respect to motions for directed 
verdict and given the state of the evidence. 
Obviously with respect to the testimony of Mr. Gomez, 
thatfs testimony that we expect will be proffered during his 
case, but we understand from his prior deposition testimony and 
by way of an offer of proof, we can certainly indicate that. 
So I think the court looks at what is the 
applicability of Summers versus Tice to the issue of ignition 
here. I think that we are clearly within the bounds of the 
theory of Summers versus Tice and I think that that has been 
accepted. And I also think that, you know, itfs — the only 
reason that we're at this juncture is that just before trial 
there was a decision by the defendants to kind of split their 
previously unified defense. That was a decision that they made 
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1 and that was a decision which I believe they thought would 
2 I procedurally be to their advantage and they've pursued it. But 
3 there are consequences that have to result or should result 
4 I from their selecting that particular defense. If they want to 
5 I present themselves as two different defendants at time of 
6 trial, then they have to accept the consequences which that 
7 I entails, and one of the consequences is the imposition of the 
8 I Summers versus Tice burden shifted. And what I see here are 
9 I defendants who want all the benefits but none of the 
10 obligations that are imposed under the law. And I think that 
11 it would be terribly unfair to allow them to have the shell and 
12 pea game that they've played thus far to benefit them in a way 
13 that would so unfairly hurt the plaintiff. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. It seems to me that Summers 
15 I versus Tice doesn't belong in this case at all. The theory 
16 J that somehow there's an ignition portion of a case and maybe 
17 a — I don't know, a fuel portion of the case and a negligence 
18 I by another party portion of the case, is an unusual approach to 
19 I a case. There are several little distinct portions and these 
20 defendants have to defend on a portion of the case. If you 
21 look at the whole case, it's clear that there are others to 
22 whom the burden of fault might be apportioned; that being true, 
23 J Summers versus Tice does not apply. Because in Summers versus 
24 Tice there are only a couple of folks who it ever could have 
25 been and we can't postulate as Mr. O'Callahan has about, well, 
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1 what if somebody had been negligent about letting them on the 
2 land or maybe a negligent manufacturer of a bullet-proof vest. 
3 I mean you could postulate a lot of nice scenarios; Summers 
4 versus Tice dealt with some specific case. Itfs clear to me it 
5 J doesn't apply. 
6 I'm making a ruling right now. I'm sorry, I didn't 
7 I notice you'd stood. Please don't let me interrupt you, go 
8 J ahead, Mr. Zager. 
9 MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Your Honor. I think it's 
10 I important for the Court to also realize one other question of 
11 I fact that the jury would be in a position to determine on the 
12 I factual issue that we expect would go to the jury. And that is 
13 J I think that there is sufficient facts for the jury to find 
14 I that both water heaters were at fault in causing the ignition 
15 I because Dr. Hoffman testified that the pilot light by virtue of 
16 combustion would tend to draw flammable vapors toward the pilot 
17 I light. And we have to remember now that we have two water 
18 J heaters acting in conjunction, which would enhance the flow of 
19 vapors to both water heaters, and the jury could find that the 
20 dual combination of both water heaters acting in conjunction 
21 aided the ignition of the fire by drawing the flammable vapors 
22 twice the draw that it would have had had there just been the 
23 one water heater. 
24 THE COURT: It's a nice — I'm going to take a 
25 minute, read Walker versus Parish Chemical. You folks haven't 
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addressed that, you folks being the plaintiffs, and I guess I 
am struck by the idea that, as I said yesterday, how does a 
jury decide a question that a expert knowing what the jury 
knows won't decide. And I think the defendants have said there 
may be an issue there. So I want to look at that case for a 
few seconds and then Ifm going to be back. And if we're 
continuing on, we'll start; if we're not, we'll go from there. 
But now that is the only question for me. Summers versus Tice 
doesn't apply. I give you the fact that there is an issue 
about where this fire started, you know. I guess if an expert 
can be overlooked on this kind of matter and plaintiffs will go 
forward, but I want to see what Walker and Parish have to say 
about that. 
MR. SUTTON: Your Honor, here's a copy, if you'd like 
me to hand it up. 
THE COURT: No, I've got — 
(A recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: I've had a chance to look at Walker 
versus Parish Chemical, that seems to me to go to a little 
different question; was there negligence. And in this case, 
clearly, the plaintiff has asserted by their evidence that 
there was negligence. I think that problem's been answered. I 
don't know that we have any — certainly Walker I don't think 
stands for the proposition that you have to have an expert tell 
us the causal connection, which is what the plaintiff, at least 
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in my view has at least asserted some evidence left door, right 
door, left water heater, right water heater, somebodyfs going 
to I guess make a reasonable inference. So I'm going to deny 
the motion for directed verdict, and as I said before, there 
will be no Summers versus Tice instruction because it's not 
applicable. We'll get Mick to bring in the jury, unless 
there's something else right now. 
MR. LUND: I don't know how you want to deal with it, 
we did submit that other memo on punitives. 
THE COURT: Right. And one day that might be what 
we'll talk about; not today, though. Thank you. 
MR. LUND: All right. Understood. 
THE COURT: But, yeah, I won't forget that. Anyone 
else? 
MR. O'CALLAHAN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I guess it's you, Mr. Atkin. 
MR. ATKIN: That's correct, Your Honor. 
(The jury entered the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Thank you. The jury has returned. 
Plaintiff has rested their case and Mr. Atkin is going to 
present some evidence for the third party. Right? 
(End of requested portion of transcript.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, TEENA GREEN, RPR, CSR, do certify that I am a 
nationally certified reporter and a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter in and for the State of Utah. 
That at the time and place of the proceedings in the 
foregoing matter, I appeared as the official court reporter in 
the Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable MICHAEL 
BURTON, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
proceedings had therein. That thereafter, my said shorthand 
notes of the Trial Proceedings were transcribed by computer 
into the foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, 
true and correct transcript of the same. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
this, the 6th day of November 2001. 
<
=^pL ^ r^t^ra AL 4>Z&^<? Teena Green , RPR/' CSR 
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MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, California 92691 
Telephone: (949)206 0550 
JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659) 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTTNEAU 
10 Exchange Place. Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing 
and American Water Heater Co. 
"LED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy CteA 
fN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING. INC., etc.. et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 980905332 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
This matter came on regularly for jury trial before the Honorable Michael K. Burton on 
October 29. 2001. Plaintiff was represented through trial by James G. OTallahan of Girardi 
Keese and Mitchel Zager. Defendant American Appliance Manufacturing was represented 
through trial by Michael S. Sutton of Sutton & Murphy and defendant American Water Heater 
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Company was represented through trial by John R. Lund of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
Third-party defendant Rudy Gomez was represented at trial by Gary E. Atkin of Atkin & 
Associates. The trial continued through October 30 and 31, 2001 as well as November 1. 5, 6 
and 7, 2001, and the matter was submitted to the jury on November 7, 2001. 
On November 7, 2001, the jury returned the Special Verdict with the following answer to 
Question No. 1: Was the 1991 American Appliance water heater in a defective condition as 
defined in the instructions? Answer: Yes No X . The jury also supplied the following 
answer to Question No. 3: Was the 1994 American Water Heater Company water heater in a 
defective condition as defined in these instructions? Answer: Yes No X . No other 
questions on the Special Verdict were answered. The Special Verdict was signed by foreperson 
John Hancock and dated November 7, 2001. 
Based on these findings by the jury and good cause appearing therefore, judgment is -
hereby entered in favor of defendant American Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. and in favor of 
American Water Heater Company and against plaintiff as to all claims asserted. Costs are 
awarded in favor defendants and against plaintiff in the amount of $<AS ^ ^ f t o be filled in by 
the Clerk of the Court in accordance with Rule 54(e)). 
DATED this ^ 7 dav of November. 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
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DATE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i HEREBY CERTIFY that on the of November. 2001.1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing [proposed] Judgment to be sent, by mail and facsimile, to: 
Mitchel A. Zager, Esq. 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City. UT 84118 
and 
5580 La Jolla Blvd. #83 
LaJolla,CA 92037 
facsimile no. (858) 456-9471 
Thomas V. Girardi. Esq. 
James G. O'Callahan, Esq. 
1126 Wilshire Blvd. 
Los Angeles. CA 90017 
facsimile no. (213) 481-1554 
Gary E. Atkin, Esq. 
311 S State #380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
facsimile no. 521-3731 
and to be hand delivered to: 
Mitchel A. Zager. Esq. 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City. UT 84118 
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Q Did you have dinner last night 
with anyone? 
A No. 
Q Have you had any other meetings 
with perBona with regard to this case other than the 
five or six-hour meeting you had yesterday with Mr. 
Murphy and Mr. Ellis? 
A No, I have not. 
Q Were you aware that a subpoena 
was going to be served upon you before the first 
subpoena came to you in this case? 
A Before the first? 
Q Yes, sir; that is did someone 
call you and tell you that you would be receiving a 
subpoena to give a deposition in this case? 
A I believe so. 
Q And who was that that called you 
and alerted you to the fact that you were going to be 
receiving a subpoena to give testimony in this case? 
A Ed Hackney. 
Q Did you at any time try to ellude 
or evade service of process in this case? 
A Absolutely not. 
Q Did Mr. Hackney at any time 
suggest to you that you try to evade service of 
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please sit for a deposition?11 Did anyone ask you to 
do that? 
A I don't know if it was for this 
case. Mr. Hackney told me back in the middle of the 
year, said that I was wanted for a deposition. And I 
don't know what the name of the case was. 
Q Let me ask you this, sir. Is it 
your practice to cooperate with your former employer 
when they ask you to give a deposition, that you will 
sit for a deposition? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you ever told your former 
employer that you refuse to sit for a deposition? 
A If I am not available at that 
time. If the time doesn't work out. 
Q Other than scheduling, have you 
ever told them that, "No, I don't feel like giving a 
deposition anymore in these cases." 
A No. 
Q Did you ever consider yourself 
being "difficult" in agreeing to sit for a deposition 
before getting a notice and before getting a 
subpoena? 
A Not that I know of. 
Q Now, it is fair to say that you, 
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MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading. 
THE WITNESS: Mathematically, 
yes. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q So if the manufacturers, the 
water heater manufacturers had decided they did not 
want a change to get through this committee, they, by 
voting together, could block any change; is that 
right? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading. 
THE WITNESS: That is 
conceivable. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q Now, it was your company's 
opinion that in 1990 the best way to address the 
hazard of the ignition of flammable vapors by these 
floor-mounted, gas-fired water heaters was to place 
this label on the water heater; is that right? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q What was the best your company 
could do to address the flammable vapors hazard in 
1990 with regard to design of your water heater? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection 
argumentative as to best. 
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A Yes. 
Q Now, your company made a 
conscious decision not to enclose stands with its 
water heaters; isn't that right. 
MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q Did your company make a conscious 
decision not to enclose stands with the standard 
gas-fired water heater? 
A Yes. 
Q And that conscious decision was 
made certainly before 1990, wasn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q And that conscious decision was 
in part made on the basis of the added cost of the 
stand, isn't that right? 
A That was one of the reasons. 
Q And your company knew -- let's 
talk about in 1990 that if the water heaters had been 
installed on stands that would reduce the likelihood 
that somebody gets burned, right? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading; 
mischaracterizes the prior testimony. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q You can answer. 
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1 A It could reduce some of the 
2 instances, yes. 
3 Q And you all made a conscious 
4 decision not to included that safety device with your 
5 products, right? 
6 MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading. 
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
8 BY MR. DOWNING: 
9 Q And when you made that conscious 
10 decision, did you all know that persons would 
11 continue to be burned as a result of ignition of 
12 flammable vapors as long as this standard model 
13 design of water heater was being sold? 
14 A Yes. 
15 MR. MURPHY: Could you read that 
16 last one back, please, ma1am? 
17 (The court reporter read back the previous 
18 question.) 
19 BY MR. DOWNING: 
20 Q And had you all made that 
21 decision to include the stand with your product, the 
22 safety device, then that would have effected the 
23 profits of your company; would it not? 
24 MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading? 
25 THE WITNESS: It would have 
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effected the sale of the product, yes. 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q And ultimately effected the 
profits of your company, isn't that right? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection, leading. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. DOWNING: Let's take a break 
for lunch. 
(A lunch recess was taken.) 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q Mr. Moore, would you describe for 
the jury the direct vent designed water heater? 
A A direct vent water heater pulls 
the combustion air from outside the structure and 
also exhausts the combustion products to the outside. 
Q And does a direct vent water 
heater, as designed, take air for combustion from the 
room in which it sits? 
A No. 
Q Is that direct vent design one 
that was around in the 1970s? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection as to 
"around". 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q Was that direct vent design in 
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claims per year were you averaging where someone 
claimed that they were involved in a flammable vapor 
fire with one of your company's water heaters? 
A I did not keep those records, so 
I wouldn't have any numbers. 
Q I thought you told us before that 
you were aware of the hazards of a flammable vapor 
fire in this type of water heater as far back as the 
1950s. 
A Yes. 
Q And in the 1970s these reports, I 
believe, the NEISS report came out, the government 
report, setting forth that there were some hazards 
with flammable vapors and water heaters; is that 
right? 
A Calspan report, hazards 
associated with water heaters. 
Q And were you aware in the 1970s 
of actual instances of people being involved in fires 
with floor-mounted, gas-fired water heaters? 
A Our company? 
Q Yes. 
A I believe it was the 80s before I 
knew of any. 
Q And from the time that you became 
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aware in the 1980s, would that have been the early 
80s? 
A Yes. 
Q And from the time that you became 
aware of actual instances involving gas-fired, 
floor-mounted water heaters up until the production 
of this particular unit involved in this case in 
1990, did your company produce any water heaters 
other those that drew air from the bottom of the 
unit? 
A We made some other products, yes. 
Q I am talking about water heaters 
that drew air from other areas other than the bottom 
of the unit? 
A Yes. 
Q So your company had the 
technology, and, in fact, was actually making water 
heaters that drew air from other regions or other 
sources? 
A Direct vent water heaters, yes. 
Q You replaced or came up with new 
labeling for your water heater in what year? 
A 1988. 
Q And was that placed on the water 
heaters in '88? 
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AT LOUDON, TENNESSEE 
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1 82nd Street, Helendale (phonetic). 
2 Q. Did you ever work with Mor-Flo 
3 J Industries, sir? 
A. Yes# I did. 
5 1 Q. When did you work with Mor-Flo 
6 Industries? 
7 A. I started in 1959. The company was 
8 called American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation at 
9 that time. 
10 Q. Where was that, sir? 
11 A. Santa Monica, California. 
12 Q. And you started in what year? 
13 A. 1959. 
14 Q. And when did you leave Mor-Flo 
15 Industries? 
16 A. In 1996. 
17 Q. And Mor-Flo, at that time in '96, was 
18 known by another name? 
19 A. American Water Heater Company. 
20 Q. And when you left American Water 
21 Heater, or Mor-Flo, in '96, what was your position? 
22 A. Vice-president of engineering. 
23 Q. And how long were you vice-president 
24 I of engineering? What was the period of time that you 
25 held that position with Mor-Flo Industries? 
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So from 1981 to '96 you were 
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esponsible I iesign he residential gas-fired 
/aterheater.; ill. I I m I m i g l i l ,' 
A. Yes 
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design 'of this Mor-Flo product that we have here in 
^urtroom marked Exhibit 1? 
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ae safety 
twenty years? 
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1 A, Yes, sir. 
2 1 Q. Was it your responsibility to approve 
3 any design changes in this product that dealt with safety 
4 for that twenty-year period? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 I Q. In the past, sir, have you been 
7 designated in litigation such as this to testify on 
8 behalf of your corporation, Mor-Flo? 
9 MR. MURPHY: Objection, Your Honor. 
10 Relevance. 
11 MR. DOWNING: Goes to bias. 
12 THE COURT: Overruled. 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. On how many occasions were you the 
15 person that was the corporate representative sitting in 
16 trials similar to this on behalf of your company? 
17 MR. MURPHY: Objection, Your Honor. 
18 I'd like a side bar. 
19 THE COURT: All right, come up. 
20 (WHEREUPON, a bench conference 
21 was had out of hearing.) 
22 MR. DOWNING CONTINUES: 
23 I Q. Have you been called upon in the past 
24 to testify on behalf of your corporation? 
25 A. Yes . 
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Is that alsc an instance where it was 
reported uiuptuu * lamina gasoline 
vapors, were ignited by a waterheatei of the same design 
as this one? 
Yes. 
Are you familiar with a matter 
company? 
Yes. 
ft- Il 
reported «-^  your company that gasoline vapors were 
ignited by a waterheater with the design ]ust s 
Yes. 
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Jedediah Franklin? 
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A. Yes. 
2 I Q. And how much time did you spend 
3 preparing for your testimony with the lawyers from the 
4 waterheater company? 
5 A. We met for a couple of hours. 
6 1 Q. Couple of hours? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. In fact, aren't you represented by the 
9 lawyers for the waterheater company personally? 
10 A. That's standard practice whenever I go 
11 for depositions or trial. The answer is yes. 
12 Q. So whose standard practice is that, is 
13 that yours or the waterheater company? 
14 A. Mine. 
15 Q. So, when you go to give testimony 
16 where you're sworn to tell the truth in something like 
17 this, or depositions involving these things, you retain 
18 your company's lawyer; right? 
19 A. Yes. In the past when I was working 
20 for the company I was represented by counsel, so I 
21 figured I should have counsel if I'm no longer with the 
22 company. 
23 Q. And you're also represented by the 
24 company's inhouse lawyer, aren't you? 
25 A. Yes, I am. 
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A. I don't know if the doors are there, I 
haven't looked at the heater today. 
Q. See the doors? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The doors are there? 
A. The doors are there. 
Q. So that's the way it was when it left 
the factory except pristine clean; right? 
A. Yes. Plus the draft hood was packed 
with the waterheater in the carton. 
Q. The what? 
A. The draft hood. 
Q. This thing that goes here. (Indicating 
top of waterheater.) 
A. Yes. 
Q* Okay. Now, you're the person in 
charge of safety, you're the person in charge of design, 
let's talk about your educational background. Tell the 
Jury which college of engineering you went to. 
A. I do not have a formal degree in 
engineering. I have thirty-seven years in the 
waterheater industry; I worked for four years, four or 
five years in the manufacturing, I learned all the 
processes for manufacturing the product. I worked from 
1963 to '74 I worked in the technical service group. I 
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1 was the first full-time service person American and 
2 Mor-Flo had. I trained all the additional service 
3 technicians we brought on board. 
4 In 1974 I went into the engineering 
5 department as a product designer. I worked there for two 
6 years and then I became chief engineer. And from that I 
7 went to vice-president in 1981, held that title until I 
8 left the company. And during that time I've got twenty 
9 patents that I was applied and granted during that period 
10 of time. 
11 I Q. My question was, which college of 
12 engineering did you go to? 
13 A. I told you I didn't have a formal 
14 degree. 
15 Q. Thank you. Did anyone suggest when 
16 that was question asked to go on with your history? 
17 A. I figured I should put it in there 
18 since you're applying I don't have a formal degree. 
19 Q. Now, did you ever take any courses in 
20 thermal dynamics? 
21 A. No, I did not. 
22 Q. Now, let's talk about the standard 
23 gas-fired waterheater. This is the most predominant 
24 gas-fired waterheater we see in the country, isn't it? 
25 A. Yes. 
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Q. And would you tell the Jury where the 
air for combustion comes from on this, please? 
A. The air is drawn in from about two 
inches off the floor through the bottom of the product. 
Q. Down here? 
A. Yes. There's openings in the bottom 
panel of the waterheater, and there's also an opening in 
the front of the heater where the doors are. 
Q. Now, don't essentially all the other 
manufacturers have a waterheater just like this one that 
takes its air for combustion from this low level? 
A. There are similar designs, yes. 
Q. Are they similar at least with 
respective to the location where they take their air for 
combustion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mow, tell the Jury, please, where the 
air for combustion was taken in the standard model 
gas-fired waterheater in the 1950's. 
A* Dm, 1950fs? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. Well, I started in 1959. The 
waterheater had probably a four-inch leg on it at that 
time, or maybe taller. 
Q. Where did the air get sucked in the 
ppnwu c WTTjrzn COURT REPORTING. INC. 
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waterheater from? 
2 I A. Again, at the bottom of the heater. 
3 Q. So it's the same basic design as where 
4 it sucks its air for the last forty years; would you 
5 agree with that? 
6 A. Yes, 
7 Q. Would you agree also that there's no 
8 real design requirement that you take the air for 
9 combustion for this waterheater from the floor; is that 
10 right? 
11 A. No, 
12 Q. That's not right? 
13 A. I'm agreeing with you. 
14 Q. You agree with me that there's no 
15 design reason why you had to take your air for combustion 
16 from the floor to operate this heater; correct? 
17 A. Yes. It's the most economical 
18 designed. 
19 Q. It's the most economical. But you 
20 would agree with me that you could take that air from a 
21 higher level and channel it into that combustion chamber, 
22 can't you? 
23 A. We do on other models. 
24 Q. On other models you do that, you said; 
25 r ight? 
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A. Yes, 
Q. This waterheater, when it leaves your 
factory do you expect that it's going to get constant 
attention by the owner? 
A, Constant attention? I don't 
understand what you mean by — 
Q. Is this a passive appliance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So, it's basically you hope that once 
it's installed the customer can basically rest assured 
they'll get hot water; right? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection to leading. 
MR. DOWNING: Bias. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you would expect they would forget 
about your heater once it's installed, wouldn't you? 
A. Unless it gives them a problem, yes. 
Q. Now, before you even got in the 
waterheater industry you understood that flammable vapors 
were heavier than air, didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And you also understood that this 
waterheater sucked air from floor level, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
noniArKT r. WTKCm miTRT REPOPTTTJfi TMC 
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1 I Q. And once you entered the waterheater 
2 industry you learned even more about flammable vapors and 
3 J waterheaters, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
5 I Q. And you knew when you entered the 
6 waterheater industry that this model waterheater could 
7 ignite floor-exposed flammable vapors; true? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And then, in the 1970' s you started 
10 learning about specific instances of these fires, didn't 
11 you? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Tell the Jury how you first learned 
14 about specific instances where people were burned as a 
15 result of the ignition of flammable vapors from this 
16 model waterheater. 
17 A. In our subcommittee meetings we had 
18 reports from CPSC on fires caused by waterheaters, 
19 ignition of flammable vapors. 
20 Q. Which subcommittee meetings are we 
21 talking about, sir? 
22 A. The Z21 Water Heater Subcommittee. 
23 Q« So you were serving on this committee 
24 that writes the standards, is that it? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 I Q. The standards for the design of this 
2 I product; right? 
A. For the performance and safety 
requirements of waterheaters, yes, 
Q. So the rules that this waterheater has 
to meet are written by a committee on which you served; 
right? 
A. Yes, Ifm one of many. 
Q. You and other representatives of other 
waterheater manufacturers; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you also learn other ways, 
did you learn another means besides these meetings that 
you all had, about persons being injured as a result of 
the ignition of flammable vapors by this standard model 
gas-fired waterheater? 
A. We were informed through our reports, 
our lawsuits that were filed. 
Q. You received information through your 
company of persons that were hurt and claiming it was 
because of the design of your product; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in those reports, you would learn 
about the testimony of other people who professed to have 
expertise in design of waterheaters; right? 
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A. I don't understand. 
Q. Would you have an opportunity in your 
work to read the testimony of other engineers who were 
criticizing your product? 
A. I have seen some, yes. 
Q. Isn't it true that you were advised 
they were criticizing your product because it sucks its 
air from the floor level, and that flammable vapors are 
heavier than air and they're at floor level, too? 
A, Yes. 
Q. And these people were recommending to 
you and your company that you elevate the air intake; 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They were also recommending something 
called direct-vent we'll talk about in a little bit, but 
weren't they recommending something called a direct-vent? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was a way that, instead of 
taking air from the floor they would take the air from 
outside the room into your heater, and the bottom would 
be sealed; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, tell the Jury how many models of 
waterheaters did your company make in 1990? 
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1 A. I don't understand what you mean by 
2 how many models. 
3 J Q. How many different model waterheaters 
did you all make? -
A. Different types? 
Q. Yes, sir. Let me rephrase that, let 
me withdraw that one. 
How many different models of gas 
waterheaters did your company make in 1990? 
A. The standard type, you're talking 
about how many models of that we made? 
Q. How many models of waterheaters; did 
you all have tall, did you have short, did you have 
under-counter, how many different models of waterheaters? 
Did you have 30-gallon, 40-gallon, 50-gallon, how many 
different models of gas-fired waterheaters did you all 
make? 
A. In the standard product line like 
this, there's 20-gallon through 75-gallon capacity, for 
tall models like this. There are short models of which 
are 30- or 40-gallon, I believe. And then we have 
direct-vent waterheaters; two different models of that, a 
40 and a 50. We also have a Polaris product line; 
there's two sizes of that, a 34-gallon and 5-gallon. And 
then there's a commercial line of product which covers 
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about fifteen models of those. 
Q. Would it be fair to say, sir, that you 
all made in 1990 at least thirty different models of 
gas-fired waterheaters? 
A. At least. 
Q. At least thirty different models. 
Now, it was common knowledge in the 1970"s that persons 
were being injured as a result of ignition of flammable 
vapors by gas-fired waterheaters in your industry; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So did you all consider that to be a 
hazard associated with your product? 
A, Yes. 
Q. So, your company was aware of this 
hazard in the 1970's; correct? 
A. Yes, we were. 
Q. And did you also discuss with other 
manufacturers their experiences? 
A. At times, yes. 
Q. Did you get the general impression 
that the other manufacturers with the same model heaters 
were having the same experience as you guys were having? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So this hazard of ignition of 
flammable vapors by this model waterheater was not just 
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peculiar to your company, was it? 
A, No. 
Q. Now, are you familiar with a report in 
1975 put out by a company called Calspan, aren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q» Let me show you a document marked as 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number 15. Are you familiar with 
that document, sir? 
A. I've seen it before, yes. 
Q. You've seen it before? You've 
certainly seen it before 1990, didn't you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
stated in here. 
Q-
A, 
stated in here. 
Yes. 
You read it? 
I've read it before. 
And you agree with it, don't you? 
I don't have any objection to what is 
I'm sorry? 
I don't have any objection to what is 
Q. So, Mr. Moore, on page 48 of that 
document, I take it -- and that was a document that was 
disseminated throughout the waterheater industry, was it 
not? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And it caused a great deal of 
discussion among the waterheater industry, didn't it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. DOWNING: I'd offer Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit Number 15. 
MR. MURPHY: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Introduce into evidence. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 15 
was filed in this cause.) 
Now, on page 48 of that document, it Q. 
says, Mr. Moore, "In terms of frequency and severity of 
injury, the accidental ignition of vapors from flammable 
liquids was the number one hazard associated with the 
mere presence of the appliances considered in this 
study-" Do you see that? 
A. What page? 
Q. Page 48. 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Which paragraph? 
(Indicating.) 
Oh, yeah. 
See it? 
Yes, sir. 
You agree with t 
Yes. 
Q. Where it states in the next paragraph, 
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1 "Adult victims generally realized the liquid they were 
2 working with was flammable, but were totally 
3 unappreciative of the distance the vapors could travel 
4 and ignite. Child victims were usually imitating adult 
5 behavior refueling a piece of equipment, often a toy. 
6 Gasoline by far was the most common liquid. Accident 
7 location coincided with the general location of the 
8 appliances; basement, kitchen, and garage." You agree 
9 with that, don't you? 
10 A. Yes, sir, 
11 I Q. Now, knowing this in 1975, what did 
12 your industry do? 
13 A. In 1975? 
14 Q. Yeah, in response to this. 
15 A. In 1978 the Consumer Product Safety 
16 Commission recommended that we apply a warning to the 
17 product, 
18 Q. Well, before that happened -- let me 
19 show you what's marked as P16 -- before that happened 
20 didn't your industry get together and evaluate this 
21 Calspan study and come up with a response to Calspan? 
22 A. I wasn't a part of the waterheater 
23 subcommittee until 1978. 
24 Q. That's right, but in your work with 
25 the waterheater industry, were you not aware of what was 
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going on at the time? 
A. Yes. 
3 J Q. So you were aware that the industry 
4 got together in 1976 to make a response to what the 
5 Calspan opinions were; right? 
6 I A. Yes. 
Q. And you see what I've marked as P16, 
you're familiar with that document, aren't you? 
A. I've seen it before, yes. 
Q. And you've read it before, haven't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Certainly, you read it before 1990; 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Of course. And that report was 
written by your industry; right? 
A. Came from GAMA, yes. 
Q. Nell, GAMA is the Gas Appliance 
Manufacturers Association; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that is a trade organization for 
waterheater manufacturers; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. As part of that work, they have 
mJOTiTXT r r/tTTcrnnk nrxrmrn nTnT^rvr^mn-*-r .^ ^-»»^i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
lobbyists in Washington, D.C. to lobby the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission on behalf of your industry; 
isn«t that right? 
A, Yes. 
MR. DOWNING: I'd offer P16. 
THE COURT: P16 is Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit. 
MR. MURPHY: No objection, Your Honor 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 16 
was filed in this cause.) 
Q. Page 19 of Exhibit 16, sir, under 
flammable liquid problem, your industry responded, "From 
a review of the NEISS investigation it appears that the 
ignition of vapor from flammable liquids is the major 
hazard associated with the presence of gas appliances. 
Industry recognizes this problem." 
it? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Now, so, in 1976 
That' 
your 
s in P16, isn' 
industry 
recognized the problem of the ignition of flammable 
vapors by the 
right? 
A. 
Q. 
1975 that one 
standard gas-fired waterheater model; 
Yes. 
And before that. your industry knew 
of the locations where these fires were 
t 
in 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING, INC. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^o 
occurring were residential basements; correct? 
A, Yes, sir. 
Q. And the reason why you all knew that 
about basements is because you all knew, as a company, 
that basements are one location where people have 
gasoline; is that right? 
A. It's one of the locations that can be 
found. 
Q. And also there's other flammables that 
can be found in basements, and you all knew that; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Other flammables that give off -- for 
instance, paint, turpentine -- that give off these 
flammable vapors that act just like gasoline; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you knew, in 1976 to 1977, that the 
hazard with this product (Indicating waterheater.) was 
with the gasoline vapors or flammable vapors that would 
travel on the floor; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, cam you tell the Jury what the 
hierarchy of engineering is? 
A. First, you try to design out the 
hazard. If you can't design out the hazard you try to 
guard against it. And if you cannot guard against it, 
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1 then you warn against the hazard. 
2 J Q. Is what I have in the chart correct as 
the way you understand the hierarchy of engineering as a 
designer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you tell the Jury what efforts 
your company made -- let's just pick from 1976 when your 
industry recognized the problem, to 1980 — what efforts 
did your company make to try to design out the hazard of 
the ignition of flammable vapors by this standard 
waterheater? 
A. We knew of no technology that could 
prevent the ignition of flammable vapors, and we also 
knew no way to guard against it, so we warned against the 
hazard. 
Q. Are there any drawings, writings, 
paper, any physical evidence that shows your company's 
attempts to either design out the hazard on the drawing 
board or design a guard against the hazard, from 1976 to 
1980? 
A. I don't know that there is any 
drawings. 
Q. So the answer to my question is, you 
don't know of any paper? 
A. That's correct. 
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list. 
Q. When asked in your deposition about 
anything your company did for 1990 you told us you didn't 
know of anything; isn't that right? 
A. Again, I tried to -- when I left the 
company I tried to forget about this because I didn't 
expect to have to come back and testify. 
Q. Your deposition was just a couple of 
month ago. 
A, Yes, it was. 
Q. Now, you're telling the Jury that you 
didn't know of amy way to design or guard against this 
hazard we're talking about; right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And we just got to trust you that you 
all kept thinking about this, but there's no paper to 
show that; right? 
A. I didn't hear you. 
Q. We got to trust you that you all did 
the work but we don't have any paper? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, you knew in the '70's that 
elevation of the air intake would reduce the chamce of 
these fires, didn't you? 
A. Reduce but not prevent. 
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Q. Reduce but not prevent? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You mean reduce but not eliminate? 
A. Eliminate, yes. 
Q. But it will prevent some of these 
fires, won't it? Elevation? 
A. If there's no interaction with an 
individual stirring up the vapors, it probably would 
prevent it. 
Q. Were you one of the people responsible 
for this label on this waterheater? 
A. Yes. I believe it has two warning 
labels on it. 
Q. Where it says in here that elevation, 
quote, "this will reduce but not eliminate the risk of 
vapors being ignited." This WILL reduce but not 
eliminate, you agree with that? 
A. Yes, sir. Under certain instances it 
will. 
Q. So it will reduce the likelihood of 
ignition, true? 
A. In certain instances, yes. 
Q. Does it say in there in certain 
instances? 
No. 
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1 I Q. Now, in fact, you've gone to meetings 
2 with lawyers who represent your company to discuss how to 
3 testify in these matters, haven't you? 
4 I A. I don't understand what --
Q. You've gone to product liability 
seminars on behalf of your company; right? 
A. Yes, I've been to a couple. 
Q. And at those seminars, lawyers give 
speeches and talks, who represent your company and other 
companies; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at those meetings, in fact, don't 
they recommend that when you're testifying like this in 
front of a jury you say just that; that elevation will 
reduce but it won't eliminate? 
A. That's always been my thought. 
Q. Isn't it true they recommend that's 
the response you give? 
A. Yes, but that's not their words, 
that's my words. 
Q. Isn't it true, sir, that elevation, in 
fact, will act as a guard against the hazard of ignition 
of flammable vapors? 
A. It doesf but elevating waterheaters 
can cause other problems, other hazards. 
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Q. First thing, my question is, elevation 
is a guard against a hazard; isn't that right? 
A. Yes, but if you guard against it you 
don't want to introduce any other additional hazards. So 
a stand is one way to guard against it but it will, in 
certain installations, cause other hazards. 
Q. But you took that into consideration 
when you all recommended that they elevate it; didn't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So, when you all balanced the pros and 
cons of recommending elevation to prevent this hazard, 
you came down on it's better to elevate; right? 
A. In certain instances, yes. 
Q. Well, it's better to elevate it in a 
basement, garage, storage area, utility room; right? 
A. Yes, and certain building codes 
require elevation in garages. 
Q. And you all specifically identified 
those locations because you all knew that's a place where 
it's a high likelihood to find flammable vapors; right? 
A. Possibly, yes. 
Q. But rather than incorporate this 
elevation feature into your product to make them safe 
everywhere, you all just gave instructions for somebody 
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else to do it; right? 
A. Your statement about everywhere is not 
correct- We don't say it will prevent it in every 
location. 
Q. Well, you've seen this type of fire 
where the waterheater is in the bathroom, haven't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or hall closets? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Storage rooms? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So there's nothing magical about the 
room, is it? 
A* In none of those that you mentioned, 
elevation probably would not have done any good. 
Q. Isn't it true, sir, that there are 
other people that recommend elevation, have recommended 
elevation for years, to prevent these types of fires? 
A. Who are you talking about? 
Q. Let's talk about municipalities. Are 
there municipalities, code authorities that recommended 
elevation since the '60's and '70's to prevent these 
types of fires? 
A* Elevation in garages, yes. 
Q. And the purpose of the elevation was 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING. INC. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to prevent these types of fires; right? 
A. It was to prevent that type, and also 
to protect the water waterheater from being damaged by 
vehicles in garages. 
Q. And you're familiar with those 
municipality requirements in the v60's and '70's, weren't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you familiar with something called 
the National Fuel Gas Code handbook? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's a handbook that you used in 
your work, isn't it? 
A. Yes, we make reference to it. 
Q. Let me show you a book, you recognize 
this as the National Fuel Gas Code handbook? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me direct your attention to page 
97. You relied on this book in '88 to do your work, 
didn't you? 
A. Yes. We included the pictorial here 
in our manuals. 
Q. This picture, you all took it and 
printed it in your manual; right? 
A. Yes. We got permission from National 
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Fuel Gas Codes to use it in our manuals. 
Q. And in that book that you all relied 
upon to take a picture, it said in there in the 
justification, there they talk about recommending the 
elevation 18 inches above the floor. And they say in 
there, "Available evidence indicates that elevating 
burner-ignition devices 18 inches or more above the floor 
locates them high enough so the vapors will not be 
ignited." That's what it says in this textbook, doesn't 
it? 
A. Yes. 
Q* You agree with that? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you write to the man who wrote 
that textbook and tell him you disagreed with it? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know what expertise or 
information he bases that textbook information on? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Did you ever question him about it? 
A. No. I knew from my own knowledge that 
it would not. 
Q. Do you know if that man is an engineer 
or has any specific training in the engineering field? 
A. No idea. 
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1 I Q. Show you a thing that I've marked as 
2 J Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number 66. Do you recognize what 
this is? 
A. It's a waterheater stand. 
Q. You've seen stands like this before? 
A. Similar stands, yes, sir, 
Q. The one that you all made was similar 
to this, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did you all first make one 
that was similar to that? 
A. Sometime in the f70fs. 
Q. Could you tell the Jury how much it 
cost for you to enclose one of these stands, how much it 
cost you all to make this stand in the 1970's? 
A. The stands we had in the 1970's were 
really more leg extensions than they were a stand like 
that. Approximately five dollars for the material. 
Q. Five dollars in the '70's. Would you 
tell the Jury how much it cost for you all to make the 
stand that can pick up your waterheater in the v80's? 
A. Ten or twelve dollars. 
Q. About ten bucks; right? 
A. Somewhere in that neighborhood, yes. 
Q. And in 1990 when this waterheater left 
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1 your factory, it would1 ve cost your company ten dollars 
2 to make this stand; right? 
3 A. Approximately, 
4 Q. This stand is a safety device, isn't 
5 it? 
6 A, I guess you could call it a safety 
7 I device. 
Q. Well, would you call something that 
can prevent or reduce the possibility of these 
catastrophic burns a safety device? 
A. Yes, as long as it doesn't introduce 
other hazards. 
Q. I thought we already went through 
that? I thought, on balance, you decided it was better 
to elevate than not? 
A. That's the recommendation that we made 
in certain locations, yes. 
Q. So, on balance, it was better to 
elevate than not? 
A. As long as it doesn't introduce other 
hazards, yes. 
Q. Did you say on here elevate it as long 
as you don't introduce other hazards? 
A. We recommend it when they know there's 
going to be flammable vapors and liquids in the vicinity 
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of the heater. 
Q. Okay, good point. So when the person 
who's installing this knows flammable vapors are going to 
be in the area, that's when they got to elevate it; 
right? 
A. We recommend it be elevated, yes. 
Q. So, the person who's going to be 
putting this in many times is the installer; right? 
A. Many times, yes. 
Q. So your company thinks the guy that 
comes in, that's in that house for about an hour maybe, 
from the outside, he's going make the decision whether 
they're going to keeping gasoline in that room; is that 
right? 
A. I would expect that the installer, 
whether it's a contractor that's hired by the homeowner 
or if they're doing the installation, I expect them to 
read the warnings on how to install the product. 
Q. You think that the installer should 
consult with the homeowner where he's installing it to 
see if they'll have flammables in that room ever? 
A. I would think that the individual 
that's installing it should look at the area it's being 
installed and determine whether or not it needs to be 
25 I elevated. 
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1 I Q- Okay. And the decision is made and 
2 J the installer leaves; right? 
A. Yes, 
Q. Has anyone told you that in this case 
the installer came in and installed this waterheater in a 
home, looked at the space, installed it on the floor, 
left, and the home is sold to the Mitchells. Now they 
come in and that installer has made a decision for them. 
Has anyone told you that? 
A. But the warnings are still on the 
product. 
Q. Has anyone ever told you those facts? 
A. No. 
Q. Instead of guarding with elevation, 
you all chose to warn? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. This label cost 35 cents; right? 
A. I believe so, at the time. 
Q. Was it, in the late ,70ls, 
technologically feasible for your conrpany to take the air 
intake for this waterheater to a level of 18 inches above 
the floor by design? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection, calls for 
legal conclusion. 
MR. DOWNING: Was it technologically 
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feasible. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Yes. 
4 I Q. You all made this safety device, 
5 instead of mandatory, optional with your products; right? 
6 I A. The waterheater stand? 
Q. The stand. 
A. Yes, it's always been an option. 
Q. Do you expect that the consumer 
understands the same hazard associated with the ignition 
of flammable vapors that this product presents as do you 
the manufacturer who has all these studies available to 
them? 
A. No, that's the reason we place the 
warnings on the product, to warn the consumer. 
Q. So you all are in a better position to 
17 | know that; right?-
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, in your work, was it important 
for you to keep abreast of the numbers of persons being 
burned as a result of these fires? 
A • Yes. 
Q. And was one source for you all 
information from the National Fire Protection 
Association? 
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A. Yes, sir, 
Q. And have you seen.... 
THE COURT: You want to introduce 66? 
MR. DOWNING: Yes. At this time, Your 
Honor, I would offer Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number 
66. 
MR. MURPHY: No objection, Your Honor. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 66 
was filed in this cause.) 
Q« Have you seen this document that I'm 
going to show you that I've marked for identification as 
40C(1)? 
A, Yes. 
Q. And did you consider that information 
reliable to provide your company with information about 
the statistics on the estimates of the number of persons 
being injured as a result of ignition of flammable vapors 
by this model gas-fired waterheater? 
A. Yes. This was for the period of 1980 
to 1984. I believe it's the information you presented to 
the waterheater subcommittee. 
Q. You found that information reliable, 
did you not, sir? 
A. Yes. 
MR. MURPHY: Object, Your Honor, ask 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING, INC. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
«±o 
in the water heater industry; right?" 
A, Yes. 
Q. "Have you relied on that Exhibit as 
information that you consider to be authoritative in 
giving you an estimate of the numbers of injuries out 
there that are reportedly associated with the ignition of 
flammable vapors by these standard gas-fired 
waterheaters?" 
A. Yes. 
Q. "And did your company accept as true 
there was an average of 300 persons burned every year as 
a result of the ignition of flammable vapors by this 
standard model gas-fired waterheater?" And what was your 
answer? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Overrule the objection. 
MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, may I voir 
dire the witness on.this issue? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
VOIR DIRE BY MR. MURPHY: 
Q. Now, isn't it a fact, Mr. Moore, that 
later during the course of that deposition you asked to 
clarify that last question? Did that occur, Mr. Moore? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you not indicate that you 
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1 1 Q. Now, do you know, sir, when this was 
2 J prepared? 
THE COURT: He's already answered 
that. 
MR. MURPHY: Oh, did I ask that? I'm 
sorry, Your Honor. Withdraw. 
Q. When was the first time you saw this 
particular document, sir? 
A. It was presented, I believe in 
November of '91, to the waterheater subcommittee. 
Q. And was that presented to the ANSI Z21 
Subcommittee by Mr. Downing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was it in his report, the document 
that he prepared and submitted to the subcommittee? 
A, Yes. 
Q. And that was in 1991? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that the first time you saw the 
document? 
A* Yes. 
Q. When was this waterheater 
manufactured, sir? 
A. 1990. 
MR. MURPHY: I have nothing e l s e , Your 
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presented, yes. 
Q. You accepted that as true, your 
company did; isn't that right? 
A- Yes. 
Q. Mr. Moore, did your company stake a 
short-model vaterheater in 1990? 
A. Yes. 
Q. . And how tall was your short-model 
waterheater in 1990? 
A. I don't remember what the height of a 
short-model would 've been. 
Q. Did you make one that was 40 inches 
tall? 
A. Without looking at that specifics I 
couldn't tell you today. 
Q. Can't tell us today? 
A. - No. 
Q. Did other manufacturers make something 
called a Low-Boy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tell the Jury what a Low-Boy 
waterheater is. 
A. The Low-Boy is a extremely short 
squatty-type waterheater. It's for installation in, a 
lot of times, undercounter-type installations. 
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Q. So you would agree with me that in 
1990 when this waterheater came out of your factory, if 
the Mitchells needed a Low-Boy to fit in that basement 
area, there was one on the market then; right? 
A. According to this report, yes. 
Q. Well, when you reviewed that report 
did you write to anybody that you had any objection to 
that report? 
A. No. We didn't offer a Low-Boy. 
•.©••• Your company didn't? 
A, No. 
@* That report was circulated to all of 
13 | the waterheater manufacturers, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. DOWNING: Your Honor, I would 
offer Plaintiffs1 Exhibit P24. 
- MR. MURPHY: No objection, Your Honor, 
except for the handwriting on the underlying. 
MR. DOWNING: We'll delete any 
handwriting. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 24 
was filed in this cause.) 
Q* Your company, sir, made a conscious 
decision in 1990 not to provide this safety device with 
this standard waterheater; isn't that right? 
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1 A. You're saying made a decision not to 
2 I include it? 
Q. Your company made a conscious decision 
-- that means thought about it, decided not to do it - a 
conscious decision not to enclose this safety device with 
your standard waterheater; am I right? 
A. Yes. They made it as an option. 
Q. As an option, if the consumer 
understood the need for it; right? 
A. I think the warnings and instructions 
gave that information. 
Q. A 35-cent warning; right? 
A. You can put that dollar amount on it 
but that's not what it cost to develop it. 
Q. You got together with the other -- how 
many other manufacturers were there when you left the 
industry? How many other manufacturers in 1990 were 
there in the industry? 
A. There was a total of five 
manufacturers. 
Q. Five. And all five of you guys got 
together and developed this label; right? 
A. Yes. We formed an ad hoc label 
committee, hired outside consultants to help us on 
developing the label, and then we put it on the product 
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in 1988. 
Q. Did you all do work with consultants 
to try to figure out where on your product to put your 
label? If down here, up here? 
A. It was recommended to put it right 
above the thermostat area, or control of the waterheater, 
Q. All right. When you made that 
conscious decision not to enclose a safety device with 
your product in 1990, one of the reasons why you made 
that decision was cost; right? 
A. Among other considerations, but the 
main reason was not to introduce an additional hazard by 
elevating waterheaters. Replacement waterheaters would 
require different venting, and piping, gas arrangements, 
and a lot of installations would not be adequate height 
to include a stand. 
Q. As a product designer, do you think 
that consumers are willing to pay a little bit extra for 
safety? 
A. Sure, they are. 
Q. Didn't you think that consumers would 
be willing to pay a little bit extra if they understand 
the importance of this ten-dollar stand? 
A. But this stand would not have allowed 
you to install this waterheater in this installation. 
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ou 
can be elevated off residential garage floors per 18-inch 
code requirements and replace all model waterheaters with 
minimal difficulty-n 
Q. So they concluded that there were 
models that could replace tell-model waterheaters with 
minimal difficulty; right? 
A. Yes# but that doesn't mean that where 
this particular waterheater's bought that that Low-Boy 
model was available to the consumer. 
Q. And what do you do when you go to a 
store that doesn't have the product you need? Go to 
another store, don't you? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Your company knew that when you made a 
conscious decision not to enclose this stand with your 
product, or some other means to elevate the air intake 18 
inches, you would continue to have persons burned in 
these types of fires; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, in fact, wouldn't you agree, sir, 
that even since you all started using this label, which 
is what you all used to address the problem, the numbers, 
the statistics, remained essentially the same? 
A. No, I wouldn't agree with that. 
Q. Have you state in the past that the 
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1 I Q. And yet we see no decrease; isn't that 
2 J right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Murphy show you a piece of 
paper or just told you that there was a decrease? 
A. I've seen another piece of paper that 
shows a reduction. 
Q. Do you know what the name of the piece 
of paper is? 
A. No, I don't. I believe it was from 
Consumer Product Safety. 
Q. But you've never seen 71, have you? 
You've never seen P71 before I just showed it to you, 
have you? 
A. I think Ifve seen that one too. 
Q. Let's talk just a minute about the 
standards process. You said you served on a standards 
committee; is that right? 
A. The waterheater subcommittee, yes, 
sir.
 ; -
Q. And that committee is the one that 
writes the design standards for this piece of equipment; 
right? 
A. We work on those standards, yes. 
Q. And your product has to meet those 
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standards; right? 
A, Correct. 
3 1 Q. Your product can't exceed those 
4 J standards, can't be less; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, isn't it true that the time of 
1990 there was approximately twenty people on that 
committee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And ten of them were representing 
manufacturers; right? 
A. Waterheater manufacturers or 
manufacturers? 
Q. In the code it says representing 
manufacturers, doesn't it? 
A. Yes, but that's not just waterheater 
manufacturers. 
Q. And then there were about ten or so 
that were representing gas companies; right? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Wasn't there approximately five people 
on there that actually worked for waterheater 
manufacturers like you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So twenty-five percent of the 
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66 
1 I committee, essentially, was made up by people like you 
2 I that work for waterheater manufacturers; true? 
A, Yes. 
Q. And what was the percentage it took to 
pass something? Eighty percent? 
A« Eighty percent. 
Q. So, mathematically, you all could 
block any change; isn't that right? 
A. That's conceivable. 
Q. But you all never did that, did you? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Qv Can you see this okay, Mr. Moore? 
(Indicating chart on easel.) 
A. Yes. 
Q. (Adjusting chart.) Can you still see 
it okay? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. We've already established 
you were aware that waterheaters were installed in 
basements, true, in 1990? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Already established that in 1990 you 
were aware that gasoline could be found in basements; 
right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Already established that you 
anticipated, when this thing left the factory, that some 
of them would be exposed to flammable vapors; am I right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was common knowledge by you and 
your company in 1990 that there was a hazard associated 
with this product that would ignite floor-disposed 
flammable vapors but sucking them through holes in the 
bottom; right? 
A. Yes. 
11 
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Q. And you were also aware that other 
manufacturers were having the same reports? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were aware that there was an 
average of 300 persons per year that were injured, 
burned, in these types of fires; right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were also aware that this 
waterheater was a passive appliance, didn't need constant 
attention; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then would you agree with me that this 
waterheater was defective? 
A. No. 
MR. MURPHY: Objection. 
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label, haven't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wasn't it reasonably anticipated by 
your company when this product left your factory in 1990 
that it would be exposed to flammable vapors? 
A. Again, that's the reason we put the 
warning label on the product. 
Q. So the answer is, yes, you reasonably 
anticipated that it would be exposed to flammable vapors; 
and as a result, you put the label on it; is that true? 
A. It was reasonably warned, 
Q. Is my answer yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So, our definition is that this 
product is unsafe for that reasonably-anticipated 
handling and use; right? 
A. I've already answered that question. 
Q. And it is? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the average consumer, do you 
think that the average consumer, when they move into a 
home that has an existing gas-fired waterheater, that it 
will ignite flammable vapors? 
A. Restate your question. 
Q. Okay. Do you think the average 
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(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 401 
was filed in this cause.) 
MR. DOWNING: Thank you, Your Honor. 
I pass the witness. 
THE COURT: We haven't had a formal 
break but you all did have a break few minutes 
ago when you went out. Does anyone need a break 
at this point. 
(WHEREUPON, no response from 
the Jury.) 
THE COURT: Are the attorneys all 
right? 
MR. MURPHY: One quick break, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Let's go ahead and take 
about a ten-minute break. 
(WHEREUPON, a brief 
recess was had.) 
THE COURT: Cross-examination. 
C R O S S E X A M I N A T I O N 
BY MR. MURPHY: 
Q. Mr. Moore, Mr. Downing asked questions 
about this document that he didn't have, didn't show you, 
which showed that, in fact, there has been a decline. Do 
you recall that, sir? 
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A. Yes. 
2 1 Q. Did Mr. Downing show you this 
3 J particular document right here which we've marked for 
identification as Defendants' Exhibit Number 40? 
A. No. 
6 I Q. Now, sir, would you take a moment to 
7 take a look at that Exhibit that Mr. Downing didn't give 
to you? 
A. (Witness complies.) 
Q. Now, sir, I'll show you a copy of the 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 71. Now, would you tell the Jury 
what the date is of Defendants' Exhibit Number 40? 
A. Number 40? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. I believe itfs the 16th. It's not 
real --
Q. Is it the 18th? 
A. It may be. It's not real clear. 
Q. Of 1994? 
A. 1994, yes. 
Q. And the document that Mr. Downing 
showed you was three days later, the 21st? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Okay. Now, does the document that Mr. 
Downing showed you show an average number of these 
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estimates of incidents for the period 1986 to 1991? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And does that show that there is an 
average number of incidents of gasoline ignitions? 
Because that's what this case is involved with, gasoline, 
A. Yes. 
Q. Of 239? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the document that Mr. Downing 
didn't show you, the 1991, would you tell the Jury what 
the estimate was for these incidents in 1991 was? 
A. 165 injuries. 
Q. Okay. Now, between 1986 and 1991, 
14 would you tell the Jury what technical change had been 
made to the waterheater which is the subject of this case 
that would account for, in your view, this decrease in 
the number of incidents? 
A. The pictorial label that is on the 
front of this waterheater here. 
Q. Now, the pictorial label, I'll show 
you, sir, this document. Is this a copy of the label? 
A. Yes, it is. 
MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, we would 
offer as Defendants' Exhibit -- if I can*find it 
-- Defendants1 Exhibit Number 3, a copy of the 
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1 pictorial label. 
2 I MR. DOWNING: If it's the identical 
size of the one that's on the waterheater we 
4 I have no objection. If it's a different size, 
5 I then we do. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to measure 
the size, I don't know what it is. If you're 
going to object to, object to it. 
MR. DOWNING: I object, without 
foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled . 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 3 
was filed in this cause.) 
Q. Now, before I skip ahead here, Mr. 
Moore, this April 18th, 1994 document, Defendants' 
Exhibit Number 40, that's a document you've seen before, 
sir? 
A. Yes. 
MR. MURPHY: We'll offer Defendants' 
Exhibit Number 40, Your Honor. 
MR. DOWNING: No objection. 
THE COURT: Let it be introduced as 
Exhibit 40. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 40 
was filed in this cause.) 
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1 Q. Now, this label -- why don't we put it 
2 over here, Mr. Moore -- have you had a chance to see this 
3 waterheater here? Could you come down here and see if 
4 I this is the condition of the label? 
MR. MURPHY: Is that all right, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. Please come down here and see if this 
is the condition the label was in when it left the 
factory, sir* 
A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. Could you describe for the Jury what 
is the difference in the condition? 
A. It's had some fire, paint or whatever, 
against it, and it's been discolored. And the wording is 
slightly blurred. 
Q. So if I put my hand at the top of the 
can and came right down, is that where it appears that 
somebody's painted over it? 
A. There's been a liquid of some kind, or 
over-spray of paint or something. 
Q. Right on the side here, sir, there's a 
piece of plastic. Can you describe for the Jury what was 
in this piece of plastic? 
A. That's the plastic pouch that the 
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1 instructions that came with the waterheater, the manual 
2 that goes to the homeowner. 
3 Q. Okay. Now, the label, there was some 
4 questions earlier, sir, that Mr. Downing had for you 
5 using the chart where it's got right here it's defective, 
6 J unsafe for reasonably --
MR. DOWNING: Excuse me. 
MR. MURPHY: Certainly, go ahead. 
Q. Now, if Mr. Mitchell had read this 
warning label, is this waterheater unsafe for reasonably 
anticipated handling or use? 
A. No. 
Q. Does the company do anything to 
conceal this label from users? It doesn't spray paint 
over it, does it? 
A. No. I think that the pictorial 
adequately gives the consumer the information he needs to 
use the product safely. 
Q. Okay. And that's the reason for the 
label, isn't it? 
A. Yes, to inform the consumer. 
Q. Now, as of October of 1990 when this 
waterheater was manufactured, were you, as the 
vice-president of engineering, aware of any technical 
solution to the ignition of flammable vapors? 
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A. Not at that time, no. 
2 I Q. Now, are you familiar, sir, with the 
3 J opinion of the United States Consumer Product Safety 
Commission about whether there was a technical solution 
5 I to the ignition of flammable vapors? 
6 A. Yes. They did not know of any 
7 solution at that time. 
8 1 Q. Okay. Now, getting back here, sir, to 
9 this diagram, Mr. Downing asked about the term 
10 unreasonably dangerous. If the warning label is read as 
11 it is on the waterheater, is this particular waterheater, 
12 this 30-gallon waterheater, unreasonably dangerous? 
13 A. No. When it's used for its intended 
14 purpose and installed per our instructions, it is a safe 
15 product. 
16 Q. Okay. Now, your label, that's a label 
17 you worked on, isn't it, sir? 
18 A. Yes, it is. 
19 I Q. Mr. Downing was suggesting that this 
20 label costs 35 cents, and I think you stated that that's 
21 not the cost of development. But then Mr. Downing didn't 
22 follow-up on that --
23 MR. DOWNING: Objection. Leading, 
24 argumentative. 
25 THE COURT: Sustained. Does he need 
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1 knew that handling gasoline around the product could 
2 cause a hazard of injury. 
3 Q* Okay. Why don't we go back to the 
4 box, sir. 
5 Could you explain to the Jury, sir, 
6 what the American National Standards Institute's standard 
7 is that applies to this particular waterheater? 
8 A. The standard that applies to this 
9 waterheater is called Z2110.1 which is for residential 
10 waterheaters. It's a standard that we have our heaters 
11 certified that we meet the requirements of that standard, 
12 and they're generally tested by American Gas Association. 
13 Q. Okay. I'll hand you what we've marked 
14 for identification as Exhibit Number 7, it's the American 
15 National Standards for Gas Waterheaters, Volume 1, it's 
16 the ANSI Z2110.1, 1987. 
17 THE COURT: What number? 
18 MR. MURPHY: Ifm sorry, Your Honor. 
19 That's Number 7. 
20 Q* Actually, which one do you have there? 
21 A. 1987. 
22 MR. MURPHY: Actually, Your Honor, I!m 
23 sorry, I think this is Number 6. I have to 
24 apologize. 
25 Q. I'd like to also hand you what we've 
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marked for identification as Defendants' Number 7. 
2 | That's the 1988 ANSI Z2110.1; is that right, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are these the codes to which this 
particular waterheater was certified? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Now, how would you characterize 
these codes, sir? How would you describe them for 
purposes of the Jury? 
A. They're the state-of-the-art that the 
particular time that these standards were written. 
They're both performance and safety standards. 
MR. MURPHY: I'd offer into admission 
Defendants' 6 and 7, Your Honor. 
MR. DOWNING: No objection. 
THE COURT: They'll be introduced . 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit Nos. 
6 and 7 were filed in 
this cause.) 
Q. Mr. Downing, sir, was asking you 
questions about the makeup of the subcommittee, and I'll 
turn your attention to page 6 of Exhibit 6. Now, how 
many representatives are there from the manufacturers of 
gas-fired waterheaters here, sir? 
A. Four, I believe. 
Q. And you're one of them, aren't you. 
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sir? 
2 I A. Yes. 
3 1 Q. And how many people are there on the 
4 committee as a whole? 
5 A. It varies at times. There's twenty to 
6 twenty-two, twenty-four. 
7 J Q. Why don't you please count there, sir, 
for that particular number. 
A. (Witness complies.) There happen to be 
twenty-four at this particular point in time. 
Q. Okay. Now, this ANSI subcommittee, is 
this a group that meets in the dark of night with black 
pointed heads or do they have regular open meetings? 
A. It's open to the public, anyone can 
attend the meeting. 
Q. Is there limited discussion about 
issues or is it fairly vigorous discussion? 
A. There's a lot of discussion about the 
items or the agenda that we're covering at that 
particular time. 
Q. After all, sir, isn't the reason for 
these discussions in these meetings to ensure that the 
product is as safe as it can be? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And that's the reason why you were 
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involved, wasn't it, sir? 
A. Yes. 
3 Q. Now, do representatives from 
4 governmental agencies attend these ANSI Z21 subcommittee 
5 meetings prior to 1990? 
6 A. Yes. Consumer Product Safety 
7 Commission attended our meetings at different times. 
8 1 Q. Did the Consumer Product Safety 
9 Commission ever say that this waterheater that was in the 
10 Mitchells' crawlspace, that that had to be recalled 
11 because it wasn't on an 18-inch stand? 
12 A. No, did not. 
13 Q* Now, who other than representatives 
14 from the Consumer Product Safety Commission were in 
15 attendance at these meetings? 
16 A.'- There were representatives from gas 
17 companies, control manufacturers, the LP gas association 
18 was there, recreational vehicles. And we also had a 
19 special-interest-group person that was not a member of 
20 any manufacturer. 
21 I Q. And he's reflected as a public 
22 interest? 
23 A. General interest. 
24 I Q. General interest? 
25 A. Michael Martin. 
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1 I Q. Okay, thank you. There was a question 
2 put to you earlier, sir, about the issue of whether that 
3 particular waterheater was to be left and ignored. I'd 
4 like to show you Defendants' Exhibit Number 2 and see if 
5 you're able to identify this, sir? 
6 A. It's the operation and installation 
7 service manual for residential storage-type waterheaters, 
8 I June of '87. 
Q. Now, sir, is that the manual that 
would accompany this particular waterheater? 
A. I don't know that this is the exact 
one but it wouldfve been very similar to this one. 
Q. Now, this manual would've been found 
right here in the pocket; is that right, sir? 
A. In that plastic pouch, yes. 
Q. Okay. Does the manual, sir, call for 
maintenance? 
A. Yes, there's a maintenance section in 
there. 
Q. Does the label also give a warning 
about the use or storage of gasoline within the proximity 
of that particular --
A. Yes, sir. The same warnings that's on 
the front of the waterheater here are also on the front 
of the manual. 
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MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, I'd offer 
this a Defendants1 Exhibit 2. 
3 I MR. DOWNING: No objection. 
4 THE COURT: All right, Exhibit 2 will 
5 I be introduced into evidence. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 2 
was filed in this cause.) 
8 I Q. Now, Mr. Moore, have you had an 
9 opportunity to look at the waterheater to see if there's 
10 only one warning on it concerning flammable vapors? 
11 A. No, there's additional warnings above 
12 the pictorial label. 
13 Q. And I'll show you this Exhibit, see if 
14 I this is a copy of that pictorial label? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, we've marked 
17 this for identification as Defendants' Exhibit 
18 75. 
19 Q. This is a blow-up of the other warning 
20 label which is on that,plastic, is it not, sir? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 MR. MURPHY: Wefll offer Defendants' 
23 Exhibit 75, Your Honor. 
24 MR. DOWNING: Objection, it 
25 mis characterizes the label. I don't mind the 
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exact same size but that one mischaracterizes 
the label. Size. 
3 I THE COURT: Objection is overruled. 
4 The Jury can look at the Exhibit 71 and the 
5 waterheater. If you want to, we'll even let fem 
6 take the waterheater into the jury room when you 
7 deliberate so you can tell the size of it. But 
8 you can see it right now. 
9 (WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 71 
10 was filed in this cause.) 
11 Q. Now, Mr. Moore, there were questions 
12 to you, sir, about what the company had done in terms of 
13 finding a technical solution to the issue, and I think 
14 you explained that during direct. What efforts, other 
15 than kind of design efforts, did the coxxipany engage in to 
16 deal with the risk of accidental ignition of flammable 
17 vapors? 
18 A. Well, we went through a series of 
19 different warnings that we put on the product. 1978 we 
20 put the first warning against flammable vapors; that 
21 label said do not use or store flammable vapors or 
22 liquids in the vicinity of the waterheater. In 1980 we 
23 changed the wording of that to include the word gasoline. 
24 In 1982 to '84, the label that you see there above the 
25 pictorial, that was put on the product. And then in 1988 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING, INC. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 we added the pictorial label that was a development where 
2 we went outside, hired consultants to help us design a 
3 label that would inform the consumer. 
4 In the early '90's we started the 
5 consumer awareness education program, it was millions of 
6 dollars spent on that. The waterheater industry took TV 
7 spots out to warn against the ignition of flammable 
8 vapors using gasoline around the product. That also 
9 provided information to fire departments to use, it also 
10 included information that was given to schools to 
11 distribute and inform children about the use of flammable 
12 vapors and liquids around the product. 
13 And after that, the waterheater 
14 industry formed a consortium to develop a solution design 
15 of waterheater to reduce the ignition of flammable 
16 vapors. 
17 Q. Okay. Now, I think I've jumped ahead 
18 of myself, I must apologize. This manual that was 
19 admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2, does that contain 
20 instructions on the maintenance for this particular 
21 waterheater? 
22 A. Yes, it does. 
23 Q. And does it call for periodic 
24 maintenance? 
25 A. Yes, it does. 
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Q. Now, the waterheater that's on the 
2 I stand over here, sir, this is not a complete picture of 
3 what the waterheater would look like installed, is it, 
4 I sir? 
A. No, it's not. 
6 1 Q. Now, what I need to place on top of 
7 the waterheater, this device right here? 
8 I A. Yes. That's a draft hood and vent 
attached to it. 
10 I Q. So that would go on top in this 
11 fashion, somewhat like that, sir? 
12 A. Yes. It goes over the flue outlet of 
13 the waterheater. 
14 Q. Now, this pipe has to go in an upward 
15 direction? 
16 A. It has to rise at least a quarter-inch 
17 per foot. 
18 Q. Why is that, sir? 
19 A. So that the combustion products don't 
20 spill out the draft hood opening and rise and go outside 
21 the structure. 
22 I Q. What is the typical installation of 
23 this? Is it typical that this pipe would run into a 
24 chimney? 
25 A. It can. Generally, it's a vent that's 
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1 dedicated for the waterheater. 
2 Q. Now, is there a risk, sir, that if the 
3 waterheater is placed on an 18-inch stand, that the 
4 installer wouldn't change the hole in the vent and would, 
5 in fact, run the pipe right back into that same hole? 
6 A. That would be the normal installation. 
Q. Now, I'm talking about the situation 
where the waterheater is originally on the floor and the 
pipe is going in an upward direction, as you've said, but 
it's replaced now with a waterheater that's elevated, 
okay? Is there a risk that the installer is going to run 
that pipe back into the same hole in the chimney? 
A. There's a risk of that. If that 
happens and there's not proper elevation to the vent pipe 
you're going to spill products of combustion into that 
area. 
Q* Okay. 
A. And products of combustion are carbon 
monoxide. 
Q. Does carbon monoxide present a risk, 
sir? 
A. Yes. It can make you sick or even 
kill you. 
Q. Carbon monoxide is a deadly poison, is 
it not, sir? 
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A. It sure is. 
2 I Q. Now, how much above the top of the 
3 vent pipe does the company require there be a clearance 
4 I for materials that can catch on fire? 
A. On the data plate of the waterheater 
there is a dimension, I believe it's 6 inches from the 
vent to combustible construction. 
Q. Okay. Now, I just want you to assume, 
sir, for purposes of this next question that the height 
at the Mitchell basement was 70 1/2 half inches, and that 
that height was approximately where I've put this piece 
of black tape. Which is always impossible to use, and 
it's not very even, is it. (Tape is placed around top of 
waterheater.) 
To the extent this waterheater was 
placed in the basement of the Mitchell residence, where 
would the top of this waterheater have been? 
A. Would've been above the ceiling. 
Q. Okay. And then to the extent we had 
to have the necessary vent pipe on it, where would that 
have placed the vent pipe? 
A. The waterheater couldn't have been 
installed, first, on an elevated stand. 
Q. All right. Now, Mr. Downing was 
asking you about Low-Boy models, do you remember that? 
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A. Yes. 
2 1 Q. And I think you had some questions, 
3 sir, as to whether -- well, perhaps not. Did you have a 
4 J question as to whether the conrpany manufactured a Low-Boy 
in 1990? 
A. I said we made short models but not a 
7 I Low-Boy. 
8 1 Q. What is the height of the short model 
9 you made in approximately 1990? 
10 A. Like I said, without a specification 
11 sheet I couldn't remember. 
12 Q. Okay. Let me just show you this and 
13 see if this will help you refresh your recollection about 
14 what the height was of a short-model 30-gallon 
15 waterheater in 1990, sir. 
16 A/ Well, the height to the top of the 
17 waterheater was 45 1/4 inches and the height to the top 
18 of the vent would've been 48 1/2 inches. 
19 Q. Okay. Now, sir, why was it that the 
20 company did not manufacture the kind of Low-Boy, 40-inch 
21 Low-Boy, that Mr. Downing was asking you about on direct? 
22 A. We, as far as I know, had never been 
23 asked by anyone in the company to develop a heater that 
24 short. We had been producing short models from the late 
25 'GO'S -- early '60's, I mean -- up until I left the 
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1 company. There just wasn't a market for a Low-Boy that 
2 our company knew. 
3 Q. I think you had a question in your 
4 mind, sir, about whether this Low-Boy could actually meet 
5 the efficiency requirements. Could you explain to the 
6 Jury what efficiency requirements are for a gas-fired 
7 waterheater? 
8 A. The Department of Energy has set 
9 specific efficiency requirements for waterheaters, and 
10 when you shorten the heater up as short as a Low-Boy 
11 there's a real problem on getting the efficiency required 
12 by federal law. And we chose not to try to develop one 
13 because there really wasn't a market for that type of 
14 product, and we wanted to make sure we gave the consumer 
15 a sufficient product. 
16 Q. Now, Mr. Moore, you use the word 
17 efficiency, can you translate that into more concrete 
18 terms for the Jury? 
19 A. It's the amount of energy, the BTUs 
20 that you're burning. A particular waterheater with a 
21 40,000 input, the efficiency is the amount of heat that 
22 you burn that you actually put into the water to heat it. 
23 And today, most products are around 80-percent efficient. 
24 And a Low-Boy, I doubt that you'd be able to make an 
25 80-percent efficient waterheater. If you did, it'd be so 
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1 low input it wouldn't be of any advantage to the 
2 I consumer. 
Q. Is it fair to describe it, then, sir, 
4 I that the consumer would have to spend more for the gas 
5 that's firing that particular Low-Boy waterheater and get 
6 less hot water? 
7 A. You could characterize it in that 
8 fashion, yes, 
9 Q. Okay. Now, a question was put to you, 
10 sir, about why is the burner down at the bottom on this 
11 waterheater, and I don't know that you got an adequate 
12 opportunity to explain that. Why is the burner down at 
13 the bottom here, sir? 
14 A. The burner is placed below the tank so 
15 that you heat the entire tank of water instead of only a 
16 portion of it. The waterheater, you've got connections 
17 at the top; the cold water side has a tube that brings 
18 water to the bottom of it and you take the hot water off 
19 the top of the heater. That way, you're able to draw the 
20 maximum amount of hot water out of the unit. 
21 I Q. So the water comes down in here from 
22 the top? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 I Q. Is it then circulated throughout the 
25 tank inside? 
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1 A, The normal heating causes the water to 
2 move in the tank. 
3 Q. Now, would it be technologically 
4 possible to put the burner compartment right here in the 
middle of the waterheater shell? 
6 1 A. It would, but you wouldn't heat the 
7 I entire tank. 
Q. So what you'd be doing then is heating 
the top part of the tank but not the bottom part of the 
tank? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, the burner in this 
particular waterheater is 6BF90333T, that's down here in 
the bottom, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you get access through the door; 
right? 
Some access, yes. 
And there's an inner door as well; 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I think I recall you saying that 
the reason why air is drawn through the door on the 
bottom is because it's the most efficient way of doing 
it; isn't that correct, sir? 
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1 A. It's the most efficient design, yes. 
2 I Q. Now, I'm not sure if I understood this 
3 but I kind of understood that there's some great sucking 
4 movement from far away that drew the vapors right into 
5 the waterheater. Is that a fair characterization of how 
6 a hot waterheater operates? 
7 A. The waterheater pulls air from the air 
8 surrounding it, and it draws it up through into the 
9 burner. It is burned there, and then a portion of the 
10 surrounding air is used to help the venting at the draft 
11 hood. 
12 Q. Isn't it a fact, sir, that the effect 
13 of radius of where air is being actively pulled is right 
14 within just a foot or so of the bottom of the 
15 waterheater; isn't that right, sir? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. At the time this waterheater was 
18 manufactured in October 1990, was this the 
19 state-of-the-art? 
20 A. Yes* 
21 I Q. Now, in 1990 approximately how many 
22 gas-fired waterheaters were there in operation day in and 
23 day out in the United States? 
24 A. Approximately fifty million. 
25 I Q. And that was a design that worked, and 
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1 continues to work, safely and appropriately; is it not, 
2 I sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, we've skipped around a little 
bit, Mr. Moore, and I have to apologize. The ANSI 
standard and ANSI certification, that's reflected right 
here on the label, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With the blue star? 
A. That's the certification symbol for 
American Gas Association. 
Q. Could you describe for the Jury, sir, 
the process with which you -- because, after all, you 
were the developer and the designer of this waterheater 
-- what was the process of testing that you went through 
to come up with this design? 
A. Once we had designed the product the 
ANSI standard was used to test the product in our 
laboratory. We went through all the testing requirements 
that were in the standard before we would ship it. I 
shouldn't say we shipped it, our lab was certified by the 
American Gas Association and they came directly to our 
laboratory and did the required testing to certify the 
product. • ~ 
Q. Now, at the time you developed this 
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model waterheater, you were the vice-president of 
engineering, were you not, sir? 
A. Yes. 
4 I Q. How many people did you have working 
5 1 with you in the engineering department? 
6 I A. When I started out in 1974 there was 
only four of us. At one time we had approximately 
twenty-two people, 
Q. And they were working under your 
direction and supervision? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did they seem to have any problem, 
sir, with the fact that you didn't have a college degree 
in engineering? 
A. No. In fact, most of the engineers 
that I had working for me had at least a Master's degree. 
Q. Now, you recall the document that Mr. 
Downing -- well, I'm jumping ahead again, I apologize for 
that. Did you do any field-testing of this particular 
model before you had it tested for the ANSI 
certification? 
A. Yes. All of new products that we 
develop we field-test it before it actually went into 
production. This particular model, several of the 
employees within the compauiy we installed them in their 
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1 houses and they were operated there. And we periodically 
2 would pull them out, re-test them, cut 'em apart and 
3 examine them. 
4 Q* Now/ you1 re responsible for this 
5 design, are you not, sir? 
6 J A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And when you designed this product did 
you intend to design it safely, as safely as you could? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And could you describe for the Jury 
the process with which the company tries to ensure that 
the quality of the product is maintained as it's being 
built? 
A. Well, the production line, when the 
product is finished on the line it goes through an actual 
flame test. The gas is hooked up to the unit, the burner 
and pilot are operated, the control is turned on and off 
to make sure that it will turn it on and off like it' s 
designed to. 
Beyond that, we periodically pull off 
a number of units per day and the quality-control 
department takes it into the quality-control lab and 
they're tested. The heater is actually filled up with 
water, the thermostat is checked for calibration, 
combustion is checked, a combustion analyzer is attached 
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1 Q. Now, sir, I'll hand you what we've 
2 I marked for identification as Defendants' Exhibit Number 
4, which is the appliance certificate from the American 
Gas Association Laboratories. Is this the certification 
5 I by the American Gas Association Laboratories that, in 
6 I fact, the model that we have in front of us, this model 
which was in the Mitchell crawlspace, was in compliance 
with the ANSI Z2110.1 standards? 
A. This is the original certification for 
that particular design of waterheater. 
MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, we'll offer 
in evidence Defendants1 Exhibit Number 4. 
MR. DOWNING: No objection. 
THE COURT: Let it be filed. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 4 
was filed in this cause.) 
Q. Now, what I'm showing you, Mr. Moore, 
is this a blow-up of the front page of that Exhibit 
Number 4? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is this what I show you a blow-up 
of the front page of the manual for this particular 
Exhibit 2? 
A. Yes, but I want to correct something. 
That is not the exact manual that came with this product. 
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The one that came with this product also had the 
pictoiia! IHIIHI mi I IIM I I I «• i f lr» n( lhr> manual. 
Oh, inside the first front page? 
/••• A . Y e h . 
-^ . So we iieeci to add the pictorial label 
msiae that manual; Is that right, sir? 
~. yes. 
~ So the consumer would get both the 
manual? 
A. • Yes,, 
*• Okay. Now, tu i*ii& extent, n i in I I Ml 
the manual for some reason i s removed, does the company, 
wxx UXJLJU • - ill a r l a b e l i • •: llhij i i iriHinm:1! .fii'iiiB • 
information a s to where to obtain the manual? 
'•A. assing the manual you 
•ar- jet It fr om the manufacturer. 
Q. And what does i t say here right where 
~*j finger -.^» *.wx. uuc u^ei, LU che extent the 
ft 
A. ] * 
waterheater warnings and instructions i the manual is 
mi ssi ng cont act the n i ^ or manufacturer. 
Q. And the company made manuals available 
to people who would call i a -and say 1 need a manual? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 1 Q. And they wouldn't charge for them? 
3 A. No charge. 
4 1 Q. Now, this label which was on the 
5 waterheater, this does have some very specific 
6 information right in this section right in here, does it 
7 I not, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was the reason for this 
particular label, sir? 
A. It was a label to inform the consumer 
of hazards related to the waterheater. 
Q. And the top portion of the label, why 
is that in pictogram-type form, then? 
A. As I stated earlier, that was in that 
form so if the person was not illiterate they could 
determine what the hazard was associated with the 
waterheater. 
Q. Isn't it also true, sir, that with 
that pic togram on the waterheater you can see it from 
some distance away. And you would be able to see it here 
if it hadn't been painted over; isn't that correct, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I guess the distance you can see 
it is only controlled by the distance at which you can 
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1 I Q. Now, again, in the righthand side of 
2 the label there's more information, teaching users of 
3 J this waterheater about what, sir? 
A. That the waterheater has a main 
burning pilot, that it is on all the time and will ignite 
flammable vapors. And that the vapors cannot be seen, 
they're heavier than air and they can go a long way on 
the floor. And they can be carried from other rooms to 
the pilot or main burner flame by air currents. 
Q. Now, I think when you were on direct, 
sir, there was question asked of you about 18-inch 
elevation and the capacity of a waterheater like this on 
a stand to ignite flammable vapors. Do you recall that, 
sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I think you mentioned something 
about air movement. What did you mean when you used the 
term air movement? 
A. Well, in testing in our laboratory 
we've used a substance,called liquid smoke in our 
development. Liquid smoke is heavier than air, itfs an 
acid. And by using it, you can see air movement. You 
can spill it on the floor and it hugs the floor like 
vapors do. But if there's any air movement, you walk 
through that, it will rise. You can see it swirl around. 
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^ovation Is not the answer to igniLioii of flammable 
vapors because they can. be carri ed, like as our label 
involvement/ any movement, -. L ; . i ip ai i 
Nov , sin , this liquid smoke that 
vou've testified about, was this something you used -"-
the laboratories il American Waterl-
oo tobex of 1990? 
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went in there. In fact, i LIIXIIK. Lliey stxll use xt today 
for development. 
Q. . And pi ior to October 
noticed this phenomena of liquid smoke, this 
A. ' Yes We had an incident where a 
of. L..III. it.1 "'..jut knoL'k eel o v e r a n d :i t just covered the whole 
_loor . As the person walked through it y ou could see die 
sapors being picked up,by the movement of the person 
walkinq through this l.n ;"pji;i.d smoke. 
Q. And that was something you saw 
? 
A. Oh yeah. 
Q. Now I think Mr. Downing has asked you 
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1 questions about where is this piece of paper and where• s 
2 that piece of paper, did you need a piece of paper to 
3 J know that gas vapor could rise with air movement? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Has that something you understood 
based on your time as an engineer and as a service man 
and as a draftsman and as the head of engineering at the 
American Waterheater Company prior to 1990? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And you understood, did you not, sir, 
that an elevated waterheater could ignite flammable 
vapors? 
A. Yes, sir. I've investigated two 
waterheaters that were elevated and did light off 
gasoline vapors. 
Q. And that was before October of 1990, 
was it not, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, getting back to the label, there 
is a reference here on, the label, says it very plainly, 
does it not, about 18 inches above the floor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the company stands behind this 
label, does it not, sir? 
A. Yes, we do. 
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Q. Okay. Now # as a matter of fact, the 
spec i, f i ? references: 
room, those words were actually removed after this 
pax t::::i oil a i: Il a 1:: e .3 i i a s st a x ted? ' 
. .. A, .. I believe so, 
Q. And weren't those specific 
identifications removed because COIDDA :O 
.uare . *: ;:^ consumers didn"t just look *e areas 
cunniaojLe 
liquids? 
A. Yes 
Q* So -L - AJL i>uuw uxiJLs notogxaph 
taker by the Lenoir City Fire Department on the evening 
MR. MURPHY; Yuut Honor, I think both 
] ,.« .,..r,,-LI xB ' audi Defendants' --
MR. DOWNING: May I see what you've 
marked? 
MR. MIJPPWV 
MR., DOWNING < 
I, y 
Exhibits, and at: * n > < i*r, _ _ _fiei — »~ ? 
evidence Defendant ^. . - I2h This ±? a 
photograph c the waterheater. 
MR. DOWNING: No objection. 
RPOWW xrWTKT^n mTTOT PRPfVPT r 
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1JLJL 
THE COURT: Exhibit 12A. 
2 I MR. MURPHY: Thank you. 
3 I (WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 12A 
was filed in this cause.) 
5 1 Q. Now, this is a photograph, sir, of the 
6 I waterheater as it was in the basement, and this is a 
photograph taken by the Lenoir City Fire Department. Do 
you see the white paint on the waterheater, sir, as you 
see it right now? 
A. No, the labels are clear there. 
Q. And that's both labels, both the older 
one which was started in 1984 and the newer one which was 
started in 1988? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, this label in 1988, was the 
coxzrpany the first waterheater manufacturer that put that 
label on its waterheater? 
A. Yes, we put it on a month or two prior 
to our competitors. 
Q. Now* did the company simply attach 
this label to any of its new products or did it do 
anything to get this label out to be attached to 
waterheaters which were already installed in the field? 
A. Our company distributed the labels to 
our wholesale plumbing houses, we also distributed to 
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] Southern California Gas Company there in Southern 
3 that they come across that did not have the label on it. 
4 I saw several waterheaters that were 
5 I made pi: i or to 1988 that Southern California Gas actually 
6 I appl ied the label to i t And also, GAMA had a program 
distributors. 
Q '• : Isn,t :i !:: a ] so true
 r si i: that GAKA had 
10 1 a program to distribute the new, label to the big gas 
11 ! util ities throughout the United States? 
A.'" ' Yes. 
Il 1 And was the purpose for that the same 
II "III purpose tns w were distributed I Sni'aU-idu 
j[3 when they « *** ***** places where waterheaters aze 
If installed for their customers, thpy'ri go and put that 
II > III
 r i II i i III i i  in in 
IB A Yes, If I hey, for any reason w ,"iniIII t o 
II I . I l l II I I I 1 II i l l II t i l I I I Jill i l l l l I I I l ( J I P W i I1 I I I I | I L I t O J 1 r l II II i r l I If » II I l l II II 
70 Lhey'd put one on the product at that time. 
21 0 hurl Unit happened prio itober < 
22 I 199011 did it not, sir? 
Yes. v.-
Q. 
25 | sir, about a direct-vent waterheater If II show «; ' on what 
<r^  f'%1 .iii'i d" II i i» ii"i "ii i" inifyi nr ii nnii m inirn f%nnit w » i i i i i i ' i 
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we've marked for identification as Defendants1 Exhibit 
2 I Number 8. Is that a copy of the manual for a direct-vent 
3 I waterheater? 
A. Yes . 
5 I MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, we'd offer 
6 I into evidence Defendants1 Exhibit 8. 
MR. DOWNING: May I just see it a 
moment? 
MR. MURPHY: Certainly. 
MR. DOWNING: Okay. No objection. 
THE COURT: It'll be admitted. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 8 
was filed in this cause.) 
Q. Now, Mr. Moore, was a direct-vent 
waterheater designed for the purpose of preventing the 
ignition of flammable vapors? 
A. No, the direct-vent waterheater that 
was designed in 1986 was designed for a new type of 
housing where the construction was very tight, good 
weather stripping and all. And the contractors wanted an 
appliance, a waterheater that did not pull its combustion 
air from within the structure, they wanted the air pulled 
from outside. They did not want the heated air within 
the structure to be used for the combustion of the 
waterheater. 
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Okay " loes the d i r e c t - v e n t do a 
g "inj i i i i l l i • Il mi nil in ill l l i in ill in u I.J r i i i i i i r 1 1 
Yes. 
n Does,, the direct-vent thai direct-vent 
~> I right there, does that have a fan on it, an electric fan? 
* ' an atmospheric-fired 
w'cilitiiijeai 
somebody came :^if - . old 
aaies and gentlemen <~ JTWT 
direct-vent waterheater had a fan on it which would 
"" ' require electrical connections, would that be in error? 
1 3 i II I i I;,, - v e n t , •-• •- -' .:-. 
1 4 • • O . Okay lien I >\ ent mi; m H 
I! tha t a l s o subjec^ ~~ ~~w ANSI standards which we ^ 
1
 marked and admitted i n t o evidence a s Exhibit 6 and 7? 
••••••:••...,.. I Ii • Yen , anil WL yu\ Lhiu .lariic, waiinnq 
1 a be ! on the d i r e c t - v e n t : a s we do our s t anda rd 
*al e i" he at. *,j,r " • "• . ' . .' •• - :'- •• . • 
M ' . _ :J is label right here, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q* AUU nuj %*ww0 uhe company w^ uuxo 
flammable-vapor label on the direct-vent waterheater? 
2 ill! I ' '.'••'. •,, .;:&• .• .: ,;,.., B e c a u s e I I'm i"? iilf'Jhi ii(|iii 'iI I tiiiH" d i r e r . 1 1 : "< M-'III ' 
waterheater will not prevent the ignition of flammable 
± i 
18 
13T5 rMVTKT r 1VT T" 'MY"*f\ f*fXT TO T* FT t ? "Ptf"\« T» T I ! 
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1 vapors. The design of a direct-vent waterheater that 
2 we're talking about here, the standard allows a certain 
3 percent of leakage on both the air-intake portion of the 
4 appliance and the exhaust that has openings large enough 
5 that will allow the flammable vapors to be pulled in. 
6 And you can ignite off flammable 
7 vapors with that product. Tests have been run on a 
8 direct-vent of this type and it did light off flammable 
9 vapors, which was gasoline that it was tested with. 
10 Q. And were those tests done at the 
11 American Gas Association Research Laboratories? 
12 A. Yesf they were. 
13 I Q. Now, even if the direct-vent would 
14 prevent the ignition of flammable vapors, what is the 
15 cost to manufacture a direct-vent? What's the 
16 relationship between the cost to manufacture this 
17 standard waterheater and the direct-vent waterheater? 
18 A. It's about three times the cost of a 
19 standard waterheater. 
20 Q. And,would that difference also apply 
21 at the retail level? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Is the direct-vent more difficult, 
24 more cumbersome, more time-consuming to install, as 
25 opposed to the standard waterheater? 
nn/>r.Tk« #» r.t^^rr^r\ nrxrinm nnnAnm>r»T« -r%Yr*i 
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If you,• re replacing a standard 
w a t f r J iwd l : t:,!l,f V' ,|l! " 
three-times difference would 
li HI vi I  11 ixpande i < u rurther as f* * comparison for 
installed cost; ±u that fair, six ? 
A Yes„ Tt requires the relocation of 
tffitPI I i I l f 1 - | l II O't" >H I'll 1 y fHlllf. II II II II I'111 Ml Ill a 
different type of venting than the standard waterheater. 
H r l " P I I I I I I I -I I I I ) II f l I M r I HUM | l l ! I l l 1 1 : S 
and there are sections that have to be put together/ and 
i silicuiit. thai; has to be put on the joint to seal it up 
y . •: . • N O K II l l lCI I I II'11 "W I:i1 II P "" : IOI l l f " IIJ II if1'1'1! Ill II 111 I 
you about elevated *-. intake , addition In a stand. I 
1 in mi i  mi II i 11 mi in in i 
designs that you were asked about that experts had told 
vnu you should ve corporated into your product? 
A. yes. 
Q. ~- ~ e l evated a i r intake? .-.•.• • 
A. 
And, was one of t hose that Mix: Downing 
.wheel lib gn? 
A. A Rheem bucket, ^uo. 
• Q* ,- '.:•' Now, why don't you tell the Jury what 
you describe this bucket theory soundN I in II i" i1 
A. The bucket as I knew it was a big pan 
RDAWM' t H T M ^ n P A ! T O T y r n ^ D T T n r 1 T'n* '« 
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1 with sides on it that went up 18 inches high and the 
2 I waterheater was placed inside of it. But in the bucket 
you've got to have an access door to be able to light or 
service the appliance, which you also have to have a 
drain hole in that device to get rid of water if the 
waterheater leaks. And at some time it will leak. 
So# without putting a hole in it and 
having an access door to it, you've got the possibility 
of leaving those open, and it's no better than the 
standard waterheater. We didn't see it as a solution. 
Q. Now, somebody proposed to you one of 
these barriers that just went around the bottom of the 
waterheater of just 18 inches, and what did you think of 
that? 
A. I think you're referring to the one 
where in an alcove they would put a device, a panel that 
went down to the floor and covered that space and was 18 
inches high. And my question to the person that proposed 
the design, I said well, what do you do about lighting 
it? He said you lift it up. I said how would you hold 
it up, and he said well, you attach a string to it. And 
my comment wa,s it looked like a guillotine to me, 
something that could fall and injure a person. 
Q. Now, this bucket that you talked 
about, does that introduce new risks? 
v**>%^«vr*«r — rj9T*+***r\ nr\TTT*fT* T5T5T^r\T5IT»T1lVI T X T r * 
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A Yes v /on donft have a drain on it, 
wl""?!' M,'- ipp.l Ian- t« luak'. i '" j poii.j,«,iiil.e that the lt:vel . 1 
waLei would ilse and you would have natural gas 01 LP yas 
escaping, not being burned i n the heater. As that wafer 
rose Jix woula xiav 
Q. No guess the barrier 
ucsicxe 
the waterheater? 
' A. Yes , i t woi ILI d •— -O1 *-he' way a r o u n d 
10 
11 | Q. And about how ~ " would if: extend? 
A. 
1 3 1 Q. And was there some something that 
3 i aenagers from just,, throwing thei Lothes, 
1 5 — j unfortunately do? 
II 6 ---.A A . • N o . --• • 
1 7" Q . I i n i l l III .1 Ill In .1 i ill: j"iiiijiIII ,"!i11'f, f- III, I n , i ; - ] ;i, i ea, 
18 that l i t t l e narrow area i s blocked potential 
III S ;>efore? 
20 :••.• A-.. •. •' ''Well , :i £ you hail combustibles in ther e 
-.'" I . • danger of them being ignited But i f you 
22 closed off the air to it you'd have carbon monoxlilf" be m nq 
23 expelled from the waterheater 
24 . I:] 1 ,  i :] 
25 risks that the bucket introduces, sir? 
m m A M I in i i in mi i " I ' M n " i i"i i" i M I » M*II 
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1 A. As I said, we didn't consider the 
2 bucket because you would have to have an access to be 
3 able to service the bottom. 
4 Q. Sir, in addition to the risks that you 
5 J talked about when you elevate a previously-on-the-floor 
mounted waterheater and the risk of carbon monoxide if 
somebody doesn't install it properly, is there any other 
risk that you can think of that the 18-inch stand 
introduces? 
A. The stand allows storage area below 
the product. 
Q. So you could take the gas can and fit 
it underneath the stand, sir? 
A, That's a possibility. I've seen 
flammable liquids that were stored in a cabinet that was 
below the waterheater. We had the person remove them at 
the time I saw them. 
Q. Now, sir, I think you at one point 
earlier today said that an 18-inch elevation can delay 
ignition; is that a fair characterization, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happens when the delay period 
runs out? 
You have a bigger explosion. 
So you literally have an explosion; is 
•^*»r-"t*"\ r*r\TTT*rn T%Y9T>r\T%tmt%m T V r r * 
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that right, sir? 
A , Y R F . N o t IIILJI I I in I i '| in Hi. i J ')r 
.rge explosion. You can blow windows out, you may exack 
• ... .. ions there's a IJ LuuJ of things that can happen. 
Q. Can you even shake a house with that 
kind of explosion with.gas vapor that's gone up that far, 
IB • i.uc J les? ' ". ' 
A .Absolutely, 
0 . lull. mi ii1! mi ill III,!"]!' ii question put to 
some kind of elevated air intake* Did you 
understand what Mr. Downing was asking yon about about 
elevated air intake? 
A. Yes He was proposing that the design 
wen,! J nil HI " Lowe !,.JJIIII."" l,n ill. I i,inn HI wri l .ei h e a l e r and I lie a i r i.nt.cike 
would be raised at least 18 inches above the bottom ot 
the • waterheater. " "'•- " 
Q. And are you aware, wou 
to try and put it in ballfield terms that be 
11 :i I .€ 
elevated portion above«your head? 
A'. 'Illiiil !, I In. iiiMuiiiJ LIIL) Lliat wub u. i d in 
that type of design. 
Q. And does this snorkel design prevent 
the ignition of flammable vapors? 
• ''""A. ' No. That design'has been tested an :1 
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1 it did light off flammable vapors. 
2 Q. Okay. And when you have a small area 
3 like this snorkel -- I guess it'd be coming up the side 
4 I of the waterheater? 
A. It could be. 
Q. When you have a small area like that 
for drawing combustion air, does that present a new risk 
because you'd so localize the area that you're drawing 
air from? 
A. It's easier to get closed off and 
prevent the combustion air from coming into the unit. 
Q. I supposed I should've gone to this 
point earlier, sir, it sounds to me as if what you're 
talking about is that poor combustion can happen either 
because the flow into the waterheater is restricted or 
the flow of combustion byproducts out of the waterheater 
is restricted; is that a fair characterization? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So, to the extent you have this small 
snorkel on the side of.the waterheater, that presents a 
risk of having a limitation on the inflow of combustion 
air? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know of any waterheater 
manufacturer who has designed this snorkel-type device 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING, INC. 
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1 for drawing in combustion air for standard waterheaters? 
2 A. Well, State Industries designed and 
3 tested one but it lit off the ignition vapors. 
4 Q. Do you know if anyone has a patent on 
5 this snorkel air design? 
6 A. I "in .not aware of a patent. 
7 I Q. Okay. The bucket, the Rheem bucket 
8 design that you're talking about earlier, sir, am I 
9 correct that the patent on the bucket was obtained some 
10 two or three years after this particular waterheater was 
11 manufactured? 
12 A. I believe it was. 
13 Q. Okay. Now, this patent, did the 
14 manufacturer Rheem, have they been out there selling them 
15 day in and day out? 
16 A. No. As far as I know, they never sold 
17 one. Their patent eventually was dedicated to the 
18 public, which meant anyone could use the patent. 
19 I Q. For any purpose? 
20 A* For* any purpose, yes. 
21 Q. Now, you had questions asked of you 
22 about a direct-vent waterheater, have you ever heard of a 
23 modified direct-vent where basically somebody takes the 
24 top off of a direct-vent waterheater? 
25 A. I think what you're referring to is 
BROWN & WINGO COURT PRPHPTTMC TWP 
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State Industries1 direct-vent waterheater. 
2 1 Q. That would be where somebody just 
3 removed the top, which is intended to be there, remove 
4 that top and just use the way it was without the top? 
5 I A. Yeah# it'd be the same as the 
snorkel-type design. 
Q. And did State Industries use that, the 
test you talked about with the snorkel, did they also 
test this modified direct-vent in the same series of 
tests? 
A. Yes. It pulled its air from the top 
of the heater. It was essentially a waterheater in a 
larger diameter jacket, that the air openings were on top 
of the heater. 
Q. And you've testified before, would 
your experience with the liquid smoke clearly show to you 
that that heavier-than-air vapor can get up to the top of 
that 56-inch high waterheater? 
A. Yes. 
THE, COURT: Mr. Murphy, how much more 
time do you need of this witness? 
MR. MURPHY: I'm probably going to 
need at least half an hour, if not a little 
more. . , 
THE COURT: We need to go ahead and 
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1 break for lunch, then. Ladies and gentlemen, 
2 while we break for lunch just leave your 
3 notebooks and pencils there on the seat. It's 
4 fifteen 'til twelve, I would ask you be back by 
5 one o'clock. And when you come back, report 
6 back into the jury room like you did before. 
7 (WHEREUPON, Jury out.) 
8 THE COURT: Court will be in recess to 
9 one o'clock. 
10 (WHEREUPON, a lunch 
11 recess was had.) 
12 THE COURT: We'll continue with the 
13 cross-examination of the witness. 
14 MR. MURPHY CONTINUES: 
15 Q. Now, Mr. Moore, I'll hand you what's 
16 been admitted into evidence as Defendants' Exhibit Number 
17 I 8. That's the installation manual for the direct-vent 
18 waterheater, is it not, sir? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 I Q. Now* sir, is there a limit, physical 
21 limit, on how far from the wall your direct-vent that was 
22 available in 1990 could be installed? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 I Q. And how far is that? 
25 A. I believe it was approximately 22 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING. TWP 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inches. 
2 1 Q. Okay. Now, above a direct-vent 
3 waterheater, what is the limit -- well, let me step back. 
4 J Do you know what the height is of the direct-vent 
waterheater? 
A. The height of it? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. Not without looking at the dimensions 
of it. 
Q. Okay. But is there a clearance above 
the vent pipe on a direct-vent waterheater? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there a clearance above the top of 
the waterheater? 
A. Yes, there is. 
Q. And what's that height? 
A. The minimum was 16 inches. 
Q. And that's for safety purposes; is 
that right, sir? 
A. Yes, to install the vent. 
Q. Okay. Now, if a direct-vent 
waterheater was located in a garage, under the National 
Fuel Gas Code would that have to be elevated on 18-inch 
stand? 
A. Yes, it would. 
nnnsmj r. TATTXTr»r* rwrroT •DVDrvDTTKfn rvrn 
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1 I Q. Now, you testified earlier today, sir, 
2 about the public awareness campaign that your company 
3 funded, to try and educate people on the uses of 
4 waterheaters and gasoline, about the risk of gasoline. 
5 Are you familiar with any of the materials that were 
6 circulated in connection with that campaign, sir? 
7 A. Yes, I was. 
8 I Q. I'd like to hand you what we've marked 
9 for identification as Defendants' Exhibit 47, this is a 
10 letter sent out on the GAMA letterhead. 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 J Q. That is what it is, sir? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And this is a letter from who to whom? 
15 A. It from GAMA to the plumbing 
16 professionals. 
17 Q. And what's attached to that document, 
18 sir? 
19 A. It's information about -- it's about 
20 the flammable-vapor safety material kit that was made 
21 available to plumbing professionals. 
22 I Q. And is there an order form attached to 
23 that for plumbing professionals, sir? 
24 A. Yes, there is. 
25 I Q. And was that part of the public 
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1 awareness campaign that the American Waterheater Company 
2 I funded in order to educate consumers about the risks of 
gasoline? 
A. Yes, it was. 
MR. MURPHY: Your Honor# we'll offer 
Defendants' Exhibit 47. 
7 1 MR. DOWNING: I have no objection. 
8 THE COURT: It'll be filed. 
9 (WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 47 
10 was filed in this cause.) 
11 Q. Now, I've got a tape here, a 
12 videotape, Mr. Moore, this has been marked for 
13 identification as Exhibit Number 49 and 50. As a part of 
14 the public awareness campaign did the Gas Appliance 
15 Manufacturers Association retain a consultant to prepare 
16 public service announcements? 
17 A. Yes, they did. 
18 I Q. And were those public service 
19 announcements broadcast nationally on television? 
20 A. Yesf they were. 
21 I Q. And was there a target audience for 
22 these particular public broadcasts? 
23 A. Consumers. 
24 Q. Was there any emphasis on males 
25 between the ages of 18 and 35? 
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A. That was one of the groups that was 
targeted. 
Q. And why was that group targeted, sir? 
A. Because of the use of gasoline. 
Q. Okay. And were the public service 
announcements, were they broadcast in connection with 
nationally-broadcast television programs? 
A. Yes, they were. Spots were actually 
bought in prime time. 
Q. Do you happen to remember amy of the 
names of television shows on which these public service 
announcements appeared nationally? 
A. No, but in Los Angeles I saw some of 
the spots on local television. 
Q. Okay. Now, in addition to educating 
the plumbing wholesalers and males particularly the age 
of 18 to 35, were there any efforts on the part of your 
cosipany through this public education campaign to provide 
information to teachers and educators about the risks of 
flammable vapors? 
A. Yes. As I said earlier, there were 
materials made available to schools to educate children. 
Q. Do you remember if there was a comic 
book which was prepared in connection with the Marvel 
Comic Book Company? 
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A. Yes, there was. 
2 1 Q. I'll show you what we've marked for 
3 identification as Exhibit 56, see if you're familiar with 
4 that, sir. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Is that a copy of the DareDevil Comic 
7 Book that your company and the trade association 
8 contracted with to prepare a comic book for children to 
9 learn about the risks of gasoline? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And is the hero of this comic book 
12 called DareDevil? 
13 A. Yes. And the villain, gasoline 
14 vapors, is called Vapor. 
15 MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, we'd offer 
16 Exhibit Number 56. 
17 MR. DOWNING: Your Honor, can we 
18 approach? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20
 a (WHEREUPON, a bench conference 
21 was had out of hearing.) 
22 MR. MURPHY CONTINUES: 
23 Q. And you had seen these public service 
24 announcements, had you not, Mr. Moore? 
25 A. Yes. 
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MR. MURPHY: We'll offer as 
Defendants' Exhibit Number 49 and 50, the public 
service announcements. 
MR. DOWNING: No objection. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit Nos. 49 and 
50 were filed in this cause.) 
MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, was there a 
ruling on the admissibility of Exhibit 56? I 
don't recall. 
THE COURT: I don't recall. 
MR. DOWNING: I don't recall it being 
offered. 
MR. MURPHY: We would offer it, thenf 
Defendants' Exhibit 56. 
MR. DOWNING: I have no objection. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit No. 56 
was filed in this cause.) 
Q. Mr. Moore, were there also, as a part 
of the consumer education campaign, materials that were 
prepared for teachers,.elementary teachers and 
kindergarten teacher -- actually, kindergarten through 
third grade --to help children to better understand the 
risks of ignition of flammable vapors? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. And, in fact, some of those even refer 
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1 to waterheaters as a potential ignition source for 
2 J gasoline; is that right, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want you to take a look real quickly 
here, sir, at Exhibit 53. Are you familiar with that as 
being a part of your consumer education campaign? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, really, right on Exhibit 53, what 
does it indicate in terms of potential ignition sources? 
A. Furnaces, stoves, waterheaters, 
clothes dryers, space heaters, electric items, motors, 
switches. 
Q. What about these items right here, 
14 | sir? 
A. Matches, lighters, candles, 
fireplaces, lanterns, space heaters, radiators, toasters, 
clothes irons, dryers, hair dryers, hot curlers, curling 
irons. 
Q. Here's another Exhibit, 55, see if 
you1re familiar with that, sir. That's Sparky the fire 
dog from the National Fire Protection Association; isn't 
that correct, sir? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And does that show a waterheater in 
the corner of a room on the third page -- fourth page, 
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sir? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. Okay. I'd like you to also look at 
these materials right here, these are more in the same 
line. This is an activity book, Exhibit 52, activity 
book for young children, elementary school? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that part of that public education 
campaign, sir? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Okay. And this Exhibit 58 which we've 
marked for identification, is that more of that same 
material, sir? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And finally, what we've marked as 
Exhibits 56 and 57, is that additional material in 
17 connection with the public education campaign? 
A. Yes, it is. 
MR. MURPHY: Your Honor, at this point 
we would offer into evidence Defendantss 
Exhibits 52, 53, 55, 56, 57 and 58. 
MR. DOWNING: No objection. 
(WHEREUPON, Exhibit Nos. 52, 
53, 55, 56, 57 and 58 were 
filed in this cause.) 
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Q. Now, you've testified earlier, sir, 
that in 1990 there was approximately fifty million 
waterheaters in operation, day in and day out, safely. 
Of that fifty million, approximately how many were 
American Waterheater Company waterheaters? 
A. Our company had about twenty percent 
of the market, so that would be approximately ten 
thousand. 
Q. Ten million or ten thousand? 
A. I mean ten million. 
Q. Now, we talked earlier about the 
development of this particular pictogram label and I 
don't know, sir, if I asked you what was the approximate 
cause, if you could estimate, for the development of this 
kind of label. I think we talked about the consultants 
and engineering time and so forth, could you --
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that in the range of tens of 
thousands of dollars? 
A. I don't know what the consultants cost 
but our engineering time, personnel involved, probably a 
hundred hours of our time. 
Q. Now, could you describe for the Jury 
the nature of the competitive relationship amongst the 
various waterheater manufacturers? 
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1 A. It's a very competitive industry. 
2 Extremely competitive. 
3 Q. Okay. Now, sir, you were shown 
4 Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 24, this is a document which is 
5 stamped draft; is that right, sir? 
6 A. Yes.. 
7 1 Q. Have you ever seen a final copy of 
8 this report, sir? 
9 A. I don't know whether I have or not. 
10 I Q. Do you know whether a final copy was 
11 ever prepared? 
12 A. No. No, I don't. 
13 Q. Okay. And so you wouldn't know, sir, 
14 if any of the conclusions reached or the opinions stated 
15 or the information contained in this document was changed 
16 when the document was finalized; correct, sir? 
17 A. No, I don't. 
18 Q. Now, sir, this particular waterheater, 
19 by virtue of the blue star, indicates that it's been 
20 certified as being in compliance with the ANSI code; is 
21 that right, sir? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 I Q. If this particular waterheater did not 
24 have that blue star on it, could this waterheater be sold 
25 here in the State of Tennessee? 
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1 A. No, it couldn't. 
2 Q. Why not, sir? 
3 A. All agencies1 building codes and all 
4 required it be a certified appliance. 
5 J Q. And certified to the ANSI code? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Does the ANSI code call for 18-inch 
legs on this waterheater? 
A. No, it doesn't. 
Q. Does the ANSI code require that only 
direct-vent waterheaters be used as opposed to this 
standard model? 
A. No, it doesn't. 
Q. Does the ANSI code require that a 
bucket of some sort be used around the bottom of the 
waterheater? 
A. No, it doesn't. 
Q. Do you know of any statute or code 
that requires a bucket? 
A. No., 
Q. If a bucket were on the bottom of this 
waterheater, would it coarply with the National Fuel Gas 
Code? 
A. No. It would still have to be* 
elevated. 
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1 Q. Do you have any understanding if the 
2 National Fuel Gas Code is followed here in the State of 
3 Tennessee? 
4 A. I believe it does. 
5 1 Q. Now, there was some questioning 
6 earlier, sir, about statistics, statistics of reported 
7 incidents. Do you know if those statistics that we 
8 looked at, those estimates -- first of all, do you know 
9 if they're estimates or not? 
10 A. As far as I know, they're estimates. 
11 I Q. And is it your understanding that the 
12 principal soixrce of those statistics are from something 
13 called NEISS? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 I Q. And is that the National Electronic 
16 Injury Reporting System? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 I Q. And is that maintained by the United 
19 States Consumer Product Safety Commission? 
20 A. I believe so. 
21 I Q. Okay. Does the Consumer Product 
22 Safety Commission warn people who use this data that the 
23 data is not to be interpreted to mean that a particular 
24 injury was caused by a particular identified appliance? 
25 A. No, I believe it says associated with 
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1 I a particular appliance, 
2 I Q. And isn't it correct that the CPSC 
actually gives a specific warning don't make the false 
assumption that because we have these statistics it means 
a particular product, whether it's a waterheater or some 
other appliance, caused the particular injury; is that 
right, sir? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, the database which is used, is 
that from tens of thousands of hospitals all across the 
country? 
A. No, I think it's a limited number of 
hospitals. 
Q. Well, could it be as few as a hundred 
hospitals that this database is used for? 
A. It could be. 
Q. Now, this Calspan report Mr. Downing 
asked you about before, this is a report, who paid for 
that report, do you have any understanding? 
A. Mr., Downing did, I believe. 
Q. And was that report publicly issued? 
You know, sent out by agencies and by the United States 
Government and so forth? 
A. No. Mr. Downing presented it to the 
25 I waterheater subcommittee. 
BROWN £ WTKrrm POTTPT PWDnDTTMr! T M P 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. After the date that this waterheater 
was manufactured? 
A, November 1991, 
4 J Q. Now, are you aware, sir, of any 
5 patents that have been obtained which address the issue 
6 J of attempting to prevent the ignition of flammable 
vapors? 
8 I A. By? What company? 
9 Q. Well, let's start with an affiliate of 
10 the American Waterheater Company. 
11 A. Yes. 
12 I Q. And when was that patent obtained? 
13 A. I believe it was last year. 
14 Q. And that was am affiliate which was 
15 located in Australia, sir? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. And you know some of the people who 
18 actually got the patent, don't you? 
19 A. I believe I know at least one 
20 individual who got it., 
21 Q. Jeff Woodford? 
22 A. Jeffrey Woodford, yes. 
23 Q. And you've gotten patents yourself, 
24 haven't you, sir? 
25 A. Yes, I have. 
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1
 J Q. What is getting a patent mean? Does 
2 that mean that this is a new idea, that it's one that a 
3 J prior art doesn't reveal it and it is new and not 
discovered before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was what caused you to get 
7 patents, wasn't it, sir? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 I Qv Now, Mr. Downing brought out a page of 
10 this Calspan report, I think it's page 48 he brought out. 
11 Did Mr. Downing ask you about what was contained on page 
12 52? 
13 A. No. 
14 I Q. Did you have an understanding of the 
15 fact that on page 52 of this report, four pages after the 
16 cite that Mr. Downing gave you, that the CPSC, the 
17 consultant, said that an 18-inch elevation gives no 
18 positive guarantee of the prevention of ignition of 
19 flammable vapors? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 I Q. Now, do you have any understanding as 
22 to whether the Consumer Product Safety Commission was of 
23 that view after this particular waterheater was 
24 manufactured? 
25 A. It's still in agreement with them. 
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1 I Q. And that's based on testing that's 
2 I been done? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the testing that was done of 
5 I 18-inch waterheaters (sic), was that done through funding 
6 by, in part, your company? 
7 f A. Yes. A.D. Little was contracted to do 
tests on waterheaters, both at floor level and elevation, 
with and without movement. 
10 I Q. This is a big national consulting 
11 firm? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. I assume it didn't come cheap, then? 
14 A. No, they werenft. 
15 Q. Was A.D. Little paid to hook up some 
16 tests to try and show that 18-inch elevation wouldn't 
17 work? 
18 A. Well, the tests were to get the 
19 information that the industry needed to decide what 
20 technology or development should be done. And as 
21 outgrowth of that, the consortium was started to develop 
22 technology that could prevent the ignition of flammable 
23 vapors. 
24 Q. Did A.D. Little, in a systemic, 
25 organized, scientific fashion, try to explore the 
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circumstances under which gasoline vapors ignited? 
A. Yes. During testing, winter blends of 
gasoline were used and summer blends of gasoline, and 
there were many, many tests run where there was a 
simulation of a person involved in the operation of the 
test where the gasoline was spilled and then the dummy 
was moved back and forth to simulate someone moving 
through the vapors. 
Q. And movement is very important to this 
whole issue of the ignition of flammable vapors; isn't 
it, sir? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Now, you understand that A.D. Little 
uses different temperatures of the room and the floor; 
you understand that, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They didn't conceal that, did they? 
A. No. All the parameters that the tests 
involved were reported in the report. 
Q. And,isn't it a fact that the A.D. 
Little Company, after it was found that there were some 
mistakes they had made, issued public clarifications, or 
errata sheets? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I'm not quite sure you understood 
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1 my first question, but A.D. Little, this national 
2 consulting firm, were they paid by the waterheater 
3 industry to phony-up, to hoak-up a set of tests to show 
4 the 18 inches wouldn't work? 
5 A. No. Absolutely not. 
6 Q. Would you, in your position, have 
7 permitted that to happen? 
8 A. No. The tests that they were going to 
9 do were presented, and on the tailend A.D. Little made a 
10 presentation to the waterheater industry before the test 
11 was done, and the industry picked A.D. Little to be the 
12 one. They we felt they could do the best job. 
13 Q. A.D. Little had actually done work 
14 before for your company, had it not? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And were you pleased with that work? 
17 A. Yes, I was. 
18 I Q. Did you believe they'd done a 
19 professional job, that they had exercised their best 
20 professional judgment?, 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Mr. Moore, I'll have a few more 
23 questions. While you were at the American Waterheater 
24 Company and the vice-president of engineering, did you 
25 instill a safety policy of that company? 
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A. Yes. 
Q- And what was that policy, sir? 
A. First of all, I wrote the quality-
control manual that the company used for their billing of 
their product. Quality-control actually reported to me 
during the years that I was vice-president, and, as such, 
I was able to make sure that our product was built to 
specification. 
Q. Was it your company, American 
Waterheater Company's policy to produce the safest 
waterheater you could? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And you're responsible for the design 
of this waterheater, are you not, sir? 
A. Yes, I am. 
16 
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Q. 
waterheaters ? 
A. 
Q. 
company, is it 
A. 
ti-
the ignition of 
company have us 
A. 
Did American Waterheater build unsafe 
No. 
Even one injury is of concern to the 
not, sir? 
Yes, it is. 
If there was a technical solution to 
flammable vapors in 1990, would the 
ed it? 
Absolutely. 
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Q. This waterheater in front of the Jury 
here, this complies with all industry and government 
standards, does it not? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. Do you believe that there's anything 
wrong with this waterheater? 
A. No, sir. 
MR. MURPHY: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Moore. Pass t h e w i t n e s s , Your Honor. 
R E - D I R E C T E X A M I N A T I O N 
BY MR. DOWNING: 
Q. Mr. Moore, it's not only your 
responsibility to make the safest product around but it 
was your duty, wasn't it? 
15 
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A. 
1 ( 
Q. 
Yes, 
Can you tell the Jury how many times 
those TV ads you're touting today were seen on the TV 
here in Loudon 
A. 
Q. 
here in Loudon 
A. 
Q. 
County? 
No, I can't. 
Do you know if they've ever been seen 
County? 
I have no way of knowing that. 
Do you know how many schools in Loudon 
County have these materials that Mr. Murphy's brought 
here today? 
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guarantee it, what we should do is ban them; right? 
A. Well, they say strong consideration 
should be given to prohibit other than direct-vents. 
Q. What would have happened to the sales 
of your gas-fired waterheaters, sir, if they ban them? 
A. I guess we would have went into 
direct-vent production. 
Q. Because they said direct-vent would 
prevent these fires, didn't they? 
A. They said it but we proved otherwise. 
Q. Mr. Murphy asked you if you knew about 
12 | this patent from Australia that was issued in '98? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you've been out of business since 
-- when did you retire, '96? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did you become aware of this 
patent? 
A. Jack Langmead informed me of it, at 
Calspan.
 5 
Q. Oh, okay. So you still keep in 
contact with them? 
A. Sometimes. 
Q. You brought up the fact that you were 
shown some statistics from the NFPA which you say that I 
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A. No, I think youfve mischaracterized 
it. It will reduce the number of instances. And if it 
does delay it, yes, there's going to be a larger 
explosion. 
Q. Oh, So you're telling me, see if I 
understand this, you say that elevation of the air intake 
18 inches will, in fact, reduce the number of victims; 
right? 
MR. MURPHY: Objection, 
mischaracterizes his testimony. He's talking 
about the stand. 
MR. DOWNING: Stand? 
Q. Did I understand you to say that 
elevation will reduce the numbers of fires that occur by 
the ignition of flammable vapors? 
A. We believe, so. 
Q. Okay, all right. So, you're not 
saying that if we elevate this we're still going to have 
a fire, it's just going to be a bigger boom? 
A. Depends on the spill of gasoline. 
Q. So, if I understand you, you think 
elevation is a good idea? 
A, In certain instances, yes. 
Q. You're not going to question the fact 
that if the gas company Loudon Comity recommends 
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elevation you wouldn't tell them that's a bad idea, would 
you? 
A. No. 
Q. You would tell them that you believe 
elevation will reduce the number of these fires; correct? 
A. . Yes. 
Q« And so, Mr. Moore, if you believe it 
would reduce the number of these fires, you still also 
believe that you shouldn't provide a device and let the 
consumer do it, do you? 
A. Are you saying should we include the 
stand? 
Q. Include the stand. 
A. No. 
Q. You've talked about this bucket 
device, this Rheem patent you said you saw. You've seen 
it, haven't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And doesn't that patent say the 
elevation of the air intake will substantially lessen the 
possibility of ignition of flammable vapors? 
A. I'm sorry, repeat the question. 
Q. Doesn't that patent that you were 
asked question about by Mr. Murphy state in there that 
elevation of the air intake 18 inches substantially 
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at that point? 
2 I A. Not at that point. 
3 Q. Do you all make a bucket? 
4 J A. No, we do not. 
Q. Did you voice this concern to the 
people who got the patent at Rheexn Manufacturing Company? 
A. I don't believe anyone in the industry 
thought it was a good idea. 
Q. Well, you talked about the good things 
about patents, you know that Rheem went out and got a 
patent on that, don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. First question out of the box when you 
hit the stand that Mr. Murphy asked you dealt with this 
i 
chart, remember that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Murphy talk to you about this 
chart before you hit the stand? 
A. No# he did not. 
Q. He didn't? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he tell you you made a boo-boo 
when you said something up there earlier? 
A. No. Haven't talked to him. 
Q. Prior to 1990, your coapany knew that 
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if the waterheaters had been installed on stands that 
2 J that would substantially reduce the likelihood that 
3 I someone gets involved in one of these fires; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And with that knowledge, you all made 
the conscious decision, for whatever reasons, not to 
enclose a stand with the product; right? 
A. I thought I answered that question 
before. 
Q. And that was yes; correct? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Let's stay with redirect. 
MR. DOWNING: He did answer the 
question, Your Honor, I think. 
Q. When you made that decision, when you 
made that conscious decision you knew that persons would 
continue to be burned as a result of ignition of 
flammable vapors as long as this standard model was sold 
without a stand? 
A. That it was possible to happen, yes. 
Q. You knew that it would continue to 
happen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You mentioned about the number of 
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1 waterheaters out there, you all said you had twenty 
2 percent of thet market, fifty million waterheaters, 
3 J twenty million waterheaters; right? 
A. No. 
Q. Ten million? 
A. Ten million. 
Q. How many waterheaters of this design 
did you all put out on an annual basis? 
A. Probably about 700,000. 
Q. 700,000 a year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that a fair estimate to say for a 
ten-year period of '85 to '95 700,000 of these 
standard-model waterheaters each year? 
A. Each year, yes. 
Q. You were asked a lot of questions 
about these standards, these are the same standards that 
the committee on which you sat; correct? The ANSI 
Z2110.1 committee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that every change to the design of 
this waterheater has to go through the committee that you 
served on with the rest the manufacturer's reps; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's a voluntary standard, it's 
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not the force of law, is it? 
A. It's the standard that is used to 
certify that type of product. 
Q. It's a voluntary standard? 
A, It's not a government standard. 
Q. And there's no rule that says you all 
can't make it better than the standard, is there? 
A. No, 
Q. In fact, when you all started using 
this label for the first time it wasn't required by the 
standard, was it? 
A, No, it was adopted later. 
Q. You all chose to go ahead and do it 
because you thought it would make it safe? 
A. YeS. 
Q. So if you chose to enclose a stand, 
your waterheater would still comply with that standard, 
wouldn't it? 
A. Yes, it would. 
Q. Mr., Murphy asked you to explain why 
the burner is located where it is, and he was holding up 
his hand up here. You still agree with me, though, that 
there is no reason why you have to take your air for 
combustion from the floor up, is there? 
A. It's the most economical way. 
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1 I Q. Other than being the cheapest way, 
2 I there's no reason that the air for combustion has to be 
taken from the floor level; isn't that right? 
A. No, direct-vents take it from at the 
top. 
Q. So the answer to my question is 
there's no reason? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Weren't you aware when you left the 
industry that there were other manufacturers making these 
stubby waterheaters, the 40-inch-high waterheaters? I'm 
sorry, Low-Boy waterheaters. Were you aware when you 
left the industry that other manufacturers were making 
these Low-Boys? 
A. I don't know if they were still in 
production at that time but I knew other manufacturers 
did make them, yes. 
Q. And they obviously found a market for 
them, I presume? 
A. I assume they did. 
MR. DOWNING: Could I have one minute, 
Your Honor? 
(WHEREUPON, a pause in 
the proceedings.) 
Q. You were asked some questions by Mr. 
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Murphy about something that was marked as Defense Exhibit 
Number 40, and he was telling you that the numbers for 
1991 of these victims were 165 injuries; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's just with gasoline; right? 
A* Yes. 
Q. The problem with this is not just 
gasoline but other flammable vapors too; isn't that 
right? 
, A. Correct. 
Q. And so what happened is that this 
committee went back, this staff went back four days later 
and gave us the estimates including all flammable vapors; 
isn't that right? That was in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit Number 
71? 
A. The number was different. 
Q. The number then went, when they looked 
at all flammables it was 316 persons --
A. No, the majority of them involved 
gasoline.
 % 
Q. Right, but the total number involved 
with flammables vapors and gasoline was 316 for 991? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. And that's the real hazard with this, 
25 I is all flammable vapors; right? 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPORTING, INC. 
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A. Yes. 
MR. DOWNING: Thank you, sir. 
MR. MURPHY: Just a few more, Your 
Honor. 
R E - C R O S S E X A M I N A T I O N 
BY MR. MURPHY: 
Q. Mr. Moore, Mr. Langmead doesn't work 
for the American Waterheater Company, does he? 
A. No, he doesn't. 
Q. He's just a friend of yours in the 
industry, isn't he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Downing asked you about the 
CPSC, that Calspan report, and the recommendation about 
direct-vents in the garage, do you recall that, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the CPSC, any state, federal, or 
local governmental agency, volunteer association, what 
have you, ever require that only direct-vent waterheaters 
be used in garages? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, let's talk about statistics here, 
sir, and I think you indicated there has been a decrease 
in the number, and I think you attributed it to this 
label. Sir, to the extent people read, pay attention to, 
BROWN & WINGO COURT REPOPTTTJO run 
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JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
KARA L. PETTIT (A8659) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DaputyCtek 
MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
SUTTON & MURPHY 
26056 Acero 
Mission Viejo, California 92691 
Telephone: (949) 206-0550 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing 
and American Water Heater Co. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN LUND 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., etc., et al., Civil No. 980905332 
Defendants. 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, 
INC., 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W.KENT NELSON, etal., 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Third Party Defendants. 
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STATEOFUTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, John R. Lund, being first duly sworn, state as follows: 
1. I am an individual over the age of 21 residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
and have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances alleged in this affidavit. 
2. I am an attorney at Snow, Christensen & Martineau and represent American 
Appliance Manufacturing Corp. and American Water Heater Co. [hereinafter "American"] in 
this case. 
3. On behalf of American, we filed a third-party complaint against the apartment 
owners solely for purposes of apportionment of fault. We have not pursued this third-party 
complaint whatsoever in light of the 1999 statutory amendments to allow fault to be apportioned 
to non-parties. We have never sought to have the Nelsons answer the third-party complaint. 
4. On October 10,2000,1 attended a pretrial conference in Judge Stirba's chambers. 
Keith Griffin was present via telephone as counsel for plaintiff. During this pretrial conference, 
counsel discussed with the Court whether this case should be set for a bench or a jury trial. 
Judge Stirba set the matter for a bench trial, and explicitly instructed Plaintiffs counsel to 
promptly file a motion if Plaintiff desired to raise the issue of trial by jury. Plaintiffs counsel did 
not object to the Court's directives. 
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5. As counsel for American, we relied upon Judge Stirba's unopposed Scheduling 
Order and have prepared for a bench trial. Preparation for a bench trial, especially one 
encompassing punitive damages claims as this case does, entails much different strategies, witness 
and evidentiary considerations than a jury trial. Due to work-product and attorney-client 
privileges, it is not workable to publicly divulge the specifics of how our trial preparation would 
have been different had this case been set for trial by jury. However, we would be willing to 
discuss the details of the differences with the Court in camera outside the presence of all other 
parties. 
DATED this ± day of May, 2001 
JohnR^dnd 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisV^ day of May, 2001. i y^flay 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
GAIL M1KOLASH 
10 Exchange PI., 11th Rr. 
tffeatogity, Utah 84111 
My Commission ExptaM 
July 15,2002 
STATE OF UTAH 
u. &*—^x^ 
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STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third JudiciahDistrict 
A F F I D A V I T 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
ROBERT G, GILCHRIST, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: ^ ^ Clartc 
1. At one time I was the attorney of record for Eagle Hardware and Garden 
Company ("Eagle") in a lawsuit styled Anna Maria Alarid v, American Appliance 
Manufacturing, Inc. et al, Civil No. 980905332, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. 1 personally recall filing an answer on behalf of defendant Eagle in that lawsuit. 
3. I have been informed that the court records indicate that I included a jury demand 
in that answer. 
4. 1 have been informed that the court records indicate that the $50 jury fee was not 
paid at the time a jury was requested. 
5. I have no personal knowledge as to whether the jury fee was paid. 
6. In my entire career as a lawyer, starting when I became a member of the Utah Bar 
in 1982, until the current date, I have never filed a jury demand and then intentionally not paid 
the jury fee; therefore, if my office did not pay the jury fee in Hie Alarid case, this was due to an 
oversight. 
Further, Affiant sacth not. 
Robett G. Gilchrist 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this ' f ^ d a y of May 2001, by Robert 
G.Gilchrist 
Notary PuWte T 
ANDREA R. MARTINEZ I 
7400 South State St. f 12206 * 
Mldvale UT 84047 I 
My comtesion Expires 
October 10,2004 I 
State of Utah 
Motary Public, State 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
MINUTES 
JURY TRIAL 
Case No: 980905332 PI 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE MANUFACTURI 
Et al, : Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Defendant. : Date: October 29, 2001 
Clerk: marcyt 
Reporter: YOUNG, BRAD BRADY 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES G O'CALLAHAN 
MITCHEL ZAGER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL S SUTTON 
JOHN R LUND 
Other Parties: GARY E. ATKIN 
Video 
TRIAL 
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for the first day 
of trial. Voir Dire is conducted and a panel of eight jurors and 
one alternate is selected to wit: John Hancock, Travis Morris, 
Mary Clark, Bruce Harvey, Tia Hill, Nedra Stott, Sheila Pea, 
Don Clements and Peggy Ames. 
The jury is excused and instructed to return at 9:30 a.m. 
tomorrow. Out of the presence of the jury, defendant's motion for 
bifurcation is argued to the Court by respective counsel and 
denied. The Court hears argument regarding Mr. Lund and Mr. Sutton 
representing separate defendants. The Court rules they are 
allowed to represent separate defendants and Mr. Sutton would not 
be required to obtain other local counsel. 
This being the hour of adjournment, further trial is continued to 
TJ-*^.^ 
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JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., a California 
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER 
HEATER CO., a Nevada Corporation, 
INSTALLATION PRODUCTS DIVISION 
OF ARMSTRONG WORLD 
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania 
Corporation, and EAGLE HARDWARE & 
GARDEN, INC., a Washington 
Corporation, and DOES I through 25, 
Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR ADMISSION 
PRO HAC VICE 
OF MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
Case No. 980905332 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co., by and 
through their counsel of records, John R. Lund of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, hereby moves 
the Court for an Order allowing the admission of pro hac vice of Michael S. Sutton of the law 
firm of Sutton & Murphy, 26056 Acero, Mission Viejo, California 92691, for all purposes 
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relating to the representation of defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and American 
Water Heater Co., before this Court in this action. As is set forth in the Affidavit of Michael S. 
Sutton, he has never been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, he is competent to 
represent the defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co., 
in this litigation, and has, in fact, represented American Appliance Manufacturing and American 
Water Heater Co. prior to the time of the filing of the Complaint in this Court. Mr. Sutton is 
licensed to practice law in the State of California. The undersigned shall act as local counsel in 
this matter and shall ensure that all pleadings, discovery and other proceedings in this litigation 
conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Evidence, the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration and other applicable Utah law. 
DATED this Q£p day of October, 1998. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN^S^^TINEAU 
By C^^> J?* 
John R. Lunjjx^ 
Attorneys for Defendants American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
N:\19944\l\PROHACVL3RD 
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JOHN R. LUND (A4368) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
By. 
JAN 1 5 1999 
UNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
MANUFACTURING, INC., a California 
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER 
HEATER CO., a Nevada Corporation, 
INSTALLATION PRODUCTS DIVISION 
OF ARMSTRONG WORLD 
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania 
Corporation, and EAGLE HARDWARE & 
GARDEN, INC., a Washington 
Corporation, and DOES I through 25, 
Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
ORDER FOR ADMISSION 
PRO HAC VICE 
OF MICHAEL S. SUTTON 
Case No. 980905332 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Based upon the Motion of the defendants, American Appliance Manufacturing and 
American Water Heater Co., the Affidavit submitted by the applicant for admission pro hac vice, 
and for good cause shown, 
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THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Michael S. Sutton, of the law firm of Sutton & 
Murphy, 26056 Acero, Mission Viejo, California 92691, is hereby admitted to practice before 
this Court, pro hac vice, for the purpose of representing the defendants, American Appliance 
Manufacturing and American Water Heater Co., in this litigation. 
DATED this ( J day Of C l a p IA&/UJ . 199ff 
BY THE COURT: 
Ch 
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Third District Court Judge 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
801-964-6100 
GIRARDI | KEESE 
Thomas V. Girardi (36603) 
James G. O'Callahan (126975) 
1126 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
213-977-0211 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, ANNA MARIE ALARID 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID ) 
) PLAINTIFF, ANNA MARIE ALARID'S, 
Plaintiff, ) EXHIBIT LIST 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 980905332 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE ) 
MANUFACTURING, INC., a California ) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Corporation, AMERICAN WATER ) 
HEATER CO., a Nevada Corporation, ) 
INSTALLATION PRODUCTS DIVISION ) 
OF ARMSTRONG WORLD ) 
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Pennsylvania ) 
Corporation, EAGLE HARDWARE & ) 
GARDEN, INC., a Washington ) 
Corporation, and DOES 1 through 25, ) 
Inclusive ) 
Defendants. ) 
r
^! !» lC0 0 HT Judicial District 
c
^«yS5r 
i 
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TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD: 
Plaintiff, ANNA MARIE ALARID, hereby submits the following exhibit list: 
1. All discovery propounded by Plaintiff, Anna Marie Alarid, to Defendant, American Water 
Heater Co., and responses thereto. 
2. All discovery propounded by Defendant, American Water Heater Co., to Plaintiff, Anna 
Marie Alarid, and responses thereto. 
3. Container of Henry 263 Outdoor Carpet Adhesive involved in subject incident. 
4. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Anna Marie Alarid (4.20.1999). 
5. Deposition and exhibits thereto of James Berkely (11.17.1999). Ellis/Mitchell v. American 
Water Heater Co. 
6. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Ron Carbonc (11.16.1998). Ellis/Mitchell v. American 
Water Heater Co. 
7. Deposition and exhibits thereto ofKristyFarnsworth (3.28.2000). 
8. Deposition and exhibits thereto ofBoydFjeldsted (3.27.2000). 
9. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Rudolph Gomez, Sr. (4.21.1999). 
10. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Deborah Hilton from Ellis/Mitchell v. American Water 
Heater Co. (11.17.1999). 
11. Deposition and exhibits thereto of John Hoffman (5.15.2000). 
12. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Charles Jacobson (5.16.2000). 
13. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Edward Karnes (6.7.2000). 
14. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Edward Karnes (7.17.2000). 
15. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Jean McDowell (5.8.2000). 
16. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Henry Jack Moore, Jr. (1.8.1999). Ellis/Mitchell v. 
American Water Heater Co. 
17. Trial testimony of Henry Jack Moore. Ellis/Mitchell v. American Water Heater Co. 
18. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Charles Morin (5.5.2000). 
? 
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19. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Stephen Morris (2.18.2000). 
20. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Cameron Nelson (3.10.2000). 
21. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Wayne Kent Nelson (12.8.1998). 
22. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Donald Wandling (2.23.1999). 
23. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Donald Wandling (6.23.2000). 
24. Deposition and exhibits thereto of Harold Zeliger (4.13.2000). 
25. Joseph Fandey, 1967-1969 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
Meeting Minutes with Hand Written Note of the Subcommittee on Standards for 
Installation of Gas Appliances and Gas Piping (12.12-14.1967) 
Meeting Minutes of the Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters (9.10-
11.1998) 
Memorandum (9.19.1969) 
26. Joseph Fandey, 1970-1976 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
Third Annual Report (Fiscal Year 1971) 
Subcommittee on Standard for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes and Appendices 
(12.4-5.1973) 
Water Heater Division GAMA 223rd Meeting Minutes and Appendices (12.12.1993) 
Heat Required to Supply Daily Quota of Hot Water Code (1974) 
Flammable Liquid Fabric Ignition Accidents Special Report (4.1974) 
Neiss News Volume 3, No. 2 (8-9.1974) 
CPSA Fact Sheet #23-Flammable Liquids (9.1974) 
CPSC Product Related Injuries Associated with Water Heaters (1.20.1975) 
Calspan Report (2.1975) 
Water Heating Division GAMA Meeting Minutes and Appendix (4.9.1975) 
Water Heating Division GAMA Meeting Minutes and Appendices (6.12.1975) 
Calspan Report (7.1975) 
3 
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• Water Heating Division GAMA Meeting Minutes (8.7.1975) 
• Letter (9.19.1975) 
• Letter (9.19.1975) 
• Letter (2.27.1975) 
• Report (Fiscal Year 1976) 
• GAMA Review of Residential Gas Appliance Standards Report Results, Attachment and 
Appendix (2.9.1976) 
• Calspan Report (2.1976) 
• Subcommittee on Standard for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes (6.16-17.1976) 
• Letter (8.12.1976) 
• Switch to Nonflammable Solvents Pays Off in Safety Article Reprint (12.1976) 
Joseph Fandey, 1977 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
• List of Questions Which May Be Addressed to the Speakers (1977) 
• CPSC Memorandum (1.3.1977) 
• CPSC Memorandum (1.4.1977) 
• Roberts Consolidated Industries, Inc. Letter (1.26.1977) 
• CPSC Memorandum (2.1.1997) 
• Pierce & Stevens Chemical Corp. Letter (2.8.1977) 
• A.D. Little Letter (2.23.1997) 
• ConTech, Inc. Letter (3.1.1977) 
• CPSC Letter (3.15.1977) 
• CPSC Memorandum (3.16.1977) 
• CPSC Memorandum (3.16.1977) 
• CPSA Meetings Minutes (4.1.1977) 
• A.D. Little Memorandum (5.3.1977) 
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CPSC Federal Register (7.13.1977) 
Letter (7.15.1977) 
Letter (7.19.1977) 
Letter (7.20.1977) 
Letter (7.20.1977) 
U.S. Department of Commerce Letter (8.12.1977) 
Letter (8.12.1977) 
Letter (8.16.1977) 
Comments on 16 CFR Part 1145 and 1302 (8.17.1977) 
West Shore Fire District Letter (8.18.1977) 
Franklin Chemical Ind. Letter (8.19.1977) 
Letter (8.22.1977) 
Letter (8.22.1977) 
Wilhold Glues, Inc. Letter (8.24.1977) 
Letter (8.25.1977) 
CPSC Memorandum (8.26.1977) 
Presentation of Proposed Ban of Certain Extremely Flammable Contact Adhesives 
(8.29.1977) 
Borden, Inc. Letter (8.31.1977) 
Dow Letter (9.2.1977) 
Roberts Consolidated Ind. Letter (9.2.1977) 
CPSC Memorandum (9.9.1997) 
Economic Analysis/Environmental Assessment of Ban on Extremely Flammable Contact 
Adhesives (11.1977) 
Negative Declaration on Extremely Flammable Contact Adhesives (11.23.1977) 
5 
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CPSC Memorandum (11.28.1977) 
CPSC Memorandum (11.29.1977) 
CPSC Memorandum (12.2.1977) 
Federal Register (11.19.1977) 
Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 243 (12.19.1977) 
;eph Fandey, 1978-1987 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
CPSP Hazardous Flammable Liquids (3.1979) 
CPSP Ban on Hazardous Products Extremely Flammable Contact Adhesives Packed in 
Containers in Excess of Vi Pint (7.5.1979) 
CPSC Hazard Identification and Analysis National Injury Information Clearing House 
(10.8.1979) 
National Fuel Gas Code ANSI Z223.1 (1980) 
State Industries Claim Department Retention Policy Memorandum (5.19.1980) 
CPSC Revised Product Safety Fact Sheet (9.1980) 
CPSC Fire Hazards Associated with Gas Water Heaters (11.1982) 
Z21 American National Standard Committee Letter (5.6.1983) 
Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes and Appendices 
(5.25-25.1983) 
Z21 American National Standard Committee Letter (7.8.1983) 
Residential Structure Fires Involving Flammable/Combustible Liquids Graph (1980-84) 
Revision of 12.1983 Engineering Analysis of Gas-Fires Water Heater's In-Depth 
Investigations (1.1984) 
Subcommittee on Standard for Gas Water Heaters Meeting Minutes (11.27-29.1984) 
Z21 Accredited Standard Committee Letter (12.14.1984) 
CPSC Memorandum (10.8.1995) 
Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-21 (2.1986) 
6 
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• Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-22 (3.1986) 
• Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-23 (5.1986) 
• Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-24 (6.1986) 
• ANSI Z535.4 Product Safety Signs and Labels Draft Report (1.1987) 
• Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-27 (4.1987) 
• White-Rodgers Division Memorandum (5.29.1987) 
• Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-28 (6.1987) 
• Residential Structure Fires Involving Flammable/Combustible Liquids Graph (1980-84) 
• White-Rodgers Division Memorandum (7.12.1987) 
• Connecticut National Gas Corporation Letter (8.28.1987) 
• Memorandum (9.9.1987) 
• Memorandum (9.17.1987) 
• GAMA Memorandum (11.2.1987) 
• Residential Gas Fired Water Heater Manual 0290785-29 (11.1987) 
Joseph Fandey, 1988-1990 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
• NFP A-AG A National Fuel Gas Code (1988) 
• GAMA Letter (3.24.1988) 
• GAMA Residential Gas Fired Water Heaters Manual (4.1988) 
• GAMA Committee Meeting Report (6.14.1988) 
• GAMA Committee Meeting Report (8.24.1988) 
• Survey on Safety Labels for Water Heaters (9.29.1988) 
• Southern Gas Association Letter (10.31.1988) 
• GAM A Committee Meeting Report (10.17.1988) 
• Preliminary Report (10.1.1988) 
7 
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Consumer Survey on Safety Labels (12.14.1988) 
Final Report (1.16.1989) 
GAM A Memorandum (1.23.1989) 
National Estimates Approach to U.S. Fire Statistics, Volume 25, Number 2, Pages 99-113 
(5.1989) 
Gas Water Heaters National Standard for Volume I Storage Water Heaters with Input 
Ratings of 75,000 Btu Per Hour or Less (1990) 
30. Joseph Fandey, 1991 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
American National Standard Criteria for Safety Symbols (1991) 
Top Twenty Appliances Igniting Gasoline Vapors in Dwellings (1991) 
Advances in Industrial Ergonomics and Safety III Report (1991) 
Proceedings of the Human Factors Society Meeting (1991) 
Memorandum (4.8.1991) 
CPSC Memorandum (4.23.1991) 
Meeting Minutes of Counsel Representing Members of the Water Heating Division 
GAMA (5.14.1991) 
Meeting Minutes Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Information and Education of the 
Water Heating Division GAMA (10.18.1991) 
Presentation of Edward F. Downing, III of Gauthier & Murphy (11.13.1991) 
CPSC Memorandum (11.21.1991) 
31. Joseph Fandey, 1992 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
National Fuel Gas Code Handbook, 2d. Edition (1992) 
Standards for the Twenty-Fourth Edition of the Standard for Gas Water Heaters 
(1.20.1992) 
CPSC Memorandum (1.8.1992) 
Minutes Legal Counsel and Risk Managers of Water Heater Division Members GAMA 
(1.30.1992) 
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Position Paper-CPSC Working Group on a Standard for Gas Water Heaters to Prevent 
Ignition of Flammable Vapors (2.1992) 
U.S. Patent Documents (2.4.1992) 
Letter (3.6.1992) 
Minutes of Meeting of Working Group Addressing Suggested Revisions to Reduce 
Possible Ignition of Flammable Vapors by Volume I Water Heaters (3.17-18.1992) 
Letter (4.20.1992) 
Report-Meeting of Technical Representatives of GAMA Water Heater Division Members 
that Manufacture Residential Gas Storage Water Heaters GAMA (6.4.1992) 
Memorandum (6.21.1992) 
GAMA Water Heater Safety (6.23.1992) 
Minutes of the Product Liability Counsel/Risk Managers and the Consumer Information 
and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division GAMA (6.23.1992) 
A.D. Little Preliminary Review of Issues Related to Water Heater Safety (6.24.192) 
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. Letter (8.5.1992) 
Meeting Minutes Water Heater Division GAMA (8.12-13.1992) 
Letter (8.28.1992) 
Meetings Minutes (9.2.1992) 
Meetings Minutes of Working Group Addressing Suggested Revision to Reduce Possible 
Ignition of Flammable Vapors by Volume I Water Heaters (9.9.1992) 
Engineering Sciences Proposal Distribution (9.9.1992) 
Loran Nordgren & Company Letter (9.22.1992) 
Z21 Accredited Standard Committee Letter (11.5.1992) 
Final Report of Work Letter (11.10.1992) 
Letter (11.12.1992) 
Memorandum (11.17.1992) 
HWH Flammable Vapor Incident Reports (11.17.1992) 
9 
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Meetings Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Information and Education of 
the Water Heater Division of GAMA (11.30.1992) 
Transmittal (11.30.1992) 
Report (12.2.1992) 
eph Fandey, 1993 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
GAMA Meeting Report (1.11.1993) 
Water Heater Division GAMA Membership Report (3.1993) 
GAMA Report on Election of Water Heater Division Officers (4.1993) 
Letter (4.6.1993) 
Summary Report to GAMA (4.8.1993) 
Letter (4.9.1993) 
Settlement Papers for Edwin W. Peart v. State Industries (4.9.1993) 
GAMA Notebook (3.4-4.13.1993) 
Consumer Information and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division Gas 
Appliance Manufacturers Association Report (4.25.1993) 
Case Leaders Detail Report of Expenses as Reported on the Case Status Report 
(4.30.1993) 
Summary of Tests (5.3-21.1993 
Z21 Meeting Announcement (5.17.1993) 
Consumer Information and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division Gas 
Appliance Manufacturers Association Report (7.1.1993) 
Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study GAMA Report (7.6.1993) 
Fire Gas Voluntary Standards (7.13.1993) 
GAMA Flammable Vapor Standards Study (6.16 & 7.15.1993) 
A.D. Little Study (7.15.1993) 
Letter (7.23.1993) 
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33. 
Letter (8.20.1993) 
CPSC Memorandum (9.16.1993) 
Consumer Information and Education Committee of the Water Heater Division Gas 
Appliance Manufacturers Association Report (9.29.1993) 
Sub-Case Status Report (11.19.1993) 
Letter (11.24.1993) 
Joseph Fandey, 1.1994-8.1994 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
GATC Focus Publication (1.1994) 
Letter (1.19.1994) 
Letter (1.20.1994) 
GAMA Safety Awareness Program on Flammable Vapor Fires (2.1994) 
Ballot Vote Sheet to CPSC Commission (2.4.1994) 
Meeting of Z21 Committee (2.23.1994) 
Letter (3.10.1994) 
Letter (3.11.1994) 
Letter (3.28.1994) 
Memorandum (4.12.1994) 
Letter (4.14.1994) 
Letter (4.15.1994) 
Letter (4.18.1994) 
Letter (4.21.1994) 
Letter (4.21.1994) 
Letter (4.22.1994) 
Letter (5.9.1994) 
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Briefing Package on Gas Fired Water Heaters Concerning Ignition of Flammable Vapors 
Certificate (6.8.1994) 
Letter (6.27.1994) 
Memorandum (6.27.1994) 
CPSC Office of Commissioner Mary Sheila Gall Meeting Log (6.28.1994) 
Z21/CGA Joint Subcommittee on Standards for Connectors for Gas Appliances 
(6.29.1994) 
Letter (7.7.1994) 
Letter (7.28.1994) 
Letter (8.1.1994) 
Final Report and Appendix (8.15.1994) 
Letter (8.17.1994) 
Meeting Log Directorate for Engineering Services (8.30.1994) 
34. Joseph Fandey, 9.1994-12.1994 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
Memorandum and Minutes on Z21/CGA Working Group (9.12.1994) 
Memorandum to Donald W. Switzer (9.16.1994) 
Memorandum to Donald W. Switzer (9.22.1994) 
Memorandum to Members of the Water Heater Technical Advisory Group (9.30.1994) 
Flammable Vapor Tech. Advisory Group Minutes and Attachments (10.27.1994) 
Flammable Vapor Test Results of a Snorkel Combustion Air Duct System (11.1994) 
Memorandum to Ronald L. Medford (11.14.1994) 
Briefing Package with Certificate (11.29.1994) 
Donald Switzer Letter (12.6.1994) 
35. Joseph Fandey, 1995 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
• Code of Federal Regulation Part 1000 to End (1.1.1995) 
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• Meetings Minutes of the Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group (1.10.1995) 
• Meetings Minutes of the Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group (3.30-31.1995) 
• Letter (4.5.1995) 
• FireXX Technology for Potential Publications as a Residential Water Heater Flame and 
Explosion Arrcstor (5.4.1995) 
• Final Report (5.6.1995) 
• Memorandum (5.22.1995) 
• Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group Meeting Minutes (6.12-13.1995) 
• Flammable Vapor Technical Advisory Group Meeting Minutes (8.8-9.1995) 
Joseph Fandey, 1996-1998 Flammable Vapors Materials: 
• CPSC Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors (3.1996) 
• Flammable Vapor Test Methodology Development for Gas-Fired Water Heaters Final 
Report (4.1996) 
• Letter (5.6.1996) 
• Product Market Research (5.9.1996) 
• First Report for Attorney Dennis Brown (5.29.1996) 
• State Trial List on Flammable Vapors (6.7.1996) 
• U.S. Home Heating Fire Patterns and Trends Through 1994 Report (10.1996) 
• Memorandum (10.15.1996) 
• CPSC and Gas-Fired Water Heaters Network Newsletter (2.24.1997) 
• Letter (3.11.1997) 
• Letter Draft (4.9.1997) 
• CPSC Network Newsletter (5.6.1997) 
• Hot Water Heater Testing Report (5.8.1997) 
• Index of Consortium Documents (6.30.1997) 
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• CPSC Network Newsletter (7.7.1997) 
37. John I loffman\s Elevation and Plainview Schematics Drawings 
38. Plaintiff, Anna Marie Aland's, Medical and Billing Records. 
39. Presentation and exhibits thereto of Edward Downing, 111 before ANSI Z21.I0.1 
Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Fired Water Heaters (11.13.1991). 
40. Donald Switzer, Briefing Package for Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable 
Vapors. 
41. Donald Switzer, Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors 
(1). 
42. Donald Switzer, Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors 
(2). 
43. Donald Switzer, Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors 
(March 1996). 
44. Trial Testimony and exhibits thereto of Henry Jack Moore, Jr. in Ellis/Mitchell v. American 
Water Heater Co. (3.2.1999). 
45. Video: American Water Heater Flame Guard; Ann Brown. 
46. Water heater involved in subject incident. 
47. NEISS News Injuries Associated with Water Heaters, Aug. 1974. 
48. CPSC Fact Sheet No. 65 Gas Water Heaters, Aug. 1975. 
49. Identification and Classification of Potential Hazards Associated with the use of Residential 
Flame-Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes Dryers and Ranges, Report No. YG-
5569-D-2, Calspan Corporation, February 1975. 
50. Investigation of Safety Standards for Flame-Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes 
Dryers and Ranges, Report No. YG-5569-D-3, Calspan Corporation, July 1975. 
51. Results of GAMA Review of Residential Gas Appliance Standards based on Review of 
Investigation of Safety Standards for Flame-Fired Furnaces, Hot Water Heaters, Clothes 
Dryers and Ranges (Calspan Corp), NEISS Data and Industry Service Experience, February 
1976. 
52. Z21/CGA Joint Water Heater Subcommittee Meetings, Appendix E to the Minutes of the 
July 28-29, 1998 Meeting Including the Prefactory Statement for the GAMA Test Method. 
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53. Z21/CGA Joint Water Heater Subcommittee Meetings, Report from Working Group 
Addressing Suggested Revisions to Reduce Possible Ignition of Flammable Vapors by 
Volume I Water Heaters, August 1997. 
54. GAMA Letter from C. Reuben Autrcy (President) to R. Swit/cr (CPSC Project Manager, 
Fire/Gas Voluntary Standards) responding to request for information, August 1, 1994. 
55. GAMA Letter from C. Reuben Autrcy (President) to R. Mcdford (CPSC Acting Assistant 
Executive Director Hazard Identification and Reduction) regarding Water Heater Ignition of 
Flammable Vapors, July 1994. 
56. GAMA Letter from C Reuben Autrey (President) to Honorable Ann Brown (Chairman, 
CPSC) regarding Staff Option Package on Gas-Fired Water Heaters, June 1994. 
57. Minutes of Meeting Working Group Addressing Suggested Revisions to Reduce Possible 
Ignition of Flammable Vapors by Volume I Water Heaters, March 1992. 
58. Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters, Nov. 199U 
59. Presentation of E.F. Downing III of Gauthier & Murphy before ANSI Z21.10.1 
Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Fired Water Heaters, Nov. 1991. 
60. GAMA Memorandum from f. Stanonik (Associate Director of Technical Services) to Water 
Heater Division regarding GATC Draft Report on Garage Installation, May 7, 1991. 
61. Gas Appliance Technology Center, White Paper Installation Options for Water Heaters 
Installed in Garages for Gas Research Institute, G. Liljenberg, Aug. 1990, including An 
Evaluation Code Requirement for 18 Inch Clearance or Appliances Above a Hazardous Floor 
Environment prepared for ALAGASCO by M.J. Sasser, PE of Inspection Services Inc. 
62. GAMA Letter from F. Stanonik (Associate Director of Technical Services) to A. Callahan 
(AGA Laboratories) regarding Full Color Samples of Labels, Jan. 20, 1989. 
63. GAMA Committee Meeting Report, Technical Committee of the Water Heater Division, 
Dec. 5, 1988. Including Summary of Actions Taken at the Dec. 6-7, 1988 Meeting of the 
Z21 Subcommittee on Standards for Gas Water Heaters. 
64. Minutes Water Heater Division Gas Appliance Manufacturing Association Inc., April 16, 
1984. 
65. Minutes Water Heater Division Gas Appliance Manufacturing Association Inc., May 2, 
1983. 
66. GAMA Letter from J. P. Langmead (Director of Technical Services) to All US 
Manufacturers of Consumer Products and Components Thereof Regarding CPSC Safety 
Bulletin No. 31 Draft of Final Calspan Report, June 11, 1975. 
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67. Arthur D. Little, Inc. Final Report Flammable Vapor Test Methodology Development for 
Gas-Fired Water Heaters, April 1996. 
68. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study; Bowin Burner 
Testing with Bowin Burner Study Final Presentation to GAMA, March 1995. 
69. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study Task 2; Analytical 
Modeling and Experimental Testing, July 1993. 
70. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study Presentation to 
GAMA, April 1993. 
71. Arthur D. Little, Inc. GAMA Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition Study Agreement (Sept.). 
72. Arthur D. Little, Inc. Preliminary Review of Issues Related to Water Heater Safety, June 
1992. 
73. Flammable Vapor Test Results of a Snorkel Combustion Air Duct System for State 
Industries, Douglas W. DeWerth, Nov. 1994. 
74. White Paper Evaluation of a 14" Barrier Proposed as a Means to Prevent Accidental Ignition 
of Flammable Vapors by a Gas-Fired Water Heater, Douglas W. DeWerth, AGA 
Laboratories, R&D, July 11, 1994. 
75. Final Report of Work June 1992-October 1992 Research Prospectus Revision I, May 12, 
1992, Vincent Debo Project, Douglas W. DeWerth, Karl Weiser, AGA Laboratories, Nov. 
10,1992. 
76. Engineering Systems Inc. (Water Heater) Flammable Vapors Test Ledgers, Feb.-April, 1997. 
77. Flammable Vapors Ignition Testing of a Gas Fired Water Heater on an 18 inch Stand, Wayne 
McCain, P.E.Feb. 1998. 
78. UL Report on Water Heaters, File El 1867, Project 79NK50555, Rheem Manufacturing Co., 
1979. 
79. United States Patent, 3,659,560 Water Heater, Wilfred G. Carter, May 2, 1972. 
80. United States Patent, 5,085,205, Fuel-Fred Water Heater With Combination Drainage Pan 
and Combustion Air Flow Control Apparatus, Jacob H. Hall, Rheem Manufacturing Co., 
Feb. 4, 1992. 
81. NFPA Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code Handbook, Fourth Edition, Heating 
Equipment. 
82. NFPA National Fuel Gas Code Handbook, ed. Theodore C. Lemoff, 5.1.10 Installation in 
Residential Garages. 
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83. NFPA 54 National Fuel Gas Code Handbook, ANSIZ223.1.5.1.8 Flammable Vapors; 5.1.9 
Installation in Residential Garages, 1980. 
84. NFPA Special Report Residential Structure Fires Involving Flammable, Combustible 
Liquids, 1980-1984, Kenneth T. Taylor, prepared July 1987. 
85. Gas Appliance Technology Center, 1990 Program, White Paper Installation Options for 
Water Heaters Installed in Garages, for Gas Research Institute, Contract No. 5086-241-1220, 
AGA Laboratories, prepared by G. Liljenberg, Aug. 1990. 
86. US CPSC Letter from R. Medford to D. Hosier regarding the results of the ANSI Accredited 
Water Heater Subcommittee Flammable Vapor Working Group meeting held November 13-
14,1997. 
87. Report from working group addressing suggested revisions to reduce possible ignition of 
flammable vapors by Volume I water heaters, August 1997. 
88. US CPSC Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D. 
Switzer, October 1996. 
89. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Medford to The Commission regarding Status Report on 
Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, April 1996. 
90. US CPSC Status Report on Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D. 
Switzer, July 1995. 
91. Statement of Vice Chairman Mary Sheila Gall on Gas-Fired Water Heaters and Flammable 
Vapors, Dec. 15, 1994. 
92. US CPSC Briefing Package for Gas-Fired Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D. 
Switzer, November 1994. 
93. US CPSC 16 CFR Part 1212 Gas Water Heaters Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
regarding unreasonable risks of injury and death may be associated with gas water heaters, 
Nov. 14, 1994. 
94. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Franklin (Economist) to D. Switzer (Project Manager for 
Fire and Gas Voluntary Standards) regarding Some Economic Issues Related to Residential 
Gas Water Heaters an the Ignition of Flammable Vapors, Nov. 8, 1994. 
95. U.S. CPSC Memorandum from T. Johnson (ESEE) to D. Switzer (ESEE) regarding Analysis 
of Data Contained in Tables 8-10 of the AD Little Task 2 Flammable Vapor Hazards Ignition 
Study, September 22, 1994. 
96. US CPSC Memorandum from William Rowe (Statistician) to D. Switzer (Manager Fire/Gas 
Codes Standards Project) regarding Review of the Scenarios from A.D. Little Flammable 
Vapor Hazards Ignition Study, Task I Report, Sept. 16, 1994. 
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97. US CPSC Memorandum from J. L. Mulligan (ESEL) to J. Fandey (ESEE) regarding 
Comments on the AD Little Study of Gasoline Vapor Ignition, March 10, 1994. 
98. US CPSC Letter from D. Switzer (Project Manager for Fire and Gas Voluntary Standards) to 
F. Stanonik (Associate Director of Technical Services, Gas Appliance Manufacturing 
Association) regarding Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, August 17, 1994. 
99. US CPSC Meeting Log Directorate for Engineering Sciences, Industry Activities to Address 
Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, D. Switzer, Aug. 30, 1994. 
100. CPSC Working Group on Gas Voluntary Standards, Position Paper on a Standard for Gas 
Water Heaters to Prevent Ignition of Flammable Vapors, February 1992. 
101. US CPSC Memorandum from Moira McNamara, Fire and Thermal Burn Hazards to The 
Commission regarding the hazards associated with gas-fired heating equipment, 1992. 
102. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Medford to The Commission regarding Options Paper; 
Hazards Associated with Gas-Fired Water Heaters Igniting Flammable Vapors. 
103. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Franklin (Economist) to J. Fandey (Project Manager for 
Fire and Gas Voluntary Standards) regarding Updated Estimates of the Societal Costs of 
Fires Associated with Gas Water Heaters and Flammable Vapors, April 1994. 
104. US CPSC letter from R. Medford (Acting Assistant Executive Director for Hazard 
Identification and Reduction) to C. Reuben Autrey (President, Gas Appliance Manufacturing 
Association) regarding Water Heater Ignition of Flammable Vapors, July 1994. 
105. US CPSC Memorandum from D. Switzer (Project Manager for Fire and Gas Voluntary 
Standards) to R. Medford (Assistant Executive Director for Hazard Identification and 
Reduction) regarding Comments on Letter from C. Reuben Autrey, President Bas Appliance 
Manufacturers Association, Nov. 1994. 
106. US CPSC Memorandum from W. Rowe (Statistician) to D. Switzer (Chemical Engineer) 
regarding Fires, Injuries, Deaths and Property Loss Associated with Gas Water Heaters and 
Flammable Liquids. 
107. US CPSC Letter from J. Fandey (Project Manager, Gas Voluntary Standards) to A. 
Callahan (Manager, Standards Dept., American Gas Association Laboratories) regarding 
CPSC Position Paper Water Heater Subcommittees Working Group on Flammable Vapor 
Ignition, March 1992. 
108. CPSC Working Group on Gas Voluntary Standards Position Paper on a Standard for Gas 
Water Heaters to Prevent Ignition of Flammable Vapors, Feb. 1992. 
109. US CPSC Memorandum from E. Leland (ECPA) to J. Fandey (Manager, Gas Voluntary 
Standards) regarding Benefits of Preventing Accidents Associated with Flammable Vapor 
Ignition by Gas-Fired Water Heaters, Jan 1992. 
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110. US CPSC Memorandum from W. Rowe (EPHA) to Fandey ( Manager, Gas Voluntary 
Standards) regarding Fires for Gasoline Ignited by Gas Water Heaters, Dec. 1991. 
111. US CPSC Memorandum from G. Sweet (EPHF) to J. Fandey (Manager, ESEE) regarding 
Gas Water Heaters, Nov. 1991. 
112. US CPSC Memorandum from R. Medford (Project Manager, Household Structural 
Products Program) to The Commission regarding Status Report-Gas Heating Systems 
Project, 1983. 
113. US CPSC Engineering Analysis of Gas-Fired Water Heater In Depth Investigations, D. 
Switzer, Dec. 1983. 
114. US CPSC Human Factors Analysis of Fires Associated with Gas Water Heater 
Combination Control Valves, W. Mathers (Human Factors, Directorate for Epidemiology) 
October 1983. 
115. US CPSC Fire Hazards Associated with Gas Water Heaters, B. Harwood (CPSC 
Directorate for Epidemiology, Hazard Analysis Division), November 1982. 
116. US CPSC Investigation Guideline Gas Hot Water Heaters, Sept. 1982. 
117. Chart captioned: "Figure 1: Top Twenty Appliances Igniting Gasoline Vapors in 
Swellings, 1991"; Sources: U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission and the U.S. Fire 
Administration. 
118. Williams v. Southcorp. Mor-Flo 2nd Amended Answers to Interrogatories with attached 
citations, petitions and complaints. 
119. Arbitration award in Franklin v. Doxol Gas Company, including opinion filed May 15, 
1990. 
120. Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code Handbook. 
121. Testing and analysis done by Safety Engineering Labs in evaluating the effectiveness of 
elevation and other means of reducing the Potential for ignition of flammable vapors by gas 
fired water heaters: 
1. Scott v. Rheem 
2. Nawn v. Bay State Gas, et al. 
3. Nina James v. Sears, et al. 
4. Stretch v.-Rheem 
122. United States Patent No. 5,797,355 dated August 25, 1998 by SRP 687 Pty Ltd. 
Australia, Ignition Inhibiting Gas Water Heater. 
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123. American Water Heater press release kit regarding The Flame Guard Safety System 
including the CPSC News Release (Release No. 99-157) announcing CPSC Chairman 
Awards Safety Commendation to The American Water Heater Company (Aug. 12, 1999). 
124. Media Release dated 13 August 1999 titled Southcorp's Ingenious Technology will Help 
Produce a Safer Gas Fired Water Heater says US Consumer products Safety Commission 
Chairman. 
125. Flammable Vapor Project Presentation by SRP-687 Pty. Ltd., Oct. 21, 1998. 
126. AGAR Research Report and data regarding the Flammable Vapors Tests Conducted on 
April 14,1998 with Direct Vent Water Heater Provided by American Water heater 
Company. 
127. Flame Arrester Literature. 
DATED: FEBRUARY 28,2001 GIRARDI AND KEESE 
By/jg^ff 
JAMES G. O'CALLAHAN 
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab 35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
civ ^ i J i ^ jwj fcwbjjsr -
pU'mKfft I'KOPOSMI) .11IKV INSTRUCTION ^•^JLI^S^T' 
W H E N 1 ^ IDENTIFIED 
[STR ] 
If the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of the 
facts necessary to prove: 
1. thai (\iili (»l iln |IMMIIH is ilcsigiicd liy the defendants were 
defective in design, and 
2. that one of the defendant's products was a cause of plaintiffs 
•' • injury, and 
3. that the Iiiji ii ) ' w as si ich that it ::: ::>i lid :> 
the defendant's products, and 
A
 that ii oiii the circumstances of the accident the plaintiff 
ejitiiiiHl iiiMisiiiiJiliill' n'Ml iliii1 Ii villi mi Ii mi lei tMiciaril sproducl was a 
cause of the injury, 
then you will find that each defendant is liable for plaintiffs injury. 
H < i ' W ( .ii nihlci sin Ii I in imislinuvs, ;i defendant is not liable if it 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all ol I he imls mvessarv MI pinyr 
that its product was .not a cause of plaintiff s I njury. 
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PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 
WHEN PRECISE CAUSE CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED 
[NEGLIGENCE] 
If the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of the 
facts necessary to prove: 
1. that each of the defendants was negligent, and 
2. that the negligent act of one of the defendants was a cause of 
plaintiff s injury, and 
3. that the injury was such that it could only result from the 
negligent act of one of the defendants, and 
4. that from the circumstances of the accident the plaintiff 
cannot reasonably establish which defendant's negligence 
was a cause of the injury, 
then you will find that each defendant is Uable for plaintiffs injury. 
However, under such circumstances, a defendant is not liable if it 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to prove 
that its negligence was not a cause of plaintiffs injury. 
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WHEN PRECISE CAUSE CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED 
If the plaintiff establish.-' r~, «-.-. preponderance of the evidence all 
of the facts necessary to prove \l) that eacr cr the defendants was 
negligent, and (2) that the negligent act: of one of the defendants was a 
cause of plaintiff's injury, and (3) that tre injury was such that it 
could only result from the negligent act of one of the defendants, and 
(4) that from the circumstances of the accident the plaintiff cannot 
reasonably establish which defendant's negligence was a cause of the 
injury, then you w:I ] 1 f:i nd that each defendant :s 1: ole for plaintiff's 
injury. 
However, under such circumstances, a defenaani _• ,^ liable i I 
the] [she] establishes by a preponderance of the evidence all of th» 
facts necessary to prove that [h i s] [h~- ' ne."-iI igenc* *M *iot a caus^ of 
plaintiff"s injury. 
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BAJI J.OU 
WHEN PRECISE CAUSE CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED 
USE NOTE 
This instruction should be used only in cases where 
the defendants' acts were separate but concurrent, and 
under circumstances where the negligence of only one 
defendant might have caused the injury. Summers v. Tice 
(1948) 33 Cal.2d 80, 84, 199 P.2d 1, 2, 5 A.L.R.2d 91. 
This instruction, depending on the facts, may or may 
not be appropriate in a multi-party traffic accident 
case. Thornton v. Luce (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 542, 554, 
26 Cal.Rptr. 3 93, 4 00 held, in appropriate. Vahey v. 
Sacia (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 171, 178 Cal.Rptr. 559, 563 
held, appropriate. 
COMMENT 
See, generally, 6 Witkin, Summary of Calif.Law (9th 
ed.), Torts, § 971. Prosser on Torts (4th ed.), p. 243. 
"In negligence and product liability cases, the 
doctrine has evolved that the burden of proof on the 
issue of causation may be shifted to the defendant when 
demanded by public policy considerations... The essential 
principle underlying this narrow exception...is that the 
burden of proving an element of a case is more 
appropriately borne by the party with greater access to 
the information". Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 
1709, 1717, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 265, 269. This opinion cites 
a number of cases for this proposition and sets forth the 
circumstances which ordinarily would justify shifting the 
burden of proof on causation. 
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1126 Wilshire Boulevard 
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213-977-0211 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ANNA MARIE ALARID 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA MARIE ALARID 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN APPLIANCE 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants American Appliance Manufacturing and American Water 
Heater Company claim that plaintiff has not put forward any evidence that would 
link either water heater to the subject fire. Defendants claim that because 
plaintiffs expert did not opine as to which water heater was absolutely the initial 
cause of the fire, plaintiff can not meet its burden of causation. Defendants 
neglect to point out the extensive lay witness testimony that has been introduced 
thus far concerning the origin of the fire. The jurors must be given the opportunity 
to weigh all the evidence, judge the credibility of all the witnesses and render a 
decision based on all the evidenced introduced at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Anna Marie Alarid testified at trial that she saw flames initiate under the 
left (east) door of the utility room. 
2. Rudolph Gomez, Sr. is expected to testify consistent with his deposition 
that he first saw flames coming under the left (east) door at the utility room. 
(Deposition, p.l03:22-25 and p.l04:l-7) 
3. Salt Lake City Fire Department Investigator Jeff Long testified that the 
water heater on the right (west) had the most damage. 
4. Jeff Long also testified that when he investigates fires to determine the 
origin, he goes from the area of least damage to the are of most damage. 
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Iknii Nelson Irslilliinl ml dull (li ill In; Insi SAW III inn . nuiir ninlci llir iidit 
(west) door if the utility room. 
Anna Marie Aland testified at trial that nobody was home in the west 
apartment at the top of the landing at SMII S I  mcoln. -
apartment at the top of 'the landing at 940 S. Lincoln were home 
The Henry 263 adhesive "~3N applied in the same manner on the landing of 
c:>"36 S Lincoln \\ ithoi it t. .: - : • 
Plaintiff's expert John Hoffman testified that the water heaters in the utility 
room were defect! wU designed and unreasonably dangerous to th* 
ordinary consumer ; toucan Dasc Lr> n ar -.>h> >n me lot. 
pi lull li) 'hi .1111 •< • * * . . ' ' : Hoffman testified 
that the pilot lights diew heavier than air flammable1 vapors to the flame of 
the pilot light. Dr. Hoffman further testified that the water heater industry 
ground was "the cause of an average of more than 'three hundred injuries per 
year. 
D r H n l l i l t i t l i d l s u U ' t l l l l n l l l h I ti t ' i iMil ' i t i l l 1 ('ill Ull in I Hi i l l I 111™ l i l t ' >Sii'< u i l r i l l 
the t w o water heaters located in the utility room. Dr. Hoffman testified that 
he wa% able n> rule out ihe otfvs potential sources of ignition including the 
light fixture,. iii, - ..rnaces. cigarette smoking and the light switches nil 11 it" 
a* Koffman " v 'as not able to opine • \ \ hi :::! i of the water heaters \y\vt\. 
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the fire. Dr. Hoffman did testify that the water heaters were of identical 
design and materials and were made by subsidiaries of the same parent 
company, although manufactured some three years apart. 
The material that Dr. Hoffman reviewed included testimony from plaintiff 
Anna Marie Alarid and from Rudy Gomez, who testified that they saw 
flames emerging from the left (east) door to the utility room. Wayne Kent 
Nelson testified that he saw flames coming from the right (west) door of the 
utility room. Dr. Hoffman was not aware of the identity or the photographs 
or the testimony of Salt Lake City Fire Department Investigator Jeff Long 
who testified at trial that the water heater on the right (west) had the most 
damage. 
The jury has received more evidence as to the fire during trial than what 
was available for Dr. Hoffman in forming his opinions. The jury has also 
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses testifying, as well as their 
demeanor and the nature and quality of the testimony given by the 
percipient witnesses. This was not available to Dr. Hoffman, who only had 
the conflicting testimony of Nelson, Alarid and Gomez, via their 
depositions. As such, he was not in a position to judge their credibility and 
their capacity for recollection. 
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According to the Utah Supreme Court, when reviewing .any challenge to a 
trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, the Court will review "Ilie -. 
iiiiniiT and iill leasoiiablc liikinia • llial iii*i\ I unit be uliauii llii/idtum in the 
light most favorable to the party nun ni aj? aiiisl aiitil n ill •usijin the denial if 
reasonable minds t onk! d; i \ -e with around asserted for directing a verdict." 
Mahmood v. Ru.v \2d 933 s i uu-. x * tah Supreme Court's standard 
i»l irvirw ml 'i < * t 
Gravstone Pines, 652 P.2d at 898. 
Under Utah law7, a party who moves for a directed verdict has the very • 
material fact \ 1.1 a Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Sei v 930 P.2d 280, 
284 (Utah, Ct.App. 1996) If there is any evidence raising a question of material 
liii I, judgment a -: L.M .. .. . improper / . court is not tree lo weigh 
the evidence aiiu Ui- - " ' " a h : 
ji idgethefaci- Grays- * 6vl P,2d at 897. 
Specific to the issue of causation, courts should refuse to grant a directed 
reasonable jury to find a causal connection between a breach and a subsequent 
. H-< Swift Stop, Inc. v.Wight 845 P.2d 250. ?^7 fTTtah Ct.App. 1902) 
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questions of fact are to be decided by the jury. Harline v. Barker ,912 P.2d 433, 
439 (Utah 1996) 
DEFENDANTS INAPPROPRIATELY RELY ON DISTINGUISHABLE 
CASELAW 
Defendants' reliance on Clark v. Farmers Insurance Exch., 893 P.2d 598 
(Utah App. 1995), 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, is misplaced. The Plaintiff in Clark 
had no recollection of how he was injured, and there was no evidence as to the 
mechanism that caused plaintiffs injuries. See id. at 28. More notable is the fact 
that the plaintiff never raised the propriety of shifting the burden of proof to 
defendants by a Summers v. Tice instruction. In the Alarid case, plaintiff has put 
forth credible evidence that the water heaters were responsible for the ignition of 
the flammable vapors. 
Interestingly, the court specifically noted this failure in footnote 6, and 
therefore declined to apply it. Id. at 29. This indicates that there are 
circumstances under which the court envisions the application of Summers v. Tice 
in Utah. Here, plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid has raised the alternative liability 
theory under Summers v. Tice and requested its application based on the evidence 
before the court. 
Defendant also mistakenly relies on Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 
1360 (Ut. 1986). In Weber, a young child was injured when he strayed from an 
apartment complex and was injured after falling into a stream. The plaintiffs 
could not establish where (over whose property) or how the young child managed 
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t o f ind t h e sli can i In I.n I IIIN |il.iiiilill,1i ilnl IM I "»ur po t rn l i a l de fendan t s \\W . 
, in /iiied properly abutting the stream and therefore could have been likely 
tortfeasors in the case. Accordingly, the court chose not to apply Summers v. , 
:.. ,\ ?npra.bec<m<iK ,ic;ci.dan Is potentially responsible were 
-'• 
, **AJL*d Marie Alarid does not have the same problem. Plaintiff knows .tnJ 
has offered credible testimony that one of the two water heaters at >4o s. Lincoln 
w as responsible ioi ijjiiitiii}1 liir llatnni.ibli i.ii mr in Il i aiisuii1 Ihr lime thai 
s e v e r e ly burned Anna Marie Alarid. Plaintiff avoids the potential inequity found 
in the Weber case because the only two potentially responsible water heater 
companies are cum .*: 
PLAINTIFF HAS PUT FORTH SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
The plaintiff must introduce evidence which ai lords a reasonable basis for 
the a MOII thai 
a cause in fact of the result, Prosser and Keeton on 2 arts §41. However, 'the 
evidence need not show that the defectiveness of the product was the sole cause of 
injury or damage, nor ftiwll il v,onelnsnvl) eliminate -ill wlhei possible c.iuses. • • 
Bartlev v. Euclid, Inc. 158 F.3d 261, 272 (5th Or. 1998) 
Prool ol eausation uut\ he made h\ eiicumstaiuial evidence, since more 
j :
~xt evidence may of ice *u UKKHIL Watson v. C.k Hard, inc., .VW So.id , J>{) 
i 
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(La.Ct.App.2d Cir 1990) In Sumison v. Streator-Smith (1943) 132 P.2d 680, the 
court discusses what evidence is needed to show causation. The court stated that, 
"The plaintiff must supply links in the chain of proximate cause . . . Some or all of 
the links may depend upon inferences." Id. at 682. 
Proof that illness or injury followed soon after the use of a product or that 
the product alleged to be defective was found following the accident in a broken 
condition have been held sufficient evidence that the injury was caused by a defect 
in the product. Johnson v. Michelin Tire Corp., 812 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1987) See 
also Hooper v. General Motors Corp., (1953) 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549. 
Proof of causation is often accomplished by the use of expert testimony, but 
is not necessarily required to prove causation. The plaintiff may prove the causal 
nexus between the event sued upon and the injuries suffered by lay testimony 
alone in those cases in which general experience and common sense will enable a 
layman to determine, with reasonable probability, the causal relationship between 
the event and the condition. Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 
733 (Tex. 1984) (stating "Generally lay testimony establishing a sequence of 
events which provides a strong, logically traceable connection between the event 
and the condition is sufficient proof of causation.") 
Model Utah Jury Instruction 2.14, Expert Witness, states in pertinent part 
"You should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, given for it. 
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V in ctirt not hound hv rurh nil npinnin rior HI 11 it* \HMJ'III V<HI liunk il dcscnes III 
you should deciu. uxut div, opinions of an expert witness are not based upon 
si ifficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons 
gi en in support: ol the opinions ait: uoi viniiull HI (kill sin. In opuuoih an 
outwoiphrd mi i niiiilin n idnier you turn disregard the opinion entirely." 
DEFENDANTS CAN NO 'REJUDKJfc ABOUi ti. * 3 
i i i i i m m m mIKY HI • • -• T T V F I IARTT TTY 
Defendants can not claim that plaintiff's proposed instruction is unfair 01 
unwarranted Defendants have -long known that plaintiff has not speciU, > 
Counsel took the deposition of John Hoffman, plaintiffs fire cause and on^m 
sxpert, in May of 2000 Dr. Hoffman did not conclusively identify which of the 
two water heaters w as the cause of the fire. 
Defendants coi ild als> :: have easily interviewed Salt Lake City Fire 
Department Investigator, Jeff Long, In fact, after defendants' motion in limine 
regarding th, i • an master waster heater was denied, defendants were again on 
notice that both IA< ater heaters w 01 lldbe the si lbject of causation testimony. Ilie 
evidence has unfolded accordingly. Investigator Long testified that the water 
heater on the right was the most damaged. A iury could reasonably infer that the 
fire originated I in; uin llin * ; i 
9 
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also chose to believe the testimony of Anna Marie Alarid who testified that she 
saw the fire develop under the left door of the utility room. 
How can the defendants claim prejudice regarding alternative causation 
theories when the defendants split into separate forms on the eve of trial. 
Defendants have participated in the case jointly for several years, preparing a joint 
defense. Mr. Sutton has taken depositions of plaintiffs experts as a representative 
of both American Appliance and American Water Heater. On the day before trial, 
counsel for the defendants informed the Court and plaintiff for the first time that 
each company would now maintain separate counsel and defend their respective 
cases separately. If anyone has been subjected to unfair surprise, it is certainly the 
plaintiff. 
Parties are entitled to have their theories of the case presented to the jury in 
the form of instructions only if they are supported by the evidence. Powers v. 
Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). Consequently, plaintiffs 
proposed alternative liability instruction only becomes appropriate once the 
evidence demonstrates a conflict as to causation. A Summers v. Tice instruction 
does not even become ripe until the evidence has been introduced. If conflicting 
testimony regarding causation has been introduced, the alternative liability 
instruction becomes appropriate. In other words, plaintiff could not have proposed 
this instruction until the close of evidence after multiple witnesses had offered 
their perspective on where the fire originated. 
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Ill III 111 H H I ! i 1' till I U R N A T I M I J All II 11 i- ,li I ^ ARTIO *IN 
SUMMERS \ VI'K'li HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN UTAH AND 
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY 
The landmark case of Summers v. 1 ke, supra, was followed by the court in 
Hood v. Mosul, <»(»h I" J'nl V1H (< HI ....... 
iw i^itify which one of two attacking dogs bit her. Id. at 44. The two dogs were 
ow ned by separate defendants h / Ilie Hood court stated: 
f * Illln'i! we tiiiisitki illIL" .* positioi t 
would flow if plaintiff was required to pm tin -sin \ on one of the 
defendants only, a requirement that ihr bmdri •« oi,,u| -..n that subiec. be 
shifted to defendants be< * • • " .* ' 
action m here the negligence ot •-ne wi th; defendants injured the •>* •» »»\ 
hence it should rest with them i aeh in absolve himself if he -.an !':* 
injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfau p» •• - i- •• 
pointing - = '. * . ••. v* • -r- • heir 
may also and plaintiff is remediless. . ai * . iting footnote -4 
"As in the Summers case, we do not believe that the plaintiff should, under 
line ejieuiiisliiiites, he pku etl in llie position oil li.iviuj1 lo pninl In \ Inch nil III I\ 
dogs actually bit her." Id. at 46. 
The equitable conclusion reached, in Hood and Summers would be no 
different if there had been a thi i d defendant, w ho sellled mil ol the suit < m ,i 
premises liahilirv union III 'poi helically liml there been a premises claim against 
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a landowner in Summers who let the hunters on his property to hunt in violation of 
a statute, the applicability of Summers would be no different. 
In the present case, the overwhelming and arguably the only credible 
evidence before the court supports the theory that one of the two water heaters 
caused the ignition which resulted in plaintiffs injuries. The jury has been 
informed of settlements with other parties and will be charged with the obligation 
to apportion damages amongst the settling parties. The application of Summers v. 
Tice would not interfere with the jury's discharge of its duties. 
The reasoning behind the holding in Summers v. Tice is embodied in the 
Restatement Second, Torts § 433B(3). "Where the conduct of two or more actors 
is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to plaintiff by only one of 
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon 
each actor to prove that he has not caused the harm." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the application of Summers v. Tice in 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 832 P.2d 858, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (UT, 1992). 
In King, a woman became pregnant despite the implantation of a contraceptive 
device. She sued two defendants, a doctor and a medical device manufacturer. 
The liability of each, if any, was separate and independent from the other. Id. at 
58. 
The Court recognized the rule imposing liability on two or more defendants 
who are concurrently negligent but only one of whom could have actually caused 
the injury was applied in Summers v. Tice, supra. The Court found that the 
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Summers rule was not appropriate given the facts because only one of the 
defendants could have been negligent. In Summers, it was clear that both 
defendants acted negligently in precisely the same manner and that one of the two 
defendants had to have been responsible for plaintiff s injury. 
In the instant case, plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid argues that both defendants 
were negligent and/or strictly liable for the defective design of the water heaters 
present at 940 Lincoln Street in July of 1996; however, it is likely that only one of 
the two water heaters was the cause of the fire. Accordingly, the Summers rule, as 
discussed in King, would apply. 
The alternative liability principle of Summers was implicitly adopted in 
Tingev v. Christiansen, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999), 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (1999). 
In Tingey, the plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries following a car accident. 
However, evidence had been introduced at trial that pointed to other pre-accident 
sources of her injuries. On appeal, Tingey argued that the trial court failed to give 
a jury instruction that stated, in effect, if the jury could not apportion pre-existing 
v. post-accident injury, then all damages must be apportioned to the tortfeasor on 
trial. Id. at 11. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. In summary, "a defendant 
should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with 
precision." Id. The court found this rule of law to be correct and adopted it. Id. 
"[I]f the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that the 
tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages." Id 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Tingey, the Utah Supreme Court not only adopted the Summers v. Tice 
alternative liability theory, but also expanded its scope to accommodate 
conflicting damage testimony. This demonstrates a very liberal application of 
alternative liability by the highest court in Utah. 
Five months later, the Utah Supreme Court again confirmed the alternative 
liability theory adopted in Tingev. See Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc. 992 
P.2d at 969 (1999), 385 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1999). In Robinson, the plaintiff 
sought review of the trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction that stated if you 
can not apportion damage between pre-accident and post-accident, then you must 
determine that all injuries are attributable to the car accident before the court. See 
Id. The court ruled that the trial court should have instructed the jury on 
alternative liability. 
The court also added that the facts of the case must merit the proposed 
instruction. Id. Consequently, an instruction may not become ripe until the 
evidence has been introduced at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Anna Marie Alarid respectfully requests 
this Court deny Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. 
DATED: November 5, 2001 GIRARDI & KEESE 
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff 
\A 
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